The World This Week

The World This Week
The US-Saudi Arabia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement I AI's Rogue Agent Breach
Return of US-Canada Tariff Tensions I 33rd ASEAN Regional Forum

NIAS Global Politics Team
26 July 2026
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TWTW Note
The US-Saudi Arabia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement:
Questions over the agreement's terms, the Abraham Accords condition, and Non-proliferation concerns

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

What happened?
On 22 July, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy His Royal Highness Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a “peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement” known as the “123 Agreement,” alongside an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement.

On 23 July, US President Trump stated that the deal with Saudi Arabia is a civil nuclear deal, does not include enrichment, and hinges on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Subsequently, Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office released a statement, saying that Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords would be an “historic leap” without mentioning the nuclear deal. 

Democratic Party members in the US have expressed concern over the deal, stating, “This agreement will set off a nuclear race in the region, further disincentivizing Iran from limiting its own program,” and that the US Congress would only approve the deal if it had “the same gold-standard safeguards as our deal with the UAE.” 

What is the background?
1. A note on the “123 Agreement”
The "123 Agreement" refers to Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires Washington to conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement before any transfer of significant nuclear material, equipment, or technology to another country, ensuring compliance with global non-proliferation standards. The US currently has 26 agreements with different countries and international organizations. In the Middle East, the UAE and now Saudi Arabia are a part of this agreement. The US has used these agreements to strengthen strategic partnerships, promote a degree of nuclear non-proliferation, and establish dominance in the nuclear export trade.

2. The US-Saudi Arabia nuclear dialogue
Ten years ago, Riyadh and Washington began discussing a civil nuclear program and a potential 123 Agreement. Negotiations date back to the first Trump administration and continued through Joe Biden’s presidency, when a nuclear deal was linked to Saudi-Israel normalization. In 2025, talks were revived; during the November visit to the US by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the two sides signed a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, laying the groundwork for the formal 123 Agreement.

3. Saudi Arabia’s long-standing nuclear ambitions
In 2019, Prince Abdulaziz said that the Kingdom aims to go "from producing uranium, to enriching uranium, using the uranium, even acquiring the technologies." In 2023, this was reiterated  by him conveying the country’s intent to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) domestically. The nuclear power is expected to free up oil for export and diversify the Kingdom's energy mix under Vision 2030. Externally, the rivalry with Iran has been a key factor. In 2018, Prince Mohamed bin Salman said that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran if it were to develop a nuclear bomb, “without a doubt.” Additionally, Saudi Arabia is reported to have helped Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and is speculated to have an understanding with Islamabad under the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement that extends a "nuclear umbrella."

4. The Abraham Accords as a conditional factor
The Abraham Accords, the set of US-brokered agreements in 2020 between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, later signed by Morocco, Sudan, and Kazakhstan, aimed to normalize diplomatic relations among the Arab countries and Israel. Saudi Arabia has long maintained that any normalization with Israel would require the establishment of a Palestinian state. Additionally, during the Israel-Gaza war in 2024, Mohammed bin Salman stated, “The Kingdom reiterates its condemnation and absolute refusal of the collective genocide committed by Israel against the brotherly Palestinian people,” while continuing to take a stand against Israel’s actions in the region as the US-Iran conflict persists. 

5. Apprehensions for non-proliferation 
The agreement has been criticized by non-proliferation experts for deviating from the "gold standard" set by the 2009 UAE 123 Agreement, in which the UAE voluntarily consented to forgo plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their main argument is the current 123 agreement, which permits an enrichment option and exempts Riyadh from joining the IAEA Additional Protocol. According to experts in the field from Carnegie and Stimson, the agreement creates new, risky precedents at a time when nuclear weapons are expanding globally, and its provisions are "tantamount to the United States giving up on non-proliferation." These concerns come in the backdrop of increasing tensions in the Middle East. 

What does this mean?
First, the Abraham Accords condition adds uncertainty. Saudi Arabia has not responded to Trump's statement, leaving it unclear whether this constitutes a binding part of the agreement, particularly given Riyadh's consistent linkage of Palestinian statehood to any normalization with Israel.

Second, should the reported non-proliferation standards prove to be true, this would reflect a shift in US policy, setting a precedent that could weaken established non-proliferation norms and also allow other countries like South Korea to advance similar interests. 
Third, the deal is likely to shape the broader Middle East calculus, given that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the only countries party to a 123 Agreement in the region, further feeding Iran's and Israel's strategic calculations and threat perceptions. 

