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In Focus
Breakthrough in Istanbul talks: Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to continue the ceasefire
What happened?
On 30 October, following a decision to give another chance to the negotiations in Istanbul, Pakistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement. According to a statement released by Türkiye’s foreign ministry, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to continue the ceasefire.
What does the joint statement say?
According to the joint statement titled “Talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan through the mediation of Türkiye and Qatar,” the four countries held meetings in Istanbul from 25 to 20 October, “aimed at solidifying the ceasefire” that was agreed upon by Pakistan and Afghanistan in Doha following the talks during 18-19 October, mediated by Türkiye and Qatar.
According to the latest joint statement, “all parties have agreed to put in place a monitoring and verification mechanism that will ensure maintenance of peace and impose a penalty on the violating party.” The agreement also says, “Further modalities of the implementation will be discussed and decided in a principal-level meeting in Istanbul on 6 November 2025.”
The joint statement also refers to the two mediators—Türkiye and Qatar and their interest to “stand ready to continue cooperation with both sides.”
What does it mean?
Given the wide differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the five-paragraph joint statement, though brief, does point out the following. First, the Taliban agreed to “place a monitoring and verification mechanism” to ensure the maintenance of peace. Taliban was reluctant on this point and wanted the focus on Pakistan respecting Afghanistan’s territory and not violating its sovereignty by military strikes.
Second, Pakistan wanted an explicit reference to Afghanistan, not allowing its soil to be used by the TTP. Though Pakistan was threatened with deep strikes inside Afghanistan, it has decided to return to the negotiating table and agree to the above statement. An earlier draft, circulated in Pakistani media, referred to the following: “Both sides committed to maintaining the ceasefire on the condition that Afghan territory will not be used for terrorist attacks against Pakistan." The understanding also requires the Afghan Taliban to take “clear, verifiable, and effective action” against groups such as Fitna al Khwarij (TTP) and Fitna al Hindustan (BLA).” However, the official statement released by the Türkiye government does not refer to it. Earlier, Pakistan’s army chief was quoted to have said: “Instead of acting decisively against Indian-sponsored terror proxies Fitna Al Khwarij and Fitna Al Hindustan, the Afghan Taliban regime has been providing all possible assistance to these groups.”
Third, the role of Türkiye and Qatar: Although Pakistan and Afghanistan decided not to reach an agreement by 29 October, the former two persisted and ensured that the ceasefire agreed in Doha continues.
Document:
Joint statement following the talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan through the mediation of Türkiye and Qatar
1. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkiye and Qatar held meetings in Istanbul from 25-30 October 2025 aimed at solidifying the ceasefire which was agreed by Afghanistan and Pakistan in Doha on 18-19 October 2025 with the mediation of Turkiye and Qatar.
2. All parties have agreed on the continuation of the ceasefire.
3. Further modalities of the implementation will be discussed and decided in a Principal level meeting in Istanbul on 6 November 2025.
4. All parties have agreed to put in place a monitoring and verification mechanism that will ensure maintenance of peace and impose a penalty on the violating party.
5. As mediators, Turkiye and Qatar express their appreciation for the active contribution of both parties and stand ready to continue cooperation with both sides for lasting peace and stability.
Pakistan and the Annual State of Impunity Report 2025:
Four takeaways on escalating risks and persistent impunity to journalists in Pakistan
On 30 October, Freedom Network, an Islamabad-based independent media research organization, published the Annual State of Impunity Report 2025. This report tracks the trends and key cases related to impunity of crime against journalists in Pakistan between November 2024 and September 2025.
The following are the major takeaways.
First, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) amendments, brought between November 2024 and January 2025, led to the growth in legal intimidation against journalists. During the period under review, 22 cases were filed against individual journalists in Pakistan, primarily in Punjab province, under the PECA Act. At least eight cases against journalists were documented under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) Act.
Second, the report finds that no place in Pakistan is safe for journalists, as an exponential growth in violations against media practitioners is registered during the period under review. At least 142 cases of attacks and violations against the media took place in the period under review.
Third, an increase in violence and violations. According to the report, there is a 60 per cent increase in violations and targeting of media professionals compared to last year, which recorded a total of 57 cases. The violations intensified after the February 2024 general elections.
Fourth, regional and provincial differences within. According to the report, the federal and Sindh governments have performed well in terms of framing and enacting legislation for the safety of journalists. However, governments of the other three provinces and two Kashmir regions under Pakistan’s occupation - Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, “AJK” and Gilgit-Baltistan are at least four years behind the progress. According to the report, particularly in Punjab, Balochistan, and “AJK,” there has been no progress in legislation.
