Teshu Singh Dr Teshu Singh is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.

The second quarter in East Asia was marked by strategic competition and economic rebalancing, culminating in significant bilateral visits. Inadvertently, Cross-Strait relations remain the focal point of all tensions and of regional stability. 

1. US President Donald Trump’s State Visit to Beijing 
Amid the ongoing Iran crisis, US President Donald Trump visited Beijing from 13-15 May 2026. This was the first visit of a US President to China since 2017. During the visit, it was agreed that both sides should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability based on fairness and reciprocity. The issue of the Iran crisis, Taiwan, Trade, and Technology were the main highlights of the meeting. During the talks, the two leaders discussed the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the US war on Iran. Both sides agreed that the Strait “must remain open to support the free flow of energy.” On the issue of Taiwan, China affirmed that Taiwan was “the most important” issue in US-China bilateral relations. The US reiterated that “nothing has changed” in its policy toward Taiwan. While on the issue of trade, China agreed to purchase at least US$17 billion annually of US agricultural products until 2028 and would buy 200 of the US company’s jets. China also agreed to address the concern regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals, including yttrium, scandium, neodymium, and indium. In addition, the two sides agreed to establish two new institutions to optimise the bilateral economic relationship: the US-China Board of Trade and the U.S.-China Board of Investment. Overall, the summit was high on rhetoric and less on substance.

2. Xi Jinping’s state visit to North Korea
Soon after hosting the US President, Xi Jinping made his first international tour. He visited Pyongyang from 8-9 June 2026. Xi Jinping was accompanied by his de facto chief of staff Cai Qi, defence minister Dong Jun, foreign minister Wang Yi and commerce minister Wang Wentao. During the visit, Kim Jong Un reiterated North Korea’s stance on the “One-China” Principle. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un agreed to deepen high-level cooperation, expand economic and cultural exchanges, and project a united front against external pressure. Amid the changing global scenario, both sides reiterated that no matter how the international situation changes, the traditional friendship of “China and DPRK will not change”. Reportedly, the visit was scheduled against the backdrop of growing ties between North Korea and Russia. Kim Jong Un have been sending troops to Russia to support its war on Ukraine. He has sent troops into combat alongside Russian forces under a mutual defence treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang. The defence treaty was formalised under the North Korea-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed on June 19, 2024, and came into force in December 2024. This year also marks the 65th anniversary of the China-North Korea defence pact. Notably, there was no discussion on North Korea’s denuclearisation. Xi Jinping’s visit was essentially to strengthen the “strategic communication” between the two sides.

3. Rising Tensions between China-Japan over the issue of Neo-Militarization
Yet another development affecting the geopolitics of East Asia during April-June 2026 was deterioration in China-Japan security relations. In April, the cabinet of Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae relaxed the rules restricting Japan’s exports of defence equipment and technology. Since then, China has accused Japan of abandoning its post-1945 pacifist posture and calling it “neo-militarisation”. The usage of the term neo-militarisation itself is contentious. Japan argues they are adopting such measures to deal with the deteriorating situation created by China, especially in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. 
The deterioration in China-Japan relations can be traced to the Japanese PM statement when she said that in case of any attack on Taiwan, there could be a military response from Japan as well. Furthermore, in addition, during the Balikatan 2026 exercise conducted from April 20-May 8, 2026 between the US and the Philippines, Japan participated actively. For the first time, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces participated in live-fire drills and defensive operations. Subsequently, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, China accused Japan of neo-militarisation. The Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi denied any of the charges and argued that Japan remains committed to international law. 

4. Developments in Cross-Strait relations
The developments in Cross-Strait relations and subsequent repercussions emanating from it loomed over the developments in East Asia. China tried to influence the domestic and external policies of Taiwan. China invited Taiwan’s opposition leader, Cheng Li-wun to visit China. She visited China from April 7-12, 2026, on a “peace mission”. The Cheng Li-wun visit was particularly significant for Cross-Strait relations, as it was the first visit by a Kuomintang Party leader since 2016. China also orchestrated the denial of airspace to Taiwanese President William Lai, who was visiting Eswatini in Africa from 22 to 26 April 2026 to attend the 40th anniversary of King Mswati’s accession and his 58th birthday. Under the pressure from China, three African countries, the Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar, denied Taiwanese President William Lai’s aircraft permission to fly through their airspace. Later, President Lai secretly visited the country. 

China continues violating Taiwan’s air space and waters. China violated the Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone around 217 times in the month of May. The China Coast Guard  (CCG) entered waters near Kinmen island (Taiwanese county just a few kilometres from China). There was also one incursion in Pratas Island (Dongsha which is the Taiwanese atoll in the South China Sea) in May. The CCG entered the restricted waters near Kinmen Island four times in the month of May. 

Subsequently, Taiwan held tabletop military exercises. The exercise was aimed at stimulating a response to a potential maritime quarantine by China. The exercise simulated a scenario in which China, without imposing a full blockade, demands that domestic and foreign vessels using Taiwanese ports complete their declarations through Chinese customs system. Taiwan is taking concrete steps to prepare for any Chinese maritime coercion that may threaten Taiwan’s international trade and critical imports. Overall, the unfolding of  situation in the Taiwan Strait remains one of the region’s most significant security concerns. 

5. The visit of the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to India
During this quarter, one of the major visits from East Asia to India was by the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), H.E. Lee Jae Myung, to India from 19-21 April 2026. There were discussions to upgrade the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The two leaders highlighted a shared vision of VOYAGES (Vision for Operations of Yard Assisted Growth with Efficiency and Scale)  
During the visit, India-South Korea signed 21 agreements. A total of 15 MOUs were signed between two countries and six new announcements regarding launch of the Economic Security Dialogue, Establishment of Distinguished Visitors Programme (DVP), Launch of dialogue between the two Foreign Ministries on Global Themes, including Climate Change, Arctic, and Maritime Cooperation, ROK joining Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative, ROK joining International Solar Alliance and India joining Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and Commemoration of the Year 2028-29 as Year of India-ROK Friendship were made. The visit helped to deepen cooperation in key sectors and further contribute to regional and global security. The major outcome of the visit was a joint strategic vision, a dedicated maritime and shipbuilding framework, economic partnership upgrades, and clean energy cooperation. It largely covers shipbuilding, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and co-production of arms. 

To Conclude:
Overall, the East Asian region was active in terms of regional diplomacy and strategic balancing. The geopolitical importance of this region is immense. The countries of the region engaged with major power and participated in various multilateral and minilateral forums. The region remains a centrepiece of geopolitical rivalry and technological competition. Thereby creating opportunities and challenges for global politics. 

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