CWA # 2207
Conflict Weekly
US-Iran War, Week 21 I Houthi's Saudi Arabia target in the Red Sea
Return of South China Sea tensions I Resurgence of Somali piracy
Conflict Weekly #341, Vol 7, No. 28, 23 July 2026
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Global Politics Team
24 July 2026
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CW Note
US-Iran War, Week 21:
Resumption of attacks and the Strait of Hormuz impasse
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 17 July, President Trump signalled the possibility of expanding the scope of US strikes to include civilian and energy infrastructure, while the CENTCOM stated that the strikes were "designed to continue degrading Iran's ability to threaten commercial shipping.”
On 18 July, Iran intensified its attacks on US allies and bases in the region, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia after Washington’s attacks on Tehran’s civilian infrastructure and power facilities.
On the same day, the US CENTCOM stated that two US military personnel were killed in Jordan and another was missing in action after an Iranian attack, while Iran's supreme leader said Washington would pay for "seeking to escalate the conflict" after a seventh straight night of US attacks.
On 20 July, Qatar, Egypt Pakistan and other regional mediators presented the US and Iran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire as a window to further negotiations.
President Trump issued severe threats against Iran, stating that "Every time Iran kills an American Soldier, they will pay for that killing â many times over.”
On 22 July, the US launched a fresh wave of attacks in Iran’s Bushner Province, home to Iran’s only nuclear plant.
On the same day, the US Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, stated that the war in Iran has cost the US USD 37 billion by latest estimates. He requested the Senate Appropriation Committee for an additional USD 70 billion in funds.
Issues at large
1. Escalating military action
The recent escalation marked one of the deadliest pints of the renewed US-Iran war with aggressive rhetoric and hedging, particularly from the US side. Washington seeks to degrade Iran’s key defence and civilian infrastructure to nudge negotiations in its favour. However, President Trump’s increasingly inflammatory statements have escalated tensions. This rhetoric has been matched by a steep expansion in the scope of US strikes, and a stark US military buildup. Iran has also threatened to pursue “eye-for-an-eye” response to US military action.
2. Iran’s retaliatory posture and regional spillover
Tehran has demonstrated notable resilience against the growing intensity of US strikes. Beyond the defensive posture, Iran has significantly widened the scope of its attacks; it has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles and drones against US military installations and assets in neighbouring countries, drawing Washington's regional allies into the fray. Kuwait faced sustained Iranian attacks, with its forces intercepting ballistic missiles and drones. The attacks also damaged Kuwait’s desalination plants and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation reported one of its oil facilities were hit, causing significant damage and injuries. In Bahrain, the IRGC targeted Sheikh Isa Air Base, a hub for US combat aircraft, and an intelligence data centre. In Jordan, Iranian missiles and drones struck the US base at Al Azraq, destroying at least two US fighter jets and three other aircraft. Simultaneously, Iran has leveraged its network of regional proxies to amplify pressure, the Houthis in Yemen to threaten and potentially blockade Red Sea shipping routes. Houthi missile and drone attacks on vessels and announcements of blockades targeting Saudi-linked shipping, have compounded the disruptions already caused by the Hormuz crisis.
3. The waning window of negotiations
Despite multiple attempts by Pakistan and other mediators to broker de-escalation, most recently the 10-day truce aimed at halting strikes and resuming talks, these initiatives have consistently failed amid escalating military exchanges and inflammatory rhetoric from both sides. As the conflict entered one of its most intense and hostile phases, with daily US airstrikes met by Iranian retaliatory attacks on regional targets and shipping, both parties have openly flouted ceasefire understandings, further eroding trust. The cycle of tit-for-tat strikes, coupled with high-level threats including US vows of infrastructure retaliation and Iranian pledges of “eye-for-an-eye” responses, has significantly diminished prospects for a near-term diplomatic breakthrough. Moreover, the growing emphasis on revenge for casualties and perceived aggressions has made negotiations politically costly.
