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CWA # 1992, 28 February 2026
Conflict Weekly
Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes I Fours Years of Ukraine War

  IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly Focus Note
Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes:
Another round of cross-border attacks
Akshath K

In the news
On 22 February, Pakistan launched airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Paktika provinces. The PAF said it struck seven terrorist camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Afghanistan rejected the claim and said the strikes hit a religious school and residential homes, killing women and children. It summoned Pakistan’s ambassador and condemned the attack as a violation of its territorial sovereignty.

On 26 February, Afghanistan launched “large-scale offensive operations” against Pakistan across the Durand Line “in response ‌to repeated provocations and violations by Pakistani military circles.”

On 27 February, Pakistan launched “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq,” and claimed targeting military infrastructure in Kabul, Paktika and Kandahar provinces and along the Torkham border.

On 27 February, Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared “open war” on Afghanistan. Its military claimed to have killed 274 Taliban fighters and wounded 400, while destroying 73 Taliban posts and capturing 18 others. Kabul said that the operations it launched earlier achieved “specified objectives.” Afghan government spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, also said that if Pakistan continues the war, Afghan forces “have the ability to take decisive action against it.” Kabul claimed killing 55 Pakistani soldiers, with “several others captured alive.”

On 27 February, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressed deep concern over the surge in violence and urged both nations to adhere to their obligations under international law. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also urged the two countries to resolve their differences through dialogue, and that Iran was ready to support the process. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also urged calm and offered to mediate if both sides agree. Turkey’s top diplomat held discussions on the ongoing conflict with ministers from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, while China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, said that it has been mediating the conflict through its own channels.

Issues at large
First, recurring tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Relations between the two countries hit a new low when fighting in October 2025 killed more than 70 people on both sides of the border. The tensions stem from Pakistan’s accusations that Kabul has allowed armed groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to use Afghanistan as a base to launch attacks on Pakistan. The October clashes saw third-party mediation, with Qatar and Turkey helping reach a ceasefire agreement.

Second, increasing attacks within Pakistan and Islamabad’s allegations against Kabul. Pakistan witnessed a spate of terrorist attacks across the country in recent weeks. In February alone, there were attacks in Islamabad and Bajaur, a suicide attack in Bannu and another attack on a Federal Constabulary convoy in Karak district. Pakistan blame the TTP and says it has “conclusive evidence” that the Taliban support the terrorists.

Third, conflicting claims over terrorist sanctuaries. Pakistan has repeatedly called on Kabul to verifiably and systematically dismantle terrorist networks in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has rejected the claim, saying it has no links with the TTP. A recent UNSC report found that the TTP had conducted multiple attacks on Pakistan from Afghan soil since the Taliban took over in 2021.

Fourth, the Taliban response. Kabul has repeatedly denied that it supports the TTP and that the group operates from within its borders, saying there is no evidence. Kabul blames Pakistan for failing to control its own internal security lapses and for violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Analysts believe the Afghan Taliban’s unwillingness to crack down on the TTP is due to prior collaboration between the two and out of fear that TTP militants might defect to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

In perspective
First, worsening relations between the two countries. Despite reaching a ceasefire agreement in October, the core issue relating to cross-border terrorism was not addressed. For Pakistan, this presents a complex situation with violence rising within due to attacks from militant groups, and Afghanistan continuing to deny playing any role. While Afghanistan has been willing to resolve the issue diplomatically, it has been unwilling to address Pakistan’s claim of the TTP operating within its borders.

Second, the recent clashes highlight the breakdown of the October ceasefire and bring the two countries closer to a major armed conflict, with Afghanistan being at a significant disadvantage when compared to Pakistan’s military strength.

Third, the need for mediation and a role for Qatar and Turkey. Despite China, Iran, and Russia offering to mediate, Qatar and Turkey seem best positioned to mediate effectively between the two countries, having already done so in October and November. While a permanent ceasefire could not be reached last year, Qatar and Turkey's diplomatic leverage make them the best options for third-party mediation.

CW Column: The War in Ukraine
Four Years of War in Ukraine: Continuing Uncertainty
Padmashree Anandhan

What happened this week?
War on the ground
On 26 February, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for another round of Geneva talks “very soon,” confirming Ukraine’s responses to key negotiation issues under preparation.

On 24 February, marking the fourth anniversary of the invasion, Zelenskyy declared that Russia had not broken Ukraine and reaffirmed commitment to achieving a “strong and lasting peace.” Russia’s President Vladimir Putin stated that strengthening Russia’s nuclear triad was an “absolute priority.”

On 22 February, Ukraine conducted deep strikes inside Russia, targeting a missile production plant in Udmurtia and energy facilities in Belgorod and Samara. In response, Russia temporarily suspended flights at several airports.

Moscow’s claims
On 26 February, Russia launched aerial assaults, using nearly 300 drones and several missiles across Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rig and Lviv. The attack damaged energy grids, logistics corridors and residential infrastructure. Ukrainian air defences claimed to have intercepted a significant proportion of missiles.

The West View
On 25 February, the UNGA adopted a resolution supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity with 107 votes in favour, 12 against and 51 abstentions. On the same day, more than 30 leaders in the “coalition of the willing” urged Russia for an unconditional ceasefire.

