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CWA # 2185, 10 July 2026
Conflict Weekly
Iran after Ali Khamenei I The War in Ukraine

  Global Politics Team

Conflict Weekly Note
Iran after Ali Khamenei:
Institutional resilience, Anti-American sentiment and an Unresolved conflict

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

In the news
On 03 July, Ali Khamenei's coffin was placed on public display outdoors beneath a glass enclosure; his three sons, Masoud, Meysam and Mostafa, attended the funeral processions; Mojtaiba Khamenei, his other son and Supreme Leader, did not attend. 

On 04 July, Trump stated that Iran was “dying to settle” and that Washington had granted “a week off for a funeral because we’re nice.” On 06 July, he stated that either a deal would be reached or the US would "finish the job." 

On 06 July, thousands accompanied the coffins from Imam Hossein Square to Azadi Square. An effigy of President Trump was hanged along the way, stones were reportedly thrown at a billboard bearing his image, and people carried placards that read “there will be blood.”

On 07 July, mourners gathered at Jamkaran Mosque, just south of Qom, with ceremonies scheduled to continue in the cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, before the final burial in Khamenei's hometown of Mashhad.

Issues at large
1. Ali Khamenei and his legacy
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei served as the Supreme Leader of Iran from 1989 to 2026. He was a close associate of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was actively involved in the 1979 Iranian revolution and held the office of President from 1981 to 1989, before becoming the Supreme Leader. During his 37-year tenure, Khamenei consolidated the authority, building a vast administrative apparatus and exercising influence over the military and judiciary. Tehran’s relations with the West remained largely adversarial, marked by repeated flashpoints over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, and regional activities. Under his leadership, Iran expanded its regional network and influence through the ‘Axis of Resistance’, including countries and non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and the Bashar al-Assad-led Syrian government. He also oversaw the growth of Iran’s defence, missile and nuclear capabilities, such as building and expanding facilities like Natanz and Fordow, against the backdrop of near-continuous sanctions throughout his tenure.

2. The post-Khamenei political transition and the regime survival
The US-Israeli strikes killed a major part of Iran’s senior leadership, including Tehran’s Defence Minister, the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, Chief of the General Staff, and Security chief, but the chain of authority in the country seems to have held. Post the strikes, a three-person interim council assumed leadership duties, IRGC command passed to former Quds Force chief Ahmad Vahidi. On 08 March the Assembly of Experts appointed Mojtaba Khamenei as the Supreme Leader. Additionally, provincial administrations, state broadcasting and religious institutions remained operational, presenting an image of institutional continuity throughout the leadership transition. 

3. Anti-American sentiment and public support for the regime in Iran
Historically, while there has been wide public support for the regime, anti-government protests have persisted, including the 1999 student protests, 2009 green movement protests, and most recently, the 2022 to 2023 Masha Amini protests. On the other hand, hostility toward the US has been a defining feature of the regime, further sharpened since the Gaza war and the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. Khamenei’s funeral drew large crowds; displays of anti-American and anti-Israeli banners – further solidifying the image of national unity and resistance, indicating a greater national mobilisation caused by the conflict. 

4. Continuing US-Iran war
President Trump’s remarks through the funeral period were escalatory. In response, senior officials in Iran also made statements condemning and returning threats. Against this backdrop, reported strikes on ships in the Strait of Hormuz drew further US strikes, escalating into further rounds of attacks, putting the already fragile MoU into question. Trump's continued rhetorical volatility of victory, threats of annihilation or ultimatums has become a recurring variable that exacerbates the existing uncertainty and tensions surrounding the conflict. 

In perspective
Ali Khamenei's most significant contribution is the strengthening of Iran’s institutions over three decades, which dealt with the death of its supreme leader and senior commanders without state collapse and reorganised within days to establish continuity. Today, Tehran presents the succession as evidence of stability, unity, and resilience against America. However, Mojtaba Khamenei's absence from public view since his appointment raises questions about the extent to which this image reflects the underlying political reality.

Second, public sentiment toward the regime is projected as uniform and consolidated. The scale of mourning and the prominence of anti-American displays argue for a regime still commanding loyalty and support. However, whether these displays reflect broader public opinion remains difficult to assess. 

