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CWA # 2031, 20 March 2026
Conflict Weekly
The US-Iran War, Week Three | Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes | Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation

  IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly Focus Note
The US-Iran War, Week Three:
Multi-front Escalation and Economic Fallouts
Rohini Reenum

In the news
US-Israeli offensive
Between 13 and 14 March, the US conducted strikes on Iran's Kharg Island, targeting military installations while sparing oil infrastructure. The US Central Command claimed to have targeted 90 military sites on the Island. On 14 March, a missile strike on an industrial site in the central Iranian city of Isfahan killed at least 15 people. On the same day, President Trump revealed that he has appealed to China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom to join the US in securing the Strait of Hormuz. Later, he called on all “the Countries of the World that receive Oil through the Hormuz Strait” to join the coalition, making a special mention of NATO. No countries have made any announcement so far regarding joining the coalition. On 15 March, US President Donald Trump threatened Iran with further attacks on the Kharg Island if it continued blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

On 17 March, the Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, claimed that Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Head, Ali Larijani, and commander of the Basij paramilitary forces, Gholamreza Soleimani, were killed in overnight strikes. On the following day, Iran confirmed their deaths, vowing revenge. On 18 March, President Trump criticised NATO allies and partners for failing to provide stronger military support in efforts to end Iran’s chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz. On the same day, Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars field, and Iran confirmed the killing of Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in an overnight attack by Israel.

Iran’s Response
Between 13 and 18 March, Iran continued to target US military bases across the Middle East, central Israel, and sporadic attacks in the Gulf countries.

On 18 March, there were multiple drone attacks in Iraq, including near the Baghdad airport and the US embassy in the Green Zone. On the same day, an Iraqi armed group claimed responsibility for 28 drone strikes across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan over the past 15 days. In response to the South Pars field attack, Iran's IRGC  launched attacks on several energy sites in the Gulf countries, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas facility, where authorities reported significant damage, and at the United Arab Emirates’ Habshan ?gas facility, where operations were suspended. Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, in an interview, said that “This is America’s war” and blamed the US for the regional escalation.

Following the killing of three senior leaders, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the “cowardly assassination” of his “dear colleagues” and added that their “path will continue stronger than before.”

Regional Responses
On 18 March, Al Jazeera reported that Saudi Arabia was hosting an emergency meeting of foreign ministers from Arab and Muslim countries in Riyadh to discuss Iranian retaliation. On the same day, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry made a strong statement following the Iranian attack on its Ras Laffan gas facility. The statement read “Qatar considers this assault a dangerous escalation, a flagrant violation of its sovereignty, and a direct threat to its national security.”

On 19 March, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan declared that the “little trust” rebuilt with Iran over the last few years is now “completely shattered.” Farhan also warned that “The Kingdom and its partners possess significant capabilities, and the patience we have shown is not unlimited.”

Developments within the US
On 18 March, US National Counterterrorism Center director Joe Kent tendered his public resignation protesting the Iran War. In his statement, he claimed that “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby.”

Issues at large
1. The rapid multi-front escalation
In the third week, the war has significantly escalated across all fronts, with the killing of three key senior Iranian leaders, targeting of its strategic assets, such as the Kharg Island, and its biggest gas field. In retaliation, Tehran has also indiscriminately targeted energy reserves and infrastructure across the Gulf countries, expanding its targets dramatically. On the maritime front, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, with Iran allowing only a few ships to pass per day based on the ship’s flagged state. With key mediators in the Middle East like Qatar and the UAE caught in the War’s crosshairs, a defiant Iran and an unwilling Trump, there naturally has been no talk of any ceasefire/peace negotiations. The only development on this front has been President Trump’s assurance that henceforth, Israel will not attack any of Tehran’s gas fields.

