CW Note

CW Note
Escalating Violence in Mali:
Between Ethnic Insurgencies, Jihadist Attacks, and Military Coups

The conflict is driven by three primary actors: the Malian government, the FLA, and JNIM.

Akshath Kaimal
1 May 2026
Photo Source:

In the news
On 25 April, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and JNIM launched a series of coordinated attacks across Mali, particularly in the cities of Bamako, Sevare, Gao, Kati and Kidal. Defence Minister Gen. Sadio Camara was killed in a targeted suicide bombing.

On 26 April, Malian armed forces and the Russian Africa Corps withdrew from the key northern city of Kidal, after reaching an agreement with the rebels, but described the attacks as a failed “coup attempt”. The FLA then officially claimed control of Kidal.

On 28 April, the JNIM announced a “total siege” of the capital Bamako, blocking fuel tankers and food trucks from entering the city. Meanwhile, Russian troops conducted airstrikes against the rebels, claiming they killed over 300 militants.

On 29 April, military leader Col. Assimi Goïta delivered his first presidential address after the attacks, saying the situation was “under control” but admitting they were of “extreme gravity”. On the same day, France urged its citizens to leave the country.

Between 26 and 30 April, the UN, US, and UK condemned the attacks in Mali, while the newly-formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) - consisting of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger - called it a “monstrous plot”. France urged its citizens in Mali to leave the country immediately.

On 01 May, JNIM fighters set up checkpoints around Bamako as part of the blockade, while also seizing the northern town of Tessalit. On the same day, the AES confirmed that it had conducted joint airstrikes on jihadist groups in northern Mali.

Issues at large
1. Mali’s long history of rebellions and political instability
Since independence in 1960, Mali’s history of Tuareg separatist rebellions and coups has fueled persistent instability. Separatists have launched four rebellions since independence, and there have been three coups in the last 15 years alone (2012, 2020 and 2021). The 2012 rebellion triggered a coup and a security vacuum, allowing violence to escalate until the French and UN interventions pushed the rebels back. Although the 2015 Algiers Accord proposed decentralisation, a reconstituted army, and a development zone, it was never fully implemented. A pivotal shift occurred with Gen Assimi Goïta’s 2021 coup. His government expelled international troops and officially annulled the peace accord in 2024. This political collapse effectively restarted hostilities, forcing northern separatist groups to unify into the FLA. Ultimately, this cycle of coups and broken agreements has dismantled the country’s security architecture, leaving Mali fragile and transforming long-standing grievances into the current state of violence.

2. Competing political and military actors and the continuous rise in violence
The conflict is driven by three primary actors: the Malian government, the FLA, and JNIM. The military leadership, supported by Russia’s Africa Corps since 2023, employs a military-first strategy and blames its civilian predecessors for past failures. Opposing them is the FLA, a Tuareg coalition formed in 2024 from legacy groups seeking independence due to underdevelopment and cultural suppression. Meanwhile, the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group, seeks to establish Sharia law and has been active in the larger Sahel region. The conflict took a major turn when the FLA and JNIM - historically distinct in their secular and religious aims - began collaborating on attacks against the armed forces and military infrastructure. This alliance, triggered by the government’s annulment of peace efforts, has leveraged the security vacuum to launch the latest round of coordinated attacks.

3. The deepening humanitarian crisis
The humanitarian situation in Mali is catastrophic. According to the UN, 6.4 million people - 26 per cent of the population - require emergency humanitarian aid, with over 400,000 internally displaced and thousands more fleeing to neighbouring countries. The hunger crisis is dire; over 1.5 million people are facing acute food insecurity, and 220,000 children are suffering from severe malnutrition. This has been exacerbated by the siege tactics employed by armed groups, like the one in Bamako imposed by JNIM last year. With USAID receiving major cutbacks in 2025, aid funding for Mali has dried up, and UNOCHA noted that just 27 per cent of projects were funded as of 2025.

4. The Russian role
Russia has been Mali’s major partner in its war against the rebels since 2023. Mali does not have to consider democratic reforms as it would when engaging with Western partners, while Russia gains access to minerals and can bypass sanctions. Following the attacks, the FLA said that it aimed to drive Russia’s Africa Corps out of the country. The Russian military said it had successfully stopped a coup but then withdrew from the key northern city of Kidal, effectively leaving it to the FLA to take over. The AES originated as a mutual defence pact, and the group has carried out joint airstrikes on jihadist groups in Mali in response to the latest attacks, bringing Niger and Burkina Faso also into the conflict.

In perspective
First, the government’s military-first approach could be its undoing. The 2015 Accord provided relative stability in the north, making the government's 2024 annulment a strategic failure. By opting for a military-first approach, the government has inadvertently emboldened the rebels, triggering the formation of the more aggressive FLA. The FLA's subsequent collaboration with JNIM proves that the government's isolationist tactics have backfired, worsening the security crisis.

Second, civilians will continue to bear the brunt of this conflict. As the government and armed groups weaponise essential resources, civilians - particularly children - face dire conditions. With the humanitarian situation at a breaking point due to aid cuts and restricted access, siege tactics around Bamako will further squeeze resources, leaving the population with no escape or support.

Third, a strategic setback for Russia. The Russian troops have been largely ineffective in stopping the cycle of violence in Mali. Its withdrawal from key cities could diminish its position as a reliable security backer in the region. The AES has responded militarily, and while this might provide Mali with extra security cover, the reaction from separatist and jihadist groups could be violent.

Finally, the latest attacks show that Mali is still not immune to political instability. A series of strategic errors by the military government - from expelling UN troops to annuling the peace accord - has once again left the country unsafe and vulnerable. 

About the author

Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and Interntional Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.


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