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NIAS Global Politics Team
22 October 2026 |
Expanding Protests in France:
From School grievances to Social unrest
Preetha Renganarayanan
In the news
On 17 October, Reuters reported that demonstrations over rising living costs and declining public services spread across France, drawing students, trade unions and Yellow Vest supporters. The Interior Ministry estimated more than half a million participants, while the CGT put the turnout at 800,000.
On 18 October, France 24 reported widespread vandalism, looting and attacks on public buildings. Around 1,500 shops and several state symbols were reportedly vandalised, while an arson attack largely destroyed Limoges town hall.
On 21 October, Le Monde reported that the government and far-right leaders accused France Unbowed (LFI) of provoking the unrest, allegations the party rejected.
On the same day, France 24 reported that local authorities banned protests in several cities and imposed night-time curfews. The Yellow Vest movement called for a march in Paris on 24 October. Meanwhile, CGT union head Sophie Binet called for strikes on 5 November, stating the meeting with PM Lecornu had failed to address the union’s concerns over the rising cost of living.
Issues at large
1. From student protests to a broader mobilisation over cost-of-living crisis
The demonstrations, which began in September over dilapidated schools and teacher shortages, have expanded into a national mobilisation over the rising cost of living. Surging energy prices, partly driven by the war in Iran, have added to household pressures. Demands now include higher wages, lower fuel costs, improved public services and greater investment in education. These grievances reflect a difficult economic backdrop. In the second quarter of 2026, France’s unemployment rate rose to 8.3 per cent affecting over 2.7 million people, according to Insee, the national statistics bureau. Youth unemployment among those aged 15-24 reached 21.6 per cent, while energy prices rose by 21.3 per cent. Insee also projected a 0.7 per cent decline in purchasing power per consumption unit in 2026. These pressures have brought diverse grievances together, as rising household costs pile onto existing concerns over wages, housing and access to public services.
2. The geographical expansion of protests: From marginalised suburbs to a nationwide mobilisation
The protests have spread from deprived Parisian suburbs to major cities and regional centres, including Marseille, Lyon, Lille, Bordeaux, Rennes and Toulouse. On 17 October, the Interior Ministry recorded over 550,000 participants nationwide across approximately 110 marches, while organisers estimated turnout at 800,000. The mobilisation has taken different forms across cities, with some marches witnessing clashes, looting, and attacks on public buildings, including in Marseille and Lyon, along with an arson attack on Limoges town hall. The geographical spread suggests that the discontent goes beyond the marginalised suburbs where demonstrations first emerged, reflecting wider socioeconomic pressures across France.
3. The widening social geography of the protests and the convergence of diverse grievances
The protests have now drawn in trade unions, farmers, transport workers, supporters of the Yellow Vest movement, and climate activists, bringing together socioeconomic grievances from diverse groups. Students demand better school infrastructure, more teachers, and reforms to university admissions, while unions such as the CGT have mobilised over wages, purchasing power and public services. Farmers have raised concerns over rising fuel and fertiliser costs, likewise, transport workers and Yellow Vest supporters have rallied amid mounting living costs and fuel prices. The movement’s expanding social base therefore reflects a broadening coalition of discontent over living standards and public-service provision.
4. A polarised political response to the protests
The protests have become a point of political confrontation between the centrist government, the far left, and the far right ahead of the 2027 presidential election. The government has accused radical-left groups of exploiting student grievances and fuelling violence. La France Insoumise (LFI), led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has rejected such accusations, criticising the government’s handling of the protests and defending the demonstrators’ demands. On the other hand, the far-right National Rally (RN) led by Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, has blamed both the government’s failure to maintain public order and the radical left’s alleged role in the violence.
5. Fiscal constraints amid growing public discontent
The protests are escalating in the backdrop of a wider fiscal squeeze that is limiting the government’s room for public spending. The government’s 2027 budget includes EUR 54 billion in cuts and savings which led to a nationwide public-sector strike on 29 September. In addition, rising borrowing costs are adding pressure with the yield on France’s 10-year government bonds recently exceeding 5 per cent, its highest level in 24 years. This cumulation of high public debt, weak growth and higher borrowing costs have constrained the government’s fiscal space. The protests therefore come at a time when the government faces competing demands to reduce expenditure while addressing gaps in public services.
In perspective
First, the growing mismatch between the scale of the protests and the government’s capacity to respond. What began with students’ demands for better education has now expanded to include workers, farmers and Yellow Vest supporters, bringing wider demands over purchasing power, fuel costs and public services.
Second, fiscal and political constraints narrow the government’s room for manoeuvre. With limited fiscal and political room to manoeuvre, the government faces the challenge of balancing spending restraint with growing public grievances while restoring public confidence.