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate student from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.


TWTW Note
AI's Rogue Agent Breach:
Recurring Patterns, Gaps in the AI safety rules and the AI rivalry

Priyanka Makhijani

What happened?
On 21 July, OpenAI disclosed that one of its AI agents went rogue during a security test, breaking out of containment and hacking into AI startup Hugging Face’s systems to complete its test. OpenAI called it an unprecedented cyber incident and said it’s strengthening its safeguard. 

On 22 July, Hugging Face revealed that it turned to Zhipu AI's open-source model, GLM-5.2, to help analyze the hack. It did this after several leading US AI models refused the task because they could not tell whether they were dealing with a defender or the attacker.

What is the background?
1. Recurring breach patterns 
In April 2026, Anthropic's next-generation model, Claude Mythos, was breached. Unauthorized users, including someone with contractor access, gained entry to the restricted model through a third-party vendor environment days after its launch. Mythos's unprecedented ability to autonomously find and exploit vulnerabilities raised alarm. In November 2025, Anthropic disclosed that the Chinese state-sponsored hackers manipulated its Claude models into autonomously executing 80 to 90 percent of an espionage campaign against 30 plus organizations. Together, these episodes show agentic AI risk recurring across multiple companies and models.

2. Goals over guardrails by the AI agents
Modern AI agents are optimized to complete a given task, not to respect the boundaries placed around them. When a system is capable enough, it treats containment as an obstacle to route around rather than a rule to follow. Katie Moussouris of Luta Security compared today's models to skilled escape artists, able to find a way through almost any barrier. This is why the incident does not look like a one-off bug. It is the predictable result of building systems that are rewarded purely for achieving goals, without an equally strong incentive to respect limits. As capability grows, this gap between goal-pursuit and constraint-following tends to widen rather than close, which is why such incidents are likely to keep recurring, not fade away.

3. The dual-use capabilities (defence and cyberattacks) of Frontier AI models 
The same AI capabilities that make a system useful for defence also make it useful for attack. The models cannot reliably show which side they are serving. Probing a system, pulling data, and finding weaknesses look identical whether a defender or an attacker is doing it. Because a model reads only behaviour, never intent. This dual-use nature creates a further imbalance; attackers follow no usage rules at all, while defenders using US models must still follow strict safety rules. During a live, fast-moving attack, defenders can end up slower and less capable than the attacker they are chasing. This happens not because their tools are weaker, but because those tools are deliberately held back by design, while the attacker faces no such limits.

4. The diverging US and China AI models
Chinese developers face far less pressure than their US counterparts to restrict their models' capabilities. China’s main goal is to match US performance at a lower cost, not to avoid blame for misuse in Western markets, where reputational and legal risk weighs heavily on developers.  Models such as GLM-5.2 and Moonshot's Kimi K3 have grown in popularity without the same restrictions that stop US models from helping with cybersecurity tasks. Chinese state media has also promoted open-source AI. This came as a response to a US-led effort to cut other countries off from advanced technology, turning a commercial choice into a matter of national positioning. This combination gives Chinese developers both the freedom and motivation to keep their models less restricted.

What does it mean?
First, the latest incident shows that safety testing itself can become a source of real-world risk. It is not just a safeguard against it. It also exposes a deeper flaw in how AI safety is currently designed. Rules built to block misuse can't distinguish intent, so they end up restricting legitimate defenders just as much as attackers, sometimes with worse consequences for the defenders.

Second, the dual-use imbalance could reshape competitive dynamics in AI. If unrestricted models keep outperforming restricted ones in real emergencies, customers may increasingly value capability and speed over safety guarantees, pushing labs to abandon uniform restrictions in favour of flexible, trust-based access models.

Third, the latest incident also exposes a vacuum in AI governance. There is currently no binding US requirement for agentic AI safety testing or incident disclosure. The executive order that would have mandated this was revoked in January 2025, and what remains today is NIST's framework, companies' safety pledges is voluntary. Representative Greg Casar called the incident alarming and pushed for mandatory testing and disclosure rules precisely because none exist.

