Conflict Weekly

Conflict Weekly
The US-Iran War, Week 22 I Heatwaves and Wildfires in Spain and France
Ebola expansion in Africa I Profile: Houthis

Conflict Weekly #342, Vol 7, No. 29, 30 July 2026

Global Politics Team
30 July 2026
Photo Source:

CW Note
The US-Iran War, Week 22:
End of pause, Return of hostilities and Expanding conflict geography

Brighty Ann Sarah

In the news
On 24 July, President Trump stated that Washington was temporarily pausing its military strikes on Tehran to revive negotiations, after thirteen consecutive days of attack. Iranian officials responded that Tehran will halt its attack for only as long as the US holds off, and that Iran remains in a position of “attack for attack.”

On the same day, President Trump stated that President Xi Jinping had assured China would not enable Tehran “Under any circumstances, give or sell weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran — And that statement included Chinese Companies.” He warned that such involvement from Beijing and Moscow “would be very bad for them.”

On 26 July, Iran's Houthi allies in Yemen said they had targeted the East-West Pipeline carrying oil to Saudi Arabia's main Red Sea port of Yanbu in retaliation for Saudi drone incursions.

On 29 July, the US CENTCOM stated that it intercepted multiple ballistic missiles launched by Iran in “an attempted surprise attack.” On the same day, the US and Saudi Arabia launched strikes on Iran-backed groups in Iraq citing drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

Separately, Reuters, in an exclusive, reported that Iran is set to purchase 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air-defence missile launchers, amounting to USD 60-70 billion. The purchase also includes between 300 and 400 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), including Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missiles. Reports also suggested that China held direct talks with the Houthis to allow safe transit of its tankers through the southern Red Sea, amid the Houthi embargo on exports from Saudi Arabia. 

Issues at large
1. End of truce and expanding geography of the conflict
The temporary pause has ended with Iran’s strikes against the US and persisting attacks unfolding across various fronts in the war. The conflict-geography has markedly expanded with new fronts opening in Yemen and Iraq. In Yemen, Iran-backed Houthi forces have sharply escalated the confrontation with Saudi Arabia, and established a second maritime front in the Red Sea, drawing Riyadh into active combat. Simultaneously, Iran-backed militias operating from Iraqi territory have turned Iraq into an active launch platform, conducting drone attacks directed by the IRGC against Saudi oil sites.

2. Targeting Saudi Arabia and opening new fronts
Saudi Arabia has emerged as Iran’s key target, notably against the backdrop of the recent US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Iran is leveraging the vast network of proxy groups it has cultivated over the decades as a tool of escalation. Opening new fronts in Yemen and Iraq has widened the scope of what US or and regional allies have to confront alongside direct confrontations with Iran. The Iran-backed militias in Iraq have turned Baghdad into an operational base for Tehran’s attacks. These militias form a key pillar of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” largely organized under the banner of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Hashd al-Shaabi, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.  Forming a powerful network of predominantly Shiite paramilitary groups, they emerged during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fight against ISIS after 2014 and were later formally integrated into Iraq’s security apparatus while retaining strong operational, financial and ideological ties to Iran’s IRGC and its Quds Force.

3. The emerging China factor and the end of Beijing's non-interference
For months, Beijing had limited its involvement in the war largely to protecting its own energy and shipping interests, publicly calling for de-escalation, safeguarding the flow of oil and avoiding direct military entanglement. However, that posture has markedly eroded with its supply of ammunition to Iran to help rebuild its short-range defences depleted by US and Israeli strikes, effectively tilting Beijing toward Tehran and shedding the appearance of non-interference. The events are a stark contradiction to the assurances against “enabling” Tehran that Trump claimed to have secured. Simultaneously, the direct talks with the Houthis to secure safe passage for Chinese tankers through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait underscore Beijing’s proximity to Iran and its proxy networks.  

In perspective
Iran has remained unyielding to Washington’s war of attrition, weaponizing the repeated cycles of aggression to nudge negotiations in its favour. On the contrary, Tehran has only amplified its offensive, leveraging regional proxies against Washington’s close allies, raising the scope and stakes of the conflict.

On the other hand, the US has been unable to curb Tehran effectively, even failing to prevent the expanding war that has dragged Saudi Arabia into direct conflict. It has neither been able to prevent the attacks on Riyadh, nor mitigate the threat posed by the Houthi’s on Iran’s behalf.

For China, the military assistance and engagement with Iran’s proxies goes beyond securing its economic interest. Beijing finds it an opportunity to counter US strategic interests that seek to wear down Iran militarily to secure a decisive win. It introduces a new dimension of US-China rivalry into the conflict and risk further complicating an already volatile crisis.

Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies. Bengaluru.


CW Note
Heatwaves and Wildfires in Spain and France:
Capacity gaps and Resource constraints amidst Recurring extreme weather

Lekshmi MK

In the news
On 27 July, Reuters reported that Spain and France are battling record wildfires driven by an intense heatwave, forcing the evacuation of 300,000 people as authorities warned that another spell of extreme heat could worsen the crisis. Euronews further reported on a European Commission official acknowledging that the intensity and spread of the wildfires were "ten times over the capacity" of the personnel and equipment available to contain them. 

On 30 July, The Guardian reported that “Spain faces ‘complex’ three days with risks of heatwave and strong winds reigniting some fires – as it happened.” Reuters further reported on the EU stating “Wildfire threat moving east, threatening Italy and Greece.”

Issues at large
1. Spain and France remain the hotspots
The current wildfires are concentrated in regions that have repeatedly experienced large fires in recent years. In Spain, the worst-affected areas include Castile and Leon, Extremadura, Andalusia, Catalonia and Galicia. These areas were of extensive forests, shrublands and grasslands combined with prolonged summer droughts and recurring heatwaves to create highly combustible landscapes. In France, major fires have occurred in Aude, Bouches-du-Rhone, Herault, Var and the Gironde region, particularly in Mediterranean forests and pine plantations. According to the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), by late July more than 60,000 hectares had burned in France and over 150,000 hectares in Spain during 2026, with France already surpassing its total burnt area for 2025. Mediterranean vegetation, increasing human activity near forests, accidental ignitions and occasional arson combine with highly flammable landscapes to make these regions recurring wildfire hotspots.