Third, the current escalations and consistent violations of the MoU by both sides suggest that the conflict is likely to persist. Iran's longer-term trajectory hinges on whether Mojtaba Khamenei exercises the authority that the state claims he holds and whether the 60-day MoU negotiating framework survives.

Conflict Weekly Note
The War in Ukraine: 
Deep strikes, NATO diplomacy and the Expanding air warfare

Padmashree Anandhan

In the news
During 02 and 05 July, Russia's launched one of the largest aerial attacks on Kyiv, killing several civilians and destroying residential buildings and humanitarian facilities. Ukraine expanded drone attacks against Russian oil infrastructure, including the Ufa refinery.

On 07 July, Ukrainian military intensified its attacks against Russian logistics by targeting at least ten sanctioned fuel tankers from Russia's "shadow fleet" operating in the Sea of Azov, aiming to disrupt fuel supplies to occupied Crimea. Addressing the NATO Summit in Ankara, President Zelenskyy renewed Ukraine's appeal for NATO membership, arguing that Ukraine's armed forces had become "one of the most experienced militaries in the world" and would strengthen NATO's collective defence. Ukraine also signed new drone cooperation agreements with Denmark, Estonia and the Netherlands, showing the growing international demand for its battlefield-tested drone technology.

On 07 July, Ukraine claimed responsibility for one of its longest-range attacks of the war by striking the Omsk oil refinery in Siberia, nearly 2,700 km from Ukrainian-held territory. Zelenskyy said: "Siberia, too, is now within reach of Ukrainian precision strikes." 

On 07 July, Russia’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated that the conflict could end "in a single day" if Ukraine ordered the withdrawal of its forces from the Donbas and recognised the territories claimed by Russia. 

On 07 July, NATO leaders reaffirmed their long-term commitment to Ukraine through new defence-industrial partnerships and military assistance while stopping short of offering a pathway to Alliance membership. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte urged Allies to present "clear, concrete and credible plans" to meet NATO's defence spending targets, as members announced more than USD 50 billion in defence contracts and announced support for strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities. 

On 09 July, US President Trump after his meeting with Zelenskyy said: “US will work on some kind of security package" and guaranteed to grant Ukraine a license to manufacture the Patriot defence systems.

Issues at large
1. Ukraine's increasing deep-strikes
Since early 2024, Ukraine has steadily extended the operational range of its indigenous long-range drones, targeting Russian oil refineries, ammunition depots, airbases and logistics hubs far beyond the frontline. Ukraine has rapidly transformed its domestic defence industry since 2022 by expanding production of long-range drones, Neptune cruise missiles, electronic warfare systems and precision-strike capabilities. Earlier strikes reached facilities at Ryazan (approximately 500 km), Tuapse on the Black Sea coast (around 450 km), and Tatarstan's Alabuga special economic zone (about 1,200 km), followed by attacks on the Ufa refinery (roughly 1,300 km) and the Olenya airbase on the Kola Peninsula (nearly 1,800 km). The strike on the Omsk oil refinery in Siberia, located approximately 2,700 km from Ukrainian-held territory, marks Ukraine's deepest confirmed attack of the war. Unlike previous strikes concentrated in western Russia or near strategic military corridors, the Omsk refinery lies deep within Russia's industrial heartland and accounts for nearly one-sixth of the country's fuel production. Crimea continues to serve as Russia's principal military and logistical hub in the Black Sea region, making attacks on transport corridors, fuel depots and the "shadow fleet" central to Ukraine's objective of imposing strategic and economic costs without undertaking large-scale territorial offensives. These operations demonstrate that geographical distance can no longer constrain Ukraine. 

2. NATO’s continuing support for Ukraine
Washington has increasingly urged European allies to assume greater responsibility for regional security, including higher defence spending and sustained assistance to Kyiv. In response, European members have accelerated efforts to strengthen defence-industrial cooperation, expand arms production and deepen partnerships with Ukraine, particularly in drone technology. Although Ukraine's membership aspirations remain stalled, the summit underscored Europe's determination to sustain Ukraine's military resilience.

