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CWA # 2240, 13 August 2026
CW Note
Escalating attacks in Pakistan:

  Akshath Kaimal

In the news
On 01 August, Dawn reported that the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICCS) released its monthly report for July. The report recorded 606 fatalities in July, making it the deadliest month of 2026.

On 02 August, Dawn reported that a suicide attack near the Kabal police station in the Swat Valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa killed at least 17 people and injured 30 others during a civilian-organized "Swat Peace Rally”.

On 03 August, Dawn reported that security forces killed 15 militants across several districts in KP as part of the military’s “Operation Azm-e-Istehkam”.

On 10 August, Dawn reported that 140,468 undocumented Afghan nationals had been deported from Punjab since 2023 under the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan. Nationally, the number stood at 2.68 million.

Issues at large
1. The resurgence in violence 
Violence in Pakistan hit historic lows between 2018 and 2020, primarily through operations like “Zarb-e-Azb”.  But since 2021, with the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, internal violence in Pakistan has risen sharply, from under 1000 deaths in 2022 to 2546 deaths in 2024. In the first seven months of 2026 alone, 2786 deaths were recorded. This clearly signifies a resurgence in violence, primarily driven by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in KP, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), and separatist groups like the BLA and BLF in Balochistan. These groups have increasingly used suicide bombings as a tactic, with a decade-high eight attacks in July 2026, while also employing heavy explosives, targeted assassinations and kidnappings, showcasing not only a resurgence but also increased sophistication in the strategies used.

2. The geographic concentration of violence 
This resurgence has been geographically concentrated in primarily two provinces of Pakistan: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. PICSS data for July recorded a 241 per cent increase in deaths in Balochistan and 105 per cent in KP. The terrain and landscape of the region plays a major role: the long, porous Durand Line enables cross-border attacks, KP’s rugged mountains and Balochistan’s vast, arid expanse provides militants with natural cover and tactical depth. The complex geography also hampers military responses, allowing militant groups to launch coordinated attacks, high-casualty strikes, and ambushes.

3. Pakistan’s ineffective counterterrorism strategy 
Pakistan mainly relies on kinetic operations to counter militant groups and attacks. While security forces killed 401 terrorists in July, this still remains insufficient for long-term stabilisation, as these actions have failed to dismantle militant networks. At the same time, militants have adapted dynamically, targeting military infrastructure and state intermediaries, evidenced by 19 peace committee members being killed in July. With a 933 per cent spike in security personnel deaths in Balochistan, this shows the government response remains ineffective in stemming the violence primarily because it does not involve reforms to local governance and community engagement. 

4. Afghanistan’s role and domestic governance failures
Pakistan has lately been attributing its security crisis to Afghan militant sanctuaries - a claim validated by the UN and Western intelligence reports. Deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have also contributed to the violence, evidenced by the rise in deaths since 2021. Yet, this does not absolve Pakistan of its own policy missteps. While KP struggles with the TTP, Balochistan’s insurgency is driven by internal socioeconomic neglect, political marginalisation, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. Cross-border safe havens worsen the security crisis, but Pakistan’s failure to address domestic governance grievances remains the primary engine.

5. The human cost of violence 
Civilians bear the heaviest burden of this resurgence in violence, with 463 civilians killed in the first seven months of 2026 alone, compared to 229 deaths in 2022 as a whole. Beyond casualties, violence has crippled regional economies through exploitation, market disruptions, and border closures. Additionally, strained ties with Afghanistan have pushed the government to place the blame on undocumented Afghan nationals, with over 650,000 deported in 2026 alone. This has increased animosity, not only with Afghanistan, but also within border communities in Tirah Valley, for instance, further fueling discontent and violence.

In perspective
First, unless there is a change in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy, the violence will continue. Without pairing kinetic operations with civilian governance, judicial reform, and local political engagement, the government will remain behind in its counterterrorism response.

Second, dialogue with Kabul is the need of the hour. While Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t see eye to eye on the TTP, dialogue between the two on other core issues could open doors to a joint counterterrorism effort that could stem the violence, at least in KP.

Third, Balochistan’s grievances cannot be solely addressed with military power. The people of Balochistan have faced economic exploitation, political alienation, and enforced disappearances, which have only emboldened groups like the BLA and BLF. Unless the government can effectively address the grievances of the people without using hard power, the violence is likely to continue.

Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader team.
 

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