Trump-Xi Meeting I China Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War I China-Vietnam 3+3 Strategic Dialogue I US Annual Threat Assessment 2026 Takeaways

CWA # 2032

The World This Week

Trump-Xi Meeting I China Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War I China-Vietnam 3+3 Strategic Dialogue I US Annual Threat Assessment 2026 Takeaways

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas

The World This Week #349, Vol 8, No 11, 22 March 2026

Global Politics Team
22 March 2026

Photo Source: Brookings Instituition, China Daily, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Depositphotos

TWTW Focus Note
Trump-Xi Meeting:
Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?

Femy Francis

What happened?

On 18 March, US President Donald Trump announced that he would postpone his plans to visit Beijing and meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump was scheduled to visit China from 31 March to 02 April 2026, which has now been tentatively shifted to the end of April.

Trump noted that he is rescheduling the meeting amid the ongoing war with Iran, requiring him to stay back in Washington. He said: “Because of the war, I want to be here. I have to be here,” and noted that “We’re working with China. They were fine with it.”

What is the background?

1. The road to the Xi-Trump meeting
Trump’s last visit to China was during his first term in 2017. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed that they “remain in communication” about Trump’s plans to visit. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt informed: “They understand the president’s rationale for doing.” The meeting was aimed at addressing a range of topics, from trade tensions, export control of rare earths, and the sale of fentanyl. Before the postponement, Trump also sought China’s support to help reopen the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz.

After Trump imposed reciprocal tariffs and a series of retaliations by China. Steps were taken to stabilise tensions. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng met to discuss a possible tariff truce. By mid 2025, representatives of two countries met on the sidelines of the G20 meeting to discuss a tariff freeze. Eventually tariff halt was agreed on, and this pause was extended to 2026. More recently US and Chinese delegation met in Paris to discuss economic cooperation. Aimed to set the stage for the scheduled and later postponed Trump-Xi meeting. This was led by Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent; the meeting saw no conclusive resolution.

2. Trade tensions between the US and China
The US and China engaged in a tariff war in 2025, with a series of escalations. At the height of tariff tensions, the US imposed a 155 per cent tariff on Chinese goods, and China retaliated with a 125 per cent tariff. This tariff crossfire is officially on pause as of now after the high-level meeting between China’s President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump in October of 2025. After which, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that both Beijing and Washington reached a consensus on tariffs, export controls, and port fees, agreeing to a tariff pause until 2026. This tariff truce followed China's imposition of export controls on rare-earth materials. China's monopoly over the supply chain for rare earths sent shockwaves across the globe, serving as a catalyst for the trade truce between the US and China.

3. China’s interest in Iran
This has been driven by economic opportunity, geopolitical interest, and energy needs. China has been the largest buyer of Iranian crude oil, importing 90 per cent of it. Iran sells this oil to China at a discounted price, in return for the military and technology support Beijing provides. Amid unilateral American sanctions, China has been the economy backing Iran. Additionally, Iran is part of China’s BRI and serves as the strategic link connecting Central Asia, West Asia, and Europe. It signed a long-term agreement in 2021 for USD 400 million investments over 25 years.

What does it mean?

First, US wartime priorities. The Trump-Xi scheduled meeting was a high-profile engagement aimed to reach some conclusion on their economic relations and curbing trade tensions. This was before the US strike on Iran and its retaliation. War-time priorities call for Trump and the US administration to currently focus on war, with the growing dissent on the Trump administration’s decision to go to war. The war cabinet will sideline other engagements as it tries to manoeuvre through. Additionally, China has condemned the US and Israel’s war efforts publicly while calling for mediation, noting that this attack violates the national sovereignty of Iran.

Second, an extended tariff pause. The decision on tariffs is on pause and will remain so at least until the dust of war settles. The US court ruled that Trump’s tariffs were illegal and therefore invalid. This has been taken up by China, which is calling for the complete retraction of unilateral tariffs. The future of tariffs remains inclusive.

