In the news
On 24 July, President Trump stated that Washington was temporarily pausing its military strikes on Tehran to revive negotiations, after thirteen consecutive days of attack. Iranian officials responded that Tehran will halt its attack for only as long as the US holds off, and that Iran remains in a position of “attack for attack.”
On the same day, President Trump stated that President Xi Jinping had assured China would not enable Tehran “Under any circumstances, give or sell weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran — And that statement included Chinese Companies.” He warned that such involvement from Beijing and Moscow “would be very bad for them.”
On 26 July, Iran's Houthi allies in Yemen said they had targeted the East-West Pipeline carrying oil to Saudi Arabia's main Red Sea port of Yanbu in retaliation for Saudi drone incursions.
On 29 July, the US CENTCOM stated that it intercepted multiple ballistic missiles launched by Iran in “an attempted surprise attack.” On the same day, the US and Saudi Arabia launched strikes on Iran-backed groups in Iraq citing drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities.
Separately, Reuters, in an exclusive, reported that Iran is set to purchase 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air-defence missile launchers, amounting to USD 60-70 billion. The purchase also includes between 300 and 400 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), including Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missiles. Reports also suggested that China held direct talks with the Houthis to allow safe transit of its tankers through the southern Red Sea, amid the Houthi embargo on exports from Saudi Arabia.
Issues at large
1. End of truce and expanding geography of the conflict
The temporary pause has ended with Iran’s strikes against the US and persisting attacks unfolding across various fronts in the war. The conflict-geography has markedly expanded with new fronts opening in Yemen and Iraq. In Yemen, Iran-backed Houthi forces have sharply escalated the confrontation with Saudi Arabia, and established a second maritime front in the Red Sea, drawing Riyadh into active combat. Simultaneously, Iran-backed militias operating from Iraqi territory have turned Iraq into an active launch platform, conducting drone attacks directed by the IRGC against Saudi oil sites.
2. Targeting Saudi Arabia and opening new fronts
Saudi Arabia has emerged as Iran’s key target, notably against the backdrop of the recent US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Iran is leveraging the vast network of proxy groups it has cultivated over the decades as a tool of escalation. Opening new fronts in Yemen and Iraq has widened the scope of what US or and regional allies have to confront alongside direct confrontations with Iran. The Iran-backed militias in Iraq have turned Baghdad into an operational base for Tehran’s attacks. These militias form a key pillar of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” largely organized under the banner of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Hashd al-Shaabi, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Forming a powerful network of predominantly Shiite paramilitary groups, they emerged during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fight against ISIS after 2014 and were later formally integrated into Iraq’s security apparatus while retaining strong operational, financial and ideological ties to Iran’s IRGC and its Quds Force.
3. The emerging China factor and the end of Beijing's non-interference
For months, Beijing had limited its involvement in the war largely to protecting its own energy and shipping interests, publicly calling for de-escalation, safeguarding the flow of oil and avoiding direct military entanglement. However, that posture has markedly eroded with its supply of ammunition to Iran to help rebuild its short-range defences depleted by US and Israeli strikes, effectively tilting Beijing toward Tehran and shedding the appearance of non-interference. The events are a stark contradiction to the assurances against “enabling” Tehran that Trump claimed to have secured. Simultaneously, the direct talks with the Houthis to secure safe passage for Chinese tankers through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait underscore Beijing’s proximity to Iran and its proxy networks.
In perspective
Iran has remained unyielding to Washington’s war of attrition, weaponizing the repeated cycles of aggression to nudge negotiations in its favour. On the contrary, Tehran has only amplified its offensive, leveraging regional proxies against Washington’s close allies, raising the scope and stakes of the conflict.
On the other hand, the US has been unable to curb Tehran effectively, even failing to prevent the expanding war that has dragged Saudi Arabia into direct conflict. It has neither been able to prevent the attacks on Riyadh, nor mitigate the threat posed by the Houthi’s on Iran’s behalf.
For China, the military assistance and engagement with Iran’s proxies goes beyond securing its economic interest. Beijing finds it an opportunity to counter US strategic interests that seek to wear down Iran militarily to secure a decisive win. It introduces a new dimension of US-China rivalry into the conflict and risk further complicating an already volatile crisis.