3. Ukraine’s drone warfare, yet vulnerable air defence
Since 2022, Ukraine has rapidly expanded domestic production of long-range drones, cruise missiles such as the Neptune, and electronic warfare systems, enabling it to sustain deep-strike operations against Russian military and energy infrastructure. However, defending its cities against Russia's ballistic and hypersonic missiles remains a significant challenge. Western partners have supplied advanced air defence systems, including Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T SLM, SAMP/T, Crotale, Gepard, and HAWK systems, which have substantially strengthened Ukraine's layered air defence network. Nevertheless, limited interceptor production, shortages of Patriot missiles, and the absence of sufficient anti-ballistic capabilities continue to expose Ukrainian capability gap.

In perspective
First, long-range drone warfare to intensify. Ukraine's demonstrated ability to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia suggests that future operations will continue focusing on energy infrastructure, logistics hubs and military production facilities, while Russia is expected to expand retaliatory missile and drone attacks against Ukraine's critical infrastructure.

Second, defence-industrial cooperation to shape Western support for Ukraine. Instead of focusing exclusively on weapons transfers, European partners are moving towards joint production, technology sharing and long-term industrial partnerships. Ukraine's growing expertise in drone warfare also positions it as an important contributor to Europe's evolving defence architecture.


Conflict Weekly Column
Africa This Week:
JNIM-FLA coordinated attacks in Mali and the RSF siege in Sudan

Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
1. Mali
On 4 May, Al Jazeera quoted the Malian army saying that armed men attacked five regions across the country, including Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sevare, and Kenieroba. The regions included a northern town where the Malian Army and the Russian forces are based. 

The al-Qaeda linked Jama’at Nusrat al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatist-dominated Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) have claimed responsibility for the series of attacks. They also claimed that it had taken control of at least seven regions held by government fighters. 

The Malian Army said that the situation was “totally under control” and that “20 terrorists were killed in Sevare and six in Gao.” 

On 6 July, the Tuareg fighters claimed that they shot down a Mi-24 helicopter of the Russian Africa Corps. 

On 7 July, Al Jazeera confirmed that the Russian Navy supplied a shipment of weapons to the Malian government to fight the latest wave of rebel advances. 

2. Sudan
This week, UN News reported a series of drone strikes in El Obeid city, the capital of North Kordofan. The attacks came after the Rapid Support Force (RSF) tightened their siege over the city. According to Save the Children, more than 11,000 people, including 5,500 children, have fled the fighting over the past two weeks. Between 6 and 28 June, drone strikes killed 45 people in 15 attacks. 

On 7 July, UN human rights chief Volker Turk stated: “The signs from el-Obeid are clear and unmistakable: Another human rights catastrophe is unfolding in Sudan.” Meanwhile, Amnesty International warned that el-Obeid could face a scale of violence similar to that of el-Fasher, where more than 6000 people were killed during the October 2025 RSF siege. The RSF has continuously denied accusations of carrying out attacks in el-Obeid.
 
What are the issues?
Mali: Islamist-separatist coordination and challenged Russian support
The latest wave of attacks was carried out by the Islamist al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and Tuareg separatist-linked FLA. In April, they carried out another series of coordinated attacks in Bamako and captured the city of Kidal. The attack killed Mali’s defence minister, Sadio Camara. JNIM, formed in 2017, is a coalition of al-Qaeda’s Sahara branch and armed groups of Ansar Dine, Katina Macina and al-Moura-bitoun. The group is led by Iyand Ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar Dine. The group’s objective is to expel Western influence from the country by taking control of territories. The FLA was formed in 2024 as a coalition of separatist forces and engages with the Tuareg rebels who have been fighting for self-determination and independence since 2012. The two groups, which are based on two ideologies, currently fight together against Malian forces and their allies, including Russian forces.
 
In 2013, under Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s presidency, the UN had brokered a peace deal between the government and the Tuareg forces. However, following the coup in 2020 and 2021, the military government cut ties with France and expelled French and UN peacekeepers for failing to quell the Islamist insurgent groups. Since 2021, the Malian government has been fighting the Islamist insurgency with the support of Russian mercenaries. The Russian Wagner forces withdrew in June 2025, but the mercenaries continued to operate under the banner of the Africa Corps. However, the Russian presence worsened security, and their ineffectiveness prompted the Tuareg rebels to reemerge. 