2. Pushback, yet reluctance of the Gulf countries to militarily retaliate
Following escalating Iranian aggression, the response from Gulf countries has shifted from defensive posturing to an active, coordinated pushback, stopping short of active military retaliation. For instance, Saudi Arabia issued warnings of military retaliation, and the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs labelled the attack on its gas field a “calculated act of economic terrorism.” Additionally, Qatar has also expelled key Iranian military and security officials along with their staff from its territory. Despite this hardening of their stance, the Gulf countries have maintained a policy of strategic non-retaliation, possibly for the fear of an all-out regional war, its long-term economic ramifications, and being viewed domestically as fighting an Israeli War. Non-retaliation also helps them maintain neutrality and secure international support.

3. Lack of support for the US-Israeli offensive
During the first two weeks, the US allies' lack of support for the Iran War was reflected in their measured statements. However, in the third week, with Trump’s direct appeals for joining the coalition rejected, traditional US allies have made their stance clearer. Further, there are signs of growing divergence of opinion among US allies in the Middle East as well. Interestingly, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi made a surprise statement in an Economist opinion stating that “the United States has lost control of its foreign policy and is involved in a war that is not its own.” This lack of support for the War at the home front was also reflected in the high-profile resignation of Trump’s counterterrorism aide, which not only reflected a difference of opinion but also put under scrutiny the pretext and rationale for starting the war itself.

4. Global economic fallouts
While the first two weeks of the War pushed oil prices past USD 100, the recent attacks on gas fields have triggered a significant global supply shock. Brent crude, which hovered around USD 70 before the war, has surged to USD 126 following the Ras Laffan attack. QatarEnergy confirmed that the strikes wiped out 17 per cent of Qatar’s LNG capacity. Experts have warned that repairs could take 3 to 5 years, creating a long-term structural deficit in global gas supply. The Hormuz Blockade has also adversely impacted the global energy supply, which is currently falling 20 million barrels per day (mb/d) short of demand.

In perspective
With expanded targeting of energy reserves and infrastructure, the War has metamorphosed from an earlier precise decapacitation military campaign to a comprehensive energy war, threatening the global energy supply chain and immediate and future energy security. With the intensification of Iranian retaliation across the Middle East and consequent growing frustration among the Gulf countries, the region could very well be at the precipice of a total regional conflagration.

The successive killing of key Iranian leaders has also hardened Iran’s defiance and rhetoric, which views the Israeli-US offensive as an existential threat to the country. This makes negotiations difficult and only heightens the threat of miscalculation. Further, President Trump is also beginning to face the repercussions of starting a unilateral war, both from his allies and at home. Overall, the trajectory of this war is becoming difficult to predict, with its progression and expansion, and a lot will depend on who blinks first and calls for de-escalation.

 

Click here for recent and related publications:
Rohini Reenum, “The US Iran War, Week Two: Expanding Fronts, Shifting Goalposts, and Global Fallout,” Conflict Weekly #323, 13 March 2026

Rohini Reenum, “The US-Iran War, Week One: Rapid Escalation, Regional Spillover, Global Uncertainty,” Conflict Weekly #322, 06 March 2026

 

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Conflict Weekly Focus Note
Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict:
Broken ceasefire, Expanding military strikes and Worsening humanitarian situation
Akshath Kaimal

In the news
On 15 March, hostilities continued between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the former launching airstrikes in Kandahar province; earlier Kabul fired mortar shells into Bajaur district of KP, killing four civilians.

On 16 March, Pakistan conducted airstrikes on Kabul and Nangarhar province, saying it targeted technical support infrastructure and ammunition storage in Kabul. The same day, Afghanistan accused Pakistan of striking a drug rehabilitation facility in Kabul and killing over 400 civilians. Afghan government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid called the strike a “crime against humanity.” Pakistan rejected the claim, saying it only targeted military infrastructure in Kabul.

On 17 March, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) confirmed the strike on the medical facility; on 18 March, it said it had recorded 143 deaths from the strike.

On 18 March, following pressure from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkiye, both countries announced a pause to the fighting. Islamabad said its operations would be paused from midnight on Thursday to midnight on Tuesday.

