Adwaith Sankar Adwaith Sankar is an intern at NIAS. He is also an undergraduate student pursuing Political Science and International Liberal Studies through the NUS-Waseda Double Degree Programme.

What happened?
On 11 July, China and North Korea marked the 65th anniversary of their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. From 10 to 12 July, North Korean Premier Pak Thae Song led a delegation to Beijing to commemorate the occasion. On 10 July, during a meeting, President Xi stated that both countries should “maintain strategic resolve and enhance strategic confidence,” reaffirming Beijing’s commitment to strengthening bilateral ties. The anniversary follows a series of high-level engagements. On 08 and 09 June, Xi visited North Korea for the first time since 2019, where discussions focused on trade, agriculture, construction, technology and cross-border transport. The visit built on the momentum created by Xi's meeting with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un in September 2025, reflecting continued efforts to deepen political and economic cooperation between the two countries.

What is the background?
1. China, North Korea and Beijing’s long road to Pyongyang
China and North Korea established diplomatic relations in 1949. Following China’s intervention in the Korean War, Beijing and Pyongyang signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1961. However, the treaty’s specific rules regarding territory and decision-making procedures are undefined. This is China’s only mutual-defence treaty, and it has never been invoked. The treaty's ambiguity preserves Beijing’s discretion. The treaty has persisted despite China establishing ties with the ROK in 1992 and the PRC’s support for UN sanctions on the DPRK through 2017. However, China’s support for sanctions strained relations between the states. Five summits in 2018 and 2019 restored contact between the countries. Pandemic restrictions reduced exchanges, while the 2024 DPRK-Russia treaty widened Pyongyang’s options. This encouraged Beijing to rebuild ties with North Korea.

2. China's trade dominance and North Korea's expanding maritime access
In 2024, China-North Korea trade was USD 2.7 billion. However, exports from North Korea constituted only USD 360 million. In 2023, 98.3 per cent of North Korea’s recorded external trade was attributed to China. Pyongyang is dependent on Beijing. However, this dependence has not translated into unlimited Chinese leverage. North Korea’s geographic position gives it significant value. China’s Tumen border ends just 15-18 kilometers from the Sea of Japan, and access to the sea from Jilin would require cooperation from both Russia and North Korea. Similarly, the use of Rajin Port would require North Korean consent. As China seeks to build up its maritime strength, this need offsets its centrality in trade.

3. Military cooperation with Russia and North Korea’s strategic options
Since 2023, military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has expanded significantly. Between August 2023 and March 2025, North Korea is estimated to have sent 4- 5.8 million artillery shells and rockets along with Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns. By March 2026, it had also dispatched more than 16,000 soldiers to Russia, where they received training and participated in operations in the Kursk region. In return, Russia is reported to have supplied electronic-warfare equipment and short-range air-defence systems and to have shared data from the battlefield use of North Korean missiles. The deepening Russia–North Korea partnership reduced Pyongyang's dependence on Beijing. To retain its influence on the Korean Peninsula, China intensified high-level engagement with North Korea.

4. The Seoul factor  
In February 2026, North Korea’s Congress rejected talks with South Korea, but did not reject talks with the US. In response, South Korea expanded diplomatic coordination with the US and Japan while also seeking China's support in managing regional tensions. As Beijing balanced its relations with both Koreas, it maintained close ties with Pyongyang while preserving broader regional stability. This has reinforced the continued relevance of the China–North Korea partnership.

What does it mean?
First, the treaty's ambiguity gives China strategic flexibility while reassuring North Korea of its commitment. Recent developments concerning Russia have changed this dynamic by China’s ability to shape Pyongyang’s behaviour. If China disengages from Pyongyang, North Korea will be incentivised to strengthen its ties with Russia. The 65th anniversary restates China’s commitment to a partner looking to diversify its alliances.

Second, China’s rising international influence can validate, to a limited extent, North Korea’s nuclear status. Goodwill from Pyongyang could help China advance its maritime agenda through access to the Sea of Japan.
 

Print

Bookmark