Sudan: RSF’s siege in El-Obeid risks another catastrophe similar to El-Fasher
Ever since the RSF lost ground in the capital, Khartoum, in March 2025, the war has shifted to Darfur and Kordofan regions. It has divided the country, with the RSF in control of western Darfur and parts of Kordofan states and the SAF in control of Khartoum and eastern states. In October 2025, the RSF carried out a major wave of attacks in the el-Fasher region of North Darfur. After the fall of the last city in Darfur, the paramilitary began its attacks on the Kordofan states. 

The city of El-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, has been under the RSF siege for the past 18 months. The RSF has surrounded the city, while the SAF has reinforced its position inside. El-Obeid is strategically important for both sides. It links the capital, Khartoum, with Darfur and the country’s southern states. It is one of the major commercial centres and a logistical hub, important for military operations, supplies and humanitarian aid. For the SAF, the city is one of the important positions for supplying weapons to fight in the Kordofan and Darfur states. Control of the city will change the RSF’s military position and restrict the SAF’s foothold in the Kordofan region. It would also provide the RSF access to a major supply route to the capital and other parts of the country.

While the RSF siege in El-Obeid continues, the use of drones has destroyed civilian infrastructure, including fuel depots, electricity networks, and water facilities. According to Al Jazeera, the RSF siege has trapped about 500,000 people, including 105,000 displaced people. 

What does it mean?
Mali
The April and July offensives imply that JNIM and FLA have expanded their attacks and regional control through coordinated attacks. The alliance, primarily pragmatic, has begun reshaping the regional security order as the state emerges as a common adversary. The attacks have stretched the Malian and Russian forces beyond their capacity. Russian forces have withdrawn from several towns, including Kidal, Tessalit and Tessit. The armed groups have taken control of these regions. Beyond the military gains, these developments also point to the limited reach of the Malian state in the northern regions and the increasing ability of armed groups to coordinate despite ideological divides when facing a shared strategic objective. 

Sudan
The latest wave of violence in El-Obeid highlights that the RSF seeks complete control over the Darfur and Kordofan regions. For the SAF, the city is strategically important for access to western Sudan and for stopping the RSF from advancing again towards the capital. For international actors and aid agencies, a major concern is whether el-Obeid will become another el-Fasher. While Kordofan emerges as a major hotspot in the RSF-SAF three years of civil war, the violence and attacks on civilian infrastructure are likely to have paramount civilian implications and dire humanitarian consequences.

Anu Maria Joseph is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Subhas Chandra Bose Chair on International Relations, Chanakya University, Bengaluru.

Conflict Weekly Note
Europe’s expanding and intensifying heatwaves: 
Rising excess deaths, Multidimensional risks and Increasing climate attribution 

Preetha Renganarayanan

In the news
On 02 July, Reuters reported that health authorities in the Netherlands estimated around 480 excess deaths following last week's unprecedented heatwave. Spain also recorded 1,029 excess deaths last month, the country's second-hottest June on record.
On the same day, nearly 2,000 firefighters battled multiple wildfires along France's Mediterranean coast due to prolonged extreme heat and dry vegetation.

On 03 July, Reuters reported that France, Belgium and the Netherlands had recorded around 3,700 excess deaths associated with the late-June European heatwave, while authorities cautioned that the figures remain preliminary.

On 07 July, the World Health Organization warned that Europe could face "more deadly weeks" as another heatwave develops over the Atlantic.

Issues at large
1. Human-induced climate change as a primary attribution to Europe's heatwaves
The World Weather Attribution (WWA) group of climate scientists recently concluded that the heatwave observed across Western Europe would have been "virtually  impossible" without human-caused climate change. The group further found that the high night-time temperatures experienced recently are now 100 times more likely than they would have been just twenty years ago. In this context, Reuters reported that decades of scientific research have confirmed that anthropogenic global warming is increasing the frequency and intensity of heatwaves. As per the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), greenhouse gas emissions primarily from burning coal, oil and gas, have raised the planet's average temperature to around 1.4°C ⁠above pre-industrial levels.

