CWA # 2246
Global Politics Explainer
What is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement?
Background, Contemporary Context, Endgames and Implications
The agreement may serve as a hedge against continued reliance on Washington, particularly amid a prolonged regional conflict that has exposed weaknesses in the existing security architecture.
|
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
17 August 2026
|
On 07 August, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, and Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif signed a joint defence agreement at the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit, called the “Mecca (Makkah) Joint Defence Agreement.”
What is the agreement all about?
In a joint statement, the three countries stated that the agreement was for collective deterrence, stipulating that “an armed attack against any of the three would be regarded as an attack on all.”
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry later stated that under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms are planned to be established, joint production and development, prioritising unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence capabilities. Additionally, reports indicate that the agreement could facilitate joint exercises, training, intelligence training and technology transfer.
The exact details of the agreement, however, remain undisclosed.
What is the background?
The Pact builds on longstanding bilateral defence partnerships between the three countries. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s defence cooperation dates back to the 1960s, formalised under the landmark 1982 Protocol, and marked by the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement. Islamabad has deployed military forces in Riyadh since the 1970s; it helped defend Saudi territory during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and provides a rotation of forces for training and advisory. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is one of the largest sources of petroleum for Pakistan, and supplies extensive financial aid, with USD eight billion announced in April and July 2026.
Pakistan has had a strong relationship with Turkiye as well, with Ankara being the third-largest arms supplier to Islamabad between 2020 and 2024. Additionally, both countries have extensive defence production, defence import and export, and technology-sharing initiatives.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have their own growing defence partnership, where they have exchanged naval vessels and training aircraft over the years. Most recently, this cooperation is marked by the 2023 drone export deal where Saudi Arabia purchased Bayraktar Ak?nc? unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which Ankara called one of Turkey's largest single defence export contracts. Lastly, the three countries also began a trilateral defence track in 2023, discussing defence-industrial cooperation ahead of the 2026 agreement.
What is the contemporary context?
The agreement was signed amid the prolonged US-Iran war, where the Gulf countries were repeatedly struck by Iran in retaliation for US strikes. Saudi Arabia has specifically been struck by Iran’s missiles and drones aimed at American assets in the country, as well as Houthi attacks in early July threatening oil exports, its Vision 2030 Agenda, and reinforcing the importance of strengthening Saudi Arabia’s existing defence capabilities.
Turkey and Pakistan, while less exposed to strikes, have shared concern over possible spillover and instability. Additionally, Islamabad has been playing an active role in the peace negotiations in the region, and Ankara has displayed a readiness to mediate peace, while preserving its security cooperation with NATO and maintaining open working channels with Iran.
On the other hand, the conflict has also triggered emergency OIC meetings that have called for coordinated diplomatic action, de-escalation, and collective mechanisms to address threats to regional security. Moreover, analysts note that with Arab-Israeli normalisation highly likely, the conflict exposed the limits of relying on the US security umbrella alone, prompting Gulf states to diversify their security partnerships.
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey: Who wants what
Saudi Arabia spent about USD 83.2 billion on defence in 2025, ranking eighth globally, with roughly 80 per cent of arms sourced from the US. Vision 2030 seeks to localise 50 per cent of procurement by 2030, with efforts to reduce dependence and diversify suppliers. Pakistan is the world’s fifth-largest defence importer, with 80 per cent of imports coming from China, all while Islamabad seeks defence and energy ties leveraging its position, as a part of both South Asia and the Middle East, to secure durable defence, financial, and energy partnerships in the Gulf. Türkiye spent USD 30 billion on defence in 2025 and exported over USD 10 billion in defence and aerospace products, including USD 2 billion in drones. Additionally, as NATO’s second-largest army, Ankara seems to seek to expand Western markets while deepening its Middle East influence.
What next?
First, it represents a significant deepening of the existing relationship among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, with each party possibly gaining distinct diplomatic, military and strategic advantages, while strengthening their national defence interests. However, due to the lack of the text of the agreement, what the on-ground, specific implications are remains unclear.
Second, the agreement may serve as a hedge against continued reliance on Washington, particularly amid a prolonged regional conflict that has exposed weaknesses in the existing security architecture and according to experts, has raised questions about the reliability of the US security umbrella.
About the author
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate student from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.