2. Recurring extreme weather events and the wildfire risks
The current wildfires are the result of compound extreme weather events rather than a single heatwave. Scientists stated that natural climate variability, including phenomena such as El Nino, can influence global weather patterns. However, the recurring heatwaves and prolonged drought affecting southern Europe are primarily linked to various conditions, which has increased the likelihood and intensity of extreme heat events. These conditions have left forests, shrublands and grasslands exceptionally dry. This allowed fires to ignite more easily and spread rapidly under strong winds. According to the World Weather Attribution (WWA) initiative, human activities have also become one of the factors to increase the likelihood and intensity of extreme heat in Europe, creating longer and more severe wildfire seasons. 

3. Dwindling state capacity
The expanding wildfires across Spain and France have exposed growing constraints in governments’ ability to respond effectively to climate-driven disasters. Human capacity has come under pressure as thousands of firefighters, military personnel and emergency responders have been deployed simultaneously across multiple fire zones, stretching available manpower. Technical capacity remains constrained by the limited availability of aerial water bombers, helicopters, specialised firefighting equipment and water resources. European Commission officials acknowledged that the scale of the fires was “ten times over the capacity” of the personnel and equipment available to contain them. Financial capacity is also under increasing strain as governments bear rising costs associated with emergency operations, evacuations, disaster relief, infrastructure recovery and long-term forest restoration. Together, these pressures highlight the growing mismatch between the scale of climate-driven wildfire emergencies and existing state response capacities.

4. Europe’s collective response under strain
The simultaneous wildfires have exposed the growing strain on the European Union’s collective disaster response mechanisms. Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and rescEU, member states share firefighting aircraft, specialised personnel and emergency assistance during major disasters. However, as multiple countries experienced large-scale wildfires concurrently, the demand for resources increased significantly, limiting the effectiveness of cross-border assistance. The crisis demonstrates that Europe’s existing emergency response arrangements are being tested by increasingly frequent and overlapping climate-related disasters. 

In perspective
First, forecasted heatwaves could further intensify the wildfire crisis across Europe. Meteorological agencies have forecast another spell of extreme heat across southern Europe in the coming week. This is likely to sustain conditions favourable for wildfire ignition and spread, intensifying existing fires in Spain and France while increasing the risk of new outbreaks in other vulnerable European countries. 

Second, recurring wildfires could increase pressure on governments. The recurrence of large-scale wildfires is likely to increase public scrutiny of governments' preparedness and response capabilities. The growing health impacts of heatwaves and wildfires are also likely to push governments and the EU to increase investment in healthcare systems as part of broader climate adaptation strategies.

Third, recurring wildfires could reshape Europe’s disaster governance. Recurring wildfires are likely to push the EU to strengthen its collective disaster governance. This could include expanding shared firefighting resources, increasing investments in prevention and climate adaptation, and improving cross-border emergency coordination. As simultaneous disasters become more frequent, collective preparedness may become a strategic priority for the EU.

Lekshmi MK is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.


CW Note
Ebola expansion in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
Healthcare worker strikes amidst Misinformation, Climate disaster and Humanitarian crisis

Akshath Kaimal

In the news
On 22 July, Charité University Hospital in Berlin reported that a US citizen, who was medically evacuated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), tested positive for Ebola and was receiving treatment in a high-security isolation unit.

On 23 July, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) emphasized that its USD 55.8 million regional preparedness plan still faced a critical funding gap, with only USD 20 million secured.

On 28 July, UNICEF announced that nearly three million children and adolescents are at risk in the outbreak zone.

On 29 July, Uganda was declared Ebola-free after detecting zero cases over the last 42 days, meeting the WHO criterion for ending the outbreak.

As of 29 July, according to the CDC, cases in the DRC stood at 3,360 and deaths at 1,487, representing a case fatality rate (CFR) of over 44 per cent.

Issues at large
1. A recurring and rapidly expanding outbreak, with DRC as the epicentre
The DRC has been the epicentre of Ebola since 1976; this is its 17th outbreak. The 2018-2020 Kivu outbreak was the second largest in history, with a 65 per cent fatality rate. The current outbreak is caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain, for which no approved vaccine or treatment exists. By late July 2026, with more than 3,300 cases and 1,400 deaths, it became the fastest-growing Ebola epidemic on record. While the 2013-2016 epidemic took eight months to reach 1,000 deaths, this outbreak did so in less than ten weeks. The DRC’s location within the Congo Basin places communities close to wildlife reservoirs, particularly fruit bats, increasing the likelihood of repeated spillover events. Yet geography alone does not explain the crisis; a chronically underfunded healthcare system, compounded by a 30 per cent cut in US health assistance in 2025, has severely weakened the country’s outbreak response.

2. Cultural practices and misinformation as accelerating factors
Beyond health infrastructure challenges, cultural practices and widespread misinformation have significantly accelerated Ebola transmission. Traditional burial rituals, which often involve washing and touching the deceased over several days, expose mourners to the virus, which is highly concentrated in bodily fluids after death. According to the WHO, these practices have triggered major chains of transmission. However, measures such as sealing bodies in bags have also brought health workers into conflict with grieving families seeking to observe cultural traditions. At the same time, false claims that Ebola as a hoax have led some communities to reject treatment, evade checkpoints, and attack response teams. The breakdown in community trust ensures that a large portion of the viral transmission remains completely untraceable. 

3. Healthcare worker strikes amid declining public trust
The rapid spread of Ebola in the DRC has been further intensified by a growing labour crisis among healthcare workers. Throughout July 2026, frontline staff in the hardest-hit regions, including Ituri, staged protests and strikes outside treatment centres. In Butembo, Beni, and Kisangani, doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians launched an indefinite strike in mid-July, citing months of unpaid wages, poor living conditions, and inadequate compensation despite facing a virus with a 30-50 per cent fatality rate. The failure to adequately support frontline responders has disrupted clinical operations, delayed experimental treatment trials, and weakened the overall outbreak response. The crisis has also deepened public mistrust. 