Third, China’s priorities. China does not feel particularly jilted, has been leading its own peace wagon with other leaders, and sees this as an opportunity to rebuild relations with European countries and the United Kingdom. China has also been actively engaging with Gulf Cooperation Council countries to reach a peace agreement and urges all actors to engage in dialogue. Though its overall support for Iran is muted, it is limited to mere rhetoric and not actionable.

Global Politics Explainer
China's Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War:
Why Beijing’s support for Iran is rhetoric and muted

Femy Francis

On 28 February, the US, along with Israel, launched a large-scale offensive, “Operation Epic Fury,” against Iran, to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. China has expressed concerns as it calls for an immediate ceasefire of the war. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: that the war on Iran “should not have happened…These actions have violated international law and basic norms of international relations.”

China also abstained from voting UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2817, condemning Iran's retaliatory strikes against Gulf states as a breach of international law. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, said: “The spillover of escalating tensions in the Middle East serves no one's interest. Resolving differences through dialogue and negotiations is the only viable way forward.”

What are China’s interests in Iran?

First, Iran is an important partner; so are other countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia supplies more oil to China than Iran; Beijing also has a USD 50 billion agreement as part of Riyadh’s Vision 2030. Trade turnover with the UAE is significantly higher than with Iran. If China openly and aggressively support the Iranian cause, it would undermine its relations with the other countries in the region.

Second, Iran and China’s oil supply. Iran has been one of China’s major oil suppliers for over a decade, at a discounted rate. The Foundation for Defence of Democracies found that China buys roughly 90 per cent of Iran’s oil export. China sees the immediate shortfall of 1.4 million barrels per day in oil imports from Iran.

Third, strategic partnerships with Iran. In the past five years, Tehran and Beijing have deepened their economic partnership. In 2021, China’s Foreign Minister signed a “25-year cooperation agreement.” The deal pledged to invest USD 400 billion in Iran for over 25 years. The deal was seen to keep Iran’s economy afloat amid American sanctions. They also signed a security partnership to counter terrorism, illegal immigration and transnational crime. The war threatens the investments made by China in Tehran, and their strategic partnership comes under scrutiny.

China also has military and technological ties with Iran. China has been the supplier of air defence systems, ballistic missile components, dual-use material and technical training for Iran.

What to expect from China?

China’s response has been mixed, shaped by its own strategic interests and calculations. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack. China’s Foreign Minister noted that “Might does not make right,” and that “the world has regressed to the law of the jungle.” China also contacted several West Asian countries and sent a special envoy for a diplomatic tour of the region, urging them to mediate peace. While calling for a joint/global effort, Beijing has not initiated any specific efforts to address the crisis. China’s response to the war remains stale.

So, what can be expected from China? First, rhetorical support to Iran. It is expected to remain muted with moral support. It will continue to portray itself as a neutral mediator, providing moral backing to Iran, but will stop short of any military or security commitments.

Second, relying on alternative energy sources. China can be seen relying on other oil sources, though this has been a major setback. For Iran, oil exports to China remain the largest; however, for China, Iran is not its largest oil supplier. China’s major oil imports came from around the world, spanning nearly 50 countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, North and South America, and Oceania. In 2025, Russia was the largest source accounting for 19.22 per cent of their oil imports, followed by Saudi Arabia (14 per cent), and Iraq (11 per cent).

China’s interest and strategies in the war remain calculated as it balances limited support for Iran and not offending other actors in the war. It is unlikely that China will be involved militarily; instead, it will focus on diplomacy. The main priority for China is to prevent any disruption to its own energy supply and global trade routes. Therefore, it would push for stability and broker peace, all the while engaging with alternative partners.

TWTW Focus Note
China-Vietnam 3+3 Strategic Dialogue:
Defence, Diplomacy and Public Security

Aparna A Nair

What happened?

