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NIAS Global Politics Team
13 August 2026 |
CW Note
Escalating attacks in Pakistan:
Resurgence in violence and Ineffective counterterrorism strategy
Akshath Kaimal
In the news
On 01 August, Dawn reported that the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICCS) released its monthly report for July. The report recorded 606 fatalities in July, making it the deadliest month of 2026.
On 02 August, Dawn reported that a suicide attack near the Kabal police station in the Swat Valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa killed at least 17 people and injured 30 others during a civilian-organized "Swat Peace Rally”.
On 03 August, Dawn reported that security forces killed 15 militants across several districts in KP as part of the military’s “Operation Azm-e-Istehkam”.
On 10 August, Dawn reported that 140,468 undocumented Afghan nationals had been deported from Punjab since 2023 under the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan. Nationally, the number stood at 2.68 million.
Issues at large
1. The resurgence in violence
Violence in Pakistan hit historic lows between 2018 and 2020, primarily through operations like “Zarb-e-Azb”. But since 2021, with the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, internal violence in Pakistan has risen sharply, from under 1000 deaths in 2022 to 2546 deaths in 2024. In the first seven months of 2026 alone, 2786 deaths were recorded. This clearly signifies a resurgence in violence, primarily driven by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in KP, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), and separatist groups like the BLA and BLF in Balochistan. These groups have increasingly used suicide bombings as a tactic, with a decade-high eight attacks in July 2026, while also employing heavy explosives, targeted assassinations and kidnappings, showcasing not only a resurgence but also increased sophistication in the strategies used.
2. The geographic concentration of violence
This resurgence has been geographically concentrated in primarily two provinces of Pakistan: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. PICSS data for July recorded a 241 per cent increase in deaths in Balochistan and 105 per cent in KP. The terrain and landscape of the region plays a major role: the long, porous Durand Line enables cross-border attacks, KP’s rugged mountains and Balochistan’s vast, arid expanse provides militants with natural cover and tactical depth. The complex geography also hampers military responses, allowing militant groups to launch coordinated attacks, high-casualty strikes, and ambushes.
3. Pakistan’s ineffective counterterrorism strategy
Pakistan mainly relies on kinetic operations to counter militant groups and attacks. While security forces killed 401 terrorists in July, this still remains insufficient for long-term stabilisation, as these actions have failed to dismantle militant networks. At the same time, militants have adapted dynamically, targeting military infrastructure and state intermediaries, evidenced by 19 peace committee members being killed in July. With a 933 per cent spike in security personnel deaths in Balochistan, this shows the government response remains ineffective in stemming the violence primarily because it does not involve reforms to local governance and community engagement.
4. Afghanistan’s role and domestic governance failures
Pakistan has lately been attributing its security crisis to Afghan militant sanctuaries - a claim validated by the UN and Western intelligence reports. Deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have also contributed to the violence, evidenced by the rise in deaths since 2021. Yet, this does not absolve Pakistan of its own policy missteps. While KP struggles with the TTP, Balochistan’s insurgency is driven by internal socioeconomic neglect, political marginalisation, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. Cross-border safe havens worsen the security crisis, but Pakistan’s failure to address domestic governance grievances remains the primary engine.
5. The human cost of violence
Civilians bear the heaviest burden of this resurgence in violence, with 463 civilians killed in the first seven months of 2026 alone, compared to 229 deaths in 2022 as a whole. Beyond casualties, violence has crippled regional economies through exploitation, market disruptions, and border closures. Additionally, strained ties with Afghanistan have pushed the government to place the blame on undocumented Afghan nationals, with over 650,000 deported in 2026 alone. This has increased animosity, not only with Afghanistan, but also within border communities in Tirah Valley, for instance, further fueling discontent and violence.
In perspective
First, unless there is a change in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy, the violence will continue. Without pairing kinetic operations with civilian governance, judicial reform, and local political engagement, the government will remain behind in its counterterrorism response.
Second, dialogue with Kabul is the need of the hour. While Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t see eye to eye on the TTP, dialogue between the two on other core issues could open doors to a joint counterterrorism effort that could stem the violence, at least in KP.
Third, Balochistan’s grievances cannot be solely addressed with military power. The people of Balochistan have faced economic exploitation, political alienation, and enforced disappearances, which have only emboldened groups like the BLA and BLF. Unless the government can effectively address the grievances of the people without using hard power, the violence is likely to continue.
Akshath Kaimal is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader team.