Preetha Renganarayanan is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
The Houthi escalation in Saudi Arabia:
Asymmetric capabilities and Mounting losses for Riyadh
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 15 October, Reuters reported that the Houthi launched missile strikes at Aden’s Al-Maashiq presidential palace, the headquarters of Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government.
Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the attacks were part of targeting "Saudi reinforcements wherever they were located” and that the headquarters stored weapons.
The attacks followed days of severe damage to Riyadh’s oil infrastructure, particularly the headquarters of Saudi Arabian oil giant Aramco, Saudi airports and ports. Coalition spokesperson Turki al-Maliki stated that the King Khalid International Airport, one of Saudi Arabia's main international aviation hubs, was attacked at least 20 times in the span of a month. The Saudi government was met with criticisms over failing to issue an effective warning before the attacks, and in intercepting the assault.
On 19 October, Al Jazeera and other major sources reported that Riyadh has postponed the 10th edition of its flagship investment conference, the Future Investment Initiative, to 2027 in the light of the Houthi attacks.
On 22 October, a Reuters exclusive stated that the US State Department had asked diplomats and families to depart from missions in Saudi Arabia following a Houthi drone attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, killing one resident and injuring eight others.
Issues at large
1. The relentless and escalating Houthi attacks
The Houthis have expanded the scope of their attacks despite the reclamation of strategic territory from the group by Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces the previous week. The feat was expected to weaken Houthi control over Yemen’s southern coast, restore maritime traffic through the strait, and constrain the group’s regional reach. However, these gains have done little to degrade the Houthis’ offensive capabilities. The group continues to launch sustained attacks against Riyadh, targeting infrastructure vital to its oil artery and expanding to civilian sites. The Houthis, bolstered by years of Iranian technical and training assistance, demonstrate a formidable capacity to sustain the pressure independently, despite the reduced support from Tehran.
2. Imbalanced capabilities, and the limits and challenges of Saudi defence infrastructure
Despite being one of the largest purchasers of US defence equipment, Saudi Arabia continues to struggle to counter the Houthis’ low-cost drones and cruise missiles. Its sophisticated arsenal, including F-15 fighter aircraft, Patriot air defence systems and THAAD interceptors, has not fully addressed the threat posed by low-flying, manoeuvrable targets deployed by the Houthis in swarms. Systems such as Patriot and THAAD are designed primarily to counter ballistic and other high-velocity missile threats, making the interception of certain low-altitude targets more challenging. Further, using a multi-million-dollar asset like the Patriot to shoot down thousands of low-cost drones creates an economic asymmetry that is too costly to sustain, particularly amid a shortage of interceptors.
Saudi Arabia’s vulnerabilities are compounded by the geographical distribution of its defence infrastructure. With much of its military preparedness historically concentrated in the north, oriented towards threats from Iran and Iraq, its southern flank remains comparatively exposed to Houthi attacks. The structural limitations, coupled with the kingdom’s continued reliance on external assistance, constrain its ability to respond effectively.
3. The muted response from regional allies and defence partners
Despite Riyadh’s central role in major regional groupings including the OPEC and the GCC,the response from its regional allies to the Houthi attacks has remained largely muted, with limited tangible assistance. The same is largely true for the kingdom's defense partners, particularly the United States, which has historically served as its principal security ally. The much-publicised Mecca defence pact has likewise yielded little beyond broad condemnations and warnings to the Houthis, falling short of a coordinated response to address the peril. The region has largely remained outside the conflict, leaving Saudi Arabia to counter the Houthi threat despite the escalation being part of the broader US-Iran war that has drawn the region into its orbit.
In perspective
First, Riyadh is suffering more damage than it is inflicting. Saudi Arabia’s multi-billion-dollar defence budget and sophisticated arsenal struggle to counter the Houthis without the cushion of US support. While the Kingdom continues to face attacks across multiple fronts, its military response has done little to significantly curb the group’s capabilities. The attacks on key oil infrastructure and civilian hubs bear down further on the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the incapacitation of the east-west oil pipeline.
The attacks have also caused cracks in Riyadh’s global positioning as a secure destination for global investment. Although no major corporations have exited the Kingdom and the Houthi threat has long remained a security consideration, the postponement of major investment events such as the Future Investment Initiative, widely dubbed the ‘Davos of the Desert,’ risks undermining confidence in Saudi Arabia’s image as a stable investment hub.
Second, Saudi Arabia is a swelling pressure point. Although the broader US-Iran war has witnessed a lull in the recent weeks, the pressure that had shifted to the Saudi-Houthi front continues to deepen. While the US and Iran remain at the periphery, a resolution between Washington and Tehran, or their willingness to engage appears increasingly necessary to ease the tensions in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia remains caught between Washington’s reluctance to provide sustained assistance against Houthi attacks and Tehran’s influence over the group as a tool to extract favourable positions from the US, while Riyadh is left with little room to manoeuvre.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
The Wildfires in Indonesia:
Environmental Drivers, Governmental Impasse and a Regional Crisis
Advik Sunanda Mohan
In the news
On 13 October, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced the mobilization of additional resources across the country for firefighters to combat the wildfires.
