PAKISTAN READER

Adwaith Sankar Adwaith Sankar is a final-year undergraduate student pursuing Political Science and International Liberal Studies through the NUS-Waseda Double Degree Programme. He is currently a research intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS).

What happened?
On 06 August, Myanmar's President Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand for two days. He was hosted by Thailand's Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul. The President was welcomed with an honour guard and held a one-on-one with the PM. Several agreements were signed during the visit. Among other topics, these agreements covered space technology, labour, and water quality management in shared rivers. The President stated that "Myanmar has now reestablished itself on the path to democracy and is moving toward a better future." The visit drew criticism from activists for allegedly lending legitimacy to the regime in Naypyidaw.

What is the background?
1. Myanmar's neighbourhood push
Since assuming the presidency of Myanmar on 10 April, Min Aung Hlaing has been pushing to normalise relations with ASEAN and deepen ties with neighbouring countries. This approach aims to legitimise the regime. The President made his first foreign visit to India. In India, he met with the Prime Minister, the President, and other leaders. Min Aung Hlaing's second visit as President was to China. On his state visit to Beijing, Myanmar's leader held talks with President Xi Jinping. The Chinese visit was particularly successful as Beijing provided full sovereign recognition and support. In July, the President visited Laos. Both countries pledged cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including trade and security. Myanmar is not wholly isolated, and some of its neighbours have sought to engage with the country.

2. ASEAN's five-point consensus and Myanmar's rejection
Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar's top leadership has been excluded from high-level ASEAN meetings. This is due to Myanmar's failure to implement the bloc's consensus. Myanmar's parliament has deemed the consensus to be "irrelevant." ASEAN and its constituent states do not have the leverage to coerce Myanmar. ASEAN did not send observers for the elections held in Myanmar between December 2025 and January 2026. The positions of individual ASEAN states differed. Malaysia did not send any observers, whilst Vietnam and Cambodia did. ASEAN foreign ministers did categorically confirm that Myanmar "remains an integral part of ASEAN." A significant development occurred in July when Myanmar's foreign minister was included in an informal discussion with ASEAN counterparts. ASEAN is unable to gain from continuing to isolate Myanmar.

3. Conflict and instability
The conflict within the country has resulted in over 100,000 deaths on all sides. As of August, over 8,200 civilians have been killed by security forces since the coup. This humanitarian crisis is perilous for a regime that aims to stabilise its rule. Myanmar's neighbouring countries, including Thailand, absorb part of the displacement. This incentivises Myanmar to pursue warmer ties with its neighbours.

4. Thailand-Myanmar bilateral issues
Thailand shares a 2,400-kilometre border with Myanmar. Moreover, the country hosts millions of Myanmar nationals, including migrant workers and refugees. In 2024, Thailand reportedly lost 110 billion Thai baht to scams. Six in ten Thais have fallen victim to these scams. These operations are predominantly found in countries including Myanmar and Cambodia. According to Thai officials, dismantling these scam centres was part of the pre-visit agenda. Thailand's foreign minister stated that its neighbouring country could "do a lot more" against scam networks. These issues have made the relationship with Myanmar very important to Thailand. Thailand is also a top foreign investor in Myanmar, with roughly USD 4.6 billion invested in the country. An aggressive approach that seeks to have Myanmar implement the consensus would risk Thai capital.

What does it mean?
First, Thailand's warm reception of Min Aung Hlaing is suggestive of broader positions across the region. Countries are increasingly engaging with Naypyidaw. ASEAN centrality, the bloc's core tenet, is consequential. ASEAN centrality necessitates that ASEAN acts as the hub through which external powers interact with the region. To maintain this focal position vis-à-vis Myanmar, ASEAN will have to compromise on its consensus. The deepening of Myanmar's ties with Beijing exacerbates this issue. As ASEAN is consensus-based by design, differing opinions will also complicate the bloc's Myanmar policy.

Second, Myanmar is actively seeking deeper relations with powerful neighbours outside ASEAN. The country is looking to diversify its relationships. This is not only to pursue legitimacy, but also to stabilise the conflict. Chinese drones have proven themselves useful to the Army. Myanmar's relationship with India, for instance, constrains the movements of the western resistance in rear areas along the border.

Third, issues of transnational crime, displacement, and trade will continue to dominate the engagement between Myanmar and its neighbours. These issues are intrusive and destabilising and require Myanmar's cooperation. Myanmar can establish itself as a more stable and legitimate actor if it engages these issues in good faith.

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