4. An outbreak worsened by a humanitarian and climate crisis
The Ebola response in the DRC is occurring against the backdrop of an expanding, multidimensional humanitarian crisis. In June 2026 alone, over 46,000 newly displaced households were recorded across eastern DRC, driven largely by armed conflict and shifting frontlines. Armed groups, such as the M23, continue to restrict humanitarian access, forcing millions into overcrowded camps where disease control is difficult. Compounding this violent instability is the accelerating impact of climate change and an expanding cholera outbreak. Torrential rains and severe flooding have devastated agricultural centers, leaving nearly a quarter of the population facing acute food insecurity. As extreme climate stress destroys livelihoods and militias capture territory, massive population movements overwhelm host communities and dismantle containment corridors, turning an isolated viral spillover into an unmanageable regional crisis.

In perspective
First, the outbreak continues to expand unpredictably. Despite Uganda being declared Ebola-free, the situation in the DRC remains dire. With international organisations struggling to meet their funding quotas and contact tracing near non-existent, according to the WHO, the trajectory of this epidemic remains unpredictable and dangerous.

Second, healthcare workers need protection to regain public trust. The DRC has so far failed to protect its healthcare workers, who continue to protest unpaid wages. This has severely undermined the country’s response, which has remained fragmented due to misinformation and the public’s waning trust in the healthcare system. Adequately paying its frontline staff is essential for the government to rein in misinformation and break the chain of transmission, which can only happen with the public’s trust and if information is disseminated in a culturally appropriate manner.

Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.


CW Profile
The Houthis:
Origins, Ethnic makeup, Political structure, Geographical footprint and External support

Manikranth Chakravarthula

The origins
Officially named Ansar Allah (Supporters of God), the Houthis are a Zaydi Shia political and military movement operating as northern Yemen’s de facto governing regime. The group emerged in the early 1990s in northwestern Sa'dah Governorate as Al-Shabab al-Mu'min (The Believing Youth), founded by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. 

Originally established to revitalize Zaydi identity against Saudi-funded Salafi and Wahhabi proselytization, the movement expanded following opposition to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the external alignment of Yemen’s former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis led six consecutive insurgencies against government forces, known as the Sa'dah Wars. 

Capitalizing on the political disruption of the 2011 Arab Spring and anger over fuel subsidy cuts, the Houthis seized Sana'a in September 2014, drove President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi into exile by early 2015, and established state-like control over northern Yemen. Ideologically and politically, patriarch Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his sons received religious training at the Iranian seminary in Qom during the 1990s, forging foundational ties with Iran.

The ethnic, elite and ideological makeup
Ethnically composed of indigenous Arab Yemenis, the movement’s internal hierarchy is strictly stratified. Executive, spiritual, and ideological leadership is concentrated within the Hashemite (Sada/Sayyid) elite class including the founding al-Houthi family which claims direct lineage from the Prophet Muhammad via his grandsons Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn. Historically, the Sada elite held immense religious and political power, serving as Qadis (Islamic judges) and ruling the Zaydi Imamate until its overthrow in the 1962 civil war.

Beneath this elite leadership, the core fighting force and grassroots backing are drawn from northern highland tribal confederations, primarily the Bakil and Hashid. Doctrinally rooted in Zaydism, a Shia branch unique to northern Yemen comprising 35–40 per cent of the Yemen’s population, the Houthis have increasingly integrated Twelver Shia political iconography while co-opting Sunni tribal groups through populist anti-corruption and anti-imperialist messaging.

The geographical footprint
From their heartland in Sa'dah Governorate, the Houthis control 20 to 30 per cent of Yemen, encompassing 70 to 80 per cent of the population (roughly 24 to 25 million people). Their domain includes major administrative centers: Sana'a, Sa'dah, Amran, Hajjah, Dhamar, Ibb, and parts of Taiz. Crucially, control over Al-Hudaydah Governorate grants direct positioning along the Red Sea coast and Bab al-Mandab Strait, providing significant leverage over global maritime trade routes.

Political and Military structure
Ansar Allah’s platform combines Zaydi revivalism, anti-imperialism, pan-Islamism, and anti-Zionism, summarized in their official slogan (Sarkha): "God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.” The movement operates across four primary operational pillars: Military Wing headed by Abdullah al-Hakim, overseeing tactical and armed operations; Tribal Wing managing integration, alliances, and recruitment across northern tribal networks; Ideological Wing directed by Abdulkarim al-Houthi, supervising religious, cultural, and political education and the Political Wing led by Mahdi al-Mashat via the Supreme Political Council (SPC), managing formal public administration. Operational authority relies on a dual structure: formal civil ministries function under the SPC in Sana'a, while a shadow supervisor network (mushrifin) enforces ideological compliance, controls civil servants, and extracts state revenue through tribal patronage, financial incentives, and coercive political repression.

Evolving from a grassroots religious organization into a strong paramilitary force capable of state capture, Houthi troop estimates vary: in 2018, Houthi officials claimed 60,000 fighters, while external estimates placed the number between 15,000 and 50,000. Historically, recruitment relied on northern social networks, religious sermons, and youth summer camps. Reports also document heavy reliance on child soldiers deployed at frontlines as guards, fighters, and mine clearers.

External Support
The Houthis are a central component of Iran's regional "Axis of Resistance." Tehran serves as the group’s primary state sponsor and sole government providing formal diplomatic recognition. Through the IRGC-Quds Force, Iran supplies ballistic and cruise missiles, kamikaze UAVs, anti-ship systems, and technical advisers. Non-state support is provided by Lebanese Hezbollah’s specialized Unit 3800 through tactical training and battlefield assistance. Financially, the movement sustains its war economy through international smuggling networks trafficking fuel, raw materials, and arms across the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Horn of Africa.

Though doctrinally Zaydi Shia, the Houthis enter opportunistic alliances with Sunni extremist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), maintaining a ceasefire since 2022 and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. To expand their global footprint and counter US influence, the Houthis have also leveraged ties with major powers, including Russia and China.

Manikranth Chakravarthula is a doctoral student at the Conflict Resolution and Peace Research Programme, School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.