On 14 October, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong demanded strong and coordinated action from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc to combat the wildfires.
On 15 October, East Timor announced the closure of all schools for three days, owing to the escalating air pollution and haze from Indonesia.
On 16 October, Singapore reported its 12th consecutive day of unhealthy readings on the Pollutant Standards Index (PSI), with air quality above 101. On 19 October, Prabowo appointed Lieutenant General Kristomei Sianturi as the new head of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) in Indonesia amidst outrage over growing wildfires. On the same day, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi informed that Malaysia had offered a Bombardier aircraft, three helicopters, and 50 personnel to help Indonesia combat the wildfires. He further informed the request was awaiting official approval from Jakarta.
On 20 October, thousands of Indonesian students protested against the government’s handling of the wildfires.
Issues at large
1. The recurring nature of wildfires in Indonesia
The islands of Borneo and Sumatra have been particularly vulnerable to wildfires for years. This is also owing to the peatland vegetation prevalent here being drained. This type of vegetation has traditionally been more resistant to wildfires due to being waterlogged. However, the constant draining of these peatlands has resulted in water drying out and the likelihood of fires increasing. The rich vegetation prevalent in Indonesia has been particularly affected by this, with large swathes of the biodiversity devastated from the wildfires, which have burnt over 900,000 hectares of land so far. The wildfires are also seasonal, traditionally occurring in the July to October period of the dry season with low rainfall.
2. The cascading effects of El Nino
The phenomenon has escalated this year due to a surge in ocean temperatures and global warming. El Nino has disrupted traditional rainfall patterns in Indonesia. Data from the Indonesian Bureau of Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics showed that cumulative rainfall across the central and southern provinces decreased by 65 per cent below the 30-year historical average. The commencement of the monsoon season was also delayed to November, a month after its traditional start. The rainfall deficit has escalated droughts and caused the rich agricultural land to dry out. This has aggravated the impact of the wildfires.
3. The flawed response of Indonesia
The Indonesian government has faced criticism over its slow response to the wildfires. The government did not declare the wildfires as a national disaster until after about a month, which meant that it could not utilize emergency reserve funds maintained for times of emergency. Additionally, a national disaster declaration would have provided the Indonesian government with the authority to handle the wildfires directly. This contrasts with the current response, which has been criticized as being more fragmented in nature with the confusion in responsibilities between the national and regional governments. The Indonesian government also refused to take foreign aid, despite offers from Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan. These countries possess specialized methods of combating wildfires that Indonesia lacks, such as the advanced cloud seeding technology of Singapore or the specialized aircraft for water-bombing Malaysia has.
4. The regional spillover across the ASEAN
Indonesia’s neighbours have been dealing with high air pollution and haze as a result of the wildfires. Malaysia, Singapore, and East Timor have all reported high levels of pollution, alongside respiratory illnesses. The haze from the Indonesian wildfires has been blamed for worsening air quality in these countries. These have forced the countries to undertake drastic measures, such as large-scale distribution of masks and closure of schools. Prabowo has struck a defiant note, criticizing countries that “insult us.” However, the wildfires and resulting haze have turned into a cross-country issue, with Jakarta facing mounting pressure over its response.
In perspective
First, the escalating climate crisis. The current wildfires are expected to last until mid-November. Additionally, with growing climate change, the problem is expected to persist in the coming years. The crisis this year has reflected several organizational gaps and equipment deficiencies prevalent within the Indonesian governmental structure vis-à-vis combating climate disasters like wildfires. However, Indonesia is expected to remain at the forefront of the climate crisis in Southeast Asia in the coming years.
Second, the domestic pressure on the Indonesian government. Two years into his presidency, Prabowo has faced increasing criticism on various issues. The government has been dogged by several corruption scandals, such as in the mid-day meal programme which caused food poisoning incidents in children, and in the disaster relief fund. Additionally, there has been discontent over the growing military involvement in civilian government posts, and the rising cost of living. The problems with the handling of the wildfires have only added to criticism. The recent protests sparked by the environmental inaction could escalate into a broader movement against the government.
Third, the regional response. These wildfires are expected to dominate the agenda at the ASEAN summit to be held next month in the Philippines. There is likely to be a greater push towards ensuring greater enforcement mechanisms for the bloc towards climate events such as transboundary haze and smoke, which it lacks at present.
Advik Sunanda Mohan is a postgraduate student at Sciences Po's Paris School of International Affairs and a Research Intern with the Global Politics platform at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in Bengaluru.
