Shangri-La Dialogue 2026: Major Statements and Takeaways

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CWA # 2137, 7 June 2026

The World This Week

Shangri-La Dialogue 2026: Major Statements and Takeaways

NIAS Global Politics Team

Shangri-La Dialogue 2026: Four Major Takeaways
Focus on Rules-based maritime order, AI & Cyber Security, and Preventive Diplomacy, but with no consensus

Aishal Hab Yousuf

During 29-31 May, 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, bringing together defence ministers, military leaders, and security experts from across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Discussions focused on regional security, maritime stability, military modernization, and the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Concerns over China's growing military capabilities, maritime security in the South China Sea, defence partnerships such as AUKUS, and the need for stronger regional cooperation featured prominently. Vietnam's President To Lam delivered the keynote address, while several countries used the forum for high-level bilateral defence engagements.

1. The emphasis on UNCLOS and the rules-based maritime order, especially in the Indo-Pacific
The Philippines's Defence Secretary, Gilbert Teodoro, emphasized China’s refusal to participate in the Annex VII proceedings under UNCLOS. He stated that China’s refusal does not absolve it from its legal obligation to comply with the tribunal’s ruling. In addition, he drew attention to China’s preferred course of action: bilateral negotiations. He quoted former Indian Secretary Vijay Gokhale’s recent book China Wars, while characterizing the said bilateral negotiations as a “talk and take strategy.” In this approach, diplomacy may create a façade of restraint while realities on the ground may be quite different. Vietnam’s President, Tô Lâm, also reaffirmed peaceful dispute settlement within the UNCLOS framework. However, he avoided any direct confrontation with Beijing. Australia’s Defence Minister, Richard Marles, also highlighted that the South China Sea continues to depict a trend of extensive militarisation and artificial island construction.

All the speeches imply the longstanding limitation of international law, while the UNCLOS provides a coherent legal architecture, it is still not a strong deterrent, giving way to state impunity.

2. Focus on AI and Cybersecurity in military applications, but with no broad consensus
The dialogue repeatedly mentioned emerging technologies. President Tô Lâm cautioned against AI and autonomous systems making decisions that amplify suspicion and increase the risk of miscalculation, especially in regions with multiple unresolved territorial flashpoints. Minister Marles mentioned satellite-based monitoring and AI-enabled vessel tracking for grey zone attribution. Australia’s 2026 National Defence strategy allocates significant importance to AI for maritime domain awareness. China’s Meng proposed the strongest measures, calling for a legally binding international instrument along the lines of the Chemical Weapons Convention to regulate AI in military applications. He also submitted a position paper on the same, but there was no consensus on a shared protocol, code of conduct, or verification mechanism. While the dialogue incentivized the underlying issue, it failed to produce a pragmatic solution.

3. Repeated emphasis on Preventive Diplomacy, but no tangible action in place
President Tô Lâm delivered the most developed vision for preventive diplomacy, a topic touched upon by a few delegates. His proposal contained dedicated early-warning mechanisms, emergency communication channels, incident management protocols, quasi-formal exchange platforms, and wider confidence-building initiatives linking defence establishments, maritime law enforcement, businesses, and civil society. The primary aim is creating a “credible diplomatic off-ramps before parties become drawn into spirals of escalation.”

Minister Marles cited NATO’s Baltic Sentry operation and the Malacca Straits Patrols as scalable regional models. However, tensions lie in Hegseth’s posture of “strong, quiet, clear” doctrine, which implicitly discourages multilateral dialogue and, in turn, favours bilateral deterrence and hard power. Currently, the US is moving towards transactional burden-sharing, and China remained entirely absent from bilateral engagements throughout the conference. Thus, the multilateral preventive diplomacy infrastructure that delegates advocated for has no major power backing it to come to fruition.

4. High on principles without major mechanisms to reach them
Most speeches were rich in principle but lacking in a practical mechanism. Secretary Hegseth’s framing of the US strategy around “interest alignments” rather than shared values marks a significant shift from the US’s longstanding promotion of liberal internationalism. Akin to Hegseth’s words, other speeches, too, centered on self-reliance and strategic resilience rather than shared norms and collective security, which are considered more conventional for a rules-based liberal order.

