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TWTW Note
President Xi Jinping's North Korea visit:
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Avaneesh S
Avaneesh S is a postgraduate student from the department of History, School of Social Sciences, Pondicherry University. He is currently an intern at NIAS.
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What happened?
On 08 June, China’s President Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang for a two-day state visit to improve bilateral relations between the two countries. Invited by North Korea’s President Kim Jong-un, President Xi’s visit to North Korea marks his first trip to the country since 2019 and his first foreign trip in 2026. He was joined by senior Polit Bureau officials, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, Minister of National Defence Dong Jun, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau Cai Qi and Head of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee Liu Haixing. The trip also marks the 65th anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.
On the same day, President Xi stated that the two countries are at a “new historical starting point.” During the talks, Minister Liu Haixing stated that the two sides reached “important consensus” on several issues and agreed to “maintain close strategic communication.” Kim stated that he would fully support the “One China principle,” and “agreed to seize the general trend of the times, respond to the shared aspirations of the two peoples, strengthen high-level exchanges.”
On 09 June, President Xi and Kim visited the Sino-Korean Friendship Tower and laid tribute, honouring Chinese soldiers who fought alongside North Korean forces during the 1950-53 Korean War. Later in the day, they visited a “Central Cadres Training School”, which is the leadership academy of the Workers’ Party of Korea, observing a class and planted a tree on campus as a gesture of friendship. In his concluding remarks, President Xi also stated that they reached “important consensus” with President Kim and had thanked for the hospitality.
What is the background?
1. A brief context on recent China-North Korea ties
Pyongyang-Beijing ties have seen periods of strained tensions and “coldness”, especially so for the past six years. North Korea is disapproving of China’s “abandonment” of socialism in the 1980s, and China is angered by its refusal to adopt Chinese-style economic reforms. However, since 2018, President Xi has worked towards mending ties with North Korea despite it being China’s only formal treaty ally, bound by the mutual defence pact signed in 1961.
2. Deepening Russia-North Korea partnership
Moscow-Pyongyang ties on the other hand have grown significantly in the past two years. It reached its peak by the ratification of the treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which is also a mutual defence pact signed in 2024. Even before the treaty, North Korea had been supplying munitions and missiles to Russia for its war effort in Ukraine, and since the treaty, it has sent over 15,000 troops to fight alongside Russians.
3. The reunification question
North Korea has amended its constitution, which dropped references to the re-unification of the Korean peninsula, and redefined its territory as bordering China, Russia and South Korea. It has acknowledged that re-unification is impossible, and the division is permanent. China also used North Korea’s official name, indicating the transition from re-unification to “coexistence.”
What does it mean?
First, China’s shift away from denuclearization. China-North Korea relations were primarily strained due to Beijing’s “Three No’s” policy, namely “No wars, no instability and No nukes,” and it has disapproved of Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons. However, in recent years, China has softened on the denuclearization rhetoric, slowly dropping its use in official statements and communications. It was also absent in this year’s summit, marking a sharp contrast since 2019, where Beijing had called for its denuclearization. Therefore, it indicates that Beijing has quietly accepted North Korea’s status as a nuclear state.
Second, China still views the US with distrust, considering recent US sanctions on curbing Chinese companies in the development on Advanced AI computing chips, and the blacklist of EV manufacturers. Beijing and Pyongyang also released a statement opposing “military hegemonism," thereby indicating that China needs North Korea in its sphere of influence in countering the US’ growing military cooperation with Japan and South Korea.
Third, if China continued to keep its distance from North Korea, it may have pushed it further into Russia’s orbit, where the latter has already provided technological support to improving Pyongyang’s military capabilities. The visit may now open a window towards a potential trilateral cooperation between China-Russia-North Korea, especially in military intelligence and sharing valuable drone warfare experience.
Myanmar President’s China visit:
Diplomatic legitimacy, Economic cooperation and Beijing’s interests
Aparna A Nair
What happened?
During15-19 June, Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing visited China. In this state visit, he met with China’s President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and the National People’s Congress standing committee chairman Zhao Leji. Both Presidents signed 18 agreements and MoUs in areas such as security, development, trade, health, science and infrastructure cooperation. Apart from the cooperation document, both agreed to jointly advance China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), and Global Development Initiative (GDI).
The Myanmar delegation included officials from Kachin and Shan states. The discussions covered cross-border transportation and regional connectivity within the Greater Mekong Subregion. China also pledged assistance for earthquake response efforts and reconstruction projects in Myanmar.
President Xi said, “I am willing to continue strengthening our leadership (over our countries' bilateral ties), carry forward the brotherly friendship between our two peoples, deepen comprehensive strategic cooperation.”
What is the background?
1. A brief note on China-Myanmar bilateral ties
China and Myanmar relations are rooted in traditional "Paukphaw" (brotherly) friendship and rest on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In 2020, the relationship got upgraded to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership,’ the highest bilateral partnership tier of China. In 2024, both sides agreed to build a community with a shared future. Historically, China has backed Myanmar rulers regardless of regime type. Myanmar occupies a critical position in China’s regional ambitions as it is a gateway to the Indian Ocean region. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor encompasses China’s BRI initiatives in Myanmar. It includes oil and gas pipelines and infrastructure. China seeks a stable Myanmar because the coup, border instability and rise of telefraud and scam centres had affected Chinese citizens and joint projects.
For Myanmar, China remains the largest trading partner and the largest source of imports and investments. In 2025, bilateral trade stood at USD 19.4 billion, a 19.1per cent year-on-year increase. The cooperation from China will help stabilise the regime, cope with economic challenges and earn diplomatic legitimacy.
2. Myanmar President seeking legitimacy after the election
Min Aung Hlaing, military junta chief, became President in April 2026 after an election held between December 2025 and January 2026. The election process was widely criticised because of the exclusion of major opposition groups. It also led the military-backed candidates to secure victory. In this context, he has been seeking international recognition and diplomatic legitimacy. The UN,EU,US,UK and ASEAN states like Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are yet to recognise his government.
What does it mean?
First, the visit marked a diplomatic success for President Min Aung Hlaing. He was welcomed to China with full state honours, and President Xi’s assurance of close engagement provided Myanmar with external recognition and strengthened claims to political legitimacy. This legitimacy will help break the international isolation Myanmar faces and enable economic aid and investment to flow to the country.
Second, Myanmar emerges as China's most comprehensive BRI partner in Southeast Asia. The signed documents and other agreements broaden bilateral cooperation in infrastructure, trade, security and innovation. This makes Myanmar China’s most comprehensive BRI partner in Southeast Asia. The agreements linked to the GSI, GDI and GCI also indicate China's effort to expand the acceptance of its global governance initiatives among developing countries. The visit also reflected the convergence of political, economic and security interests.
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