Aishal Hab Yousuf Aishal Hab Yousuf is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

From 24-26 September, China’s President Xi Jinping began his much-anticipated state visit to Washington, marking the third summit between President Xi and President Donald Trump within the year, preceding meetings taking place in Busan and Beijing. As per most Western media reports, especially those near Washington, believe that what transpired was a summit heavy on pageantry and light on substance. Diplomacy was guided through realist principles of self-preservation and strategic resilience rather than shared norms or collective security. The five takeaways below assess what was agreed upon, what was omitted, and what the silence on highly consequential matters reveals about the future of one of the world’s most significant bilateral relationships.

1. The trade truce is short with a long stalemate ahead; pre-existing structural deadlock is likely to endure
One of the most tangible outcomes of the summit was the extension of the bilateral trade truce for a mere two months until 10 January, thereby pushing the harder questions into yet another round of negotiations. Beijing was hopeful of a longer extension, the current extension being a modest reprieve rather than a breakthrough. Writing for Brookings, scholar Kari Herman notes a deeper problem, the new new trade arrangements do very little to address excess structural capacity. Critical minerals and technology are not peripheral issues but remain unsettled. They were core agendas determining policies towards China in Washington. For businesses, the summit produced a very familiar instability, lower tariff rates for the interim, but no sustainable policy on the horizon.

2. AI remains a hot line where guardrails are imperative
AI was the summit’s most consequential agenda item for posterity. Beijing confirmed a new AI dialogue, with talks scheduled towards the end of November. The leaders diverged diametrically regarding regulations. President Trump rejected guardrails in its entirety, stating that he wanted to leave AI "exactly where it is,” and that the only guardrail required is a “strong and smart president.” In contrast to this President Xi called for AI to remain "always under human control." Analysing for Carnegie, Jeffrey Prescott remarked that the hotline that was announced was a simple arrangement between Treasury Secretary Scott Bessemer and China’s Vice to pick up their phones in a crisis, the diplomatic equivalent of keeping “DMs open” rather than an accountable mechanism to reduce risk.
 
3. Ambiguity turns into vulnerability about Taiwan, Iran, and Ukraine
Taiwan did not make it onto the White House’s public agenda but was nonetheless the subtext for much of the discussion. Beijing pressed Washington to come out in formal opposition to Taiwanese independence, a stronger wording than what the US administration’s policy of not “supporting” independence means. President Trump answered his question as usual obliquely, “We didn't talk about it too much. Right now, it's fine.” The most worrisome sign comes from US Ambassador David Perdue saying that President Trump asked President Xi whether Beijing would be willing to buy US made arms, an indication observed to be that the Trump administration is not taking seriously how China is belligerent towards Western allies. During the same week, Chicago Council polls showed support for using American soldiers to defend Taiwan dropping to 38 per cent from 52 per cent in 2021, with Gen-Z having changed their mind most dramatically. Akin to this, is the pattern observed regarding Ukrainian and Iranian conflicts. Beijing continues to provide Moscow diplomatic cover. On Iran, President Trump confirmed discussions indeed took place but offered little to no detail. Ambassador Perdue claimed that China was "moving away" from Tehran, an assertion that remains unverified. Across all three crises, the effect is identical, there has been an erosion of deterrence not deliberately through policy reversal but through ambiguity and lack of attention. 

4. Beijing’s narratives comfortably take up more space
The optics of the summit heavily favored Beijing. Trump was accompanied by VP JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whereas Xi did not bring any business delegation, a deliberate message of negotiation assurance. For Europe, the summit will do little about reducing its vulnerability, with a very likely prospect of bilateral US-China accommodation securing the supply safety of American companies. European policymakers who are planning to take certain steps in addressing China Shock 2.0 find themselves alone in their endeavors. The summit was reflective of Chinese statecraft employing the transactional nature of Washington to its benefit.

5. Iranian conflict and Washington’s allies in the Indo-Pacific remain missing 
However, it may well be that what was not there at the summit may prove even more important than its intended outcomes. Regarding Iran, Trump said talks had been had but without providing any information on the substance of these conversations, as the Strait of Hormuz remains shut. For America's Indo-Pacific partners, who were left exposed through all of this, Trump’s statements referring to the wartime collaboration between the US and China could only invite more trouble, especially since China is currently putting pressure on Tokyo. 

Print

Bookmark