NATO Summit 2026 I Chinaâ€™s SLBM test in the Pacific

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CWA # 2190, 12 July 2026

The World This Week

NATO Summit 2026 I Chinaâ€™s SLBM test in the Pacific

NIAS Global Politics Team

NATO Summit 2026:
Four takeaways on Alliance unity, Defence commitments, and Support for Ukraine

Lekshmi MK

During 07-08 July, the NATO Summit was held in Ankara, Turkiye. The summit brought together leaders of all 32 NATO member states, along with partner countries including Ukraine, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, as well as leaders from the European Union. The summit concluded with the adoption of the Ankara Summit Declaration, reaffirming the Alliance's commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. During the summit, President Trump reaffirmed that "We're with them all the way," while NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte described the meeting as, making NATO "stronger, fairer and more lethal." Host President Erdogan emphasised unity and called for closer cooperation in addressing shared security challenges. The summit was held against the backdrop of continuing transatlantic uncertainty, the prolonged war in Ukraine, rising European defence spending, renewed US-Iran tensions, and President Trump's calls for greater burden-sharing and renewed claims over Greenland.

The following are four major takeaways from the NATO summit.

1. Reaffirmation of alliance unity amid transatlantic uncertainty
The summit took place amid concerns over the future of transatlantic security. This followed President Trump’s criticisms of NATO and calls for greater European burden-sharing. Against this backdrop, the summit projected unity and reassured allies. Leaders reaffirmed their "ironclad" commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. They also emphasised that collective defence remains the Alliance's core principle, and reiterated their shared commitment to supporting Ukraine and strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence posture. However, President Trump's renewed remarks on Greenland underscored that political uncertainties within the transatlantic relationship persist. While NATO demonstrated institutional cohesion, questions remain over the long-term consistency of US leadership and its implications for European security.

2. Shift from defence commitments to defence capabilities
The summit marked a shift from announcing defence spending targets to ensuring that these commitments translate into real military capabilities. This reflects NATO's recognition that higher defence budgets alone are insufficient to deter emerging security threats, particularly Russia's prolonged war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has exposed shortages in ammunition, air defence systems, and defence production across Europe. As a consequence, the summit prioritised expanding the defence industrial base, accelerating capability development, enhancing logistics and supply chains, and investing in emerging technologies. This was a step to strengthen the Alliance's long-term deterrence and resilience. However, the implementation of the 2035 spending target is likely to remain uneven. Differences in economic capacity, domestic political priorities, and threat perceptions among member states could make burden-sharing one of NATO's challenges over the coming decade.

3. Ukraine and the Black Sea as the core strategic priorities
The summit reaffirmed that the war in Ukraine remains the Alliance's foremost security challenge. NATO views Ukraine's ability to defend itself as central to maintaining stability across the Euro-Atlantic region and deterring further Russian aggression. Alongside Ukraine, the Black Sea emerged as a key strategic theatre due to its significance for regional security, maritime access, energy infrastructure, and connectivity between Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. In this context, the choice of Ankara as the host city also reflected Turkiye's growing strategic importance within NATO. Situated at the crossroads of these regions, Turkiye remains central to the Alliance's efforts to strengthen deterrence on its southeastern flank and enhance security in the Black Sea. As a result, the summit reiterated long-term military support for Ukraine, emphasised strengthening Black Sea security. Together, these developments indicate that NATO continues to view Russia as its primary security challenge.

4. Unaddressed strategic issues
First, the summit remained largely silent on NATO enlargement. While it reaffirmed support for Ukraine, it did not provide a roadmap for Kyiv's accession or discuss the membership aspirations of other candidate countries. This suggests that the Alliance continues to prioritise immediate deterrence over further enlargement. Second, China and North Korea received limited attention compared to previous summits. Despite their growing strategic cooperation with Russia and increasing influence on the Indo-Pacific security environment, discussions remained centred on Russia and the Euro-Atlantic theatre. Third, arms control and strategic stability were largely absent from the agenda. The summit focused on strengthening deterrence through higher defence spending and military readiness. But little emphasis was given to reducing military risks, reviving arms control agreements, or establishing new dialogue mechanisms with Russia. This indicates that NATO currently prioritises military preparedness over risk reduction.

NATO Summit 2026: Who said what?