Vietnam’s President Tô Lâm offered a highly ambitious vision with early warning systems, emergency communication channels, and preventive diplomacy. However, without the support and facilitation of major powers, the words remain just a mirage.

Proposals to reform multilateral institutions were made by China’s Meng Xiangqing, raising the valid point that the Global South is marginalized when it comes to global security governance; this assertion was largely uncontested by the Global North’s contingent that is increasingly reliant on realpolitik. The disruptions on the Strait of Hormuz had a direct impact on the Indo-Pacific, despite which, during the conference, no coordinated response was proposed. The Shangri La dialogue was firm in its rhetoric on a rules-based order while also accepting its current, gradual erosion in silence.

Aishal Hab Yousuf is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies. Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at NIAS, Bengaluru.

Shangri-La Dialogue 2026:
Who said what

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

During 29-31 May, the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, bringing together defence ministers, military leaders, and security experts from across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Discussions focused on regional security, maritime stability, military modernization, and the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Concerns over China's growing military capabilities, maritime security in the South China Sea, defence partnerships such as AUKUS, and the need for stronger regional cooperation featured prominently. Vietnam's President To Lam delivered the keynote address, while several countries used the forum for high-level bilateral defence engagements.

Tô Lam, President, Viet Nam
On 29 May, President Tô Lam delivered the keynote address of the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue, warning that the world is facing an interconnected crisis of international order, economic development, and strategic trust. He noted that economic competition, geopolitical competition, and emerging technologies are increasing the risk of conflict and instability. He called for stronger crisis-prevention mechanisms, ASEAN-centred regional cooperation, responsible governance of emerging technologies, human security and societal resilience, and preventive diplomacy as recommendations for creating a peaceful Indo-Pacific. Finally asserting that “peace, stability and development” are foundational principles for all peoples, and that they “carry meaning only when translated into concrete actions.”

Pete Hegseth, Secretary of War, United States
On 30 May, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, at the first plenary session on the United States’ Strategy for Peace in the Indo-Pacific, opened his speech with Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury as a realistic approach to America’s national Defence, further discussing the 2026 US National Defence Strategy as America First but not “America alone.” He warned that China’s military buildup poses a challenge to the balance of power in the region, undermining regional security. He argued that the United States, in the case of the Indo-Pacific, aims to sustain equilibrium, preserve stability, and safeguard American interests in the region, highlighting the recent Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing. He asserted that burden sharing among allies in the Pacific was necessary, along with strengthening military capabilities and defence spending, and in this regard, appreciating nations like South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India. Finally, he highlighted the ideas of “peace through strength,” saying that “Those who long for peace must prepare for war.”

Dr José Ramos-Horta, President, Timor-Leste
On 30 May, President José Ramos-Horta delivered a special address at the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue, where he argued that the current international security architecture is “irrelevant,” that preserving the rules-based order requires restraint and dialogue, and that the current conflicts are a failure of global leadership. He highlighted ASEAN as a good example of bringing together nations with vast differences, building trust between nations, and delivering mutual benefits. He asserted the importance of preventive diplomacy, proposed exploring a “zone of peace” in the South China Sea, and argued the importance of rules being applied consistently. Lastly, he also discussed the dangers of climate change, food insecurity, and weak resilience as threats to security, calling for a “third path” focused on cooperation.

Gilberto Teodoro Jr, Secretary of National Defence, the Philippines
On 31 May, Secretary of National Defence Gilberto Teodoro Jr, at the sixth plenary session on Evolving Security Partnerships in a Fragmenting World, contended that “we are in a period of transition” caused by strained institutions and diverging priorities, and that the international order is changing. In his statement, he noted the tenth anniversary of the Arbitral Award of the South China Sea, affirming the importance of adhering to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), criticizing China’s rejection of the ruling, and warning against coercive behaviour, foreign interference, and economic manipulation. Furthermore, he presented a “vision of the Philippines” as the “Archipelagic Sentinel,” “Guardian of the Freedom of the Seas,” and “indispensable to Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.” He highlighted the importance of international law, ASEAN-centrality, deterrence, and enhanced regional cooperation with partners such as Australia, Japan, and the United States. Lastly, he called on countries to protect human life, to protect migrant workers from Asian countries, and asserted that “in a fragmenting world, convergence is not merely an option.”

Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia
On 30 May, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, at the third plenary session on Asia’s Maritime Security Disorder, warned that maritime security is deteriorating because of attacks against subsea critical infrastructure, noting events in the Baltic Sea and Indo-Pacific, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the militarisation of the South China Sea, and shadow fleets operating in grey zones. He argued that the post-Cold War assumption that economic interdependence ensures security is no longer valid, calling for stronger maritime capabilities, regional cooperation, and protection of critical infrastructure. Additionally, he noted the importance of the “stabilisation of the Australia–China relationship.” On the international rules-based order, he noted its imperfections, however, arguing that “we are so much better off with it than without it.” Lastly, he closed his statement by illustrating Australia’s investment in ensuring security, cooperation, and peace in the region.

Chan Chun Sing, Minister for Defence and Coordinating Minister for Public Services, Singapore
On 31 May, Minister for Defence Chan Chun Sing, at the sixth plenary session on Evolving Security Partnerships in a Fragmenting World, presented Singapore’s perspective on the nature of conflict as extending beyond geography, military firepower, and “beyond the here right now.” This, he explained, was because of countries being hyper-connected across borders, citing the example of the supply chain disruptions caused by the conflict in the Middle East, a result of multidimensional systems of power like economic leverage, and because conflicts are about the setting of frameworks for tomorrow’s contests. He called for strengthening international rules and institutions, developing flexible issue-based partnerships, and building domestic cohesion as security measures against evolving conflict, presenting examples like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and Singapore’s work with the Netherlands and South Korea to convene global discussions on military-AI governance. Lastly, stating that the goal for countries remains the same, “to build a better future for the next generation.”

Meng Xiangqing, Professor; Member, National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China
On 30 May, Professor Meng Xiangqing, at the simultaneous special session one, on Managing Threats to Strategic Stability, warned that strategic stability is under threat due to nuclear risks, weakening arms-control mechanisms, the militarization of emerging technologies such as AI, and disorder in global governance resulting from disrupted multilateral mechanisms. He criticized AUKUS, conveyed concerns over Japan’s security posture, and noted the challenge to traditional rules of engagement and ethics of war, highlighting the importance of stronger multilateralism, inclusive co-governance, greater representation for developing countries, expansion of BRICS, SCO, and ASEAN, a renewed commitment to non-proliferation, and human control over warfare and weapons.

Cui Tiankai, Former Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China
On 30 May, Former Vice Minister Cui Tiankai, at the simultaneous special session two, on Enhancing Littoral Security in Asia, noted the diversity of challenges in the context of littoral security. He argued that these challenges must be resolved through respect for sovereignty, peaceful negotiation, and inclusive partnerships rather than military alliances or bloc politics. He stressed that for a free and open Asia-Pacific, confrontational blocs and exclusive security arrangements divide the region and deprive other countries of the right to development. Additionally, he expressed concern about instability in the Strait of Hormuz, noting its impact on China. Finally, concluding by saying that “if anyone tries to have total and absolute freedom at the expense of others’ freedom, then there is no freedom for anyone.”

Koizumi Shinjirō, Minister of Defence, Japan
On 31 May, Minister of Defence Koizumi Shinjirō, at the sixth plenary session on Managing Regional Tensions Amid Global Competition, highlighted that the Indo-Pacific is “ the world’s centre of growth,” which is currently facing challenges such as economic coercion, disinformation, and complex competition. He reaffirmed Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (noting the implications of an “unfree and closed” Strait of Hormuz), stressing that all nations must be free to choose their own future without coercion, while calling for stronger deterrence, defence cooperation, transparency, and dialogue. Against Japan being labeled “new militarism,” he asserted Japan’s lack of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers, respect for international law and the United Nations, “path as a peace-loving nation” valued by the international community, and its continued cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the Quad, and ASEAN.

Catherine Vautrin, Minister for the Armed Forces and Veterans, France
On 30 May, Minister for the Armed Forces and Veterans Catherine Vautrin, at the third plenary session on Asia’s Maritime Security Disorder, argued that maritime security is central to economic resilience and global stability, citing France’s presence in the Red Sea through Operation Aspides, the La Pérouse exercise, and the battle against piracy in the Indian Ocean through Operation Atalanta. She warned of the growing threats to maritime security from shadow fleets (discussing Russian shadow fleets), geopolitical tensions, targeting of critical underwater infrastructure, organized crime, drug trafficking, and climate change. Lastly, she asserted that France, as “a nation of the Indo-Pacific committed to its strategic autonomy,” is committed to free and open maritime areas and to ensuring the sovereignty of every state.