In perspective
Washington seeks to militarily coerce Iran to its terms, but Tehran continues to hold its ground and refuses to concede its new-found leverage over the strait, which has now become the central flashpoint of the conflict. Washington’s strategy appears cantered on militarily degrading Iran’s key defence infrastructure and prolonging the conflict in hopes that Tehran will eventually return to the negotiating table on US terms. However, Iran has secured more relative gains so far, and has effectively turned the waterway into its central bargaining chip. Washington cannot simply walk away without losing face if shipping through the strait is not restored on its terms. Prolonged disruption risks an economic fallout and political embarrassment at home. Simultaneously, Iran is determined to institutionalise its control, which it views as a legitimate post-war gain. However, the spillover of the conflict and the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz could eventually turn the winds against Tehran. A drawn-out “forever war” would likely exhaust Iran’s defences over time, especially if countries successfully develop alternative shipping routes or adopt a more unified retaliatory stance. The high stakes of the strait had locked Washington and Tehran in a dangerous standoff, with neither willing to back down easily, and the escalation churning into broader war.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.
CW Note
The Houthis target Saudi Arabia:
A new front in the US-Iran War
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 16 July, Yemen’s Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi warned that if Saudi Arabia escalates its involvement in the conflict, the group will target all Saudi oil facilities and other vital infrastructure with missiles and drones. The threat followed Houthi missile strikes on Saudi Arabia, after the group accused Riyadh of bombing the Saana airport under their control on 13 June, effectively ending a four-year truce between the two sides.
On 21 July, the Houthis declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabian vessels transiting through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait in the Red Sea. The group also sent e-mail threats to shipping companies, warning them against using Saudi ports, or they may be targeted.
The Saudi-backed coalition government in Yemen stated that they would respond to the threat through military force and has adopted measures to secure the strait.
On 23 July, the group declared that it attacked two Saudi oil tankers, Encelia and Layla, in the Red Sea that had "violated" its blockade of Saudi ports.
President Trump warned that a repeated attack would be met with "major military punishment" upon both the Houthis and Iran.
Issues at large
1. The long-standing Saudi Arabia-Houthi conflict
The latest flare-up between Riyadh and the Iran-backed Houthis have broken the fragile truce that had taken hold four-years back in 2022. The Houthi’s began as a Zaidi Shia group from northern Yemen in the early 2000s. The group repeatedly clashed with the Saudi-backed government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of interfering in Yemeni affairs and supporting crackdowns against them. Tensions escalated dramatically in 2014-2015, when the Houthis seized the capital Sanaa amid Yemen’s civil unrest, ousted the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, and advanced toward key areas, prompting Saudi Arabia to form a nine-nation military coalition in March 2015. The intervention, initially called Operation Decisive Storm, aimed to restore Hadi’s government, secure Saudi Arabia’s borders, and counter Iranian influence through the Houthis. The intervention led to one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with widespread civilian casualties, famine risks, cholera outbreaks, and infrastructure destruction. A fragile truce was set in place in 2022 and had largely held in terms of Saudi-Houthi clashes, which has been broken by the latest outbreak.
2. The Iran-Houthi axis
The Houthi’s hold a central position in Iran’s network of regional proxies, or the ‘Axis of Resistance.’ The Houthis initially rose with grievances against the central government, but Iran saw strategic value in supporting them as a low-cost lever against Saudi Arabia and broader Sunni Gulf powers, particularly leveraging their control of the Red Sea chokepoints. Tehran provides advanced weaponry, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, explosives, drones and other military support to the group’s operations, often smuggled through the Red Sea. IRGC-Quds Force have also trained the group in combat. Financially, Iran supplies funding, gold and sanctions-evasion networks to sustain Houthi operations. While the Houthis retain considerable autonomy in decision-making, Iran provides overarching guidance, especially during escalations, encouraging actions like Red Sea disruptions.
3. The Red Sea blockade and the compounding crisis
The Houthi blockade on Saudi vessels and the Red Sea has dramatically compounded the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis by simultaneously threatening both the primary and alternative export routes for Gulf oil. Following the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea corridor had acted as a key transit point for oil and shipping vessels from the Middle East. Saudi Arabia had responded by rerouting a significant portion of its crude through the East-West Pipeline to Red Sea ports like Yanbu, with recent volumes reaching several million bpd, much of it heading south through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Bab el-Mandeb typically handles 4-9 million bpd of oil and products, forming a critical southern gateway for shipments to Asia and Europe.
By imposing a naval embargo and claiming attacks on Saudi-linked tankers, the Houthis have forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles, 10-14 days of transit time, and sharply higher costs, while spiking insurance rates and oil prices to USD 100 per barrel. This dual-chokepoint pressure severely risks broader energy market instability.