CW Newsmakers
Protests across Albania, Alberta and Italy, and the Supersized "heat storm"
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, and Urja R Kudalkar
Albania Youth-led protest:
Demand Prime Minister Rama’s resignation over corruption, education and controversial coastal development
On 20 October, The Guardian and other sources reported that anti-government protests in Albania entered their eighth day, with young demonstrators demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama. The protests, centred in Tirana, have escalated into clashes with police, who used tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets to disperse crowds. The movement initially emerged in opposition to a controversial luxury resort development on an environmentally protected coastal area linked to a company associated with Jared Kushner, United States President Donald Trump’s son-in-law. It subsequently expanded to include grievances over corruption, high university tuition fees, inadequate student accommodation, unemployment and deteriorating public services. The protests are largely decentralised, with students, environmental activists and other citizens coordinating through social media rather than formal political organisations. Demonstrators have rejected the traditional political establishment and called for Rama’s resignation and the formation of a technical government. The Prime Minister has rejected the allegations against his government and accused political opponents and external actors of exploiting the unrest. The continuing demonstrations highlight growing frustration among young Albanians over governance, economic opportunities, and public accountability.
Alberta's separatist protests:
Referendum defeat fails to quell separatist movement
On 19 October, Reuters and other major sources reported that Albertans voted in the province's first-ever referendum on separation, a push fuelled by resentment that the oil-rich province's energy wealth is subsidising the rest of Canada and by anger over federal environmental rules. Voters were asked whether Alberta should remain a province of Canada or begin the legal process toward a binding independence referendum, and about 75 per cent backed remaining. Prime Minister Mark Carney, who grew up in Alberta, called it a choice for unity, handing him a boost as he navigates a trade war with the United States and works with Premier Danielle Smith on a new pipeline to the Pacific coast. Separatist leaders said they would continue the fight. Keith Wilson of Let Alberta Decide said "we've already won" by making separation a major issue, while Jeffrey Rath of the Alberta Prosperity Project vowed to challenge Smith and "form a government." Analysts warned that deep-seated grievances remain, with University of Ottawa's Geneviève Tellier saying the movement could no longer be trivialised. The referendum drew in activists who opposed COVID-19 mandates and backed the 2022 trucker convoy, and some separatist leaders met US State Department officials last year. Voters also backed eight of nine other nonbinding questions on provincial powers, immigration and voter identification.
Italy’s protest crackdown:
Meloni sends 500 troops to Milan and toughens laws after cost-of-living riots
On 21 October, Euronews and other major sources reported that Rome approved the deployment of an additional 500 troops to Milan on 20 October, following violent cost-of-living protests in Milan, Turin, and Bologna. AP reported that a march on 17 October against wars and rising living costs began peacefully, but masked protesters threw stones and paving blocks at riot police, looted stores, and set fires in central Milan. Police used water cannons and tear gas. PM Giorgia Meloni said nearly 200 police officers were injured and 330 people detained, around half of whom she described as of “foreign origin.” The cabinet stopped short of granting soldiers extra policing powers, reportedly after opposition from President Sergio Mattarella. The new Public Security Decree creates an offence of “violent participation in public demonstrations” and presumes minors aged 14 to 18 can be held criminally responsible unless proven otherwise. Justice Minister Carlo Nordio said organisers of violent demonstrations, including through social media, could face four to 12 years in prison. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto blamed a “hybrid war” waged through TikTok and other platforms, though The Independent noted he named no one. Meloni faces an election next year.
The supersized "heat storm":
Extreme heat is becoming a permanent climate risk
On 20 October, Reuters and The Hindu reported that extreme heat events have expanded significantly since the 1960s, highlighting the growing risks posed by climate change. The investigation introduced the term “heat storms” for exceptionally large heatwaves covering at least one per cent of the globe at their peak. The average number of active heat storms increased from around five annually in the 1960s to 102 per year in the current decade. The largest recorded event, Heat Storm Vera, lasted 367 days during 2023 and 2024 and covered nearly 85 per cent of the globe. Its impacts included extreme temperatures, droughts, wildfires and flooding across different regions. Reuters also identified “heat storm cascades”, in which successive and overlapping events prolong exposure to extreme temperatures. The findings indicate that extreme heat is becoming a persistent, interconnected climate risk rather than an isolated seasonal hazard. The increase in the frequency and geographical reach of these events can intensify pressure on public health, agriculture, water resources and disaster management systems. Prolonged exposure also reduces the time available for communities and ecosystems to recover between heat events. Reports link these trends to rising greenhouse gas emissions. Atmospheric carbon dioxide levels increased by more than 30 per cent between the 1960s and the current decade, while the average area of the planet likely to experience heat storms and heatwaves increased more than twelvefold. The findings underscore the importance of reducing emissions alongside strengthening heat preparedness, early-warning systems and climate resilience.
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, and Urja R Kudalkar are postgraduate students at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences. They are currently Research interns at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.