Rajesh Kumar Singh, Defence Secretary, Ministry of Defence, India
On 30 May, Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh, at the simultaneous special session three, on Building Defence Industrial Resilience, argued that in a time of geopolitical uncertainty, vulnerabilities caused by conflicts and strategic competition, defence preparedness is necessary. He highlighted how, for India, this has meant self-reliance and trusted interdependence, diversified manufacturing networks, and reforms in defence production, innovation, and exports – this, he argued, has transformed India into an emerging, dependable defence manufacturing and maintenance hub. Speaking on the Indo-Pacific, he asserted the importance of cooperative frameworks, secure sea lanes, stable supply chains, ASEAN-centrality, multilateral mechanisms, and inclusive and reliable partnerships. Lastly, stating that “resilient defence industries must support peace and stability and not deepen divisions.”

Apart from these statements, representatives from Greece, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Poland, Germany, New Zealand, Lithuania, Qatar, South Korea, Norway, NATO, ASEAN, and SCO made statements as well.

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.

TWTW Explainer

The Blue Origin Rocket Explosion:
Does this leave Jeff Bezos grounded, Elon Musk unchallenged, and NASA’s lunar timeline in jeopardy?

Acsah H

On 28 May, Blue Origin's heavy-lift “New Glenn” rocket exploded during a static fire test on its launchpad at the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida. The spacecraft was preparing for its fourth orbital mission, scheduled on 04 June, to support Amazon’s LEO broadband constellation mission plans. The enormous fireball was visible for more than a hundred miles. The company has not identified the root cause of the major disaster that destroyed a huge portion of Launch Complex 36, whose ruins can also be seen from the space.

What is Blue Origin?
In 2000, Blue Origin, the Jeff Bezos-owned American aerospace manufacturer and spaceflight services company, was founded. Its primary objectives are to reduce the cost of access to space, harness the vast resources of space, and inspire and mobilize future generations. Its founding philosophy, in its Latin motto Gradatim Ferociter ("Step by Step, Ferociously"), reflects Bezos' vision of moving heavy industry off Earth to preserve the planet, building reusable rockets to make space access economical enough for a permanent human presence beyond Earth.

BO operates two major rocket families: New Shepard, a suborbital vehicle used for space tourism and scientific experiments that carries paying passengers to the edge of space; and New Glenn, a large orbital rocket that made its debut in January 2025 and is designed to compete directly with SpaceX’s Falcon 9. It also develops lunar landers under the Blue Moon programme.

On the explosion, BO responded that, "We experienced an anomaly during today's hotfire test. All personnel have been accounted for. We will provide updates as we learn more." This was shortly followed by Jeff Bezos, who said, "All personnel are accounted for and safe. It's too early to know the root cause but we're already working to find it. Very rough day, but we'll rebuild whatever needs rebuilding and get back to flying. It's worth it." On 31 May, CEO Dave Limp shared the largest update yet, confirming that critical propellant infrastructure remained intact and dismissing speculation about switching rocket configurations. He also pledged to fly again before year's end, which framed the explosion as a setback rather than a turning point.

What does the explosion mean for the launch infrastructure?
The explosion not only destroyed the New Glenn rocket but also severely damaged Launch Complex 36, which was the company’s only orbital launch facility. The Transporter-Erector and Lightning Protection Tower were destroyed beyond repair, while the launch tower sustained heavy charring.

Critically, the propellant farm, fuel tanks, and water tower survived intact, the longest lead-time items, significantly compressing the recovery timeline. According to avaiable report, rather than rebuilding the Transporter-Erector, Blue Origin will adopt a vertical integration concept already in development, removing the pad entirely. Blue Origin targets a return to flight by the end of 2026, whereas NASA suggests a full recovery of the launchpad is only possible by 2028.

