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Dincy Adlakha
15 August 2021 |
Since the coup, China and Russia have both followed different strategies and different interests with the junta. While Russia takes the military route, China follows the economic path. However, their intent remains the same.
China’s motives in Myanmar
First, the Belt and Road Initiative. Myanmar’s BRI lines are crucial for China; they provide China with a direct entry into the Indian Ocean, surpassing the Malacca Strait and other tension prone routes in the South China Sea.
Second, the border and connectivity to oil/energy. Myanmar also serves as the gateway to all oil and energy imports into China through the Indian Ocean. Thus, enter the China-Myanmar border economic cooperation zones. All-important gas/oil pipelines and Liquified Natural Gas routes fall on the border of Yunnan province and Myanmar. Hence, Myanmar’s border and stability here become extremely important for the safety of these pipelines.
Third, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the CMEC, is an economic project similar to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It opens a platform for China to grab hold of Myanmar’s market quickly. It will act as the connecting link for industrial, transportation, and even social and environmental projects in Myanmar through the Chinese force.
Fourth, Myanmar’s effect on Chinese territory. Myanmar shares a long border with the Yunnan province of China, one of the poorest provinces of the country. Any investment or development it receives is through China’s strategy towards Myanmar. Two major concerns of China for Yunnan are the oil and gas pipelines running through the province and the refugee/chaos spill-over.
Russia’s motives in Myanmar
Russia, too, has shown keen interest in Myanmar. First, the historical alliances with the military. Russia has supported the military of Myanmar through arms, training, and a haven since the 1950s. The presence of the NLD government did not alter Russia’s ties with Myanmar’s military. What started as the working relationship with the military regime has now turned into full-blown support for the military.
Second, the market for arms export. Myanmar is a potential expanding market for arms according to Russia. Currently, around 16 per cent of the arms in Myanmar are exported by Russia. This expansion has an ulterior motive. Through this trade, Russia intends to reach the other South East Asian regions as well, augmenting its baseline.
Third, the strategic importance. The growing integration of Myanmar in the South East Asian economy is not lost on Russia. With Myanmar under the influence of Russia, there will be a position for the giant in the centre of the Indian Ocean. Combined with the Russian emphasis on Eurasian Economic Cooperation, this bores well for Russia. Russia has been negotiating with a few South-East Asian countries to join EEC. If Myanmar is integrated with EEC as well as the regional neighbours, it will allow a great amount of income to flow for Russia.
Fourth, the ideological support. Russia’s tactic of supporting any country which is isolated and punished by the west is not a new strategy. Since the coup, Western countries have imposed sanctions on Myanmar. Russia is the helpful yet powerful hand waiting for the opportunity.
The giants and the Junta
Despite the history of the military regime in Myanmar and its relations with China, the cooperation between the two has continued without a pause. Numerous BRI projects like the New Yangon City Project and the China-Myanmar border economic cooperation zones were signed between China and the NLD government. However, contrary to the predictions, the deals continue to be signed even after the coup.
In March, merely a month over the coup, the 2.5 billion USD project, Mee Lin Gyaing, for a liquefied natural gas power plant in the Ayeyarwady region was approved. In May, the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone management committee was reorganised to implement the SEZ and work on the deep-sea port project in Kyaukphyu. This is an important strategic port project under the BRI. The Junta also reorganised other significant committees such as the Cross Border Economic Cooperation Zones in Kachin and Shan states to provide a boost to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Such appeasement of the Chinese by the Junta is not void of Chinese involvement. The two have accelerated the extent and speed of economic cooperation and are closing in the gap of their histories.
Russia has continued to support the Junta leader, General Min Aung Hlaing. The frequent high-level meets between Myanmar and Russia are signalling for an enhanced relationship. General Hlaing visited Russia for the Victory Day parade and amplified the Myanmar-Russia ties. The military cooperation and trade between the two have also received a boost ever since the coup.
Moscow and Beijing are following different Myanmar approaches. Both are eager to establish their monopoly over Myanmar. A rush of foreign businesses and an expanded arms sale will enable them to make space for themselves in conflict-ridden Myanmar. The isolated and sanctioned Myanmar is as away from the west as it can be. China and Russia have both moved in to make the best use of this opportunity. Their steps in blocking the international response on or action in the matter are conspicuous as it is. Their moves have displayed that they do not oppose any form of government that is in power. China will confirm bilateral arrangements with any form of government as long as it can extract maximum profit from the deals. It does not look far beyond into matters of ethics, morals, or democratic governments. Whereas, Russia seems to provide unconditional support to the military. The democratic government only served the purpose of a phase in the military ties between Russia and Myanmar.
Their disregard for the kind of government may be criticised by many voices. Nonetheless, the realist approach of the giants makes this disregard a strong point in how they perceive Myanmar.
