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Sunidhi Sampige
31 December 2025 |
What happened?
In October, Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) carried out violent protests and marched towards Islamabad; 11 people were killed in the violence. It exposed the Barelvi street power and resulted in a government re-ban of TLP.
On 10 October, the TLP carried out anti-blasphemy and Gaza solidarity marches from Muridke and Lahore toward the US Embassy in Islamabad, protesting against the US peace plan in Gaza. Thousands of people blocked roads and railroad lines. Between 11 and 13 October, a station house officer was killed in Muridke; police fired live rounds in Lahore; and protesters reached Islamabad's Red Zone before being dispersed by police tear gas. Shutdowns caused an estimated PKR 50 billion economic losses, and more than 100 protesters were arrested.
On 24 October, the government re-proscribed TLP as a terrorist organisation, which was its second ban after de-proscription in 2021.
What are the issues?
First, the lack of political representation of the Barelvis. TLP has been the major outlet for the Barelvi community seeking political representation. Thousands of young people from the Barelvi community have been working in Saudi Arabia and the UAE since the 2000s. The Gulf remittances helped the Barelvi middle-class community economically grow. However, their sociopolitical profile has not increased, and their presence in the elite class has decreased. The TLP receives millions of votes every election; Gallup Pakistan says the party received 2.89 million votes in 2024. However, it has not been able to obtain significant parliamentary seats due to its reduced vote concentration because of Pakistan’s first-past-the-post system. The party is structurally limited to street agitation. Its voice has never been translated into legislative power or policy influence.
Second, the establishment’s proxy dynamics with TLP. TLP served as the establishment’s strategic tool to counter PTI and PML-N at different junctures. In 2018, TLP's 2.2 million votes surpassed PML-N's losing margin in 14 Punjab National Assembly seats, allowing PTI victories. However, in 2021, the TLP was de-proscribed after countrywide protests following Asia Bibi's acquittal by the Supreme Court, which paralysed Islamabad for three weeks. The 2025 crackdowns indicate a purposeful recalibration in the post-Imran Khan landscape, where the establishment appears to have exhausted TLP’s utility amid intensifying PTI rivalry.
Third, the recurring violence. TLP's signature sit-ins, which started in 2017 in Faizabad and continued until the recent Red Zone sieges, witnessed recurrences of violence. Through large-scale sit-ins that cripple Pakistan's economy, TLP has frequently used violence as a tactic to achieve its objectives. During the 21-day Faizabad dharna in 2017, Islamabad was blockaded, and Minister of Law Zahid Hamid was forced to resign. During the 2018 protests against the Asia Bibi acquittal verdict, 13 people, including seven civilians and six police, were killed. During the TLP's 2021 campaign to expel the French Ambassador, two police officers were lynched, and more than 100 people were injured in Lahore.
Fourth, the PML-N's stance on TLP. The resignations from the PML-N, forced by TLP protests and Maryam Nawaz's diminished popularity in Punjab following the 2024 election, hurt the PML-N leadership. They perceive the party as an existential electoral threat that divides its conservative Barelvi constituency and as a spoiler proxy supported by the establishment. This has led to repeated calls for long-term TLP bans from PML-N.
What does it mean for 2026?
Following the ban, the TLP is subject to asset freezes, mosque seizures, and no-fly lists for leaders, including Saad Rizvi. These actions are likely to force underground operations or rebranding, similar to what Lashkar-e-Taiba did with the Milli Muslim League. However, its 2.89 million vote base and grassroots mobilisation through madrasas and social media are likely to break up into local cells rather than disintegration.
The ban destroys Barelvi aspirations for political power and re-marginalises the community. No other Barelvi group can match TLP's street power. The Sunni Ittehad Council rejects TLP violence, and traditional parties like Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan and Sunni Tehreek remain weak. It implies that Barelvi may align with PTI or emerge as radical splinter groups.
Without a Supreme Court reference under Article 17(2), the ban's effect on TLP's activity will not be permanent. Considering the mass support in both Punjab and Sindh, TLP members can successfully run for elections as independents. Meanwhile, the long-term trajectory of the ban would be largely determined by the PML-N’s ability to unite with the establishment. The previous records also suggest that, if necessary, the party may tactically de-proscribe TLP in order to counter PTI.
About the author
Sunidhi Sampige is a Postgraduate student from O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
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