PAKISTAN READER

Adwaith Sankar Adwaith Sankar is a final-year undergraduate student pursuing Political Science and International Liberal Studies through the NUS-Waseda Double Degree Programme. He is currently a research intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS),

In July 2026, Indonesia’s President Prabowo and Prime Minister Modi oversaw a series of bilateral outcomes in Jakarta. India listed 14 MoUs/agreements and six announcements covering maritime security, defence, critical minerals, health, agriculture, education, digital commerce, steel and culture. The agreements are at various stages of progress.

What were the major agreements?
First, two main defence agreements. Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence and BrahMos Aerospace signed a procurement contract for the BrahMos missile system. Additionally, an “Air-to-Air Missile Cooperation Agreement” was signed between Indonesia’s Republikorp and Bharat Dynamics Limited. The cooperation agreement involves the supply of India’s Astra missiles for possible integration into Indonesian Sukhoi fighter aircraft.

Second, maritime-security cooperation was extended. The two concluded an Implementing Arrangement between the Indian Coast Guard and Indonesia’s maritime security agency, BAKAMLA. The underlying MoU had been renewed for three years in January 2025. An extension protocol and the Implementing Arrangement were signed on 30 June 2026. Indonesia also deployed a liaison officer to the Indian Navy’s maritime security hub.

Third, both countries signed agreements on steel and an MoU on critical minerals. Indonesia’s Krakatau Steel agreed to explore a possible joint venture with the Steel Authority of India Limited. The proposed joint venture would involve establishing a stainless-steel slab manufacturing facility in Indonesia. Indian and Indonesian organisations signed an MoU to investigate cooperation pertaining to the rare-earth sector. The MoU names mining, processing and magnet production involving Indian and Indonesian organisations.

Fourth, the bilateral package also included the health and education sectors. India’s Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation signed an MoU with its Indonesian counterpart on the regulation of medical products. An MoU between the two regulatory agencies was also signed in 2018, and the July MoU renews this cooperation. The governments also concluded an arrangement regarding the health workforce. This arrangement covers fellowships, professional exchanges, and specialised training. India announced a proposed IIM Bangalore campus in Indonesia. An MoU pertaining to this was signed on 6 July. The institute proposes to begin with short executive-education programmes. Degree programmes would follow only after successful implementation of the initial phase and the necessary approvals.

Fifth, culture and agriculture were part of the package of outcomes. On 8 July, PM Modi and President Prabowo inaugurated an archaeological partnership at the UNESCO-listed Prambanan Temple Compounds. This conservation and restoration partnership centres on selected subsidiary shrines within the ninth-century Hindu Loro Jonggrang complex. No measurable physical restoration work has commenced. The developments in agriculture remain unclear. India’s outcome list places an agriculture-and-allied-sectors MoU among the exchanged “MoUs / Agreements”. However, the joint statement says the leaders looked forward to its “early conclusion”.

What was new and what was the continuation?
Several outcomes from the PM’s July visit continued work initiated during President Prabowo’s January 2025 visit to India. The President’s visit produced instruments covering health, culture, maritime safety, and digital development.

Regarding the maritime developments, the Indian Coast Guard-BAKAMLA MoU was renewed for another three years in January 2025. BAKAMLA then recorded the extension protocol and signed an Implementing Arrangement on 30 June 2026. Indonesia’s liaison to the Navy-hosted security hub is a new addition. Earlier records document coordinated patrols, professional training, cross-deck activity, operational ship visits, and other exchanges.

The Prambanan outcome represented a new stage in earlier discussions, while the IIMB initiative was new in July. The campus MoU was signed the day before the leaders’ talks, while the temple project advanced from a previous understanding through a Letter of Intent to formal inauguration. The campus remains proposed; the Prambanan partnership has entered formal project commencement, but physical implementation has not yet been demonstrated.

The health outcomes combined implementation with the renewal or expansion of older institutional ties. The Implementing Arrangement followed a broader health-cooperation MoU announced during President Prabowo’s 2025 visit to India. The cooperation between the drug regulatory agencies predates the PM’s visit to Jakarta.

Some of the outcomes from July are new. The new outcomes agreed upon in July include the MoU to explore a possible steel joint venture, the rare-earth MoU, and the IIM Bangalore MoU.

Why do the agreements mean?
First, the missile agreement must be taken in the context of similar BrahMos deals that India has concluded with Vietnam and the Philippines. By concluding another deal with a major Southeast Asian nation involved in the South China Sea, India has become a more important stakeholder in the South China Sea conflict. However, it must be noted that Indonesia has diversified its defence suppliers, and India is not yet a major supplier. For Indonesia, supplier diversification has costs and benefits. A diversified defence inventory can complicate interoperability, maintenance, training, and logistics. Alternatively, it allows the country to avoid risks arising from supplier unreliability and export controls.

Second, maritime engagement between the two countries allows for greater preparedness and flexibility in safeguarding their waters. The bilateral coast-guard framework covers search and rescue, pollution response, and maritime law enforcement. The liaison supports maritime information exchange. In 2024, a Chinese coast guard vessel had to be repeatedly driven out of Indonesia’s EEZ waters. India had its own incident in 2025, when Sri Lanka apprehended Indian fishermen in an encounter that resulted in injuries. Deeper maritime cooperation harnesses the maritime manpower and expertise of both countries to better respond to such issues.

Third, the rare-earth MoU deepens the economic-security dimension of the relationship. India’s critical-mineral policy seeks more secure supply chains. Securing these supply chains directly supports India’s industrial policy in sectors such as electric vehicles, renewable energy, electronics, and defence manufacturing. Indonesia’s downstreaming strategy aims to process more resources domestically and capture greater value before export. The MoU cannot achieve these goals without leading to confirmed investments, secured mineral supplies or production projects.

Fourth, health, education, and cultural outcomes strengthen the bilateral relationship. These outcomes create or strengthen people-to-people exchanges, business opportunities and cultural ties. This may lead to deeper trust and greater engagement between the countries. As the largest country in ASEAN, Indonesia can bring India closer to the bloc as ASEAN grows increasingly important.

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