Mark Rutte, General Secretary, NATO
On 07 July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered his opening remarks at the NATO Summit, projecting the meeting as a demonstration of the Alliance's unity, credibility, and collective resolve. He reaffirmed NATO's unwavering commitment to Article 5 and stressed that collective defence remains the cornerstone of the Alliance. Rutte emphasised that the changing security environment, driven primarily by Russia's war in Ukraine, requires NATO to move beyond defence spending commitments towards building credible military capabilities, expanding defence industrial capacity, and enhancing operational readiness. He also underscored the importance of greater burden-sharing among Allies and sustained long-term support for Ukraine. Throughout his remarks, Rutte presented the summit as a transition from political commitments to practical implementation. He also highlighted that preparing the Alliance for future security challenges would remain NATO's central priorities beyond the Ankara Summit.

Donald Trump, President, United States
During 07–08 July, President Trump placed burden-sharing and defence spending at the centre of the NATO Summit discussions. He welcomed the allies' commitment to increase defence and security-related spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035, arguing that European members must assume greater responsibility for their own security. Trump also renewed his claim that Greenland should come under US control and criticised Spain over its defence spending commitments. He further expressed disappointment that several NATO Allies had not supported the US during the war with Iran. His remarks highlighted Washington's continued expectation of greater European responsibility while exposing uncertainties within the transatlantic alliance.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President, Turkiye
During 07–08 July, President Erdogan welcomed allied leaders to Ankara and highlighted Turkiye's strategic role within NATO amid an evolving regional security environment. He emphasised that Turkiye remains a key contributor to the Alliance's collective defence through its geographical position at the crossroads of Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, as well as through its growing defence industrial capabilities. Erdogan also called for greater allied cooperation in addressing common security challenges, including terrorism, regional instability, and the continuing war in Ukraine. By hosting the summit, Turkiye projected itself as an indispensable member of the alliance. It also reinforced its role in strengthening NATO's southeastern flank and enhancing security in the Black Sea region.

Volodymyr Zelensky, President, Ukraine
On 08 July, President Zelensky urged NATO allies to sustain long-term military, financial, and political support for Ukraine as the war with Russia continues. He emphasised the urgent need for additional air defence systems, military assistance, and continued cooperation to strengthen Ukraine's defence capabilities. During his engagements with allied leaders, Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's security is inseparable from the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. He also stressed that continued support is essential to deter further Russian aggression. His participation reaffirmed Ukraine's central place on NATO's security agenda and underscored the Alliance's commitment to providing long-term assistance.

Friedrich Merz, Chancellor, Germany
On 08 July, Chancellor Merz emphasised that Europe must assume greater responsibility for its own defence, Meanwhile, he also emphasised on preserving the transatlantic partnership as the foundation of NATO's collective security. He welcomed the allies' commitment to increase defence spending and highlighted the need to translate higher investments into stronger military capabilities, defence production, and operational readiness. Merz also reaffirmed Germany's commitment to supporting Ukraine and strengthening NATO's deterrence posture on its eastern flank. His remarks reflected Germany's expanding leadership role in European security and reinforced resilient defence architecture within the alliance.

Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, United Kingdom
On 08 July, PM Keir Starmer reaffirmed the UK's commitment to NATO's collective defence and its continued support for Ukraine. He stressed the importance of maintaining allied unity in response to Russia's aggression and called for sustained investment in defence capabilities. Starmer also highlighted the need for closer cooperation among NATO members to address evolving security challenges and strengthen the Alliance's long-term deterrence posture. His remarks reflected the UK's commitment to reinforcing Euro-Atlantic security through both political leadership and defence cooperation.

Emmanuel Macron, President, France
On 08 July, President Macron emphasised the need for Europe to strengthen its defence capabilities while remaining firmly committed to NATO's collective security framework. He argued that increasing defence investment and expanding defence capacity would reinforce both European security and the Alliance's overall deterrence posture. Macron also stressed that greater European responsibility should complement, rather than replace, the transatlantic partnership. His remarks reflected France's long-standing advocacy for stronger European strategic autonomy. Meanwhile his speech highlighted the growing convergence between NATO's defence priorities and Europe's efforts to build a more resilient and self-reliant security architecture.

Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister, Italy
On 08 July, PM Giorgia Meloni stressed the importance of preserving NATO's unity and strengthening cooperation among allies. This was in response to an increasingly complex security environment. She highlighted the need for sustained defence investment and greater military preparedness to address both conventional and emerging threats. Meloni also emphasised the importance of maintaining a comprehensive approach to security, including challenges affecting Europe's southern neighbourhood and the Mediterranean region. Her remarks reflected Italy's role in balancing Euro-Atlantic security priorities with regional concerns.

Ursula von der Leyen, President, European Commission
On 08 July, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the importance of strengthening cooperation between the European Union and NATO to enhance Europe's contribution to collective defence. She emphasised the need to expand defence industrial capacity, promote technological innovation, and improve military resilience across Europe. Her remarks reflected the growing role of the European Union in supporting security efforts through investments, industrial coordination, and defence-related initiatives, while recognising NATO as the primary framework for collective defence. Von der Leyen's intervention underlined that closer EU–NATO cooperation would be essential for addressing shared security challenges and reducing vulnerabilities within the European defence ecosystem.

Mark Carney, Prime Minister, Canada
On 08 July, PM Mark Carney reaffirmed Canada's commitment to NATO's collective defence. He also highlighted the importance of strengthening the alliance's capabilities in response to a changing security environment. Carney also underlined Canada's continued role in supporting NATO's eastern flank and maintaining security across the Euro-Atlantic region. His remarks reflected Canada's effort to balance its traditional role as a North American member of NATO with growing attention to Arctic security.

Apart from the above, representatives from several allied and partner countries, including Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, Lithuania, New Zealand, South Korea, and Qatar made statements as well.

Lekshmi MK is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

China’s SLBM test in the Pacific:
Modernization, Increasing deterrence and Strategic messaging

Avaneesh S

What happened?
On 06 July, China launched a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) with a dummy warhead from the South China Sea and into the Pacific Ocean. It was reportedly launched from one of China’s Type 094 Nuclear submarines and used the JL-2 SLBM. After the launch, Beijing received immense criticism from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Taiwan and later, from the US and NATO. China’s news agencies reported on PLAN stating that the test had “complied with international law and international practice and was not directed at any specific country or target.” The test occurred after a few hours in which Australia and Fiji had signing a mutual defence treaty, becoming the fourth treaty ally of Canberra, after Papua New Guinea in 2025 and the US.

Following the test, Japan stated that they had only been informed of the test 90 minutes ahead of the launch. The US State Department officials termed the launch and the inadequate notices as “irresponsible.” The move was also criticised by NATO Chief Mark Rutte who stated that the launch was “evidence that we cannot be naive about China.”

What is the background?
1. China’s military modernisation and expanding nuclear arsenal
Since 2020, China has been modernising its nuclear triad armaments, including phasing out its Type 094 Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile submarines. China began developing the Type 096, which is to be introduced by the end of this decade. The latest SLBM test flew a reported range of 7,500 kilometres, and is Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capable of being able to carry at least 3 warheads in a single missile. Being MIRV-capable, longer-range SLBM would raise the credible deterrence level for strikes against China, especially against neutralising its nuclear arsenal. The latest test allows China to raise its minimum credible deterrence towards a much greater level of deterrence.

2. China’s increasing military activity to counter the US and Australian presence in the Indo-Pacific
China’s expanding military activities are also an attempt to constrain the US influence and operating space within the first and second island chains in the South China Sea and by extension, into the Pacific. The US maintains a significant presence in the Pacific region, closely coordinating with regional powers such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Australia. It is able to maintain a large naval presence in the region due to the close partnership with these powers, and additionally having bases in the pacific islands such as Guam, Hawaii and Marshall Islands.

Australia has also increased its footprint in the region by increasing its formal treaty allies from the US to Papua New Guinea and Fiji. It is also set to deepen ties with the Solomon Islands after a China-friendly government was voted out of power, and the incumbent Prime Minister is set to review a security pact with Beijing. China enjoys close relations with several Pacific Island Countries (PICs) through various initiatives. But Australia’s move of increasing its outreach to the PICs slowly pushes out China’s influence in the region.

What does it mean?
First, the missile test is to showcase China’s rapid modernisation. Through the missile test, China showed off its nuclear arsenal and continuous at-sea deterrence. Here, the doctrine seeks to have at least one permanent deployment of second-strike launch capabilities. China is set to showcase more of its modernisation achievements, whether they are armaments or platforms, in the following months and years.

