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CWA # 1304, 9 May 2024
Pakistan Reader
The Fog of 9 May: One year after the anti-Establishment violence

  D Suba Chandran

Where does Pakistan stay, one year after the 9 May 2024 violence, led by the PTI supporters targeting the mighty Pakistani military? Where does it leave the Establishment, PTI and Imran Khan? And where does the present government, led by Shehbaz Sharif, stand?

On the eve of one year of 9 May violence that Pakistan witnessed in 2023, Maj-Gen Ahmed Sharif, the Director General of the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) referring to a dialogue with the PTI could only happen, if the latter “earnestly apologises publicly in front of the nation.” Dawn quoted him saying: “If some political mindset, leader or clique attacks its own army, causes rifts between the army and its people, insults the nation’s martyrs and issues threats and hatches propagandas, then there can be no dialogues with them…There is only one way back for such political anarchists that it asks for an earnest pardon in front of the nation and promises that it will forgo politics of hate and adopt constructive [style of] politics.”

In response, the national news papers (Dawn and The News) reported that Imran Khan refused to apologise. He was also quoted to have expressed his willingness to face an inquiry regarding the sit-in in 2014 and appead before any inquiry committee. A week earlier, on any dialogue, Dawn quoted him saying: “always ready for talks, but it could only take place when their stolen mandate was returned and innocent imprisoned workers were released.”

So where does Pakistan stay, one year after the 9 May 2024 violence led by the PTI supporters targeting the mighty Pakistani military? Where does it leave the Establishment, PTI and Imran Khan? And where does the present government, led by Shehbaz Sharif, stand?

First, for the PTI and Imran Khan. 9 May 2023 marked the end of the “same page” narrative that was being pushed by Imran Khan and the PTI. While developments during 2022-2023 did highlight the growing differences between Imran Khan and the Establishment, 9 May marked the rupturing of a tenuous relationship. Imran Khan was arrested and repeatedly placed in jail under one case or the others. The party leaders were hounded; invariably, the entire second-rung leadership of the PTI was forced to withdraw from politics and/or distance from Imran Khan. 

However, it was not a complete failure for Imran Khan and the PTI. Despite the Establishment going against Imran Khan and the PTI, and the Election Commission targeting the party (the loss of party symbol, not allowing the contestants to fight under the party, and allegations of pre-election and poll rigging) the PTI candidates who have contested as independents have won more than the PML-N and PPP. While many expected that the PTI will disappear in Punjab during the February polls, the party did remarkably well against all electoral and legal odds.

The PTI’s case seems to have strengthened during the last year in terms of popular support for the party, especially from Punjab. In the elections, the party has swept the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and performed surprisingly well in Punjab province, which is expected to be the PML-N stronghold.

Second, for the Establishment. 9 May 2023 should mark one of the biggest political failures for the Establishment. It was the end of the Imran experiment, which it had carefully orchestrated even before the 2017 elections. The idea was to keep the PML-N away and the PPP under. While the PPP’s political base is in Sindh, and has been losing its support in Punjab, the Establishment found a political eureka moment in Imran Khan. Unfortunately for the Establishment, that moment did not last. There were signs of the “same page” getting damaged even when Gen Bajwa was the Chief of Army Staff. The Establishment had to return to the PML-N and agree to the return of Nawaz Sharif, which was a part of its pre-2017 political engineering plan.

But the worst failure for the Establishment was the loss of support in Punjab. The February elections should end the general perception that Punjab votes along with the Establishment. They should have surprised the Establishment as well and made it realize that engineering a party and its leaders is easier than engineering the new generation. Even worse for the Establishment should be the “invincibility” perception. 

9 May 2023 highlighted how vulnerable the Establishment was. Despite decades of military rule, political engineering, gagging media and pressurising judiciary, 9 May 2023 should have been a complete shocker for the Establishment. And for a political party, it was not only crossing the Rubicon but also surviving it. 

While the Establishment followed up on 9 May 2023 developments with arrests and political engineering one year later, is the institution stronger today than it was? Despite the arrests and the loss of second-rung leaders, is the PTI weaker today? Or is it the case that the PTI lost the battle on 9 May 2023 but has been winning the war ever since? 

The biggest beneficiary of the 9 May 2023, however, should have been the PML-N. They have formed the government, got Nawaz Sharif back in Pakistan, and formed the government in Punjab. Or are they? The biggest beneficiary of 9 May 2023? This should constitute the fog of 9 May 2024. 

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