CW Note
The Board of Peace Plan for Gaza:
The challenge of demilitarization and disarmament
Urja Kudalkar
In the news
On 09 August, ABC News reported that Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected President Donald Trump's 15-point Gaza peace plan, stating at a cabinet meeting that the Israeli military "will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is truly disarmed and will continue to thwart threats against our forces and citizens." Hamas responded in a statement that it "affirms its commitment" to the 15-point plan, calling on mediators and guarantors to establish a clear timetable for its implementation.
On 10 August, ABC News further reported that Netanyahu posted online that "as long as I am Prime Minister, a Palestinian state will not arise, not in Gaza and not in the West Bank.”
On 11 August, ABC News reported that a senior Board of Peace official insisted the US-backed peace plan for the territory remained the only way forward, even as Israel continued strikes on Gaza despite the October 2025 ceasefire. Hamas maintained that handing over its heavy weapons was contingent on Israel ending "all forms of aggression" and withdrawing its forces from Gaza.
Issues at large
1. The Board of Peace and its 15-point proposal
The Board’s 15-point roadmap, published on 31 July sets out a roadmap for Hamas's disarmament, Israel's withdrawal and Gaza's governance. Its structure has become an issue, with no independent enforcement power of its own. It exists largely as a document on paper as a set of intentions rather than an operating plan. The plan has not mentioned any verification body to check the process and carries no penalty if either side stalls. Nearly three weeks after publication, the plan remains on a page while the situation on the ground stays volatile.
2. Trump’s unilateral declaration
A key issue is the gap between Trump's words and reality. In late July, Trump called his 15-point plan a "a monumental step toward lasting peace," saying Hamas and all other armed groups had agreed to fully disarm. However, PM Netanyahu said that Israel had "sent their comments" on a draft. Following Israel’s rejection, Hamas also pushed back, saying it would only disarm once Israel halts strike and pulls troops back first. The resistance from Israel reveals that Trump announced a "done deal" without securing an agreement from either side.
3. Disarmament, demilitarization of Hamas and Israeli withdrawal
Hamas's disarmament, Gaza's broader demilitarization, and Israel's withdrawal remain the central obstacle for implementation. Hamas says its weapons could be handed to a new Palestinian authority over 200 to 300 days, running alongside a phased Israeli pull-back. Israel rejects this, with Netanyahu saying the IDF "cannot retreat in the Gaza Strip" until Hamas is fully and genuinely disarmed. Smotrich has gone further, objecting that the published roadmap "is not the plan... nor is it the one we voted on," arguing it fails to guarantee full demilitarization of the strip. Israel says withdrawing while Hamas or Gaza's factions retain any weapons would recreate the same security threat. The deadlock repeats itself as Hamas wants disarmament and withdrawal to run in parallel, while Israel demands complete disarmament and demilitarization to hold its end of the bargain.
5. Political pressure from Israel’s far right
The rejection of the plan is closely linked to domestic Israel’s domestic politics. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu depends on his far-right coalition partners to maintain his government and therefore cannot easily afford to alienate them, particularly ahead of the October 2026 elections. Far-right figures, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have opposed arrangements that could reduce Israeli control over Gaza or allow Hamas to retain military capabilities. Some far-right ministers have also supported expanding Israeli territory and establishing settlements in Gaza, directly conflicting with the plan. Netanyahu’s insistence on complete Hamas disarmament therefore addresses both Israel’s state’s security concerns and the political demands of his coalition.
In perspective
First, the rejection of the 15-point plan raises questions about whether the peace process can move forward. The plan depends on both sides accepting a common process, but Israel and Hamas continue to differ over disarmament and withdrawal. This could keep the agreement in a deadlock.
Second, Netanyahu’s dependence on his far-right coalition partners could shape his position on the Gaza plan. Their opposition to Israeli withdrawal and support for a harder line on Gaza may limit his ability to compromise, especially as elections approach. The issue could therefore become part of Netanyahu’s wider political strategy.
Third, the deadlock over sequencing persists . While Hamas insists on Israeli withdrawal to facilitate disarmament, Netanyahu has made clear that Israel will not withdraw until Hamas is fully disarmed. This difference in sequencing remains a major obstacle to the agreement.
CW Note
Ethiopia:
The war threat in Tigray
Anu Maria Joseph
In the news
On 1 August, Al Jazeera reported that a new wave of fighting broke out in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal forces. The violence comes after the Pretoria Peace Agreement of November 2022 and a four-year lull.
According to Al Jazeera, hundreds of Ethiopians from the northern Tigray region have crossed to Sudan this week, fearing another war.
Al Jazeera quoted the TPLF as saying that the fighting involved heavy artillery and drones between the Ethiopian army and Tigray rebels in the Shererina region, near the Sudanese border. The rebels also blamed the federal government of launching a “large-scale infantry offensive.” There has been no official statement from the federal government.