CW Newsmakers
The Berlin Pride attack I Gaza’s International Stabilisation Force 
Netanyahu’s US Visit I Zelensky’s US Visit I US Senate bill on Russia sanctions I Japan’s earthquake 

Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar

The Berlin Pride attack:
A Lone Wolf Attack and Responses in Germany

On 25 July, The Guardian reported that an attacker rammed a van into a crowd leaving Berlin's Pride celebrations in Tiergarten Park, killing one person and injuring 29 others, in what authorities classified as an Islamist terrorist attack. The suspect, identified as Abdul B, a German citizen with links to Islamist circles, was tracked down after a nationwide manhunt and shot dead by police in Spandau on 26 July after charging at officers with a bladed weapon. Investigators said he had made repeated failed attempts to join the Islamic State, including travelling to Lebanon, where he was jailed for three months before returning to Germany and being arrested again for preparing a serious act of violence. Despite this, a judge had handed him a 22-month suspended sentence rather than the three years sought by prosecutors, a decision Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt called incomprehensible given the danger he posed. The government has since ordered a review of terrorism laws, considering changes to bar suspended sentences for those convicted of terror-related offences, including juveniles.

The attack triggered sharply divided political reactions. Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier condemned the violence and urged Pride-goers not to be intimidated, while CDU lawmakers pushed for tougher penalties and expanded digital investigative powers. However, columnist Fatma Aydemir criticised this show of solidarity as hypocritical, noting that Merz's own coalition had cut funding and protections for queer communities in recent years, including rejecting a rainbow flag over the Bundestag last year. She argued the debate risked being hijacked by both the far-right, which used the attack to attacks migration policy, and by conservatives whose own record on queer rights she called comparably hostile.

Gaza’s International Stabilisation Force:
Israel’s security cabinet approves the US-backed ceasefire plan

On 26 July, Reuters reported that Israel’s security cabinet has approved the legal framework allowing the entry of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) into Gaza as part of President Trump’s ceasefire plan for the territory. The decision was taken ahead of Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, where discussions with US officials included Gaza’s future security arrangements and regional stability. The International Stabilisation Force is expected to operate in areas of Gaza that are not under Israeli control and will work in coordination with the Israeli military. The force is planned to include around 200 personnel from countries including Uganda and Morocco, although the participation of individual countries will require separate approval. A timeline for deployment has not yet been announced. The deployment is part of a broader US-backed framework aimed at stabilising Gaza after prolonged conflict. The plan includes humanitarian assistance, establishing a civilian Palestinian administration, reducing Hamas’ military capabilities and supporting the transition towards post-war governance. However, challenges remain, including disagreements over Hamas’ disarmament, the extent of international involvement and Israel’s continued security concerns. Israel’s approval of the force represents a significant step towards implementing the proposed Gaza arrangements, but the limited scope of the deployment has raised questions about its effectiveness. Some analysts have described the move as a strategic decision by Israel to manage international pressure while maintaining control over security arrangements in Gaza. The establishment of the International Stabilisation Force is expected to play a key role in shaping Gaza’s post-war environment, balancing Israel’s security priorities with international efforts to restore governance, humanitarian access and regional stability. 

Mass migrant crossings Spain's Ceuta 
Regional government requests Madrid to deploy army and close the border with Morocco

On 30 July, Reuters reported that migrants crossed into Spain's North African enclave of Ceuta, with over 1,500 people crossing over, some swimming and others breaking through fences on foot. A Guardia Civil spokesperson said migrants were "massively entering from the sea," calling it an "explosion" following a slow trickle since a Supreme Court ruling that migrants intercepted at sea cannot be summarily returned to Morocco. Ceuta and Melilla represent the EU's only land border with Africa and have long been flashpoints for migration into Europe. State television TVE reported 2,000 to 3,000 people had crossed. Ceuta's regional government requested Madrid deploy the army and close the border. Spain's Interior Ministry said the armed forces would reinforce the Guardia Civil, while Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pledged an “immediate response.” Spanish authorities blamed human trafficking networks for exploiting the court ruling to encourage crossings, vowing to deport those entering illegally. Spain and Morocco agreed to strengthen cooperation and return irregular migrants "as soon as possible 

Hamas announces “complete disarmament” 
President Trump claims of a "historic agreement" 

US President Trump announced that his Board of Peace had reached what he described as a "historic agreement" to secure the phased disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza, alongside the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces. The announcement marks the first major diplomatic initiative by the Board of Peace, a US-led body established in 2026 to oversee peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Gaza.  According to Trump, the agreement is based on a 20-point framework that includes the dismantling of Hamas' weapons and tunnel network, the deployment of an international stabilisation force, and the establishment of a new Palestinian technocratic administration to govern Gaza during a transitional period. Trump said the agreement would represent a "monumental step" towards lasting peace in the region. 
Reuters reported that the Board of Peace was first proposed in 2025 and formally launched in January 2026. Chaired by Trump, it includes senior figures such as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Jared Kushner. Reuters and the BBC reported that key issues, including the sequencing of Hamas' disarmament and Israel's military withdrawal, remain unresolved. 

Netanyahu’s US Visit:
Focus on Iran, Gaza and Middle East security 

On 27 July, Reuters reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington for talks with President Trump focused on the future direction of US-Israel policy in the Middle East, with Iran emerging as the main issue of discussion. Netanyahu is expected to urge Trump to maintain a firm approach towards Tehran, arguing that Iran continues to pose a major security threat and that any future negotiations over its nuclear programme should include strict conditions. Trump, while continuing pressure on Iran, has shown interest in exploring diplomatic options. The discussions focused on preventing Iran from rebuilding its nuclear and military capabilities, possible frameworks for future negotiations, and responses if Tehran resumes uranium enrichment or expands its regional activities. The leaders also discussed Gaza, including efforts to stabilise the territory, humanitarian concerns, future governance arrangements and possible international involvement. Developments in Lebanon and measures to reduce tensions along Israel’s northern border were also part of the broader regional security discussions. The visit came amid reported differences between Trump and Netanyahu over handling Iran and the future approach towards regional conflicts. Netanyahu sought continued US support for Israel’s security priorities, while Trump aimed to balance military pressure with diplomatic engagement. The talks also covered broader regional diplomacy, including efforts to expand the Abraham Accords and strengthen US-Israel cooperation in the Middle East.