Second, the missile launch appears to be reactionary to multiple activities of the US in the region. The missile launch is a reactionary action to the US's activities of placing Typhon missile systems in the Philippines and Japan, Tokyo supplying Patriot interceptors to Washington, and the recent naval exercises in the Pacific. Therefore, it indicates that China can also strike in US-friendly waters and areas in its sphere of influence, just as the US is able to project that it can strike at China’s own sphere.

Third, China's strategic partnerships strengthen its military posture. The test happened while Russian naval vessels were stationed in China for the 13th China-Russia Joint Sea exercise. It also conducted joint air patrols with Russia last month over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the western Pacific. As such, China can posture itself by also having allies and friends through strategic and coordinated military activities.

Avaneesh S is a postgraduate student from the Department of History, School of Social Sciences, Pondicherry University. He is currently an intern at NIAS.

65 years of the China-DPRK friendship treaty:
Reopening links, Russia factor, and Nuclear compromise

Adwaith Sankar

What happened?
On 11 July, China and North Korea marked the 65th anniversary of their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. From 10 to 12 July, North Korean Premier Pak Thae Song led a delegation to Beijing to commemorate the occasion. On 10 July, during a meeting, President Xi stated that both countries should “maintain strategic resolve and enhance strategic confidence,” reaffirming Beijing’s commitment to strengthening bilateral ties. The anniversary follows a series of high-level engagements. On 08 and 09 June, Xi visited North Korea for the first time since 2019, where discussions focused on trade, agriculture, construction, technology and cross-border transport. The visit built on the momentum created by Xi's meeting with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un in September 2025, reflecting continued efforts to deepen political and economic cooperation between the two countries.

What is the background?
1. China, North Korea and Beijing’s long road to Pyongyang
China and North Korea established diplomatic relations in 1949. Following China’s intervention in the Korean War, Beijing and Pyongyang signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1961. However, the treaty’s specific rules regarding territory and decision-making procedures are undefined. This is China’s only mutual-defence treaty, and it has never been invoked. The treaty's ambiguity preserves Beijing’s discretion. The treaty has persisted despite China establishing ties with the ROK in 1992 and the PRC’s support for UN sanctions on the DPRK through 2017. However, China’s support for sanctions strained relations between the states. Five summits in 2018 and 2019 restored contact between the countries. Pandemic restrictions reduced exchanges, while the 2024 DPRK-Russia treaty widened Pyongyang’s options. This encouraged Beijing to rebuild ties with North Korea.

2. China's trade dominance and North Korea's expanding maritime access
In 2024, China-North Korea trade was USD 2.7 billion. However, exports from North Korea constituted only USD 360 million. In 2023, 98.3 per cent of North Korea’s recorded external trade was attributed to China. Pyongyang is dependent on Beijing. However, this dependence has not translated into unlimited Chinese leverage. North Korea’s geographic position gives it significant value. China’s Tumen border ends just 15-18 kilometers from the Sea of Japan, and access to the sea from Jilin would require cooperation from both Russia and North Korea. Similarly, the use of Rajin Port would require North Korean consent. As China seeks to build up its maritime strength, this need offsets its centrality in trade.

3. Military cooperation with Russia and North Korea’s strategic options
Since 2023, military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has expanded significantly. Between August 2023 and March 2025, North Korea is estimated to have sent 4- 5.8 million artillery shells and rockets along with Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns. By March 2026, it had also dispatched more than 16,000 soldiers to Russia, where they received training and participated in operations in the Kursk region. In return, Russia is reported to have supplied electronic-warfare equipment and short-range air-defence systems and to have shared data from the battlefield use of North Korean missiles. The deepening Russia–North Korea partnership reduced Pyongyang's dependence on Beijing. To retain its influence on the Korean Peninsula, China intensified high-level engagement with North Korea.

4. The Seoul factor
In February 2026, North Korea’s Congress rejected talks with South Korea, but did not reject talks with the US. In response, South Korea expanded diplomatic coordination with the US and Japan while also seeking China's support in managing regional tensions. As Beijing balanced its relations with both Koreas, it maintained close ties with Pyongyang while preserving broader regional stability. This has reinforced the continued relevance of the China–North Korea partnership.

What does it mean?
First, the treaty's ambiguity gives China strategic flexibility while reassuring North Korea of its commitment. Recent developments concerning Russia have changed this dynamic by China’s ability to shape Pyongyang’s behaviour. If China disengages from Pyongyang, North Korea will be incentivised to strengthen its ties with Russia. The 65th anniversary restates China’s commitment to a partner looking to diversify its alliances.

