PAKISTAN READER

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate student from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.

In the news
On 05 October, officials from Russia, Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in Moscow for the eighth Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan. Delegations from Belarus and Egypt also attended as guests. The Afghan delegation was led by Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi.

On the same day, Sergey Lavrov held a separate meeting with the Afghan Foreign Minister. The two sides reportedly discussed prospects for developing bilateral cooperation and interaction within international and regional forums. Lavrov stated: “Five years is a short time to overcome the consequences of many decades of occupation, yet your [the Taliban] government’s achievements are evident, and we welcome them,” further noting the Taliban’s successes in combating extremists and its efforts to eradicate drug trafficking.

Following the meeting, Russia’s special representative for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, said that the delegations of Pakistan and Afghanistan “didn’t see eye to eye,” resulting in the lack of a joint statement. However, he added that while this was regrettable, the Moscow Format remained useful as a platform for regional cooperation.

Issues at large
1. The Moscow Format and the evolving legitimacy of the Taliban
The Moscow Format started as a trilateral between Russia, China, and Pakistan in December 2016, and was expanded to India, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) in 2017. The stated purpose and objective of this format was to help facilitate intra-Afghan talks, act as a reconciliation process in Afghanistan to establish peace, and to discuss the humanitarian, political, and security implications of the conflict. The Taliban first attended in 2018 as a stakeholder in the conflict. After Russia recognised the Taliban government in 2025, it joined as a formal member. This meeting in 2026 demonstrates regular participation by the Taliban alongside other countries at a high-level forum, increasingly establishing the legitimacy of the Taliban’s governing authority, while much of the international community refuses to recognise the Taliban government formally.

2. Continued Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions, despite negotiations and mediations
The meeting comes after repeated efforts internationally to mediate and discuss the Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict. Qatar and Türkiye helped secure a ceasefire in October 2025, followed by Istanbul talks and a proposed monitoring mechanism. In 2026, China hosted talks in Urumqi after renewed fighting, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye also supported efforts to de-escalate the conflict. However, these initiatives have failed to produce a resolution to the dispute over cross-border militancy and Pakistan’s challenges with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In addition, the lack of a joint statement further reflects the depth of their divide, as Pakistan continues to demand that Kabul take verifiable action against militants operating from Afghan territory, while the Taliban rejects Islamabad’s accusations and continues to condemn Pakistani military strikes.

3. Russia’s strategic stake and the Moscow Format as an instrument
Russia’s interest in Afghanistan has seemingly been security. Lavrov has argued that the Pakistan-Afghan tension is partly due to the Islamic State and outside interference. This suggests that Moscow possibly remains concerned about the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), narcotics trafficking, and the potential spillover of instability into Central Asia. This is also in tandem with Russia's removal of the Taliban’s terrorist designation, recognition of its government later that year, and in May 2026 describing its relationship with Kabul as a “full-fledged partnership,” covering security, trade and humanitarian cooperation. The Moscow Format consequently serves as an instrument through which Russia maintains diplomatic relevance in Afghanistan and the wider Eurasian region, and advances Moscow's "regional solutions to regional problems" doctrine.

In perspective
First, the consultations demonstrate the Taliban’s growing legitimacy. Its participation as a formal member, engagement with Lavrov, bilateral meetings, and ability to influence the language of the final document reflect its growing capacity to shape regional discussions and be treated as Afghanistan’s government.

Second, the lack of a joint statement reflects the deepening divide between Kabul and Islamabad. With Pakistan's strikes continuing days before and after the meeting, the forum was unlikely to change the conflict's course. While the lack of a consensus this time demonstrated a setback, Moscow asserts that the format was made not for bilateral dispute resolution but for regional cooperation.

Third, Russia’s interest possibly stands between security concerns and relevance. Hosting these consultations lets Moscow keep an eye on the security situation of the region, while building regional consensus on security, humanitarian aid, and trade, and presenting itself as a continued convenor of diplomacy when it comes to Afghanistan.

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