Overall, the report highlights the escalating risks and persistent impunity in Pakistan, with journalists facing threats to their lives and physical violence, especially in regions like Islamabad, Punjab, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, underscoring the urgency of protection and accountability mechanisms for media practitioners in Pakistan. (“Annual State of Impunity Report 2025,” Freedom Network, 29 October 2025)
"CPC’s 4th plenary session and its impact on China-Pakistan relations"
Major takeaways of a comment by the Consul General of China in Lahore
On 31 October, The News International published a commentary authored by China’s Consul General in Lahore. It referred to the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded in Beijing on 23 October, outlining China’s roadmap for long-term modernisation. The meeting also reaffirmed China’s resolve to advance the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and strengthen cooperation across the Global South through the Four Global Initiatives on development, security, civilisation, and governance.
The comment looks at the implications of the above meeting for China-Pakistan relations. The following are the major takeaways of the above commentary.
First, the commentary links the session with deepening economic and technological reforms. The session, according to the comment, reflected China's dedication to growth through innovation with advanced manufacturing, digital economy integration, and supply chain resilience. For Pakistan, this poses opportunities for participation in industrial and technology ecosystems led by China through possible joint ventures in CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) zones.
Second, on green development and energy transition, the Plenum declared China would achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030 while establishing a path to carbon neutrality by 2060. The model allows Pakistan to achieve low-carbon development through joint work on renewable energy and climate adaptation initiatives.
Third, on shared prosperity and global engagement, the meeting demonstrated China's commitment to equitable globalization through BRI by supporting mutual development and South-South cooperation. The framework enables Pakistan to boost its trade operations and draw foreign capital while creating improved transportation links.
Fourth, strengthening the China-Pakistan partnership. The fourth Plenary Session produced results that support the 2025–2029 Action Plan by strengthening industrial and agricultural, mineral and educational, and defence sector collaboration. The two countries maintain their "Iron Brotherhood" bond through their mutual dedication to modernization and strategic stability. (“CPC’s 4th plenary session and its impact on China-Pakistan relations,” The News International, 31 October 2025)
In Brief
ECONOMY
Pakistan commits PKR 200 billion contingency tax plan to satisfy IMF conditions
On 31 October, The Express Tribune reported that Pakistan has assured the IMF it will introduce PKR 200 billion in additional tax measures by January if the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) misses its mid-year revenue targets or expenses exceed agreed limits. Tax increases for mobile and landline services and bank withdrawal fees, and solar panel usage are introduced by this plan, and it establishes new excise taxes on confectionery products and biscuits. The plan is designed with the aim of maintaining Pakistan's USD seven billion IMF programme and achieving a 1.6 per cent of GDP primary surplus, though economists caution that such measures may further burden existing taxpayers. (“Pakistan assures IMF of Rs200b tax measures,” The Express Tribune, 31 October 2025)
ENVRIONMENT
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) report flags Indus flow disruption as a threat to Pakistan’s agriculture
On 31 October, Dawn reported on “Ecological Threat Report 2025” published by the Institute for Economics and Peace. According to the report, Dawn found that India’s control over Indus River dams could enable it to manipulate water flows to Pakistan within its technical limits, posing a serious risk to Pakistan’s agriculture sector. According to the report, Pakistan faces a severe risk because it maintains only 30 days of Indus River water storage capacity. The report indicates that India's independent dam management and the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty have created new tensions between countries, while China and Saudi Arabia show interest in the situation. (“Danger looms as India can manipulate Indus flows,” Dawn, 31 October 2025)
PMD warns of emerging drought conditions in Balochistan
On 31 October, Dawn reported that the Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) had placed two districts of Balochistan under drought watch, advising the provincial government to take preemptive measures in drought-prone areas. The PMD report recorded an increase in the number of dry days across the Balochistan region, accompanied by a significant rainfall deficit. The prevailing dry conditions are expected to cause water stress in cultivated areas, primarily due to limited irrigation water availability for rabi crops. The PMD also advised close monitoring of the evolving drought situation. (“12 Balochistan districts under drought watch,” Dawn, 31 October 2025)
SECURITY
TTP deputy chief among 22 killed in KP, Balochistan
On 31 October, Dawn reported that a TTP commander, Amjad alias Mazahimwas, was among four terrorists killed in an operation by armed forces in Kurram’s Dogar area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. He was also placed on a US terrorism list in December 2022. Separately, at least 18 terrorists were killed in two intelligence-based operations in Balochistan. Balochistan CM Sarfraz Bugti expressed satisfaction over the two operations and praised the bravery, determination, and professionalism of the security forces. (“TTP ‘deputy chief’ among 22 killed in KP, Balochistan,” Dawn, 31 October 2025)
POLITICS
Tiff over PTI central Punjab leadership
On 31 October, Dawn reported that the decision to remove the two leaders from PTI central Punjab leadership had led to the controversy. Earlier, on 16 October, PTI announced that, on the instructions of PTI Founder Imran Khan, PTI’s Central Punjab President and General Secretary were being removed and Ali Imtiaz Warraich was to be the new Central Punjab President. However, PTI Founder’s sister Uzma disputed the decision and rejected the claims of removal of the president and general secretary.