What does the explosion mean for Blue Origin’s commitments to NASA?
Blue Origin’s commitments and active contracts with NASA primarily focus on the lunar exploration initiative and commercial infrastructure. In 2018, Blue Origin made its entry into NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) programme; in April 2020, it joined the Human Landing System Competition. In 2021, the company lost to SpaceX in the HLS competition. In September 2022, NASA opened a second HLS Competition; Blue Origin in the following year was selected with a USD 3.4 billion for the HLS contract for Artemis V.

NASA made its first CLPS task order for Blue Moon Mark 1 Cargo Lander to carry science payloads to the Moon's South Pole, which slipped from late 2025 to 2026 and now faces further delays following the explosion. In September 2025, NASA awarded a second CLPS task order, a USD 190 million contract, to deliver the revived VIPER water-hunting rover to the Moon's South Pole in late 2027. NASA restructured Artemis in February 2026, turning the crewed Moon landing into a direct competition between SpaceX and Blue Origin, with Blue Moon Mark 2's first crew-capable flight test targeted for as early as 2027. Finally, just two days before the explosion, NASA awarded Blue Origin a 468 million USD contract to deliver crewed lunar terrain vehicles to the Moon, bringing its total NASA contract exposure to over 4 billion USD and making the May 28 explosion the most consequential technical failure in the company's history, when most of these missions depend entirely on New Glenn returning to flight. Blue Origin cannot get anything to the Moon without New Glenn, and New Glenn is grounded.

Blue Origin offered a lower price than competitors, extra lander capabilities, and a reusable architecture. Where SpaceX's Starship is enormous and requires orbital refueling before reaching the Moon, Blue Moon Mark 2 is simpler and self-contained for initial missions. NASA deliberately spread lunar contracts across both companies to avoid over-dependence on any single provider, a lesson drawn directly from the risks exposed by SpaceX's repeated Starship delay.

What are the implications?
The explosion did not occur in isolation; it was the third significant setback Blue Origin faced in 2026 alone. On 19 April, New Glenn's third mission launched from Cape Canaveral carrying AST SpaceMobile's BlueBird 7 satellite, while the first-stage booster landed successfully on a drone ship for the first time; the upper stage's second engine burn failed to produce sufficient thrust, placing the satellite in an orbit too low to be usable. AST SpaceMobile confirmed the satellite would be de-orbited and destroyed. Blue Origin had only just cleared that grounding when it proceeded to the static fire test that destroyed the rocket and its pad.

The explosion's most immediate consequence falls on NASA's Artemis lunar programme. A prolonged launchpad repair would effectively hand SpaceX's Starship an uncontested position across every crewed and cargo lunar mission simultaneously.

The explosion will likely have implications for NASA's Artemis programme timeline and the nation's efforts to return astronauts to the surface of the Moon. If Blue Moon Mark 2's first crew-capable flight test slips past 2027, SpaceX's Starship Human Landing System despite its own delays, becomes NASA's only viable crewed lander option for Artemis III and IV by default. When New Glenn exploded, it was not just a rocket that burned, it was months of that ambition, and the clearest evidence yet that Blue Origin remains structurally, technically, and operationally behind the competitor it has been trying to catch for a decade.

References
“Blue Origin Rocket Explosion the Largest Ever at Cape Canaveral: Commander," airandspaceforces, 02 June 2026.

“Blue Origin says New Glenn rocket will launch again 'before the end of the year' after explosion,” space.com, 03 June 2026, https://www.space.com/space-exploration/launches-spacecraft/blue-origin-says-new-glenn-rocket-will-launch-again-before-the-end-of-the-year-after-explosion?shem=rimspwouoe.

“Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket explodes during prelaunch testing at Cape Canaveral” SpaceflightNow, 29 May 2026
https://spaceflightnow.com/2026/05/29/blue-origins-new-glenn-rocket-explodes-during-prelaunch-testing-at-cape-canaveral/

“NASA head urges new launcher for Blue Origin’s moon landers to meet Artemis mission deadlines” SpaceflightNow, 04 June 2026
https://spaceflightnow.com/2026/06/04/nasa-head-urges-new-launcher-for-blue-origins-moon-landers-to-meet-artemis-mission-deadlines/?shem=rimspwouoe

Acsah H is a postgraduate student in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at the Manipal Institute of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, MAHE, Manipal, Udupi. She is currently a research intern at NIAS.

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