2. Heatwaves’ expanding frequency 
As per the WMO, Europe has warmed by around 2°C over the past 50 years, making it the world's fastest-warming continent with extreme temperature events becoming more frequent. Further, a study by the WWA group found that out of 800 European cities analysed, 45 per cent have recorded or are predicted to record their highest heat stress levels for late June. The study also noted that a heatwave similar to the June 2026 event would have been around 3.5°C cooler in 1976, highlighting how successive heatwaves are becoming more intense under a warming climate.

3. Heatwaves’ expanding geography 
The geographical footprint of heatwaves is expanding. While southern European countries such as Spain have traditionally been associated with extreme summer heat, the June 2026 heatwave also extended to Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgium recorded around 1,200 excess deaths, while the Netherlands recorded around 480 excess deaths. Both countries also witnessed record June temperatures, highlighting that severe heatwaves are now increasingly affecting a wider geography. 

4. The cross-sectoral impacts of heatwaves across public health, infrastructure, energy, and environment
The recent heatwaves highlight that extreme heat is now becoming a cross-sectoral challenge. The WWA noted that the health impacts of the heatwave are just starting to emerge with scientific evidence showing more than 60,000 deaths from heat-related causes during Europe's 2022 summer heatwaves. Health risks have also reportedly increased due to extreme night-time temperatures that prevent the body's ability to recover from daytime heat stress.

Apart from mortality, implications of prolonged heat are cutting across infrastructure and ecosystems in Europe. France has reported rail disruptions due to thermal expansion of tracks and damage to overhead power lines. Rising temperatures have also pushed cooling demand to its highest level in at least 45 years, with Italy seeing power outages caused by soaring air-conditioning usage. Meanwhile, countries such as Spain continue to face worsening drought and water stress. 

Heatwaves are straining Europe’s energy systems with concerns now emerging over reduced output from French nuclear power plants due to warmer rivers. This could lead to higher electricity prices and worsen Europe’s growing summer energy needs. At the same time, the risk of wildfires is expanding, with the WMO warning that sustained heat, low humidity and dry vegetation could further elevate the risks.

In perspective
First, heatwaves are evolving from environmental hazards into multidimensional risks. Impacts of extreme heat are now observed beyond excess mortality to affect public health, critical infrastructure, energy, transport systems, ecosystems and emergency response capacities. This growing interconnected nature of impacts highlight that future heatwaves will require integrated preparedness and cross-sectoral planning.

Second, the impacts of extreme heat remain disproportionately concentrated among already vulnerable populations. The WWA has highlighted that vulnerability extends from older persons living alone to homeless populations, migrants, people with chronic illnesses and those facing socioeconomic disadvantage. WHO officials have also warned that these vulnerable populations continue to lack adequate protection across Europe. As extreme heat becomes more frequent and prolonged, reducing vulnerability will require adaptive, equity-focused heat-health policies.

Third, the increasing need for climate-resilient healthcare systems. The WHO observed that countries with heat-health action plans responded quickly and were better positioned to protect their populations during the June heatwave. However, fewer than half of WHO Europe's member states currently have such plans in place, exposing the preparedness gap and the growing need for climate-resilient healthcare systems.


Conflict Weekly Review
UNHCR Global Trends Report 2025: 
Four takeaways on Forced returns, Collapsing protection, Protracted crises

Deb Dutta

 

On 11 June, UNHCR released its Global Trends report on forced displacement in 2025. According to the report, 117.8 million people were displaced worldwide at the end of 2025, a drop of 5.4 million from the previous year. It is the first decline in global displacement in a decade. But the report warns this fall is not a sign of crises ending. Most of it came from refugees being pushed out of host countries, often back into unsafe conditions at home.

The following are five key takeaways on the state of global displacement in 2025, based on the UNHCR report.
1. Forced returns, not by the resolution of crises drove the decline in global displacement 
Global displacement fell to 117.8 million in 2025; however, the UNHCR's report cautions against reading this as progress. The decline was driven by a surge in returns: 14.7 million people went back to their countries or areas of origin, the second-highest figure on record. Most of these returns happened under pressure, not by choice. 