Issues at large
1. Ethiopia’s continuing Tigray problem
Tigray is one of the 12 federal regions of Ethiopia, divided on ethnic lines. However, demographically Tigrayans constitute only six per cent of the total population. Until 2018, the minority TPLF dominated Ethiopian politics for three decades, which fuelled resentment from other ethnic groups, including Oromia, Amhara, and Afar. In 2018, Abiy Ahmed came to power after a popular protest led by the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups that overthrew the TPLF government. After coming to power, the Abiy administration targeted TPLF members, removed them from key portfolios and arrested them on corruption charges. The tensions between the TPLF and Abiy administration increased with the signing of the Eritrea-Ethiopia 2018 peace agreement, which ceded Tigray territory to Eritrea. In between the tensions with the TPLF, Abiy’s centralised reforms to unify Ethiopia led to widespread discontent from ethnic groups. TPLF accused Abiy’s administration of marginalising the Tigray community. The tensions escalated into a full-scale violent conflict which lasted for two years.??
2. The longstanding War in Tigray
The War began in 2021 when the TPLF attacked the Northern Command headquarters of the federal forces. It was fought between the federal forces, Amhara Special Forces and allied militias on one side, and the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) on the other. Widespread human rights abuses, unlawful killing, torture, sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing were reported during the war. According to the UN, it killed more than 600,000 people and displaced over 5.1 million people internally. The region also faced a famine during the war, affecting 350,000 people. Several mediation efforts by Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, the African Union and IGAD, and international actors such as the US, EU and the UN failed. Later, a peace deal was signed between the warring sides in November 2022, mediated by the US, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria.
3. A peace deal and its challenges
Despite the peace deal, the Tigray region remained fragile. The agreement discussed four major developments: disarmament of TPLF and withdrawal of external forces from Tigray, unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray, the restoration of constitutional order and the protection of fundamental human rights. However, these provisions were never fully implemented. Additionally, post-agreement reforms by Abiy’s administration triggered parallel ethnic violence across other regions. The regional ethnic forces of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia violently resisted Abiy’s attempt to integrate all ethnic armed forces into the federal forces. It led to multiple instances of violent conflicts across different ethnic regions between 2022 and 2025. Four years after the peace deal, the promised elections were never conducted in Tigray, and the interim administration was never dissolved, which was later forcefully replaced by the TPLF. Eritrean forces allegedly continue to occupy northern regions of Tigray and exacerbate tensions. The HRW in June 2024 reported ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans after the peace agreement. Only half of the 2.1 million IDPs have returned after the war. According to a WFP report in January this year, 80 per cent of the Tigray population requires humanitarian support. Four years after the peace deal, the federal administration restricts Tigray from access to humanitarian aid, health care, internet and communications.
4. Recent tensions and preparation for another war
TPLF hardliners, instead of signing the 2022 peace deal, had always wanted to continue after a short ceasefire to regroup. The extremist elements in Fano groups of Amhara, which supported the federal forces in the war, also wanted to continue the war. Later, the Fano militia of Amhara became an adversary to the government when the latter ceded the disputed territories to Tigray under the peace agreement. TPLF began the preparations for another war early this year. The war became imminent when it forcefully dismantled the regional interim administration and set up its own illegal administration. The TPLF hardliners have allegedly aligned with Eritrea while the other Tigray faction is siding with the federal administration. According to Human Rights Watch’s report on 9 July, the TPLF has been forcefully recruiting civilians and preparing for another war. The tensions escalated during the recent general election, in which Tigray was excluded, which the federal government referred to as “unfavourable conditions.”
In perspective
First, the peace deal never ended the conflict. The November 2022 peace deal was a major achievement towards peace in Tigray. However, slow and incomplete implementation of the provisions has led the region to the brink of another war. The TPLF hardliners’ disagreement with the federal government and internal divisions have led to a remilitarisation in the region. The group aims for an absolute territorial claim over the region. The developments imply the war is imminent.?
Second, the recent developments have been shaping another war. The TPLF has been preparing for the war. The developments during the past six months, including TPLF’s forced recruitment, weapons proliferation, and restoration of the pre-war council in April, were ignored by regional and international actors, especially the assigned monitors and observers of the peace agreement. The ignorance and inaction have brought Ethiopia to the brink of another war.
Third, the near future increasingly points to another full-scale war. The peace deal has been compromised, implementation and monitoring mechanisms have failed, TPLF is adamant about starting another war, and the federal government’s response to the recent wave of violence implies another full-scale war in Tigray immediately. A renewed war, involving several internal and external actors, will be catastrophic, prolonged and deadly. It will also have overarching implications for the region already ravaged by another civil war in the neighbouring Sudan.