Issues at large
1. The ceasefire in tatters
In October 2025, Pakistan and Afghanistan were engaged in a brief military confrontation.  A ceasefire agreement was reached with the help of Qatar and Turkiye. Under the deal, Kabul agreed not to “support groups carrying out attacks against the Government of Pakistan.” However, the two sides continued trading fire, albeit with less intensity, as Pakistan felt Kabul was not doing enough to stop the flow of terrorists from its territory into Pakistan. A series of terrorist attacks in January and February 2026 prompted Islamabad to conduct airstrikes inside Afghanistan, with Kabul retaliating with its own attacks. The Taliban denies Pakistan’s claim that it supports terrorist groups - especially the TTP - that have been conducting attacks within Pakistan. Kabul, instead, blames Islamabad for being the aggressor and failing to address its own internal security issues. The initial ceasefire agreement was fragile but saw military hostilities recede by the end of 2025. With clashes intensifying over the last three weeks, that ceasefire is now effectively broken.

2. The expanding geographical scope of attacks by Pakistan and Afghanistan
During October 2025, Pakistan primarily targeted Taliban and militant camps near the border. But this time around, Islamabad has expanded its attacks to the interiors of Afghanistan, primarily Kabul and, more recently, Kandahar. Pakistan has also expanded its attacks on Taliban military and technical infrastructure, both along the border and in Kabul. This expansion resulted in a drug rehabilitation facility in Kabul being hit by Pakistani airstrikes, killing over 140 civilians. Although less intense, Afghanistan has also struck the interiors of Pakistan, particularly Quetta, Kohat and Rawalpindi. Kabul used drones to conduct these attacks, which injured several, two among them children. This signals an expansion in the geographical scope of attacks from both sides.

3. Conflicting data on attacks and casualties
Pakistan, on the one hand, has consistently provided figures on the number of militants killed, injured, checkposts captured and military equipment destroyed, without shedding any light on civilian casualties. Afghanistan, on the other hand, provides figures relating to its own operations, but primarily highlights the civilian casualties of Pakistani attacks, accusing Islamabad of indiscriminately targeting civilians, which Pakistan denies. Meanwhile, the UN has also been providing figures on civilian casualties, but they usually differ from those of the other two parties. For example, Afghanistan says that over 400 civilians were killed in the Pakistani airstrike on the drug rehabilitation facility in Kabul. At the same time, the UN announced the number was actually 143, and Pakistan denied attacking the facility in the first place. This makes it difficult to understand the direct impact of the hostilities on civilians.

4. The international response
Countries like China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkiye have been primarily calling for hostilities. President Erdogan of Turkiye offered to help restore the initial ceasefire to help end the fighting. China has also repeatedly offered to mediate as it maintains warm relations with both countries. The UK and the US also expressed concern over the violence. India has backed Afghanistan and also highlighted Pakistan’s failure to control its internal security situation. The United Nations, through its human rights chief Volker Türk, has expressed concern over the rising civilian toll, with a majority of them being children. Ultimately, it was Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkiye that managed to secure a temporary pause in fighting.

In perspective
First, a conflict with no end in sight. While fighting has been paused at the moment, Pakistan has said that it would resume its operations from next week. Both sides seem to be at an impasse.

Second, the border closures and worsening impact on civilians. The hostilities this time are having a far worse impact on civilians. Additionally, Pakistan has also ramped up action against illegal Afghan nationals, arresting thousands across the country. Prolonged border closures have resulted in trade losses of around USD 2 million per day. This can expand displacement, worsening the humanitarian situation.