On 16 March, the inaugural China-Vietnam “3+3 strategic dialogue on diplomacy, defence, and public security” was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. It was chaired by China’s Foreign Minister, the Minister of Public Security, and the Minister of National Defence, with their Vietnamese counterparts. “Coordinating Development and Security, Advancing on the Socialist Road with Unwavering Commitment, and Forging United Fronts to Confront Shared Challenges” was the theme of the dialogue. The meeting was convened with the aim of safeguarding political systems, promoting strategic collaboration and rejuvenating the global socialist cause.

What is the background?

1. A brief note on China and Vietnam relations
The Chinese Communist Party assisted Vietnam’s struggle for independence with ideological, political, and material aid against French colonialism. Vietnam’s communist party unified the nation as a socialist republic in 1976. They also defeated US forces with China’s support (1950-1978). The relations experienced a difficult time when Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, invaded Cambodia and ousted the China-backed Khmer Rouge. It led to animosity and resulted in the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. In 1991, normalisation of relations began under the slogan of “good neighbours, good friends, good comrades, and good partners.” In 2008, it evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership. The guiding principles were now that party-to-party ties remain central, and the countries celebrated their 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2025, joining hands for a “community with a shared future.”

2. Party ties and shared values
The Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) are rooted in Marxist-Leninist principles. They emphasise vanguard leadership, proletarian internationalism, and the socialist path. They strive against imperialism, revisionism, and “colour revolutions.” Vietnam’s leader affirms China as a “comrade and brother,” while China’s doctrine of “community with a shared future for mankind,” tailored to socialist states, guides the relationship.

3. The road to the 3+3 dialogue
In 2025, China’s President met with Vietnam counterpart to commemorate the 75th year of diplomatic relations. On this occasion, China’s President proposed six proposals to elevate the China-Vietnam community with a shared future, and the "3+3 strategic dialogue" was one among them. This mechanism was instituted to strengthen strategic coordination on diplomacy, dialogue, and public security. It aimed to protect people and ensure regional security and stability.

4. The focus on defence, diplomacy and public security
The first aspect, defence ties, focuses on pragmatic cooperation in the maritime domain and border stability. It addresses separatism, cyber threats and natural disasters. Furthermore, the absence of major arms sales, prioritisation of mutual deterrence against external forces, and alignment with the socialist armed forces' ethos of self-reliance support regional stability without compromising sovereignty claims. With respect to diplomacy, Vietnam follows a “bamboo diplomacy” that emphasises flexibility and resilience, while China pursues a “strategic priority” with a multi-vector foreign policy. Furthermore, China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner. The influence is exerted over the regional supply chain, infrastructure cooperation, and connectivity. The dialogue aims to usher in a “new golden era” of elevated partnership amid geopolitical flux. The third aspect is public security, which aims to safeguard the political system and prevent destabilisation efforts. Additionally, it aims to counter transnational crime via regular ministerial meetings. The focus is on political stability, citizen protection, information sharing and joining campaigns against crime.

What does it mean?

First, strategic alignment. The dialogue cements CCP-CPV supremacy by institutionalising ministerial engagements in diplomacy, defence, and public security. The dialogue called for a "united front" to counter “colour revolution” and separatism head-on, given global historical experience. It aligns with the aspirations of both countries.

Second, the dialogue offers both countries an opportunity to promote regional stability and security. The parallels are tailored to the external and internal needs of Beijing and Hanoi. South East Asia is increasingly becoming a theatre of a tug-of-war between the US and China. Hence, the countries resort to consolidating influence and reinforcing their positions.

Global Politics Review
Transnational organized crime, Emerging technologies, Global security environment and ‘Diverse threat vectors’:
Five Takeaways of the US Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) Report for 2026

R Preetha

On 18 March, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) of the US Intelligence Community (IC). The ATA is an official, unclassified annual report that evaluates the most direct and serious threats to US national security.

In the 2026 report, the IC assesses top concerns including transnational organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, migration, the threat of Islamist ideology and terrorism, major power competition, and WMD threats. The report does not quote any foreign intervention in elections, despite several years of US intelligence findings identifying Russia, China and Iran as a concern in this domain. Meanwhile, areas such as emerging technologies, particularly AI, made a prominent feature.