CW Note
The War in Ukraine:
Continuing deep strikes, escalating civilian targeting, and expanding drone warfare
Lekshmi MK
In the news
On 03 August, The Moscow Time reported on Ukraine launching a large-scale drone attack on Russia and occupied Crimea, targeting logistics facilities, including Wildberries warehouses in the Vladimir and Samara regions. Russian officials reported 11 casualties following Ukrainian drone strikes in occupied Crimea and southern Russia.
On 04 August, Reuters reported that Russia launched one of its largest missile and drone attacks on the Kyiv region, killing 14 people and damaging warehouses and critical infrastructure. Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russian military logistics and accused Russia of committing a war crime after footage showed a Russian drone attacking a civilian vendor in Kherson.
On 05 August, The Guardian reported on Russia launching a major missile and drone barrage on Kyiv, killing 17 people and damaging civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian drones struck a major Wildberries logistics hub in the Tula region, which Kyiv said was part of Russia’s military logistics network.
Issues at large
1. Ukraine’s expanding deep-strike campaign against Russia
Ukraine has intensified its long-range drone and missile strikes against targets deep inside Russia, including military airfields, logistics hubs, fuel depots and the warehouse, which Kyiv claims supports Russia’s military supply chain. While Ukraine has conducted deep strikes since 2023, recent attacks indicate a sustained expansion of this strategy. In June 2025, Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web targeted multiple Russian strategic airbases hundreds of kilometres from the frontline, damaging long-range bomber aircraft. In August 2026, Ukrainian drones struck Wildberries logistics facilities and military-linked infrastructure in several Russian regions and occupied Crimea. These attacks reflect a shift in Ukraine’s military strategy from primarily defending the frontlines to disrupting Russia’s ability to sustain the war. By targeting logistics and industrial infrastructure, Ukraine seeks to weaken Russia’s operational capacity, increase the costs of the war. It also tries to force Moscow to redeploy air defence systems to protect critical infrastructure inside its territory.
2. Crimea as Ukraine’s primary strategic target
Crimea has remained a central objective of Ukraine since Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014 and has been consistently targeted since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. However, the frequency of Ukrainian strikes has increased as Kyiv has acquired longer-range drones and missiles. Crimea holds immense strategic value for Russia. Militarily, it hosts the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, major naval facilities at Sevastopol, key airbases such as Belbek and Saky, and logistics hubs supporting Russian operations in southern Ukraine. Strategically, the peninsula provides Russia with military dominance in the Black Sea and serves as a vital corridor connecting southern Russia with occupied territories in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Politically, Crimea is a symbol of Russia’s 2014 annexation and remains central to President Putin’s narrative of restoring Russian territory.
Ukraine carried out multiple drone and missile strikes on occupied Crimea, targeting military infrastructure and logistics facilities. These attacks are intended to degrade Russia’s military capabilities, complicate logistics and reduce the peninsula’s role as a secure operational base. The strikes also reinforce Kyiv’s position that Crimea remains an integral part of Ukraine despite its annexation.
3. Escalation of attacks on military and civilian targets
Recent attacks by both Russia and Ukraine have increasingly involved targets beyond the immediate battlefield. While Russia continues missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, Ukraine has targeted facilities such as the Wildberries warehouse, arguing that they contribute to Russia’s military logistics. However, Russia describes such facilities as civilian infrastructure. Between 03 and 05 August, Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities killed 17 civilians and injured dozens more, while damaging residential buildings, warehouses and critical infrastructure. During the same period, Ukraine struck Wildberries logistics centres and other facilities that it identified as supporting Russia’s war effort. This growing overlap between civilian and military functions raises competing claims over what constitutes a legitimate military target.
What does it mean?
First, Ukraine is shifting the war beyond the frontlines. Ukraine’s expanding deep-strike campaign signals a shift from defending frontline positions to targeting Russia’s military and logistical infrastructure deep inside its territory. By attacking these facilities, Kyiv aims to weaken Russia’s ability to sustain military operations while increasing the costs of the war.
Second, Crimea is likely to remain one of the principal theatres of long-range warfare. The peninsula’s strategic location, military infrastructure and political significance make it central to both sides’ objectives. As Ukraine expands its long-range strike capabilities, attacks on Crimea are likely to remain a recurring feature of the war.
Third, drones and missiles are redefining the character of the war. Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to strike deep inside Russia. Meanwhile, Russia continues to employ large-scale missile and drone attacks against Ukraine. As both sides continue to improve their long-range strike capabilities, drones and missiles are likely to shape military strategy.
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