Another dispute that led to confusion was about who would submit lists for access to Adiala Jail. Recently, the Supreme Court specified that the party’s secretary general should be the one to submit such lists. However, a tug-of-war over who has the authority to issue these lists erupted after two separate lists were sent to the Adiala Jail superintendent on Oct 29, one by Secretary-General Salman Akram Raja and the other by Barrister Ali Zafar. (“Another public tiff over Punjab leadership rocks PTI,” Dawn, 31 October 2025)
KP Chief Minister Afridi denied meeting with Imran Khan for the fourth time
On 31 October, Dawn reported that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's newly elected CM, Sohail Afridi, was prevented for the fourth time from meeting PTI Chairman Imran Khan at Adiala Jail. Despite the Islamabad High Court order, the KP CM was not allowed. Separately, the PTI Political Committee has demanded the immediate issuance of notifications for the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly and the Leader of the House in the Senate, emphasising that the party had fulfilled all legal and procedural requirements and held a clear numerical majority on the opposition benches in both houses. (“CM Afridi denied meeting with Imran for fourth time,” Dawn, 31 October 2025)
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir
PPP-PML-N finalize power-sharing plan amid political shift in “AJK”
On 31 October, Dawn reported that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met President Asif Ali Zardari to discuss the change of government in “AJK” and a potential power-sharing formula between the PPP and the PML-N. The PML-N agreed to support the no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Haq but decided to sit in opposition in the upcoming new “AJK” government. PPP is likely to announce the PM nominee today, after a meeting of the PPP "AJK" parliamentary party to be chaired by PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari. (“Allies put final touches on plan for AJK no-trust vote,” Dawn, 31 October 2025; “Capital abuzz as president, PM mull AJK power shift,” The Express Tribune, 31 October 2025)
Editorials/Opinions
Huang Yunsong, "The unbreakable bond," Dawn, 30 October 2025
"The China-Pakistan strategic cooperation is the cornerstone of Pakistan’s defence architecture. China remains the most significant, reliable, and consistent supplier of technology, training, and strategic defence platforms to Pakistan. Now, consider the logical absurdity of the narrative being pushed. Why would a sovereign nation deliberately risk sabotage to the very foundation of its own defence system? Why would Pakistan, for any short-term, conditional transactional benefit from a historically fickle partner, risk alienating the strategic partner that guarantees its long-term strategic depth and technological edge against regional threats? The answer is a simple No. Undermining strategic trust with Beijing is, effectively, an act of national self-sabotage. The intensity of this information warfare is a clear reflection of the extreme discomfort felt by regional and global competitors who feel threatened by the longevity and cohesiveness of the Pakistan-China strategic alignment. This narrative is a calculated attempt to induce paranoia and force a strategic fissure. We must reject this psychological warfare as an insult to the intelligence and security integrity of the Pakistani state"
Editorial, "Mosque management," Dawn, 31 October 2025
"...the Punjab government has decided to hand over the administration of the religious places to ‘moderate’ clerics led by Mufti Muneeb ur Rehman. The Punjab administration has also announced monthly stipends for imams of the province’s over 65,000 mosques. These moves raise questions about how much the state should exert control over religious institutions, and where the line should be drawn to preserve individual religious freedoms. In other Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkiye, the state is heavily involved in the appointment and oversight of imams, particularly Friday prayer leaders, while the contents of Friday sermons are also vetted. Can similar models be followed in Pakistan? In this country, attempts have also been made to regulate mosques."
Editorial, "Troops for Gaza," Dawn, 31 October 2025
"Representatives of eight Muslim states, including Pakistan, are due to meet in Turkiye next week to hammer out the details. However, there has been scepticism expressed by politicians and civil society regarding Pakistan’s potential role, with the concern that this country should not be seen as an accessory to Israeli occupation. Pakistan has in the past participated in several successful peacekeeping missions overseas, but in this particular case, the mandate and the goals of the mission must be very clear. For example, Donald Trump’s ‘peace’ plan envisions “demilitarisation of Gaza”. Considering that Hamas has not decided to give up its weapons, will this mean that foreign peacekeepers will have to de-weaponise Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions by force? These uncomfortable questions need answers from the state."