Zelensky’s US Visit:
Trump agrees on Ukraine’s production of US-designed Patriot air defence missiles

On 28 July, The New York Times reported that President Volodymyr Zelensky met President Donald Trump at the White House. Zelensky, still confronting fallout at home over his decision to dismiss Ukraine's defence minister and army chief, sought to reboot stalled peace talks with Russia and press Trump to follow through on a pledge, first made at this month's NATO summit, to grant Ukraine a licence to produce US-designed Patriot air defence missiles domestically. Ukraine has said it needs the interceptors, which can strike targets up to 1,000 kilometres away and track multiple threats simultaneously, to counter escalating Russian drone and ballistic missile attacks, Kyiv and its army have said 25 Patriot systems are needed, with each missile costing an estimated USD 3 million to USD 5 million.

Trump called the closed-door meeting "very good," and Zelenskyy told reporters afterwards that Trump had agreed to grant the production licences, adding he had since met representatives of US defence manufacturers to discuss possible co-production. The two leaders also discussed a potential ceasefire on long-range airstrikes and the broader peace process. Zelenskyy separately met a bipartisan group of senators shortly before the Senate voted 86-12 to advance sweeping new sanctions on Russia and Iran, legislation championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham, whose memorial service both leaders were in Washington to attend. Domestic production of the Patriot systems would also help shore up Zelensky's approval ratings, with the key remaining question being where Ukraine could produce the systems securely and quickly enough to shift the balance of the war.

US Senate bill on Russia sanctions:
The US Senate advances Graham's Russia sanctions bill 

On 28 July, The New York Times reported that the US Senate voted 86-12 on 28 July to invoke cloture and advance the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, clearing a key hurdle for legislation aimed at penalising Moscow over its war in Ukraine. The vote came hours after senators memorialised Graham, who died on 11 July, at ceremonies in the Capitol and Washington National Cathedral, and shortly after they met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who watched the vote from the Senate gallery and thanked senators for their continued support as the war neared its four-and-a-half-year mark. Senator Roger Wicker said the bill would go after Vladimir Putin, his inner circle and the shadow fleet used to evade sanctions, while holding accountable those who purchase the most Russian oil and gas. The bill targets Russian officials, oligarchs, banks and financial institutions, and empowers the president to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on the largest purchasers of Russian oil and gas, with the top five buyers reassessed every 180 days.

The bill, which has 62 co-sponsors, also extends the Iran Sanctions Act by five years and includes a five-year sunset clause on the new tariff powers. It still requires House approval, where Democrats have expressed reservations about expanding Trump's tariff authority, 11 Democrats and one Republican voted against the measure in the Senate. Senator Peter Welch, who opposed the bill, said its language on "facilitators" of Russian oil sales was too broadly defined and could let Trump target countries arbitrarily. Negotiators had revised the bill to require, rather than merely permit, the president to impose sanctions, while allowing him to waive them on national security grounds, and added reporting requirements to Congress.

Japan’s earthquake:
Death toll crosses 30

On 28 July, Asahi Shimbun reported that a magnitude 7.1 earthquake, registering a maximum intensity of 7, struck Kumamoto Prefecture at 1627 hrs, with the epicentre at a shallow depth of about ten kilometres. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ordered a government-wide emergency response. About 90 minutes later, an explosion suspected to be a gas leak tore through the AEON Mall Kumamoto in Kashima town, collapsing its second floor and trapping shoppers and staff. Reuters reported nearly 260,000 people were evacuated, with over 34,000 homes still without power amid temperatures near 34 degrees Celsius, raising heatstroke concerns at evacuation centres. Kyushu Shinkansen services and Kumamoto airport were suspended, roads and bridges buckled, and Kumamoto Castle's stone walls, still under repair since 2016, were damaged again. The quake disrupted the region's manufacturing hub. Sony Semiconductor, Renesas Electronics, Ebara Corp, Honda, and Mitsubishi Electric's Melco unit suspended plants, while Toyota halted three Fukuoka factories through Friday. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) evacuated workers but resumed operations gradually. 

Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar are postgraduate students at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences. They are currently Research interns at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)


 


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June 2026 | CWA # 2166

Ramya B 

Russia (April-June 2026)
Unsuccessful Offensive, Drone Attacks and Economic Challenges
June 2026 | CWA # 2165

Himani Pant

Europe (April-June 2026)
End of the Orban Era, Political Fragmentation, Tightening of Migration Rules and Continuing Economic Slowdown
June 2026 | CWA # 2160

Radhika M Agarwal

The War in Ukraine:
Ukraine's Crimea Campaign, The Belarus Standoff, and Russia's Aerial Bombardment
June 2026 | CWA # 2159

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

The US-Iran MoU
Renewed strikes, Persistent disagreements, and a Fragile Agreement
June 2026 | CWA # 2157

Global Politics Team

The G7 Summit 2026
President Xi Jinping’s North Korea visit I Myanmar President’s China visit
June 2026 | CWA # 2154

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

The G7 Summit 2026
Four Takeaways on Economic security, Critical minerals, and Consensus on Ukraine and Iran
June 2026 | CWA # 2153

Global Politics Team

The US-Iran MoU
The War in Ukraine I Anti-immigrant violence in South Africa I Ultra Orthodox Jews' protests in Israel
June 2026 | CWA # 2150

Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella

The War in Ukraine:
Massive drone attacks, Europe's support for Ukraine, and a Distant ceasefire
June 2026 | CWA # 2149

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran MoU:
Asymmetric Gains and Implementation Challenges
June 2026 | CWA # 2145

Glynnis Winona B

Myanmar and Press Freedom: 
Four Takeaways on Legal repression, Institutional collapse, Violence, and Digital control 
June 2026 | CWA # 2144

Nithin V

Bangladesh and Press Freedom: 
Four Takeaways on Digital security laws, Political polarisation, Journalist safety, and Media vulnerability 
June 2026 | CWA # 2143

Aishal Hab Yousuf 

Sri Lanka and Press Freedom: 
Five Takeaways on Political influence, Legal mechanisms to control, Ethnic sensitivities and History of State intimidation
June 2026 | CWA # 2142

Glynnis Winona B

Bhutan and Press Freedom:
Four takeaways on Regulatory control, Economic fragility, and Social constraints
June 2026 | CWA # 2141

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Maldives and Press Freedom:
Four takeaways on the influence of democracy, legislation, and state funding
June 2026 | CWA # 2140

Nithin V

Pakistan and Press Freedom:
Four takeaways Military influence, cyber laws, political instability, and youth-driven digital journalism
June 2026 | CWA # 2139