 

Click here to read recent and related commentaries:
Akshath Kaimal, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes: Another round of cross-border attacks,” Conflict Weekly #321, 27 February 2026

Akshath Kaimal, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Disputed border, TTP attacks and heightened tensions,” Conflict Weekly #313, 31 December 2026

Lekshmi MK, “Pakistan-Taliban Peace Talks: Background, Issues, Challenges and Implications,” PR Commentary, 31 December 2026

 

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Conflict Weekly Focus Note
Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation:
Expanding Israeli Military Operations and the Reshaping of Southern Lebanon
Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 12 March, Hezbollah and the IRGC, in a coordinated strike, launched a barrage of over 200 missiles targeting Israel, in a steep escalation of hostilities. In response, Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, stated that the Israeli military has been instructed to expand its operations in Lebanon. Katz warned Lebanese President Joseph Aoun that if the Lebanese government could not prevent Hezbollah from attacking Israel, Israel "would do it ourselves.”

On 13 March, Defence Minister Katz stated that the IDF is expanding its military operations in Lebanon, issuing evacuation orders and launching strikes at the heart of Beirut. He threatened to unleash Gaza-scale destruction. Hezbollah’s leader, Naim Qassem, responded that the group has “prepared ourselves for a long confrontation.” On the same day, the Norwegian Refugee Council stated that Israel's evacuation orders for southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut now covered about 1,470 square kilometres or about 14 per cent of the country. Israeli officials also stated that the displaced population will not be allowed to return to their homes until Israeli citizens are safe from the threat of Hezbollah

On 16 March, Israeli officials indicated that Israel and Lebanon are expected to hold talks, but President Aoun’s demands for a ceasefire are questionable.

On 18 March, Reuters reported that Israel has more than doubled the number of troops along its border with Lebanon and is searching homes in southern Lebanese villages that the military has ordered to evacuate.

On 19 March, Israeli forces declared that two landbridges over the Litani River, connecting southern Lebanon with the rest of the country, had been destroyed in strikes.

Issues at large
1. A brief note on the geographic and demographic importance of the southern Lebanon and Israel-Hezbollah confrontations
Israel’s strikes are closely concentrated across south Lebanon, directly adjacent to Israel's northern border. Geographically, the south, precisely the border strip south of the Litani River was the zone Hezbollah was required to vacate under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, 2006. Hezbollah never fully complied; instead, it rebuilt its military capabilities there. For Hezbollah, this region is also the primary operational zone, hosting most of its military assets and command centres, and the hilly and rugged terrain is suitable for guerrilla operations.

Demographically, southern Lebanon is the heartland of Lebanon's Shia Muslim community, which forms Hezbollah's core support base and recruitment pool. The group has dominated the areas for decades through military control, social services and political influence. For Israel, operations here directly disrupt Hezbollah's grassroots infrastructure and forward-deployed personnel. Similarly, in Beirut, the southern suburb of Dahiyeh is also a Hezbollah stronghold, hosting a large Shia population, displaced by Israeli attacks in south Lebanon since the 2006 war.

2. Israel’s reluctance to negotiate with Lebanon and Beirut’s weak control over Hezbollah
Israel's reluctance to negotiate stems from a deep scepticism toward the Lebanese government’s ability to deliver on its commitments to disarm Hezbollah. Beirut’s incapacity in enforcing previous agreements and curbing Hezbollah militarily has significantly weakened its diplomatic position with Tel Aviv. The administration lacks both the military capacity and political will against Hezbollah’s political and military stronghold in the country. The administration's fear of triggering an internal collapse allows Hezbollah to act independently, aligning with Iranian interests.  

3. Israel’s strategic interests in southern Lebanon and the Litani River
Israel regards the Litani River as its ”natural northern border,” which functions as a de facto “red line” and geographic buffer. Israel's operations in the region claim to create a temporary “forward defence area” or security perimeter south of the Litani by pushing Hezbollah northward and neutralising its infrastructure to enforce the demilitarised buffer without permanent annexation. Israel seeks to depopulate the southern strip and extend military control over the region to prevent the resurgence of Hezbollah in the territory, securing Tel Aviv’s northern borders.

In perspective
Israel’s targeted strikes in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs are a dual-pronged strategy to reduce Hezbollah's military and operational capacity and also its hold over these sub-regions. By hitting its core infrastructure, command centres, launch sites and tunnel networks, Israel aims to erode Hezbollah’s ability to carry out cross-border operations.