Priyanka Makhijani is a postgraduate student at the department of Public Policy, School of Social Science, Ramaiah University of Applied science. She is currently an intern at NIAS.


TWTW Note
The Return of US-Canada Tariff Tensions:
Retaliation and Legal setbacks

Namrata L Ghanghatkar

What happened?
On 20 July, US President Donald Trump signed proclamations imposing an additional 50 percent tariff on Canadian goods such as wine, dairy, automobiles, and cement, effective on 19 August. He also imposed an overriding protection under the Canada United States Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), citing Canada's "discriminatory treatment" of American commerce over alcohol bans, auto quotas, and dairy rules favouring Europe. Prime Minister Mark Carney called it "the latest in a series of unilateral US trade actions." 

On 22 July, PM Carney convened an emergency cabinet meeting in Charlottetown, where provincial premiers agreed to remove barriers on selling alcohol across provinces. 

On 23 July, PM Carney said Canada would do "whatever it takes," and Washington announced separate tariffs of 10 to 12.5 percent on 60 countries over forced labour concerns. 

On 24 July, tariffs took effect, placing most Canadian exports under a 10 percent duty, distinct from the steeper 50 percent rate due on the USD 20 billion basket from 19 August.

What is the background?
1. Recurring tariff tensions since 2025 
Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, Canada and the US have cycled through repeated rounds of tariffs and retaliation. Washington imposed its first duties on Canadian goods in February 2025, citing fentanyl trafficking, and Ottawa responded with tariffs of its own and provincial bans on US alcohol. Each round has been followed by talks, only for a fresh grievance to reopen the dispute. Canada is part of Trump's broader America First tariff strategy. By mid-2026, that approach had produced tariffs on dozens of other countries. Washington's tariffs on Canada were themselves imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act for a full year before the Supreme Court struck them down in February 2026. Within days, Washington turned to Section 122 of the Trade Act for a global 10 percent tariff, and five months later to Section 338 for the 50 percent tariff on Canada specifically. Two replacement laws inside half a year show tariffs functioning as a permanent lever, not a punishment issued once.

2. Trump's position on compliance over compromise
Washington has treated this as a matter of compliance, not negotiation. The White House cites Canadian auto import quotas, provincial bans on US alcohol, and dairy rules favouring the European Union as its grievances and has used Canada's retaliatory measures to justify further tariffs. Ottawa's response has been partial, easing internal alcohol trade rules while keeping the US alcohol ban in place

3. The historic Canada-US relationship under tension
Canada and the US share one of the most integrated economies in the world, built on decades of cross-border supply chains and, until recently, near tariff-free trade guaranteed under CUSMA. The current dispute has placed considerable strain on that arrangement, with tariffs now applied even to goods intended to move freely between the two countries, testing a relationship that has rarely faced open economic conflict at this scale.

The relationship has become increasingly reactive. Canada's provincial bans on US alcohol were themselves retaliation for Washington's original 2025 tariffs, and that ban is now cited by the White House as grounds for the new 50 percent tariff. The other two grievances Washington lists, Canadian auto import quotas and dairy access rules favouring the European Union, are longer standing Canadian policies rather than responses to this dispute, folded into the same justification regardless. The timing, weeks before CUSMA's scheduled review, suggests Washington is using this mix of genuine retaliation and older complaints to weaken Ottawa's position before renegotiation begins.

What does it mean?
On 24 July, the same day Canada's tariffs took effect, Washington imposed forced labour tariffs of 10 to 12.5 percent on 60 trading partners, placing Canada inside a much broader global tariff push. Canada is now carrying two measures at once, a 10 percent duty applied broadly and a 50 percent tariff aimed specifically at the USD 20 billion basket of goods due from 19 August.

Namrata L Ghanghatkar is a postgraduate student at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences, Bengaluru. She is currently a research intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS).


TWTW Takeaways
ASEAN Regional Forum:
Six Takeaways on Issues, Limitations, and Opportunities

Adwaith Sankar

On 23 July, the 33rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held in Manila, Philippines, as part of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. During the meetings, ASEAN members reiterated the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities in the Middle East and emphasized the importance of ensuring maritime safety and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The forum also took place amid renewed US warnings over Iran’s potential disruption of the Hormuz Strait and heightened China–Philippines tensions following a confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal. 

The following are six major takeaways from the ASEAN Regional Forum.

