In the news
On 18 March, Democratic Republic of Congo's President Félix Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame held direct talks in Doha, Qatar. A joint statement following the talks implied commitment to an “immediate and conditional” ceasefire in eastern DRC. Later, the Rwandan presidency separately stated that direct talks between DR Congo and M23 are "key to addressing the root causes of the conflict.”

On 17 March, M23 rebels in eastern DRC withdrew from the peace talks in Luanda, Angola; the first to directly involve the rebels. The rebel alliance implied the EU sanctions of obstructing the peace talks. The group stated: "Successive sanctions imposed on our members, including those enacted on the eve of the Luanda discussions, severely undermine direct dialogue and make any progress impossible."

On 17 March, the EU imposed sanctions against nine individuals of the M23 rebel group and senior officials of Rwanda's military. The measures included asset freezes and travel bans. 

Issues at large
First, a brief background to the conflict. DR Congo’s M23 rebel problem was an outcome of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the two Congo wars that followed. M23, a group by the Congolese Tutsi minority, was formed to fight the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The latter was a militant group of ethnic Hutus who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC after carrying out the genocide. Congo-backed FDLR has been fighting the Rwanda-backed M23 group for years. 

Second, M23 in control of Goma and Bukavu. In 2012, M23 was contained by the UN and Congolese forces, but it reemerged in 2021. In January, the violence escalated and M23 captured Goma and Bukavu, the capital cities of North and South Kivu provinces. The group is in absolute control of two cities and neighbouring mining towns. Congolese defences failed and have withdrawn from the region. SADC regional troops have withdrawn after its losses. Congolese allied militia, Kabido, defected to M23. The group seems to have come closer to achieving its objectives of territorial control, access to minerals, regional and political influence, and protection of Tutsi minorities.

Third, Rwanda’s objectives in Congo. The link between M23 rebels and Rwanda is the Tutsi kinship. The minority Tutsi community in eastern DRC, who migrated from Rwanda to the region over centuries, has always been considered "foreigners" by other communities. However, the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, formed after the genocide in 1994, has been supporting its DRC kin ever since, for two reasons: To use the group to fight and stop the FDLR from expanding and returning and accessing the mineral deposits in eastern DRC. 

Fourth, the EU’s role and concerns. For the EU, DRC is an important partner in its objective to diversify its critical mineral supply. DRC is the world's leading producer of cobalt, accounting for 70 per cent and the second largest producer of copper. It is also a leading producer of coltan, lithium, nickel and rear earth. The majority of the mineral reserves are concentrated in the conflict-hit eastern DRC. The instability in eastern DRC has directly posed security concerns to European mineral investments. The EU signed another deal with Rwanda in February 2024, accessing its supply of critical minerals. However, Rwanda is currently being accused by the UN of using M23 rebels to seize mining towns in eastern DRC and smuggle minerals into Rwanda's supply chain. This created a narrative that the EU-Rwanda agreement enables illicit mineral trade in the international market. Thereby financing the rebels and exacerbating the conflict. 
 
In perspective
First, weak state, and the complex DRC problems. There are numerous actors and issues are multifold but inclusive efforts have been minimal. M23 being one problem of this crisis, an end to the conflict is nearly impossible. The latest wave of violence is an example of how in the absence of functioning state institutions and military, external actors take advantage of instability for their interests. 

Second, the M23 problem and redundant ceasefire calls in Doha. Congolese forces’ failure in Goma and Bukavu and failed regional mediations enabled M23 to carry out its lightning advances, bringing the region under its absolute control. Likely, M23’s withdrawal from Angola-led peace talks, pointing at the EU sanctions, was intentional to stay in control of the region. With M23 achieving its objectives and no fighting with Congolese forces, the Doha ceasefire is redundant. Besides, the ceasefire talks did not include M23, the major party to the conflict. However, the violence is likely to recur as leaving the region under M23’s control is unlikely to be a choice of DR Congo. And, it is unpredictable whether the group plans to advance further. Previously, it had made comments on advancing towards the capital Kinshasa. 

Third, the EU’s role. Although stability in the region is important for the EU, the sanctions were likely a move to imply its non-supportive stance against M23, defend the allegations of involvement in illicit trade with Rwanda and thereby protect its investments in the region.