Second, Israel’s strikes also mark an attempt to erode Hezbollah's domestic support among its most loyal Shia base by triggering widespread public frustration over persistent destruction and suffering, while simultaneously dispersing the population through mass evacuation orders, repeated bombardments and displacement. This forced relocation prevents the formation of a unified collective force or resistance network and fosters resentment toward Hezbollah for "dragging" Lebanon into war on Iran's behalf. Over time, such a strain could complicate Hezbollah’s standing domestically, potentially making it easier for the administration of Lebanon to push more firmly for restrictions or disarmament, especially if public support for the group becomes more fragmented.

 

Click here for recent and related publications:
Brighty Ann Sarah, “Continuing Israel-Hezbollah Confrontation: Attacks in South Lebanon, Beirut’s Conundrum, and Tel Aviv’s Greater Goals,” Conflict Weekly #323, 13 March 2026

 

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CW Column: The War in Ukraine
Massive drone attacks, Growing energy leverage and Drifting peace efforts
Padmashree Anandhan

In the news
War on the ground
On 16 March, Zelenskyy called for tighter control over Ukraine’s drone exports amid rising global demand, particularly from the US and the Middle East. He also noted delays in peace talks, stating Ukraine was awaiting responses from the US and Russia. On 17 March, Zelenskyy visited the UK, where Prime Minister Keir Starmer warned that the Middle East war could become a “windfall for Putin” through rising energy revenues. On 18 March, the Ukrainian military deployed over 200 anti-drone military experts to Gulf countries, including the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to counter Iranian-designed Shahed drones. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that drone warfare is expanding beyond state actors.

Moscow View
On 15 March, Russia launched a large-scale missile and drone assault across Ukraine, deploying over 400 drones and dozens of missiles, targeting energy infrastructure and civilian areas. Multiple regions, including Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Mykolaiv, reported casualties and damage. Russian strikes caused sustained damage to urban centres like Kharkiv, Sloviansk and Zaporizhzhia, particularly targeting residential areas and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine’s strikes have focused on military-industrial and logistical targets inside Russia.

West View
On 14 March, the US postponed another round of trilateral peace talks due to the Middle East conflict, while also issuing temporary waivers on Russian oil sanctions. US-Russia discussions continued without Ukrainian participation, with a partial focus on energy cooperation. On 18 March, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas cautioned that rising energy prices and diversion of air defence systems to the Middle East could benefit Russia. She said: “If we just go back to business as usual, we will have more of this – more wars.” On the same day, Ukraine confirmed Druzhba pipeline repairs were progressing, but restoration of oil flows to Hungary and Slovakia would take weeks.

Issues at large
1. Russia’s gradual pressure in eastern Ukraine and intensifying attacks on key urban and energy centres
Russia continues to hold roughly one-fifth of Ukrainian territory and is consolidating its position in the Donbas, with reported advances toward strategic hubs such as Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. While gains remain incremental rather than decisive, Russia’s approach combines slow ground advances with sustained aerial bombardment. Cities in eastern Ukraine, including Kharkiv, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Zaporizhzhia, have faced repeated missile, drone and glide bomb attacks, leading to significant civilian and infrastructure damage. At the same time, Ukraine has shown the ability to counter Russian offensives through air defence and localised counterattacks.

2. Russia leveraging the global energy crisis and negotiations
The war in the Middle East has driven oil prices upward, allowing Russia to boost revenues despite sanctions. US moves to ease certain restrictions on Russian oil have further enabled this trend. Russia is now positioning itself as a reliable supplier in a disrupted global market and signalling potential resumption of energy flows to Europe under favourable conditions. Meanwhile, disputes within Europe, involving Hungary and Slovakia, show continued dependence on Russian energy and difficulty in energy transition.