The following are the major takeaways from the report.

1. Border enforcement as a success project and transnational criminal organizations as a continuing and evolving threat
The report highlights that recent efforts to strengthen homeland defense have produced positive outcomes, particularly in border enforcement, while emphasising the continuance of “complex and evolving threats.” It puts forth sealing of the US–Mexico border and stricter US policies as contributing to sharp declines in migrant encounters and fentanyl seizures since early 2025. However, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) involved in drug trafficking, financial crimes, and facilitating illegal migration are identified as a continuing concern that needs to be addressed. The assessment also highlights risks from terrorist groups, particularly those motivated by “Islamist ideology,” alongside the capability of state and non-state actors to directly strike the Homeland. Overall, enforcement gains are presented as coexisting with “evolving” threats.

2. The global security environment as complex, requiring a selective and prioritized approach
The report frames the global security environment as increasingly complex, shaped by rising risks of economic fragmentation, emerging technologies, and the growing frequency of armed conflicts. It notes that major power competition persists, while both state and non-state actors continue to improve their military capabilities. Increasing competition over supply chains and technological primacy, and unresolved regional conflicts, are presented as generating “interconnected risks.” However, the report cautions against treating all such global challenges as equally significant to US interests. In effect, the IC calls for balancing alertness with selectivity against over-securitization.

3. China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan’s advancements in missile delivery systems identified as potential direct strike threat to the US homeland
The assessment highlights that China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are developing a range of novel, advanced, and traditional missile delivery systems with both nuclear and conventional payloads capable of striking the US homeland. The IC projects this threat to expand significantly, with missile counts expected to exceed 16,000 by 2035, up from over 3,000 currently. North Korea has already showcased intercontinental reach through its successful ICBM tests, while Iran has space-launch vehicles that can help develop a military-capable ICBM by 2035 if it chooses to do so. These states are said to be pairing such advanced systems with cost-effective, expendable platforms to “stress” US defenses. In essence, the IC flags the expanding missile capabilities as increasing both the scale and complexity of direct homeland threats.

4. Emerging technologies with AI and quantum computing as the centre of American “leadership competition”
The report highlights that leadership in emerging technologies is increasingly shaping global power and national security outcomes, particularly for the US and China. AI and quantum computing are identified as central to this competition; while enabling new capabilities, they also introduce risks across domestic and national security domains needing careful analysis and mitigation. The assessment notes that maintaining leadership in AI provides the US with a “first-mover advantage,” but fast progress by other powers are challenging the American economic competitiveness and national security advantages. The competitive edge of the US, particularly in advanced chip design, is said to be driving global powers to build rival ecosystems, with China identified as the “most capable competitor,” aiming to lead by 2030. Overall, this “leadership competition” is presented as a key determinant of global influence today.

5. Military, space, cyber, and WMD as ‘diverse threat vectors’
The report, in a segment titled “diverse threat vectors” highlights the threat landscape for the US across military, space, cyber, and WMD domains. It notes that even if great powers refrain from conflict, regional and smaller powers such as Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UAE are increasingly willing to use force. In space, reduced costs have enabled more actors to develop capabilities, with China eclipsing Russia as the primary competitor and counterspace threats increasing. In Cyber, it notes China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to be primary threats. China is identified as the “most active and persistent cyber threat” to the US Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks. On WMD capabilities, it predicts that states will continue “modernization, expansion, and testing efforts,” with China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia advancing delivery systems, and India developing longer-range nuclear systems. In effect, the report presents the combined threats of these domains as creating a “volatile and complex” global security landscape.

About the authors

Femy Francis is a Project Associate at NIAS, Bengaluru. She coordinates the China, East Asia and the Pacific Area studies, focusing on both internal and external developments.

Aparna A Nair is an undergraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai.

R Preetha is a post-graduate student at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai, and is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

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