1. South China Sea tensions become the focal point despite dialogue and mechanisms
The confrontation between China and the Philippines at the Second Thomas Shoal occurred shortly before the ARF. As the 2026 ASEAN Chair, the Philippines was in a stronger position to influence the ARF agenda and was able to leverage it to address the issue. It continued to anchor key legal basis for the Philippines’ maritime position in the 2016 arbitral award, while China disputes this ruling. The ARF has not been able to quell these tensions. Although ASEAN and China support finalizing a Code of Conduct by the end of the year, China has said that the Code will not settle bilateral territorial disputes.

2. Hormuz disruption raises domestic economic pressures
The Hormuz crisis featured prominently at the ARF as ASEAN countries assessed its potential economic consequences. The economic effects of the war have directly impacted ASEAN countries due to their dependence on energy imports and maritime trade. According to the ASEAN Centre for Energy, a prolonged closure of the strait could affect 28 percent of final oil consumption in the region. Similarly, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has increased its inflation forecast for developing Southeast Asia. This has meant that ASEAN countries must face domestic impacts. This has turned the war into an economic and social issue for ASEAN governments.

3. ASEAN consensus limits collective action
The ASEAN model of consensus-based decision-making continues to limit its ability to respond collectively to regional security challenges. Although all the organization’s countries would benefit from predictable shipping, there are several divisions. ASEAN countries have different sovereignty claims, security relationships, and views of the arbitral award. They also have different security relationships and views on China. These differences result in cautious language, a focus on restraint, and an absence of collective enforcement.

4. The ARF remains a valuable platform for crisis diplomacy
Despite the institutional constraints and the non-binding nature, the ARF continues to facilitate communication. Following the 20 July maritime confrontation, the Philippines and China held ministerial-level discussions. The forum is a non-binding arena for engagement that leaves diplomatic channels open despite bilateral tensions. While the meeting did not produce any concrete resolution or binding outcome, it helped preserve diplomatic channels, reduce the risk of miscalculation, and sustain communication between the parties.

5. The Hormuz crisis could accelerate ASEAN energy-security cooperation
The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security is already exists. The crisis in the Middle East could develop this further. Although the ARF itself did not produce any outcomes on energy cooperation, the shared concern around the crisis may take existing arrangements further. Indonesia had already proposed an ASEAN oil-storage hub. Possible developments could include coordinated strategic reserves, joint procurement, and emergency-sharing rules. The consensus model makes any concrete outcome regarding energy security more complex.

6. ASEAN is more united on Hormuz than on the South China Sea dispute
Although both issues involve maritime transit, the South China Sea is much more difficult for ASEAN to agree on. This was seen in the difference between statements made during the ARF, where there was a clearer common position on Hormuz, without a similarly strong consensus on the South China Sea. Competing sovereignty and maritime claims combine with security partnerships to make the South China Sea much more difficult for ASEAN to agree on.

Adwaith Sankar is an undergraduate student pursuing Political Science and International Liberal Studies through the NUS-Waseda Double Degree Programme. He is currently an intern at NIAS.


TWTW Newsmaker
Andy Burnham:
UK's New Prime Minister

Akshath Kaimal

On 20 July, Andy Burnham was appointed Prime Minister of the United Kingdom by King Charles, following the resignation of Keir Starmer in June. Burnham is a prominent Labour Party politician who spent the last nine years as the Mayor of Greater Manchester. His return to Westminster was engineered when MP Josh Simons resigned his seat, clearing the path for Burnham to win the Makerfield by-election in June 2026. Following a swift cabinet mutiny that forced Starmer out, Burnham stood unopposed in the leadership contest, securing massive backing from his party.

His sudden appointment follows the eventful exit of Keir Starmer, whose short-lived premiership collapsed under the weight of severe policy U-turns, a toxic scandal involving Ambassador Peter Mandelson, and a historic -36 per cent net approval rating. Under Starmer, the Labour Party became profoundly unpopular, viewed by two-thirds of the electorate as out of touch. To rescue the party’s collapsing legitimacy, experts believe Burnham could lean into his established "outsider" tag, leveraging his distance from the toxic Westminster bubble to project a more grounded, authentic connection with everyday voters that Starmer lacked.