In Afghanistan, nearly 2.9 million people were forced back after Iran and Pakistan tightened deportation policies, with returns from Iran sometimes exceeding 40,000 people a day in July 2025. In Syria, 1.3 million refugees returned following the fall of the Assad government, into a country where 90 per cent of the population still lives in poverty. Sudan saw 651,500 returns even as war continued elsewhere in the country. 

The UNHCR report notes that over 90 per cent of all refugee returns in 2025 went to just three places: Afghanistan, Syria, and Sudan. All of which remain fragile and unsafe.

2. Executive order restricted the refugee entry, leading to a decline in resettlement in 2025
According to UNHCR's estimates, in 2025, there were 2.9 million refugees who needed resettlement. But fewer than three out of every hundred got resettled. The resettlement usually comes at the end of the chain for the most vulnerable refugees, especially tortured persons, vulnerable women and girls, and those who cannot go back home safely.
According to the report, in 2025, resettlement and sponsorship helped only 81,800 refugees get settled down, representing a 57 per cent decrease from 188,800 refugees in 2024. This became the lowest number since 2011. This dramatic decline was caused by the situation in the US, where the resettlement of refugees fell by 89 per cent as a result of the executive order restricting entry for most refugees. The leading resettlement states were Canada and Australia. But even they were unable to compensate for this decline. In addition, 

3. High median time in asylum; women and girls stay displaced longer than men
Displacement is often imagined as a temporary emergency. The data says otherwise. Nearly 70 per cent of the world's refugees are in "protracted" situations; displaced for five years or more with no durable solution in sight. A UNHCR analysis of eastern and southern Africa found the median time spent in asylum is just under 16 years; close to an entire childhood. Family size matters more than age; families of five or more remain displaced for almost 19 years, while single people leave the system in under six. Women and girls stay displaced longer than men, nearly 17 years versus just over 14. In response, UNHCR launched a "50 by 35" initiative, aiming to halve the number of aid-dependent refugees in protracted displacement by 2035. An admission that the old model of short-term emergency aid was never built for crises that last this long.

4. The IDPs, not refugees, make up the largest and least protected share of the displaced
By December 2025, 68.7 million people were displaced within their own nations due to conflict and violence, 58 per cent of the world’s displaced population and almost twice the global number of refugees. Of these displaced individuals, 9.1 million were in Sudan alone, which represents the largest internal displacement crisis in the world, despite a 21 per cent reduction compared to 2024. Since the internally displaced have not crossed any international borders, they are therefore excluded from the protections of the 1951 Convention. 

Taken together, these findings suggest that the apparent decline in global displacement reflects coercion and fragility rather than resolution. The systems meant to protect the displaced, from asylum to resettlement, are increasingly unable to keep pace with need.

References
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2025. Copenhagen: UNHCR, 11 June 2026.

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The US-Iran MoU:
TWTW Explainer
June 2026 | CWA # 2136

Acsah H | Acsah H is a postgraduate student at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Institute of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, MAHE, Manipal, Udupi. She is currently a research intern at NIAS.

The Blue Origin Rocket Explosion:
TWTW Note
June 2026 | CWA # 2135

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella | Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.

Shangri-La Dialogue 2026:
TWTW Note
June 2026 | CWA # 2134

Aishal Hab Yousuf | Aishal Hab Yousuf is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies. Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at NIAS, Bengaluru.

Shangri-La Dialogue 2026: Four Major Takeaways
CW Note
June 2026 | CWA # 2132

Brighty Ann Sarah | Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

The US-Iran War, Week Fourteen:
CW Note
June 2026 | CWA # 2131

Rohini Reenum | Rohini Reenum is a doctoral student at NIAS. She is working on Governance in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction using the case study of the BBNJ Agreement.

Israel-Lebanon Tensions:
TWTW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2127

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella | Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru

The Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting 2026:
CW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2124

Glynnis Winona B | Glynnis Winona B is an undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations, Peace Studies, and Public Policy, St. Joseph's University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengalur

The Crisis in Cuba:
CW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2121

Deb Dutta | Deb Dutta completed his graduation from the Department of Political Science, Sir Aurobindo International Centre of Education (SAICE), Puducherry. He is currently an intern at NIAS.

Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the Border Tensions:
CW Column
May 2026 | CWA # 2120

Brighty Ann Sarah | Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

Conflicts in the Middle East
TWTW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2116

Yesasvi Koganti | Yesasvi Koganti is currently pursuing undergraduate studies at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. 

India, the UAE, and PM Modi’s visit:
Global Politics Explainer
May 2026 | CWA # 2114

Glynnis Winona B | Glynnis Winona B is an undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations, Peace Studies and Public Policy, St. Joseph's University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru

What makes the UAE a global player?
Global Politics Explainer
May 2026 | CWA # 2112

Nithin V | Nithin V is a postgraduate student in international relations at Loyola College, Chennai. He is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

Why does the Falkland Islands dispute keep recurring?
TWTW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2109

Aishal Hab Yousuf | Aishal Hab Yousuf is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026:
CW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2104

Brighty Ann Sarah | Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
CW Column
May 2026 | CWA # 2091

Brighty Ann Sarah | Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

Conflicts in the Middle East:
CW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2090

Brighty Ann Sarah | Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

The US-Iran War, Week Ten:
TWTW Takeaways
May 2026 | CWA # 2088

Nithin V | Nithin V is a postgraduate student in International Relations, with an interest in geopolitics, international political economy, and climate governance. He is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

King Charles's US Visit:
TWTW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2087

Siddhi Halyur | Siddhi Halyur is an undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations, Public Policy and Journalism at St Joseph's University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

Japan, Vietnam and PM Takaichis Visit
TWTW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2086

Aishal Hab Yousuf | Aishal Hab Yousuf is a postgraduate student at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

UAE's Exit from OPEC:
TWTW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2085

Glynnis Winona B | Glynnis Winona B is an undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations, Peace Studies and Public Policy, St. Joseph's University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru

US troop withdrawal from Germany:
CW Note
May 2026 | CWA # 2083

Brighty Ann Sarah | Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant with the Global Politics team at the Science, Technology and International Relations (STIR) Programme at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

The US-Iran War, Week Nine:
CW Review
May 2026 | CWA # 2081

Jenin Raj S | Dr Jenin Raj S is an Assistant Professor and Head of the Centre for Media, Department of Journalism, Mount Carmel College (Autonomous), Bengaluru.

Media freedom hits a 25-year low:
TWTW Note
April 2026 | CWA # 2079

Aishal Hab Yousuf | Aishal Hab Yousuf, Postgraduate student, Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is currently an intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.

Japans New Defence Posture:
CW Note
April 2026 | CWA # 2074

Brighty Ann Sarah | Ms Sarah is a Research Assistant at NIAS and Assistant Editor of NIAS Conflict Weekly.

Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
CW Note
April 2026 | CWA # 2073

Akshath Kaimal | Mr Kaimal is a Research Assistant at NIAS. He works on Pakistan and Africa.

The US-Iran War, Week Eight:
The World This Quarter
April 2026 | CWA # 2065

Lakshmi Venugopal Menon | Dr Lakshmi Venugopal Menon is an academic and policy researcher specializing in Gulf studies, cultural heritage trafficking, geopolitics, migration, Afghan politics and the Taliban.

The Middle East (JanMar 2026):
March 2026 | CWA # 2042

Preetha Renganarayanan

March 2026 | CWA # 2001

Preetha Renganarayanan

PR Commentary
February 2026 | CWA # 1986

Preetha Renganarayanan

February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti | Yesasvi Koganti is an undergraduate student from Madras Christian College, Chennai.

UK and China
February 2026 | CWA # 1957

Preetha Renganarayanan | R Preetha is pursuing post-graduation in the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai, and is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

The India-US interim trade framework
February 2026 | CWA # 1956

Lekshmi MK | Lekshmi MK is pursuing post-graduation in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai, and is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

End of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
TWTW note
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
TWTW Note
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
CW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
TWTW Note
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Science, Technology and International Relations
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta | Centre for South Asian Studies, Kathmandu

Nepal
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

The Maldives
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

India
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

Bangladesh
South Asia Monthly Brief (Nov 2018)
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

Afghanistan