Second, China’s rising international influence can validate, to a limited extent, North Korea’s nuclear status. Goodwill from Pyongyang could help China advance its maritime agenda through access to the Sea of Japan.

Adwaith Sankar is an intern at NIAS. He is also an undergraduate student pursuing Political Science and International Liberal Studies through the NUS-Waseda Double Degree Programme.

The IMF World Economic Outlook:
Five takeaways on Global growth, AI, and Economic resilience

Dhivya K M

On 08 July, the IMF released the July 2026 Update on World Economic Outlook (WEO), revising its April economic growth projections. The report focused on the resilience of the global economy despite heightened geopolitical and trade uncertainties. It assesses the impact of the Middle East crisis on global energy markets, growth of investment in AI and its increasing contribution to global economic growth, trade, and productivity.

The following are five key takeaways from the report.
1. Global economy shows resilience, but with a slim margin
The world economy's ability to withstand a shock to its energy supply without falling into a recession is an achievement in its own right. The growth rate of 3 per cent registered in Q1 2026 surpassed the estimate in April by the Fund, as the world has successfully diversified over the last ten years its energy dependence on hydrocarbons. It appears that the efforts to diversify energy supply sources following previous shocks were not in vain, and policy-makers now have a little more room to maneuver. However, the IMF did not declare this problem solved. The energy supply buffer has been depleted, and the supply chain is still under pressure, so there will be no cushion next time.

2. The AI-driven growth is reshaping the global economy, but unevenly shared
A significant finding is the uneven distribution of the AI-driven growth cycle. Export economies in the semiconductor and technology chain, such as Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam, received a considerable boost from rising demand for AI hardware and infrastructure. Growth in India was fuelled less by exports than by domestic consumption, while that in China was offset by high-tech exports and infrastructure investments. The significance lies in participation in the technology value chain. Economies participating in the technology value chain become an important factor of resilience, while non-participants in the chain suffered from higher energy and food prices.

3. Disinflation is failing, and it challenges the credibility of central banks
Since 2024, the IMF has maintained that global disinflation has been progressing in the right direction. Headline inflation is set to increase to 4.7 per cent in 2026 from 4.1 per cent in 2025, after which it will resume its descent in 2027. Since this hike is due to energy and food prices rather than an over-heated demand, the policy solution is different from the solution needed in case of a demand-induced jump. Despite core inflation being stable, the IMF has warned that this should not be taken to mean the target is back. Core indicators are expected to have normalized by mid-2027 in the UK, by end-2027 in the US and Japan, and by 2028 in the eurozone. In those cases where credibility is weak, then the expectations will turn out to be un-anchored.

4. Geopolitical disruptions hit the Middle East hardest, but Asia held firm
Geography influenced the strength of the shock, demonstrating the disparity that occurs between international risk and the national outcome. Economic growth in the Middle East and Central Asia region is expected to weaken considerably to 0.7 per cent in 2026. Countries highly vulnerable to transportation and energy supply interruption will suffer economic contraction until 2027, assuming reopening of the Strait of Hormuz beginning in mid-July. The US, which is an energy exporter and major technological investor, had a strong performance, recording economic growth of 2.3 per cent. Meanwhile, while the Europe recorded slower growth of 0.9 per cent due to high energy prices and low confidence. The emerging Asia region displayed some resiliency, with India, Vietnam and Malaysia doing relatively well, while Pakistan's growth remained steady at 3.6 per cent because of its recovery plan supported by the IMF.

5. Emphasis on policy discipline to preserve economic resilience
The IMF’s recommendation is to maintain stable interest rates where inflation is transitory, but to be prepared to raise rates when central banks lack credibility. Fiscal policy advocates providing targeted aid to vulnerable groups for a specified period and area, rather than general energy subsidies. This was due to the loss of fiscal space due to poor policy decisions. Countries that benefit from energy or technology booms are advised to save the gains they make. In regards to structural reforms, the advice concerning renewable energy, digitisation infrastructure, and artificial intelligence has become urgent. Cooperation must avoid trade barriers and export restrictions but should encourage quick resolution of debt under the Group of Twenty Common Framework.

Dhivya K M is an intern at NIAS and is also a postgraduate student from the Department of Financial Economics, Madras School of Economics, Chennai.