Amrita Jash

The first quarter of 2026 presents a snapshot of China’s external relations defined by diplomatic outreach, calibrated actions, and assertive posturing. Continuing a 36-year-old tradition, Beijing’s 2026 diplomatic outreach began with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s first overseas visit to Africa. From Asia to Africa to Europe, Beijing’s pursuit of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics was premised on advancing China’s diplomatic agenda by affirming its strategic interests, repairing strained ties where necessary, and positioning itself as an indispensable global actor. Neither overtly confrontational nor wholly conciliatory, China’s foreign relations at this phase were best described as ‘selectively adaptive’.

1. Reaffirming the primacy of the ‘neighbourhood’ and Regional Assertion 
As a part of emphasizing on Beijing’s neighbourhood policy, on 5 January, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, as his first foreign guest of the year, which culminated in the signing of 15 cooperation agreements spanning science and technology, ecological environment, transportation, economy and trade, among others. This visit marked the first by a South Korean president since 2019 and came just a day after Pyongyang fired two ballistic missiles in the Sea of Japan. The timing underscored Beijing’s intent to project itself as a stabilising force in a volatile regional security environment. 

Amidst the many ‘firsts’, this first quarter also witnessed China’s assertive edge, mainly, in its relations with Tokyo and Manila, which saw renewed friction. Beijing imposed export bans on 20 Japanese entities, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Subaru, as well as restricting “dual-use” items and rare-earth materials such as gallium, germanium, graphite, and rare-earth magnets. These measures can be read as China’s response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks suggesting that Japan could intervene militarily if China attacks Taiwan. While on the South China Sea front, tensions ratcheted up with the Philippines, marked by repeated confrontations near Second Thomas Shoal and around Scarborough Shoal, with Chinese Coast Guard vessels obstructing Philippine resupply missions and limiting access for Filipino fishermen. These actions run counter to Beijing’s diplomatic outreach, highlighting the relatively ‘selective’ nature of its engagement.

2. Pragmatic recalibration of ties with the US and Europe
Beyond its neighbourhood, China’s diplomatic engagements in early 2026 indicated a pragmatic recalibration of ties with key global actors. For instance, with its principal strategic competitor, the United States, trade ties have witnessed a relative cooling-off period—described as “tactical truce.” Meanwhile, speculation about a potential visit by US President Donald Trump to China—the first by an American President since 2017—could set the tone for high-stakes bilateral engagement. On the other end, Beijing’s “no limit” partnership with Moscow remained on a steady trajectory.  The 2026 China-Russia Sanya Dialogue was held in Sanya, Hainan province, from 3 to 4 March, where both sides jointly released a research report titled “Implementing the Global Governance Initiative: Concepts, Practices, and Communication of China-Russia Cooperation in Arctic Governance.”

Several high-level visits further paved the way for Beijing’s ties with the West. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to Beijing between 13-17 January—the first since 2017—marked a turning point following the discord in the ties with the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in 2018, with both sides committing to advancing the building of a “new strategic partnership.” This was followed by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit from 28 to 31 January—the first in eight years—marking a significant thaw in relations and leading to agreements on visa-free travel and enhanced economic cooperation. Similarly, renewed engagement with the European Union, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s inaugural visit from 25 to 26 February and the subsequent visit of EU lawmakers in March—a first visit in eight years—illustrated a conscious yet cautious effort on both sides to revive dialogue despite persistent trade and strategic tensions.

3. Diplomacy over military engagement in the Middle East
Beyond its immediate neighbourhood and ties with major powers, China’s engagement in West Asia is worth noting. In the context of the US-Israeli joint strikes on Iran since 28 February, China has adopted a calibrated and restrained approach. On one hand, it has condemned the attacks on Iran, opposing unilateral actions, and favouring diplomacy over getting involved militarily. On the other hand, it reportedly continued to provide Tehran with military supplies, particularly rocket parts, as well as provided intelligence support, satellite navigation, radar systems, and electronic warfare technologies, and economic aid to Iranian war efforts. Despite this dual-track approach, China has avoided overt confrontation with Washington, reflecting a careful balancing of its strategic interests. At the same time, China has secured safe passage for its vessels through the Strait of Hormuz—illustrating the pragmatic underpinnings of its regional engagement.

4. Back-channel diplomacy in South Asia between Pakistan and Afghanistan
In South Asia, amidst the cross-border hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan, since Islamabad’s large-scale offensive against the Afghan Taliban regime on 27 February, China stepped up its diplomatic efforts to mediate talks between the two parties. Positioning itself as a regional stabiliser, Beijing engaged in backchannel diplomacy and facilitated dialogue to de-escalate tensions. Simultaneously, on 31 March, China, in collaboration with Pakistan, launched a five-point peace initiative to address the escalating conflict involving Iran. The proposal emphasised immediate ceasefire, protection of civilian infrastructure, respect for sovereignty, and the restoration of safe maritime navigation, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz.

Earlier, on 10 February, a new round of the China-India Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi, during which both sides reviewed the positive momentum in bilateral relations and exchanged views on regional and global developments, as well as multilateral issues.

5. Projecting Beijing as a stabilising force against American interventionism 
Taken together, these efforts by Beijing not only highlight its willingness to play a peace broker, aligning with its Global Security Initiative; at the same time, they also reflect China’s broader ambition to project itself as a stabilising force against American interventionism—as seen in episodes such as the US-led first military operation in Venezuela in early January 2026 and subsequent strikes on Iran, both cases which China criticised as violations of sovereignty and examples of unilateral force. Through mediation efforts, peace proposals, and multilateral engagement, Beijing seeks to portray itself as a promoter of dialogue, respect for sovereignty, and economic cooperation—positioning itself in contrast to American unilateralism and interventionism.

To conclude: China’s external relations in the first quarter (Jan-Mar 2026)
On the whole, the first quarter of 2026 exemplifies three broad trends in China’s foreign policy. First, a continued effort to stabilise its Asian neighbourhood, driven by an acute awareness of the volatile external environment. Second, choosing pragmatic recalibration of ties with key global actors—Canada, the UK, the EU, and Germany, while asserting itself vis-à-vis Japan and the Philippines. And third, projecting itself as a responsible global actor by choosing mediation and diplomatic outreach. In essence, China has been practising a composite strategy of ‘outreach, assertion, and mediation’—all aimed at consolidating its position in a rapidly evolving and contested global order.

About the author
Dr Amrita Jash is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal Institute of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence), Manipal. Her research focuses on China’s foreign policy, the People’s Liberation Army, security and strategic issues related to India-China, China-Japan and the Indo-Pacific.

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