Siddhi Halyur

Afghanistan and Press Freedom:
Four takeaways on political control, religious restrictions and economic vulnerabilities 
June 2026 | CWA # 2138

Siddhi Halyur

Nepal and Press Freedom:
Three takeaways on Political constraints, Missing legal protection and Funding issues
June 2026 | CWA # 2136

Acsah H

The Blue Origin Rocket Explosion:
Does this leave Jeff Bezos grounded, Elon Musk unchallenged, and NASA’s lunar timeline in jeopardy?
June 2026 | CWA # 2131

Rohini Reenum

Israel-Lebanon Tensions:
New Deal amidst Israeli incursion and Hezbollah’s retaliation
June 2026 | CWA # 2130

Akshath Kaimal

The UK-Rwanda Asylum Deal: 
Why did the Permanent Court of Arbitration reject Rwanda’s claims? What was Rwanda’s complaint? Why did the UK cancel the deal?
June 2026 | CWA # 2129

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa This Week:
The Ebola fear in DR Congo and the Elections in Ethiopia amidst conflicts
May 2026 | CWA # 2126

Aparna A Nair

The Shenzhou-23 Mission:
China’s Space Missions, Technology, and Infrastructure
May 2026 | CWA # 2124

Glynnis Winona B

The Crisis in Cuba:
The US Sanctions, Energy Crisis, and Economic Instability
May 2026 | CWA # 2123

Akshath Kaimal

The Ebola and the DR Congo:
Multiple Outbreaks, Fragile Healthcare System, and Ineffective Global Responses
May 2026 | CWA # 2122

Radhika M Agarwal

The War in Ukraine:
Ballistic missiles, Nuclear drills with Belarus, and the Czech ammunition initiative
May 2026 | CWA # 2120

Brighty Ann Sarah

Conflicts in the Middle East
The US-Iran War Week Thirteen: Escalating Hostilities, Tenuous Ceasefire and Tense Negotiations
May 2026 | CWA # 2119

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa
The Ebola spread in DR Congo, The Faye-Sonko split in Senegal, and the Deepening US military involvement in Nigeria
May 2026 | CWA # 2115

Aparna A Nair

The Putin-Xi Summit
Trade, Technology, Security, and Pipeline
May 2026 | CWA # 2114

Glynnis Winona B

What makes the UAE a global player?
Explaining the Governance, Economy, People, and Strategic Influence of a Small Middle Eastern State
May 2026 | CWA # 2113

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Sri Lanka and the US-Iran War 
Rising oil imports, Austerity measures and State capacity
May 2026 | CWA # 2111

NIAS Global Politics Team

The Trump-Xi Summit
The Africa Forward Summit 2026 I North Korea's Constitutional Amendment 2026
May 2026 | CWA # 2110

Aishal Hab Yousuf

The Trump-Xi Summit:
Managing Strategic Competition through Trade, Technology, and Diplomacy
May 2026 | CWA # 2092

NIAS Global Politics Team

The US-Iran War, Week Ten
CW Column on Middle East: Escalating Israeli Aggression in Lebanon I UAE's Covert Manoeuvres
May 2026 | CWA # 2090

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Ten:
Fraying Ceasefire, Renewed Negotiations and the Risk of a Stalemate
May 2026 | CWA # 2089

Global Politics Team

King Charles's US Visit
May 2026 | CWA # 2088

Nithin V

Emphasis on strong bilateral relations, democratic values and security cooperation
May 2026 | CWA # 2087

Siddhi Halyur

Exploring Strategic Sectors of Cooperation
May 2026 | CWA # 2086

Aishal Hab Yousuf

Implications for the Middle East and the Energy Market
May 2026 | CWA # 2085

Glynnis Winona B

Growing US-Europe differences and Challenges for Berlin
May 2026 | CWA # 2083

Brighty Ann Sarah

The US-Iran War, Week Nine:
Deadlocked Negotiations, Competing Agendas and Domestic Pressure
May 2026 | CWA # 2082

Akshath Kaimal

Escalating Violence in Mali:
Between Ethnic Insurgencies, Jihadist Attacks, and Military Coups
April 2026 | CWA # 2080

Global Politics Team

Four Takeaways of the WFP's report on the fallouts of the Middle East crisis
April 2026 | CWA # 2079

Aishal Hab Yousuf

From Post-War Pacifism to Strategic Recalibration and Autonomy
April 2026 | CWA # 2078

Mahesh Bhatta

Managing Consensus and Moving ahead towards a New Nepal
April 2026 | CWA # 2074

Brighty Ann Sarah

Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire:
Asymmetric Terms, Fragile Truce and Israeli Occupation
April 2026 | CWA # 2073

Akshath Kaimal

The US-Iran War, Week Eight:
A Fragile Ceasefire, Attempts to Control Hormuz and the Stalled Talks in Islamabad
April 2026 | CWA # 2072

Anu Maria Joseph

Three Years of War in Sudan
Prolonged Stalemate, Humanitarian Cost, External Interventions and Regional Fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2070

NIAS Global Politics Team

The US-Iran War I Conflicts in Africa I The War in Ukraine I China-Japan Tensions I Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes
April 2026 | CWA # 2069

Padmashree Anandhan

The War in Ukraine
Expanding Drone Warfare, Russia's Strategic Patience and Ukraine's Diplomatic Outreach
April 2026 | CWA # 2068

Femy Francis 

China-Japan Tensions
Escalating Defence Posturing and Economic Decoupling
April 2026 | CWA # 2067

Anu Maria Joseph

Conflicts in Africa
Continuing Conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan and DR Congo, Security issues in Nigeria, and Political Instability in Madagascar
April 2026 | CWA # 2065

Lakshmi Venugopal Menon

The US-Iran War, Israel-Hamas Conflict and their interconnected fallouts
April 2026 | CWA # 2064

Anwesha Ghosh

Gender Repression, Leadership Rifts, Regional Realignments and Clashes with Pakistan
April 2026 | CWA # 2063

Ramya B

Russia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Assertive Military Posture, Attempts for an Economic Turnaround and Search for Partners
April 2026 | CWA # 2062

Himani Pant

Europe (Jan-Mar 2026)
Trade diversification & FTAs, Increased defence spending, Tightening irregular migration and Economic slowdown
April 2026 | CWA # 2061

