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Lekshmi MK
30 November 2025 |
At the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) organised a Rome Water Dialogue in Rome, Pakistan's Adviser to the PM, Syed Tauqir Hussain Shah warned that Pakistan's climate adaptation efforts are being choked by slow, bureaucratic climate-finance systems. He also mentioned that Pakistan would need USD 7-14 billion annually to cope with worsening water scarcity, extreme weather, and food security threats.
1. What is the nature of Pakistan’s climate and water crisis?
Being one among the world's most climate-vulnerable countries, Pakistan faced a dual threat of water abundance and scarcity. Extreme weather events have become recurrent, highlighting the country's exposure to climate shocks. Devastating 2022 floods that affected over 33 million people and destroyed four million acres of crops. At the same time, water storage capacity is limited. It left the nation with barely 30 days' supply, which threatened food security. Agriculture, which employed a large portion of the population, was directly impacted. Flood and drought disrupted crop cycles and irrigation. Rising temperatures and erratic rainfall patterns stressed water resources. Meanwhile, urbanisation, population, growth, and inefficient water management further strained supply. These challenges make water crisis an existential threat rather than an abstract policy concern. Pakistan risked worsening food insecurity, economic losses and increased vulnerability particularly in rural areas without immediate and effective adaptation measures.
2. Is the challenge national or provincial challenge?
Pakistan’s climate and water crisis is both a national and provincial issue. Each tier experiencing distinct but interconnected challenges. At the national level, Pakistan faces systemic vulnerabilities, melting glaciers, erratic monsoons, chronic water scarcity, and rising climate-finance needs that require coordinated policies, interstate river management, and federal disaster-response mechanisms. However, because of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, provinces now hold primary responsibility for environment, water, land use, agriculture, and local development. This means provinces such as Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan face the crisis directly. They face waterlogging, drought cycles, canal degradation, and rapid ecosystem loss. Their institutional capacity is often weaker than federal bodies, making them less equipped to design and implement adaptation projects, even though they manage the areas most exposed to climate impacts.
Urbanisation has intensified these provincial vulnerabilities. In major cities like Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar, riverbanks, floodplains, wetlands, and natural drainage channels have been encroached. These are due to unregulated construction, real-estate expansion, and weak municipal enforcement. The destruction of natural buffers such as the Ravi riverbanks in Lahore and the Lyari and Malir riverbeds in Karachi has severely restricted water flow, causing urban flooding even during moderate rains. This ecological degradation, combined with heavy rains and poor infrastructure, increases flooding. This demonstrates that the crisis is nationally structural and provincially acute.
3. Is the institutional capacity a primary challenge for Pakistan?
At the national level, Pakistan has made progress by establishing the Ministry of Climate Change, a Climate Finance Unit, and developing key frameworks such as the National Climate Change Policy and updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These enable engagement with global funds like Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Global Environment Facility (GEF). However, national institutions still struggle with limited technical expertise to prepare complex, “bankable” project proposals, which require sophisticated modelling, feasibility studies, and detailed financial planning. Coordination gaps across ministries such as climate, water, agriculture, planning, and finance further slow decision-making and hinder timely submission of proposals.
The provincial-level capacity is even more constrained despite being the frontline for climate adaptation. Provinces lack specialised climate finance cells, trained officers, and modern data systems needed for vulnerability assessments and project design. Their monitoring, reporting, and implementation systems remain weak, reducing absorption capacity even when funds are approved. As a result, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on international accredited entities to structure proposals and execute projects. Overall, while the policy direction exists, institutional capacity limitations particularly at the provincial level continue to hinder Pakistan’s ability to efficiently attract, manage, and utilise climate finance.
4. Why is Pakistan struggling to access climate finance?
First, bureaucratic barriers. Pakistan faces significant administrative obstacles while trying to access global climate finance. Climate funds expect highly technical and “bankable” project proposals, which require extensive data, modelling, and financial justification. Pakistan’s institutions, however, often lack the specialised capacity needed to meet these complex criteria, especially under time pressure. As a result, Pakistan struggles to prepare competitive proposals quickly, slowing down its ability to secure urgently needed climate funds.
Second, structural inefficiencies in climate funds. Even when Pakistan submits proposals, the structure of major climate funds themselves becomes a bottleneck. Multi-year legal and procedural processes delay decisions, and disbursement cycles remain slow. Funds like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) operate with fragmented internal review systems, often taking 24 months or more to approve a single project. Additionally, much of the financing provided is loan-based rather than grant-based, increasing the debt burden on already fragile economies.
5. What are the legal and policy frameworks has Pakistan adopted?
At the federal level, Pakistan’s core legal framework is shaped by the National Climate Change Policy (2012; updated 2021) and the Pakistan Climate Change Act (2017). The Act mandates the formation of key bodies such as the Pakistan Climate Change Council and the Pakistan Climate Change Authority, responsible for coordinating national climate planning, approving adaptation and mitigation programmes, and guiding climate-finance access.
Complementing this is the National Water Policy (2018), which legally recognises the country’s water crisis and establishes commitments to integrated water-resource management, groundwater regulation, and climate-resilient infrastructure. The Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (1997), implemented through federal and provincial Environmental Protection Agency (EPAs), provides statutory authority for environmental assessments, pollution control, and environmental monitoring. Nationally, climate obligations have been mainstreamed through the National Adaptation Plan, updated NDCs, and the Living Indus Initiative.
References
"Climate finance stuck in red tape, Pakistan warns FAO dialogue," Dawn, 20 October 2025
Dure Sameen Akhund, "The climate finance boom and why Pakistan is missing out," Dawn, 28 July 2025
"Pakistan urges urgent grant-based climate finance at COP30," Dawn, 23 November 2025
"The Pakistan Environmental Protection act, 1997," Gov.pk, 12 December 1997
About the author
Lekshmi MK is pursuing postgraduation in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. She is also a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
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