On 23 February, Hungary and Slovakia threatened to block a EUR 90 billion EU loan package and further sanctions against Russia unless oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline resumed. The clash exposed internal EU tensions over energy and financial support for Ukraine.

What are the issues?
First, escalation in strike intensity rather than territorial breakthrough. In previous weeks, Russian advances around Pokrovsk and Kupyansk showcased increasing ground pressure. This week, however, a change was seen in the scale of reciprocal long-range attacks. Russia’s near-300-drone barrage expanded targeting into logistics networks, rail infrastructure and municipal systems, signalling an effort to degrade Ukraine’s defence. Simultaneously, Ukraine deepened its strike reach into Russian industrial and energy facilities.

Second, Europe’s energy relationship with Russia remains unresolved. While the EU reduced its reliance on Russian pipeline gas and imposed sanctions, Russian crude exports globally remain substantial (Asian markets). Within Europe, Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely heavily on the Druzhba pipeline, and this week’s dispute exposed how energy dependence still shapes political leverage. Despite declarations of energy autonomy since 2022, the EU has diversified rather than fully cut off Russian energy links.

Third, Ukraine’s defence systems are under strain. Ukrainian air defences intercepted a mass proportion of incoming drones and missiles, preventing wider devastation this week. However, the scale and frequency of Russian infiltration attacks reflect attempts to exhaust interceptor stocks and test resilience. The UK’s new support package, Europe’s joint low-cost drone initiative, and Ukraine’s expanding production partnerships in the UK and Germany also indicate a shift from emergency assistance to longer-term industrial integration.

Fourth, the UN Security Council continues to reflect paralysis in global governance. Since 2022, the Council has been unable to adopt binding resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion due to Russia’s veto power as a permanent member. While humanitarian briefings and emergency sessions continue, the UNSC has not altered the ground dynamics. Diplomatic momentum has shifted instead to the General Assembly, where resolutions carry political weight but no enforcement power.

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa
Sudan: Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
On 23 February, the Chadian government closed the eastern border with Sudan after several soldiers and civilians were killed in recent clashes. Chad's Minister of Communications, Mahamat Gassim Cherif, said that the decision was made after  “repeated incursions and violations committed by the forces involved in the conflict in Sudan on Chadian territory." He added: The closure “aims to prevent any risk of the conflict spreading to our soil, to protect our fellow citizens and refugee populations, and to guarantee the stability and territorial integrity of our country."

On 21 February, during a fight between Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and militias linked to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the border town of Tina, five Chadian soldiers and three civilians were killed. Meanwhile, on 22 February, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led government condemned Uganda for hosting the head of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, as an "insult" to the Sudanese people. Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “This unprecedented step insults humanity before it insults the Sudanese people, and at the same time, it disregards the lives of innocent people killed due to the behaviour of Hemedti and his terrorist militia."

The development also came after the UNSC imposed new sanctions on four RSF leaders over atrocities in el-Fasher.

What are the issues?
Sudan: A genocide call, regional tensions and limited international response
During the previous week, a UN fact-finding mission in its report accused the RSF of carrying out mass killings in el-Fasher in October 2025, which pointed to a genocide. According to the report, more than 6,000 people were killed in three days during the siege. Following the capture of the city, the entire Darfur region came under the RSF. It also signalled the RSF's consolidation of a parallel government and strategic upper hand in the war.

Since December 2025, the Sudanese civil war has moved closer to the Chadian border, prompting regional tensions. Since the beginning of the war, Chad has taken in over one million refugees. The border communities, especially Zaghawas, belonging to the same ethnic group but divided by the Chad-Sudan border, have had different positions on the Sudanese civil war. Ethnic tensions and clashes are common among the Zaghawa communities of Chad and Sudan.  DW reported that the RSF fighters pursued the rival factions into clashes along the border. The Sudanese non-Arab Zaghawa ethnic group supports the SAF and has been a major target of the RSF atrocities in Darfur. Additionally, Chad has been accused by the SAF of supplying weapons from the UAE to the RSF, which the country has denied.

Further, the international genocide calls in Sudan came after three years of violent conflict between the RSF and the SAF, which is on the brink of dividing the country. Besides the call and sanctions, international actors and bodies have been unable to prevent the continuing human rights atrocities. Besides, the UAE and Iran are allegedly supporting the RSF and the SAF with weapon supply. The abundant flow of weapons, despite the UN arms embargo, has given the warring parties an incentive to disregard sanctions and condemnations and continue the violence.

What does it mean?
The latest development along the Sudan-Chad border highlights how the warring sides are taking tactical advantage of the border tensions to gain the upper hand. Chad's latest move to close the border points to a precaution to avoid the regional spillover of the war. However, ethnic tensions along the Chad border are not limited to Chad; they are also common along the Sudan-Ethiopia and Sudan-South Sudan borders. The warring sides may likely carryout similar moves along the other vulnerable borders, which highlights growing concerns that the Sudanese civil war is destabilising the region.

Further, the slow pace of international response to the RSF's genocide in Sudan points to ineffective international institutions, a lack of interest and the failure of existing mechanisms to prevent and stop another genocide in Darfur.

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