3. The Middle East reshaping the strategic environment of the Ukraine war
The diversion of global attention and military resources has directly affected Ukraine, particularly through the reallocation of air defence systems and delays in diplomatic engagement. Rising energy prices linked to the Middle East conflict are also strengthening Russia’s economic position. Ukraine’s leadership has openly expressed concern that the conflict is losing centrality in global strategic priorities, which could prolong the war and weaken support.

4. Europe’s political signal for Ukraine
The European leaders have reiterated commitments to Ukraine’s security and rejected calls to normalise ties with Russia. However, internal divisions over energy dependence, financial assistance and strategic priorities persist. While support remains firm in rhetoric, the ability to maintain cohesion and sustained engagement is increasingly challenged by competing geopolitical pressures.

In perspective
Compared to previous weeks, the pattern remains consistent. Russia is not achieving rapid breakthroughs but is steadily degrading Ukraine’s defensive capacity and urban resilience through persistent strikes, while Ukraine relies on interception and targeted counterstrikes to stabilise the front. Russia’s ability to combine gradual territorial advances with sustained infrastructure strikes, alongside renewed energy leverage, positions it to endure the conflict. Ukraine remains resilient, adapting through technological innovation and defensive effectiveness, but the overlap of multiple conflicts is diluting diplomatic momentum and exposing cracks within Western support structures. As a result, the war is likely to be prolonged.

Padmashree Anandhan, “Continuing Strikes and Inconsistent Diplomatic Efforts,” Conflict Weekly #323, 13 March 2026

Padmashree Anandhan, “Four Years of War in Ukraine,” Conflict Weekly, 21 February 2026

Padmashree Anandhan, “Ukraine Peace talks in Abu Dhabi,” Conflict Weekly, 14 February 2026

 

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CW Column: Conflicts in Africa
Sudan-Chad tensions and the Boko Haram attack in Nigeria's Maiduguri
Anu Maria Joseph

In the news
1. Sudan-Chad
On 19 March, the Chadian government said that a drone launched from Sudan killed 17 people in the Tine town of Chad. Chadian President, Mahamat Idriss Deby, has ordered the military to retaliate against any further strikes.

On the same day, according to Chad's government spokesperson, Tine has been targeted despite "various firm warnings addressed to the different belligerents in the Sudan conflict and the closure of the border." The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) denied and blamed each other for carrying out the attack.

2. Nigeria
On 17 March, the BBC reported that at least 23 people were killed and 108 were injured in a series of suicide bombings in Nigeria's city of Maiduguri in Borno state. Nigeria's military has blamed Boko Haram for the attack.

On the same day, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu condemned the attack, calling it "profoundly upsetting” and the "desperate act of the evil-minded terrorist group."

Issue at large
1. Sudan-Chad: Cross-border tensions and threat of a regional spillover of civil war
Ever since the civil war in Sudan began in April 2023, Chad has been the most affected neighbouring state. According to the UN, Chad is hosting more than one million war refugees. Chad shares a 1,400-kilometre-long porous border with western Sudan, which includes almost the entirety of the Darfur region and is currently under the control of the RSF. In February, the RSF gained control of the Sudan's side of Tine town, which is separated from Chad's Tine by a narrow stream. The latest attack came despite Chad's warnings to the two warring sides and a closure of the border in late February following a previous clash in Tine. Five Chadian soldiers were killed in the attack.

Meanwhile, the attack on border towns also took place along ethnic lines. The majority of the population in towns like Tine is non-Arab Zaghawa. However, the same ethnic group is divided by the Chad-Sudan border and has different positions on the civil war. Ethnic tensions are common in the border towns. The Sudanese Zaghawas support the SAF and have been a major target of the RSF atrocities in Darfur. Additionally, RSF pursues the rival ethnic factions in the border towns into clashes.