S Shaji

Africa (Jan-Mar 2026)
Elections, Civil Wars, Militancy and Peace Initiatives
April 2026 | CWA # 2058

Nishchal N Pandey  & Mahesh Raj Bhatta

Nepal (Jan-Mar 2026)
Political Upheaval, Generational Change and Economic Uncertainty
April 2026 | CWA # 2057

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar (Jan-Mar 2026)
An Illegitimate Regime's Consolidation Game
April 2026 | CWA # 2056

Ashik J Bonofer

Southeast Asia (Jan-Mar 2026)
Deteriorating situation in Myanmar, Philippines as the ASEAN Chair, New government in Thailand, and Economic & Environmental challenges
April 2026 | CWA # 2054

Amrita Jash

Regional assertion, Pragmatic recalibration with the West and Avoiding military entanglement in the Middle East
April 2026 | CWA # 2053

Anand V

The "Two Sessions," Recalibrated growth targets, Technology prioritization, and Military purges
April 2026 | CWA # 2052

Shreya Upadhyay

April 2026 | CWA # 2050

IPRI Team

March 2026 | CWA # 2042

Preetha Renganarayanan

Five Takeaways of the US Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) Report for 2026
March 2026 | CWA # 2039

Femy Francis

Trump-Xi Meeting
Why did Trump reschedule it? What does that mean?
March 2026 | CWA # 2035

Akshath Kaimal

Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict
Broken ceasefire, Expanding military strikes and Worsening humanitarian situation
March 2026 | CWA # 2033

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal after elections:
Five major challenges for the new government
March 2026 | CWA # 2023

Femy Francis

New Five-Year Plan, Ethnic Unity Law, and an Enhanced Defence Budget
March 2026 | CWA # 2019

Akshath Kaimal

Rising Violence in Nigeria
Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment
March 2026 | CWA # 2017

Global Politics Team

March 2026 | CWA # 2011

Tanvi Thara Harendra Jha

Resetting Economic, Strategic and Cultural Ties
March 2026 | CWA # 2009

Sreemaya Nair

Nepal Elections 2026
Rise of a new leadership and Reset in political landscape
March 2026 | CWA # 2004

Akshath Kaimal

Instability returns, with a fragile peace agreement, uptick in violence and limited international engagement
March 2026 | CWA # 2003

Yesasvi Koganti

From bilateral ties to a special strategic partnership
March 2026 | CWA # 2002

Femy Francis

Reducing trade deficit and recalibrating economic cooperation with Beijing
March 2026 | CWA # 2001

Preetha Renganarayanan

Six major takeaways on the economy, border and internal security and Iran
February 2026 | CWA # 1998

Anu Maria Joseph

Instability in Sudan
Response to the genocide call and the threats of a regional spillover
March 2026 | CWA # 1991

Global Politics Team

February 2026 | CWA # 1986

Preetha Renganarayanan

Focus on Trade, Defense, Energy and Regional Connectivity
February 2026 | CWA # 1985

Abhimanyu Solanki

Basant in Pakistan
The return of Basant, and what it signifies
February 2026 | CWA # 1977

Anu Maria Joseph

Violence in Nigeria
US military deployment amidst worsening insurgency
February 2026 | CWA # 1976

Lekshmi MK

The War in Ukraine
The Geneva Talks and Growing Negotiation Asymmetry
December 2025 | CWA # 1971

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan Budget 2025-26
Legislating stabilisation under IMF discipline and coalition constraints
December 2025 | CWA # 1970

Aparna A Nair

Pakistan & China
Ten Years of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
November 2025 | CWA # 1968

Vani Vyshnavi Jupudi

Pakistan and the US
A New opening, or another cycle?
November 2025 | CWA # 1967

R Preetha

Risks, Reforms and Trajectories
November 2025 | CWA # 1966

Lekshmi MK

Five Questions on Challenges, Capacity and Policies
February 2026 | CWA # 1962

Global Politics Team

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas
February 2026 | CWA # 1961

Lekshmi MK

What does it mean for domestic politics and regional stability?
February 2026 | CWA # 1955

Global Politics Team

Regional Roundups: From East Asia to the Americas
January 2026 | CWA # 1947

Brighty Ann Sarah

January 2026 | CWA # 1946

Preetha Renganarayanan

The Davos Summit 2026
Five Major Takeaways from The World Economic Forum
January 2026 | CWA # 1945

Global Politics Team

January 2026 | CWA # 1943

Anu Maria Joseph

January 2026 | CWA # 1942

Lekshmi MK

January 2026 | CWA # 1941

Brighty Ann Sarah

January 2026 | CWA # 1940

IPRI Team

January 2026 | CWA # 1939

Lekshmi MK

January 2026 | CWA # 1937

Anu Maria Joseph

December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1930

Aparna A Nair

December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1914

Preetha Renganarayanan

December 2025 | CWA # 1913

Rohini Reenum

December 2025 | CWA # 1912

Lekshmi MK

December 2025 | CWA # 1911

Swati Sood

December 2025 | CWA # 1905

Femy Francis

December 2025 | CWA # 1902

Brighty Ann Sarah

December 2025 | CWA # 1893

Lekshmi MK

December 2025 | CWA # 1889

Femy Francis

December 2025 | CWA # 1881

Sunidhi Sampige

December 2025 | CWA # 1864

Femy Francis

Ten Takeaways of a SCMP Interview with a former PLA Colonel
December 2025 | CWA # 1861

Femy Francis

China Reader
November 2025 | CWA # 1859

Brighty Ann Sarah

November 2025 | CWA # 1858

Padmashree Anandhan

August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech and the Civil Rights Movement in the US
August 2025 | CWA # 1790

GP Team

The World This Week#323-324
The Trump-Putin meeting & the US-China tariff extension
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
Weaponization of access to the US economy
August 2025 | CWA # 1779

GP Team

The World This Week#322
US tariffs on India, Brazil and Canada & the EU-US trade deal
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia, starting the First World War
July 2025 | CWA # 1770

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations:
Why the focus on terrorism, refugees, and Uzbekistan as the third partner?
July 2025 | CWA # 1769

GP Team

The World This Week#321
Indian PM Modi's visit to the Maldives I Elections to the Upper House in Japan
July 2025 | CWA # 1762

