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Adwaith Sankar
30 August 2026 |
Kim Jong Un publicly emerged as Kim Jong Il’s successor at the 2010 Workers’ Party conference. After his father died in 2011, he became the supreme commander of the armed forces. In 2013, Kim purged his uncle, “who could have competently executed a coup.” In contrast to his father’s military-led regime, Kim restored the party as central to personnel appointments. The 2016 party congress formalised Kim’s position as party chairman while the following congress in 2021 featured his election as general secretary. In 2013, Kim adopted the Byungjin line. This policy framed economic development and the nuclear weapons programme as parallel goals.
China: Dependence and diversification
The PRC is North Korea’s long-standing treaty ally. It also accounts for the vast majority of North Korea’s recorded external trade. Relations with China had deteriorated during Kim’s early nuclear weapons expansions. China voted for the major UN Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea in 2016 and 2017. Kim did not meet President Xi Jinping during his first six years in power. However, Kim’s first known foreign trip was made to Beijing in 2018. During a period of fifteen months between 2018 and 2019, Kim and Xi met five times. Xi also visited Pyongyang in June 2026. Kim has described the DPRK’s relationship with China as the country’s most important bilateral relationship. However, he has been deepening ties with Russia. Kim’s policy towards China has not forsaken the legal and material realities of their relationship. At the same time, he has become more pragmatic in diversifying partnerships.
Russia: Strategic alignment
During the initial period of Kim’s reign, Russia remained a secondary partner. After the 2019 Trump-Kim summit ended without an agreement, Kim met Putin in Vladivostok two months later. The Russia-Ukraine conflict presented an opportunity for both countries to deepen their relationship. At the 2023 Vostochny summit, Kim and President Putin discussed military cooperation. Between 2023 and 2025, the DPRK is estimated to have sent millions of artillery shells to Russia. Furthermore, North Korea has allegedly transferred ballistic missiles and rocket launchers to Russia. In return, North Korea has received Russian defence equipment and battlefield data on North Korean weapons. In 2026, Kim noted that the relationship with Russia was a top foreign policy priority. During his rule, Kim has considerably deepened ties with Russia, widening North Korea’s strategic options beyond China.
South Korea: From engagement to hostility
Kim’s South Korea policy has drastically shifted over time. In 2018, he held three summits with South Korea’s then-President Moon. He also became the first North Korean leader to cross the Military Demarcation Line into the ROK. Kim and Moon signed the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018. This was a commitment to end hostilities and pursue peninsular denuclearisation. Seoul played an intermediary role between Kim and Trump during this period. This dynamic was weakened by the unsuccessful conclusion of the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi.
In December 2023, Kim stated that the relations between North and South Korea should be understood as relations “between two hostile states.” In 2024, he stated that reunification with South Korea was no longer possible. Although Kim’s foreign policy towards the ROK was conciliatory for a brief period, his current approach has hardened into a more hostile posture.
The US: Diplomacy and deterrence
Kim’s most consequential interactions with the US have happened under Donald Trump’s first presidency. President Trump had threatened to destroy North Korea in 2017 amidst North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests. In November 2017, Kim declared the state nuclear force complete. Kim met Trump in Singapore in June 2018. This summit resulted in a joint statement that committed both sides to better relations and lasting peace while pursuing denuclearisation. The second Trump-Kim summit in 2019 ended without an agreement. Trump crossed the Military Demarcation Line during the third meeting; however, the talks that followed this meeting also ended without any agreement. In September 2025, Kim mentioned in a speech that he had “fond memories” of Trump. He also stated that there was no reason to avoid talks if the US withdrew its demand for North Korea’s denuclearisation. In August 2026, Trump took steps to “substantially reduce” US participation in the annual US-ROK Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. This is a military exercise designed to prepare for a North Korean attack. Kim’s approach to the US has been relatively flexible in diplomacy but firm on North Korea’s nuclear status.
