In the news
On 02 October, Reuters reported that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated that Iran had proposed engaging Yemen’s Houthis through political channels following the group’s attacks. Dar noted that both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi sought to bring the matter to a conclusion.
On 03 October, Reuters and other major outlets reported that the Houthis had targeted an Aramco facility in Riyadh using ballistic missiles and drones.
On 05 October, Al Jazeera and other sources reported that the Saudi-backed Yemeni government had claimed a rapid military advance under Operation Dawn of Yemen, aimed at dislodging the Iran-backed Houthis from much of the territory they had seized.
Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced the launch of military operations to recapture the remaining territories held by the Houthis and restore “the authority of the state and its institutions over the entire national territory”.
On 07 October, the Houthis retaliated with ballistic missile and explosive-laden drone strikes on the Yemeni city of Aden. The group subsequently claimed responsibility for attacks targeting two civilian airports and the Royal Saudi Air Force’s King Khalid Air Base.
Issues at large
1. Revival of Yemen’s dormant civil war
Yemen’s civil war traces its roots to the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, which forced long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh from power. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia movement from the northern Saada governorate that had already fought several rounds of conflict against the central government capitalised on this weakness. In 2014 they advanced from their heartland, and seized control of the capital Sanaa. Saudi Arabia entered the conflict in March 2015 at the head of a coalition, launching Operation Decisive Storm. Riyadh viewed the Houthis as an Iran-aligned threat on its southern border and a challenge to its regional influence.
The kingdom has remained both a key backer of the internationally recognised government and a primary target for Houthi attacks. The 2022 UN-brokered truce largely froze the fighting for several years. That calm ended in September when the Houthis seized control of the Bad el-Maneb strait in connection with the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, snipping Saudi Arabia’s access to its major shipping artery. The escalation plunged Yemen back into an all-out war.
2. Yemen’s renewed posture
The latest offensive from the Yemeni government and the deceive victory had long remained an impossibility. The significant support from Saudi Arabia supplied the decisive military edge to Sanaa. The operation has reportedly destroyed Houthi positions, supply lines and high-value targets, securing key territory and pushing them to the highlands. Further, the operation marked the first time in years that Yemen’s government has been successful in consolidating the operational coordination among the multiple anti-Houthi factions in the country after years of internal rivalry. The main forces involved include the Southern Giants Brigades, southern tribal and Salafi fighters; Nation’s Shield Forces, formed under Saudi auspices around and placed under the direct authority of Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alimi; and the Popular Resistance / Tihama Resistance and National Resistance elements comprised of local tribal and residual Republican Guard units operating on the western coast and around Taiz. This level of coordination signals significant momentum for a government that has long been fragmented, under-resourced and consistently outshown by the more cohesive Houthi military structure.
3. The strategic geography of the conflict
With the revival of full-scale war, the government’s stated objectives have expanded well beyond temporarily securing the strait and restoring commercial traffic. The territories now being fought over carry outsized importance, with the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the adjacent coastline of Mocha, Dhubab and the surrounding Tihama plain directly affecting the security of Red Sea shipping and Saudi oil export routes. The highlands and supply roads around Taiz further determine whether the government can maintain links between its southern base in Aden and the rest of the country. Operation Dawn of Yemen itself has been framed as a campaign to reassert control over Houthi strongholds, including the capital Sanaa.
4. The US-Iran restraint and a new challenge
Both the United States and Iran have largely remained outside the latest wave of direct fighting. Washington has declined Saudi requests for offensive military assistance beyond intelligence sharing, while Iran is publicly expressing willingness to mediate between Riyadh and the group. Beyond the initial strategic contest over the Bab al-Mandeb, the conflict in Yemen has taken on a dynamic of its own. What began as a secondary theatre linked to the broader US-Iran confrontation has grown into a self-sustaining war. The Houthis-Saudi confrontation now pose challenges well beyond Iran’s interest, and a resolution to the broader US-Iran conflict no longer guarantees a desescalation in Yemen.
In perspective
Yemen’s latest gains in its campaign against the Houthis mark a significant escalation in the government’s efforts to reclaim territory from the group. However, the advance has been made possible largely through Saudi Arabia’s support, and its sustainability remains uncertain. For the Houthis, the loss of strategic territory represents a significant setback, while their “escalation for escalation” response sustains the risk of a prolonged conflict, particularly as negotiations remain at a nascent stage. Tehran’s assistance also hangs on a balance as deeper involvement in the Houthi conflict risks further straining its already stretched capabilities.