Lekshmi MK

Ocean Darkening: 
What is the phenomenon? What are its effects? And who are more vulnerable?
July 2025 | CWA # 1749

R Preetha

Africa as the Hunger Epicenter
Of the 13 Global Hunger Hotspots, 8 are in Africa: Five reasons why
July 2025 | CWA # 1748

GP Team

The World This Week #318
PM Modi’s Visit to Trinidad and Tobago & Ghana, One big beautiful bill, and Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting
July 2025 | CWA # 1744

Chittrothu Vaihali

EU-Canada Summit 2025
What is security and defence partnership all about?
July 2025 | CWA # 1742

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly # 287-88
The 12 Day War and the Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal
July 2025 | CWA # 1738

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Thailand and Cambodia
What was the phone call between PM Shinawatra and President of Senate Hun Sen? What is the border dispute between the two? Why has this become an issue?
June 2025 | CWA # 1735

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025:
Trump making Europe great again
June 2025 | CWA # 1734

GP Team

The World This Week #317
NATO Summit 2025 and Russia-Mali bilateral agreements
June 2025 | CWA # 1733

Ananya Dinesh

China and the Pacific Islands 
What was the recent China-PIC joint statement about? What it says, and what it means?
June 2025 | CWA # 1728

M Kejia

G7 Summit 2025:
The Focus on the Middle East and Trade negotiations
June 2025 | CWA # 1726

GP Team

The World This Week #316
China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan, and the G7 Summit in Canada
June 2025 | CWA # 1725

Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Santhiya M, Aparna A Nair & M Kejia

Operation Midnight Hammer: US bombs three nuclear sites in Iran
What were the three Iranian nuclear sites that were targeted? What are the B2 Bombers and Bunker Buster Bombs? What do these attacks mean? What Next?
June 2025 | CWA # 1724

IPRI Team

Conflict Weekly #286
The Spiralling Israel-Iran Crisis, and the Dangerous Hunger Hotspots
June 2025 | CWA # 1721

Rizwana Banu S and Santhiya M

Who are the Afrikaners?
Why is Trump interested in the Afrikaner question in South Africa?
June 2025 | CWA # 1720

Lekshmi MK

New WMO Report on Arctic Warming
What are the social, economic and environmental implications of Arctic warming
June 2025 | CWA # 1719

J Yamini  

China’s EV Surge
What contributes to the rise of BYD
June 2025 | CWA # 1717

J Yamini

Gender Violence in Pakistan:
What are the larger issues in the Noor Mukadam case?
June 2025 | CWA # 1715

Femy Francis

The US-China:
On Tariffs, Rare Earths and Visas
June 2025 | CWA # 1713

GP Team

The World This Week #315
The UN Ocean Conference in France and the US-China Meeting in London
June 2025 | CWA # 1712

R Preetha

June 2025 | CWA # 1705

GP Team

The World This Week #314
Elections in South Korea and Poland I China and the Pacific Island Countries I Bangladesh Election Announcement 2026
June 2025 | CWA # 1703

M Kejia 

Sagarmatha Sambaad in Nepal
Kathmandu’s Global Agenda for the Himalayas
June 2025 | CWA # 1700

R Preetha

Ethiopia bans the TPLF
What does the TPLF ban mean for the Pretoria agreement? What next for Ethiopia?
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
Harvard vs Trump Administration
June 2025 | CWA # 1691

GP Team

The World This Week #313
China-ASEAN-GCC Summit I President Macron's visit to South East Asia I Trump Vs Harvard
May 2025 | CWA # 1690

GP Team

The World This Week #312
Elections in Romania, Portugal & Poland I UK-EU Summit
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
Continuing Russia’s Aerial Attacks, despite exchange of prisoners
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
The Humanitarian Crisis and Israel’s Renewed Offensive
May 2025 | CWA # 1685

Aparna A Nair

UK-EU Summit:
First step towards a reset
May 2025 | CWA # 1683

Aashish Ganeshan

Elections in Portugal:
The Rise of Chega Party and the Search for Political Stability
May 2025 | CWA # 1679

Aashish Ganeshan

US in the Middle Easr
Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE
May 2025 | CWA # 1678

Gauri Gupta

China in Latin America
China-CELAC forum: Strengthening ties with Latin America and Caribbean
May 2025 | CWA # 1677

GP Team

The World This Week #310-311
China in Latin America and the Carribbean I Trump's Middle East Visit I Denmark as the new Arctic Chair
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
PKK disbands after 40 years of armed insurgency
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
The Discussion in Turkiye and the Elusive Ceasefire
May 2025 | CWA # 1671

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

US, Ukraine and Russia:
Air attacks amidst a Minerals deal and Ceasefire Proposals
May 2025 | CWA # 1670

Fleur Elizabeth Philip

Singapore Elections in 2025:
People’s Action Party (PAP) Wins, Again
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
Tough Tariff Negotiations with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1666

Padmashree Anandhan

The US-Ukraine
The mineral deal with the US
May 2025 | CWA # 1665
Conflict Weekly # 280-81
India-Pakistan De-escalation I Ukraine Discussion in Istanbul I The Battle over Port Sudan I Disbanding of PKK in Turkiye I France-Algeria Diplomatic Tensions
May 2025 | CWA # 1663

R Preetha

Canada Elections 2025:
What do the results convey? What next for Mark Carney?
October 2024 | CWA # 1480

IPRI Team

July 2024 | CWA # 1413

Ramya B

May 2024 | CWA # 1336

Femy Francis

April 2024 | CWA # 1275

Ramya B

March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
March 2024 | CWA # 1246

Sivasubramanian K

February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
November 2023 | CWA # 1148

GP Team

October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
October 2023 | CWA # 1087

PR Team

October 2023 | CWA # 1083

GP Team

August 2023 | CWA # 1049

IPRI Team

July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
July 2023 | CWA # 1009

GP Team

December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
December 2022 | CWA # 872

Sapna Elsa Abraham

November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2020 | CWA # 337

Anju Annie Mammen

February 2020 | CWA # 235

Lakshmi V Menon

September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer

Afghanistan
July 2018 | CWA # 47

Rahul Arockiaraj

June 2018 | CWA # 26

Siddhatti Mehta