2. Nigeria: Increasing violence despite security partnership with the US
The city of Maiduguri is known for the origin of Boko Haram and used to be the epicentre of violence in the mid-2010s. The latest attack on the city is said to be the deadliest attack on the city in years. It also comes as Nigeria battles a recent increase in complex security crises involving several armed groups across the country. Boko Haram, the ISAWP and other armed groups, including bandits, have carried out more than 15 major attacks this year, including the 4 January attack that killed 120 people in Kwara state.

In the backdrop of an increasing security crisis, Nigeria has expanded security cooperation with the US after Trump accused the Nigerian government of failing to protect Christians. The US-Nigeria military cooperation began with the US military strikes against IS-linked groups in Nigeria's Sokoto state in December, in collaboration with the Nigerian government. In February, 100 US military troops arrived in Maiduguri to provide intelligence, military equipment and technical and operational coordination. However, so far, the US-Nigeria security partnership has been unable to control the increasing number of attacks.

What does it mean?
1. Sudan-Chad
The Sudan-Chad border town of Tine is increasingly becoming a hotspot of violence and a symbol of the regional spillover of the Sudanese civil war. The warring sides appear to be exploiting border tensions to gain the upper hand. Besides, Chad has already been accused of being involved in the civil war by supplying the UAE's weapons to the RSF. The increasing tensions highlight that Chad is highly likely to be drawn into Sudan's war.

2. Nigeria
The latest major attack on Maiduguri has increased the fear of the return of peak Boko Haram insurgency in the city, despite the US deployment. Besides Borno, Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks are frequently recorded in other states, including Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Katsina, Kwara and Sokoto. It implies that the increase is not only in number but also in geographic spread. While the Nigerian government welcomes US support, there is growing domestic concern about external influence on Nigeria's internal security decisions and US economic and geopolitical interests in the region.


ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Rohini Reenum is a PhD scholar at NIAS.

Akshath K is a Research Assistant at NIAS.

Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at NIAS and is currently pursuing post-graduation at Stella Maris College.

Padmashree Anandan is a Project Associate at NIAS.

Anu Maria Joseph was a Project Associate at NIAS.

Issues in Peace and Conflict This Week
Regional Roundups
Abhimanyu Solanki, Adwitiyo Das, Aishal Yousaf, Akshath K, Brighty Ann Sarah, Glynnis Winona Beschi, Kirsten Wilfred Coelho, Lekshmi MK, R. Preetha, Siddhi Haylur, Sreemaya Nair, Tonica Sharon C, Vani Vaishnavi Jupudi, Vishal Manish M, Yesasvi Koganti

East, South and Southeast Asia
Afghanistan: Pakistani air strikes kill six Afghans near Kandahar
On 13 March, Reuters reported that Pakistan had bombed a fuel depot near the airport of Kandahar. The conflict has only gotten worse since last week, and overnight strikes have affected residential parts of Kabul as well. Six people, including children, have been killed in the attacks. Residents in the capital city noted that many woke up to dust and broken windows and walls. The Taliban led regime’s spokesperson stated that the attack would “not go unanswered.” This incident comes to light despite Beijing's efforts to mediate a peaceful end to the conflict.

Afghanistan: Kabul retaliates against Pakistan airstrikes
On 14 March, The Tribune reported that, quoting the Ministry of Defence in Afghanistan, operations were carried out along the Durand Line in response to Pakistan’s airstrikes. According to the report, the Taliban had claimed that 14 Pakistani soldiers were killed in the attack, while 11 were injured. These moves are said to be a part of the Afghan ‘Reject Oppression’ campaign.

Afghanistan: Taliban claims of Pakistan’s air strikes in Kabul killing more than 400
On 17 March, according to news reports, the Taliban claimed Pakistan’s air strike on Kabul killing more than 400 people, the majority of whom were civilians. Pakistan, however, rejects these claims, stating that the air strikes targeted military and “terrorist infrastructure” and insisting that no civilian sites were hit. The strike comes amid rising hostilities between the two countries, with Pakistan accusing Afghanistan of harbouring militants, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has carried out repeated attacks inside Pakistan.

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