CWA # 1382
NIAS Global Politics
Why Israel is NOT facing a strategic defeat in Gaza: A Response to Stanly Johny
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Ayan Datta
13 July 2024
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On 2 July 2024, Dr Stanly Johny, International Affairs Editor at The Hindu, published an opinion titled “Israel is facing a strategic defeat in Gaza.”
Dr Johny’s argument is that Israel’s threats have multiplied and intensified since launching its war against Hamas. His assessment is partly accurate, however, overestimates the intensity and long-term implications of the threats. While Israel faced a complex security environment after 7 October, the Jewish State made significant progress in managing those threats. Similarly, Dr Johny overestimates the intensity of the Iran threat and fails to acknowledge Israel’s gains and adaptability. Israel has operated in a multi-threat environment since its inception and is resilient.
The Stanly Johny Argument on Israel’s Strategic Defeat
Dr Johny argues that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza failed to achieve its war aims. He emphasises that Israel’s leadership miscalculated its abilities to destroy Hamas swiftly, underestimated Iran’s response to Israel’s assassinations of its Generals, and damaged Israel’s global standing and long-term interests.
On Israel’s failure to achieve war aims
Dr Johny argues that Israel wanted a quick and decisive victory. According to him, Israel’s war aims include the following: defeating the Al-Qassam brigades and another fight, destroying Hamas’ tunnel networks and killing its top leadership. Did Israel’s leaders promise a swift victory? On 8 October, Prime Minister Netanyahu explicitly stated that it would be a “long and difficult” war. His Minister of Defence, Yoav Gallant, reiterated the government’s position on 28 October, stressing to US President Joe Biden that Israel would need US support because of the anticipated long duration and complexity of the conflict.
Will Israel be able to eliminate Hamas completely? The IDF’s destruction of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure radicalised ordinary Gazans, making them pliable for recruitment by the armed group. According to the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies, the average Hamas company contains around 200 people, making it easy for the armed group to replace lost foot soldiers. However, Israel’s progress towards its war aims, even if incomplete, is significant. After eight months, the IDF has made gains; thus far, it has eliminated Hamas’ third and fourth-highest-ranking leaders, Marwan Issa and Saleh Al-Arouri. It destroyed 20 to 40 per cent of Hamas’ tunnels by January, including 85 per cent in Rafah. Israel has dismantled 20 out of 24 Hamas battalions, which will require substantial time to reconstitute. Importantly, the IDF forced Hamas to launch hit-run tactics, destroying their ability to launch another 7 October-scale attack. Furthermore, rocket fire from Gaza has decreased drastically. For Israel, it is not a complete loss and certainly not a strategic defeat in fighting the Hamas.
On the Iran nuclear threat
On Tehran, has Israel “miscalculated Iran’s response” and “weakened” Israel’s deterrence ? The assassinations of Iranian generals, including Mohammed Reza Zahedi of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)? has led to Iran’s drone and missile “barrage” against the Jewish State on 14 April.
Israel did underestimate Iran’s response to the Damascus strike. A report by the New York Times revealed that senior IDF staff estimated that Iran would only respond with small-scale attacks. However, Iran’s attack on Israel was not a demonstration of its defensive capabilities nor an attempt at establishing deterrence against Israel. Iran’s barrage included 170 Shahed drones, which are slow-moving (maximum speed: 115 miles per hour) and, therefore, vulnerable to air defences. The attack took nine hours to unfold, giving the IDF ample time to prepare. Iran did not use its more powerful weapons, including the Sejil and Kheiber drones. The attack was more likely designed by Iran to placate its domestic audience, including the rest of the IRGC leadership, following the death of the generals, and to collect intelligence on how Israel’s air defence capabilities behave during multi-front conflicts. An Israeli rocket launched by Israel after Iran’s barrage landed near the latter’s Natanz nuclear site, with no counter-response from Iran.
Has Iran’s attack successfully deterred Israel from further assassinations? On 4 June, two months after Iran’s supposedly deterrence-inducing attack, an IDF airstrike killed an Iranian military advisor who was an IRGC member in Syria’s Aleppo. Israel also promised to respond to the barrage with a larger attack and fired a missile that landed near Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, questioning Tehran’s effectiveness in deterring Israel.
On the Arab-Israeli normalisation process
Is Israel facing a strategic defeat vis-à-vis normalisation with the Arab states? In 2023, when normalisation talks were at an advanced level, Israel was already occupying Gaza and destroying its infrastructure. In 2022, 65 per cent of Gazans were dependent on food aid from humanitarian groups because of the Israeli blockade of the strip. The same year, the IDF conducted an airstrike campaign in the strip called Operation Breaking Dawn, injuring around 300 civilians in two days. Between the end of the second Intifada in 2005 and 2023 (before 7 October), Israeli forces killed around 6000 Palestinians. None of these actions by the Israelis deterred Saudi Arabia from attempting a normalisation with the Jewish state in 2020 and signing the Abraham Accords. Moreover, during Tehran’s missile and drone attacks, Riyadh reiterated its strategic alignment by sharing intelligence with Washington and Jerusalem.
Saudi Arabia’s past behaviour indicates that its demand for a Palestinian State before normalisation is more about international optics than genuine sympathy for the Palestinian cause. The following are Riyadh’s actual conditions for normalisation: sufficient US pressure on its leadership, a lower intensity of conflict in Gaza so that the conflict fades from the world media headlines, and increased US commitment to contain Iran. Realpolitik and the regional balance of power are the crucial determinants of Saudi foreign policy, not sentimental and ideological attachment to Palestine. If the right geopolitical conditions align, Riyadh would be once again willing to normalise with the Jewish State without changes to the status of Gaza or Palestine.
On Netanyahu’s endgames
Does the Israeli PM lack a clear endgame? Whether he will achieve it or not, he seems to have one for Gaza and Hamas. His plan, as obtained by CNN, included Israeli security control over both Palestinian territories, the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip and closing its border with Egypt, and overhauling Gaza’s educational systems to combat radicalisation. However, we must concede that the plan is controversial and unworkable. Hamas enjoys substantial support among Gazans, and Israeli attempts to exert security and educational control will likely face fierce resistance. Netanyahu proposed a level of control and transformation that would be unachievable in Gaza.
About the Author
Ayan Datta is a Research Intern at NIAS. He is a Master's Student at the University of Hyderabad, Department of Political Science. At NIAS, he covers Middle Eastern affairs and is affiliated with the Africa Monitor, Conflict Weekly and The World This Week programmes. His research interests include security studies and conflicts in the Middle East.