In perspective
The latest Saudi-Houthi flare-up has effectively opened a dangerous new front in the broader regional war by shattering the fragile four-year truce and dragging Riyadh back into direct confrontation with the Houthi’s. What began with accusations over the Sanaa airport bombing quickly escalated into Houthi missile and drone strikes on Saudi targets and their declaration of a naval blockade on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea, directly threatening the kingdom’s alternative oil export routes through Bab el-Mandeb at a time when the Strait of Hormuz is already under severe pressure. This mirrors how escalation in the US-Iran conflict rips open old and unhealed conflicts across the region, long-simmering rivalries and unresolved grievances that were never truly settled, only temporarily suppressed during brief spells of uneasy calm. The pattern had been earlier visible in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict as well, where conflicts lie dormant, waiting for minor hairpin triggers to set off conflicts.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.
CW Note
China, the Philippines, and the return of South China Sea tensions:
Accusations, Arbitrations and Ambiguities
Aparna A Nair
In the news
On 21 July, Reuters reported that China and the Philippine Coast Guards traded accusations at Second Thomas Shoal.
The China Coast Guard (CCG) stated that a Philippine vessel rammed into a Chinese patrol boat in the South China Sea and the Philippine personnel initiated "malicious attacks" against Chinese law enforcement officers by using oars and long sticks.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stated that the Chinese Coast Guard approached within close range of â its grounded warship on the Second Thomas Shoal and took photos and videos. Additionally, Philippine Navy personnel were harmed with a wooden baton.
On the same day, the Philippine president summoned the Chinese Ambassador to Manila and China's foreign ministry summoned Manila's envoy to China. China’s Foreign Ministry stated that it will never accept any attempt by the Philippines to build permanent facilities or establish a permanent outpost at Ren'ai Jiao. The statement added that the grounded vessel violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) of 2002.
On the same day, on the sidelines of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended a consultative meeting on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
Issues at large
1. Relevance of Second Thomas Shoal
Second Thomas Shoal is 200 nautical miles from Palawan, which makes the area under the Philippines' exclusive economic zone based on UNCLOS. China calls this region Ren’ai Jiao, and claims this area as a feature of the South China Sea. This atoll is in the Spratly Islands and is a gateway to Chinese-occupied reefs and waters. The presence of the Philippines' BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II–era vessel, makes the area a semi-permanent military outpost. The Second Thomas Shoal grounds the World War II–era Philippine vessel BRP Sierra Madre. It was beached in 1999 to serve as a physical outpost and a symbol of effective control. China had demanded the removal, claiming it was an “illegally grounded warship.” China’s main argument was that the presence of this vessel violates the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Beijing also views the resupply mission as a routine operation to sustain personnel stationed there.
2. The long-standing South China Sea dispute and its multiple actors
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and other countries in the South China Sea contest overlapping territorial and maritime claims. China, being the largest claimant, has laid out the Nine-Dash Line and claims several territories, islands, reefs, and territorial waters in this area. China and other claimants, such as the Philippines, have constructed facilities and deployed coast guard to highlight their presence and enforce control. In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration against China to clarify its maritime rights and the legal status of disputed features in the South China Sea. The tribunal decision rejected China’s historical sovereignty in the region. It also laid out that the nine-dash line is incompatible with UNCLOS. China rejected the arbitration and reiterated its historical sovereignty. Beijing has been consistently rejecting third-party interference and maintains that the issue must be addressed by the concerned parties.
3. The UNCLOSS award and its tenth anniversary
On the tenth anniversary of the arbitral award, fourteen countries, including the US, Philippines, Australia, and Canada, released a joint statement reaffirming the award. The statement rejected China’s maritime claims and urged that the parties resolve the dispute peacefully. They also reiterated their historic rights and that land territorial issues are not subject to UNCLOS.
The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed between ASEAN and China. It is not a legally binding document but calls for peaceful dispute resolution, self-restraint, and cooperation in the South China Sea. Contrarily, Manila, along with many ASEAN countries, views China’s claims and coast guard behaviour as the real breach of the norms. Ironically, the coast guard accusations happened as the consultative meeting was progressing.
In perspective
The incident brings out the ambiguity over sovereignty claims, UNCLOS-based arguments, and DOC-based claims. The bottom line reflects that there is ample legal and operational ambiguity. The UNCLOS arbitration and DOC, which were supposed to bring peace to the table, are now tools for mutual blame. For Beijing, withdrawing from features like Second Thomas Shoal undermines its claim to its indisputable sovereignty. On the other hand, if Manila concedes, it would be read as abandoning its legal and moral grounds
Aparna A Nair is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai.
