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China's Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War
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Femy Francis
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On 28 February, the US, along with Israel, launched a large-scale offensive, “Operation Epic Fury,” against Iran, to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. China has expressed concerns as it calls for an immediate ceasefire of the war. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: that the war on Iran “should not have happened…These actions have violated international law and basic norms of international relations.”
China also abstained from voting UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2817, condemning Iran's retaliatory strikes against Gulf states as a breach of international law. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, said: “The spillover of escalating tensions in the Middle East serves no one's interest. Resolving differences through dialogue and negotiations is the only viable way forward.”
What are China’s interests in Iran?
First, Iran is an important partner; so are other countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia supplies more oil to China than Iran; Beijing also has a USD 50 billion agreement as part of Riyadh’s Vision 2030. Trade turnover with the UAE is significantly higher than with Iran. If China openly and aggressively support the Iranian cause, it would undermine its relations with the other countries in the region.
Second, Iran and China’s oil supply. Iran has been one of China’s major oil suppliers for over a decade, at a discounted rate. The Foundation for Defence of Democracies found that China buys roughly 90 per cent of Iran’s oil export. China sees the immediate shortfall of 1.4 million barrels per day in oil imports from Iran.
Third, strategic partnerships with Iran. In the past five years, Tehran and Beijing have deepened their economic partnership. In 2021, China’s Foreign Minister signed a “25-year cooperation agreement.” The deal pledged to invest USD 400 billion in Iran for over 25 years. The deal was seen to keep Iran’s economy afloat amid American sanctions. They also signed a security partnership to counter terrorism, illegal immigration and transnational crime. The war threatens the investments made by China in Tehran, and their strategic partnership comes under scrutiny.
China also has military and technological ties with Iran. China has been the supplier of air defence systems, ballistic missile components, dual-use material and technical training for Iran.
What to expect from China?
China’s response has been mixed, shaped by its own strategic interests and calculations. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack. China’s Foreign Minister noted that “Might does not make right,” and that “the world has regressed to the law of the jungle.” China also contacted several West Asian countries and sent a special envoy for a diplomatic tour of the region, urging them to mediate peace. While calling for a joint/global effort, Beijing has not initiated any specific efforts to address the crisis. China’s response to the war remains stale.
So, what can be expected from China? First, rhetorical support to Iran. It is expected to remain muted with moral support. It will continue to portray itself as a neutral mediator, providing moral backing to Iran, but will stop short of any military or security commitments.
Second, relying on alternative energy sources. China can be seen relying on other oil sources, though this has been a major setback. For Iran, oil exports to China remain the largest; however, for China, Iran is not its largest oil supplier. China’s major oil imports came from around the world, spanning nearly 50 countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, North and South America, and Oceania. In 2025, Russia was the largest source accounting for 19.22 per cent of their oil imports, followed by Saudi Arabia (14 per cent), and Iraq (11 per cent).
China’s interest and strategies in the war remain calculated as it balances limited support for Iran and not offending other actors in the war. It is unlikely that China will be involved militarily; instead, it will focus on diplomacy. The main priority for China is to prevent any disruption to its own energy supply and global trade routes. Therefore, it would push for stability and broker peace, all the while engaging with alternative partners.
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