Miftah Ismail, "When growth loses to politics," The News, 31 October 2025
"...our large and entrenched political parties are unwilling to undertake any reforms because they benefit politically from this extractive governance. And without meaningful and fundamental reforms, we will continue to bemoan our youth trying to go abroad for low-wage jobs, our rich getting a second passport in Europe, and Chinese and Middle Eastern investors, despite the most favourable conditions internationally in decades, giving Pakistan a pass. When the government wants it can make policies quickly and against the IMF’s wishes. When the sugar mill owners demanded a handout for instance, the government changed policy and ensured that consumers paid Rs60 per kg more for sugar or Rs30 billion a month extra to the sugar mill owners. When it came to charging consumers Rs3.23 per unit more for electricity to pay for the theft, mismanagement and inefficiencies of the power companies, the government did act and increased your bills. When it needed to put a supertax on top of an income tax rate of 35 per cent on salaried individuals making a few lakhs a month, the government found the will and political space to do so."
Tariq Khalique, "At A Fragile Turning Point, Pakistan Searches For Economic Stability," The Friday Times, 30 October 2025
"Looking to the future, Pakistan’s economic success will depend on key reforms. These include broadening the tax base so that more people and businesses contribute, improving governance to cut corruption and waste, investing in education and skills, raising productivity in agriculture and manufacturing, expanding exports to new markets, and attracting investment in technology, renewable energy, and infrastructure. Better regional trade could also bring major benefits through new trade routes, lower transport costs, and joint energy and infrastructure projects. Pakistan has several strengths. Its young population offers a large workforce and growing consumer market (median age around mid-20s). Its strategic location makes it a natural trade hub between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The rise of small businesses and tech start-ups shows the energy and creativity of its people. The country has also shown resilience in the face of natural disasters, security threats, and economic crises. Recovery has often been driven by public effort, private enterprise, and international support."
Arshad Yousafzai, "The Paradox Of Pashtun Nationalism: Between Resistance And Reconciliation," The Friday Times, 29 October 2025
"The paradox of Pashtun nationalism extends beyond ideology to practical realities. Dreams of “Loy Afghanistan” or a unified Pakhtunistan, promoted by figures like Achakzai and Afghan and Pashtun expatriates who associate themselves with PTM, overlook stark truths. Pakistani Pashtuns outnumber Afghan Pashtuns, and secession from a nuclear-armed state to join a theocratic regime defies logic. International accords confirm existing borders, and myths of territorial reclamation only dissipate energies that could be channelled towards internal reform. In a globalised world, multi-ethnic societies flourish across borders, proving that coexistence need not erode identity. While some progressive Pashtun leaders have faced criticism for controversial domestic positions, the larger challenge is the alignment of nationalism with militant sympathies, which compromises both moral authority and practical objectives. This tension is particularly evident among youth, some of whom, despite experiencing or witnessing Taliban persecution, express sympathy towards extremist causes, reflecting the profound confusion sown by inconsistent political signals and historical grievances."
Shahzad Chaudhry, "Managing Afghanistan," The Express Tribune, 31 October 2025
"Pakistan has five levers of modifying Afghan behaviour towards it: cross-border and transit trade which can hurt Afghan economy and leadership no end; facilitation that Pakistan enables Afghans in goodwill to find educational, health and occupational support; the three million-plus over Afghans that continue to reside in Pakistan remain a dilemma for Afghanistan unable to decide where lie their loyalties; Afghanistan remains beholden to Gulf states for its existence in terms of remittances and for diplomatic and other support as a Muslim nation—this can be activated at the diplomatic level to keep mindless Afghan belligerence in check. The final arbiter of any Afghan adventurism remains Pakistan's kinetic response, which is lethal and dominant. It would, though, realise the Indian design to actualise the second front on Pakistan with its attendant consequence of shifting focus, attention, and resources to what will always be a futile end. A blend of political, diplomatic and economic options remains Pakistan's most pragmatic, strategically prudent and workable option."
Syed Mohammad Ali, "Pakistan's minerals wealth: opportunities and risks," The Express Tribune, 31 October 2025
"Ultimately, Pakistan's mineral wealth offers both opportunity and risk. The country could leverage its resources to spur economic development, technological engagement, and regional influence. But mismanagement through elite capture, environmental negligence, or poorly structured foreign investments could deepen inequities and exacerbate regional tensions. The global scramble for critical minerals may enable the country's power elite to attract more funds, but how Pakistani policy and decision-makers harness these opportunities will determine whether the country benefits from this rush or else becomes another cautionary tale of the resource curse."
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