However, Burnham faces an uphill task in a country marred by political instability, becoming the UK's seventh prime minister in just 10 years. Chronic economic stagnation and clashes over immigration policies have shattered the traditional two-party monopoly between the Conservatives and Labour, fueling the rapid rise of the right-wing Reform UK and the left-wing Green Party. Starmer failed to bridge the country’s deep economic and social divides. Burnham now has the task of healing this divided electorate. If he fails, the intensifying political divide could force him to call a general election before 2029. (“Britain's new prime minister, Andy Burnham, vows to end years of instability,” Reuters, 20 July 2026; “Key takeaways as Andy Burnham becomes PM,” BBC, 20 July 2026)


 


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Five major challenges for the new government
March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget
March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2017

Global Politics Team

March 2026 | CWA # 2011

Tanvi Thara Harendra Jha

Resetting Economic, Strategic and Cultural Ties
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
March 2026 | CWA # 2004

Akshath Kaimal

Instability returns, with a fragile peace agreement, uptick in violence and limited international engagement
March 2026 | CWA # 2003

Yesasvi Koganti

From bilateral ties to a special strategic partnership
March 2026 | CWA # 2002

Femy Francis

Reducing trade deficit and recalibrating economic cooperation with Beijing
March 2026 | CWA # 2001

Preetha Renganarayanan

Six major takeaways on the economy, border and internal security and Iran
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
March 2026 | CWA # 1991

Global Politics Team

February 2026 | CWA # 1986

Preetha Renganarayanan

Focus on Trade, Defense, Energy and Regional Connectivity
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
November 2025 | CWA # 1967

R Preetha

Risks, Reforms and Trajectories
November 2025 | CWA # 1966

Lekshmi MK

Five Questions on Challenges, Capacity and Policies
February 2026 | CWA # 1962

Global Politics Team

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas
February 2026 | CWA # 1961

Lekshmi MK

What does it mean for domestic politics and regional stability?
February 2026 | CWA # 1955

Global Politics Team

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas
January 2026 | CWA # 1947

Brighty Ann Sarah

January 2026 | CWA # 1946

Preetha Renganarayanan

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
January 2026 | CWA # 1945

Global Politics Team

January 2026 | CWA # 1943

Anu Maria Joseph

January 2026 | CWA # 1942

Lekshmi MK

January 2026 | CWA # 1941

Brighty Ann Sarah

January 2026 | CWA # 1940

IPRI Team

January 2026 | CWA # 1939

Lekshmi MK

January 2026 | CWA # 1937

Anu Maria Joseph

December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1930

Aparna A Nair

December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1914

Preetha Renganarayanan

December 2025 | CWA # 1913

Rohini Reenum

December 2025 | CWA # 1912

Lekshmi MK

December 2025 | CWA # 1911

Swati Sood

December 2025 | CWA # 1905

Femy Francis

December 2025 | CWA # 1902

Brighty Ann Sarah

December 2025 | CWA # 1893

Lekshmi MK

December 2025 | CWA # 1889

Femy Francis

December 2025 | CWA # 1881

Sunidhi Sampige

December 2025 | CWA # 1864

Femy Francis

Ten Takeaways of a SCMP Interview with a former PLA Colonel
December 2025 | CWA # 1861

Femy Francis

China Reader
November 2025 | CWA # 1859

Brighty Ann Sarah

November 2025 | CWA # 1858

Padmashree Anandhan

August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1712

R Preetha

June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1703

M Kejia 

Sagarmatha Sambaad in Nepal
Kathmandu’s Global Agenda for the Himalayas
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
October 2024 | CWA # 1480

IPRI Team

July 2024 | CWA # 1413

Ramya B

May 2024 | CWA # 1336

Femy Francis

April 2024 | CWA # 1275

Ramya B

March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
March 2024 | CWA # 1246

Sivasubramanian K

February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
November 2023 | CWA # 1148

GP Team

October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
October 2023 | CWA # 1087

PR Team

October 2023 | CWA # 1083

GP Team

August 2023 | CWA # 1049

IPRI Team

July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
July 2023 | CWA # 1009

GP Team

December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
December 2022 | CWA # 872

Sapna Elsa Abraham

November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2020 | CWA # 337

Anju Annie Mammen

February 2020 | CWA # 235

Lakshmi V Menon

September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan
July 2018 | CWA # 47

Rahul Arockiaraj

June 2018 | CWA # 26

Siddhatti Mehta