CW Note
The resurgence of Somali piracy:
Sophisticated tactics, Regional instability and an Ineffective international response
Akshath Kaimal
In the news
On 17 July, seven armed Somali pirates hijacked a Tanzanian-flagged chemical and oil products tanker, MT ASANA, roughly 75 miles off the coast of Mukalla, Yemen. This marks the second such hijacking of a tanker since May.
On the same day, maritime security group Ambrey revealed that the ship lacked an on-board private armed security team and identified the perpetrators as an active "pirate action group".
Also on the same day, risk management group Vanguard said that while the hijacking was in progress, specific details regarding the total number of attackers and crew status remained unconfirmed.
There were no statements from the owner of the tanker or the Somali government.
Issues at large
1. Political instability and Somali coast’s persisting problem
Piracy along the Somali coast came out of the collapse of the Somali government in the early 1990s, when small, disorganised militias formed by local fishermen began combating illegal foreign fishing and toxic dumping. From here, it grew into a lucrative hijacking enterprise, creating a major global threat, primarily between 2005 and 2012. During this period, pirate groups carried out over 1,000 attacks, which cost the global economy USD 18 billion annually. This era was marked by localised and rudimentary tactics, with groups relying on small arms and basic skiffs to launch their attacks.
Political instability has historically fueled piracy off Somalia’s coast. Since the fall of the Somali government in the 1990s, federal authorities have faced increasing calls for autonomy from states. The lack of sovereign control, coupled with rising insurgencies from Islamist militant groups, created a vacuum for piracy to flourish. Today, in 2026, the country is going through a constitutional crisis, with the government unilaterally postponing the general elections and ousting regional leaders in South West and Jubaland states. Besides, the spread of Al-Shabaab and Islamic State-affiliated militant groups, has left the government incapable of addressing the piracy issue effectively. Local leaders and communities are pushed to increasingly rely on piracy as a source of unregulated funding for their regional campaigns, a similar trend seen during the 2005-2012 era.
2. From rudimentary to sophisticated tactics
Since 2023, piracy has evolved into a far more sophisticated threat, with groups using GPS and satellite technologies to track commercial ships up to 1,000 kilometres into the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, pirate groups have forged new alliances - with the Al-Qaeda-aligned Al-Shabaab for logistical protection on land, and Yemen’s Houthis for advanced weapons, training and strategic intelligence - turning a once-rudimentary force into a highly sophisticated one.
3. Economic stagnation and aid cuts
Widespread poverty, high cost of living and climate change have pushed Somalia into a multidimensional humanitarian crisis. This is worsened by international aid cuts, with USAID funding falling from USD 467 million in 2024 to just USD 3 million in early 2026. In addition to this, illegal, unregulated fishing drains USD 300 million from the Somali economy annually, leaving civilians in desperation. This situation is also increasingly pushing young people to view piracy as an economic lifeline, with pirate groups locally celebrated as generous employers whose multi-million dollar ransoms fund whole communities. Hence, economic stagnation and aid cuts create a complex environment for piracy to flourish.
4. Regional conflicts as drivers this resurgence in piracy
The ongoing US-Iran war and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have created a vacuum for Somali pirates. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and the high security risk around the Red Sea, nearly 70 per cent of maritime traffic in the region has been rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing a large volume of ships and tankers directly past the Somali basin. Simultaneously, the international naval fleets have reduced their anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa to reinforce security in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The regional instability and lack of reinforcements have allowed pirate groups to mount attacks further into the Indian Ocean.
5. Ineffective regional and international responses
The international community today lacks the political and fiscal willpower to resurrect the major naval security initiatives it undertook in the previous era. For its part, Somalia has signed defence pacts with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to protect its mainland as well as the wider Red Sea corridor, but these commitments remain insufficient to address threats 1,000 kilometres offshore. Shipowners are also compromising on expensive private security teams, leaving vessels exposed. The Somali Basin is inching towards being designated a “high-risk area," which could drive up costs and worsen the humanitarian situation.
In perspective
With two major incidents in the space of three months, the threat of Somali piracy is no longer theoretical. Somalia is currently in a no-win situation, with domestic political turmoil, violent insurgencies and an accelerating humanitarian crisis leaving the government incapable of addressing piracy on its own. Unless the international community can collaborate again to fight this growing threat, piracy incidents around the Horn of Africa are only expected to rise.
Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader team.