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CWA # 2019, 14 March 2026
Rising Violence in Nigeria

  Akshath Kaimal

Conflict Weekly #323, 13 March 2026

In the news
On 06 March, the BBC reported that “massive” numbers of civilians had been killed by armed men in Ngoshe in Borno state, in northeast Nigeria. While the Nigerian senator who spoke to the BBC did not quote a figure, a local journalist in Borno confirmed that many people had been killed and hundreds abducted.

On 10 March, Africa News and the Associated Press reported that Jihadist groups, in particular Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), were found to have launched intensified attacks targeting military bases in Borno and Yobe states and the wider Lake Chad region.

On 11 March, The Guardian reported that at least 65 Nigerian soldiers were killed in attacks by ISWAP across the country’s northeast over the last two weeks. Militants also abducted 300 civilians, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

Issues at large
1. Nigeria’s complex security landscape
Nigeria faces multiple security issues. It has been experiencing a decades-long insurgency in the northeast part, primarily led by Islamist groups Boko Haram and ISWAP in Borno and Yobe states. In the northwest, armed men, locally known as bandits, have been carrying out killings and ransom kidnappings. Lakurawa, another militant group, has also been perpetrating violence in the northwest. In the Middle Belt, Fulani Muslim herders have been attacking farmers belonging to both Christian and Muslim communities. Nigeria’s diverse geography and porous borders allow militant groups to spread across freely. Nigeria has also been fighting separatist movements in the southeast part of the country, which has primarily been led by the Indigenous People of Biafra. Additionally, analysts warn that Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked groups are also gaining prominence in the northwest and central regions of the country.

2. A brief note on the actors and the rising violence
The latest attacks took place in Borno and Yobe states in the northeast, where Boko Haram and ISWAP are the main actors. Boko Haram came into prominence in 2009, when it waged an insurgency against the Nigerian government to set up an Islamic State. In 2014-15, the group split into two, with the second group renaming itself ISWAP. Boko Haram have been known for its indiscriminate attacks on civilians and mass kidnappings. ISWAP, on the other hand, has also employed similar tactics, but has focused more on attacking military troops and infrastructure. Violence by these actors has been steadily rising, with nearly 800 incidents of violence reported in 2025, as compared to 610 incidents in 2024 and around 520 in 2023, according to ACLED. In 2026, the violence had spread to Kwara, Niger and Katsina states, with villages in all three states reporting incidents of killing and kidnapping by the two groups. Fighting between the two groups also sharply increased in 2025, adding to the general rise in violence in the region.

3. The limited capacity of the state
The Nigerian state has responded to the rising violence with multiple operations. Several of these operations have been successful in neutralising terrorist attacks, but security resources are being increasingly stretched due to two main factors. One simultaneous, overlapping crisis across Nigeria makes it difficult for security resources to reach all areas of the country, particularly remote areas. Two, limited infrastructure -  particularly in rural areas - porous borders with neighbouring Niger and Chad and the difficult terrain of the Lake Chad region further complicates the security response. Nigeria has received support from the United States, which also conducted airstrikes on militant groups. Still, the state response has been largely inadequate and ineffective due to the military's limited capacity.

4. Increased civilian casualties and the worsening humanitarian situation
Since 2009, over 350,000 people have been killed, while nearly 3.5 million have been displaced. In 2025, according to ACLED, 11,698 people were killed across the country in violent incidents, representing a 20 per cent increase over 2024 and nearly 40 per cent over 2023. Over 1000 were killed by Boko Haram and ISWAP alone in the northeast, and hundreds of thousands have also been displaced. The UN also found that in 2026, around 5.9 million people are projected to have severe to extreme humanitarian needs in the northeast states, with women and children accounting for 80 per cent of those needing assistance.

In perspective
First, violence is expected to continue increasing. The two groups have already begun carrying out major attacks on civilians and military infrastructure in 2026. With both of them - ISWAP in particular - growing more sophisticated in their attacks, security forces will be facing an even more complicated insurgency. Additionally, the rise of other groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State means incidents of violence are bound to continue increasing in 2026, especially as the state response remains inadequate and largely dependent on the US.

Second, the humanitarian crisis is likely to get worse. Over 130 million Nigerians - 63 per cent of the country’s population - live in multidimensional poverty. The worsening security situation, combined with US aid cuts, will leave more people reliant on humanitarian aid. Civilian casualties are also likely to increase, continuing the trend of rising numbers over the last few years. Attacks on farmers and destruction of crops and farmland also pose a serious threat to the humanitarian situation in the northeast.

 

Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at NIAS.

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