CWA # 2250
Conflict Weekly
Catastrophic Floods in Nepal
Japan's Yasukuni Shrine Controversy
Conflict Weekly #345-346, Vol 7, Nos. 32-33, 28 August 2026
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NIAS Global Politics Team
30 August 2026
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CW Note
Catastrophic Floods in Nepal:
Remote Terrains, Limited Early Warnings and Command Challenges
Sreemaya Nair
In the news
On 26 August, The Kathmandu Post reported that the Rasuwa District Administration Office received reports of a surge in the Bhotekoshi River that could increase the risk of downstream flooding towards the Trishuli River. A flash flood swept through the Timure and Syabrubesi areas of Rasuwa. The flood's origin is situated in a high-vulnerability zone for Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs).
The disaster was triggered by a massive rock-and-ice avalanche following a glacial collapse on the Langtang Lirung peak, a subrange of the Nepalese Himalayas. As there were no rains before and during the floods, a glacial lake burst was suspected. According to available news reports, the primary trigger was glacial collapse and debris flow, potentially involving water and ice released during the collapse.
On 28 August, The Kathmandu Post reported that the confirmed death toll from the flood reached 538, with 977 still missing. The Nepali Army notified the Rasuwa Chief District Officer that the newly formed barrier lake near the Chhochen Khola-Purepu Tsangpo confluence had breached. The US Geological Survey confirmed that there was no earthquake, and the 4.4-magnitude signal was a result of a glacier collapse that led to the Bhotekoshi flood.
Issues at large
1. Remote regions and limited early warning systems in the Himalayas
The initial collapse occurred in an extremely remote region near the Nepal–China border, while the resulting debris flow travelled nearly 100 kilometres downstream along the Bhotekoshi and Trishuli river systems. The region’s steep terrain, limited road connectivity and destruction of access routes severely complicated rescue operations. Although Nepal had routine flash-flood warnings in place, there was no specific warning predicting the sudden glacial collapse and resulting flood wave; the flood arrived within minutes, highlighting the limitations of existing transboundary early-warning systems.
2. Destruction of critical infrastructure and resulting isolation
Critical infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and hydropower installations, has been destroyed along the path of the flood. Transport infrastructure damage has isolated several communities and severely restricted access for rescue operations, humanitarian aid and relief supplies. The US Geological Survey estimates that the flood travelled nearly 100 kilometres, affecting populated areas downstream and damaging infrastructure on both sides of the Nepal–China border. The damaged area is strategically important for Nepal–China connectivity, including the route towards the Gyirong border area in Tibet.
3. Secondary environmental hazards and expanding disaster zones
The collapse and subsequent deposition of enormous quantities of ice, rock, and sediment created a natural barrier lake near the confluence of the Chhochen Khola and Purepu Tsangpo rivers. The lake initially held an estimated 1.5–2 million cubic metres of water, with an additional three million cubic metres of water estimated to enter, creating the possibility of another destructive downstream surge. On 28 August, the barrier lake breached, just a few days before China’s estimated timeline, prompting temporary disruption of rescue operations as authorities assessed the risk of another flood wave entering the Bhotekoshi system. As the glacial collapse triggered an avalanche, debris flow, river blockage, temporary lake formation, and a subsequent flood, the threat is therefore not confined to the original disaster zone but extends hundreds of kilometres downstream, including communities and infrastructure that had already been damaged.
4. Emergency management and command changes
Helicopter operations were initially severely constrained by the terrain, damaged helipads, high floodwaters and poor accessibility which led to the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) at Tribhuvan International Airport to go through a rapid succession of leadership changes, shifting from a Home Ministry deputy secretary on the morning of 26 August, to a joint-secretary in the evening, to an Army colonel on 27 August, and finally being placed under Law Minister Sobita Gautam on the morning of 28 August to streamline flight management, while the destruction of roads and bridges prevented rapid deployment of ground rescue teams. The disaster highlights a transboundary monitoring gap between Nepal and Tibet.
5. Vulnerability and climate risks in the Himalayan region
The Himalayan region is highly sensitive to glacial collapses, ice-rock avalanches, and Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs), especially because of its cascading nature, where one disaster is almost always accompanied by another. Scientists have warned that rising temperatures are accelerating glacier melt and destabilising ice, rock and permafrost at high elevations. Nepal, Tibet and the wider Hindu Kush Himalayan region are estimated to possess 25,614 glacial lakes, out of which 47 are deemed potential outburst risks. The current disaster is particularly significant because the same Bhotekoshi River experienced another major flood in July 2025, when a rapidly shrinking supraglacial lake in the upper Purepu Tsangpo contributed to a destructive flood. The recurrence within just over a year showcases that this is not an isolated natural disaster but part of a broader pattern of cascading cryosphere hazards.
Sreemaya Nair is currently pursuing her postgraduate degree from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai, and is part of the Neighbourhood Reader team at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS).
CW Explainer
Japan's Yasukuni Shrine Controversy:
Why do Japanese leaders continue to visit the shrine? Why do Japan's neighbours object?
Namrata L Ghanghatkar
On 15 August 2026, marking the 81st anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine in central Tokyo, while Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi sent a ritual offering.
In response, China’s foreign ministry condemned the visits, while South Korea’s ministry expressed deep regret and urged Japan to demonstrate humble reflection and sincere remorse for the past. This pattern has repeated annually since 1985 with the shrine remaining as a diplomatic flashpoint, where Japanese officials continue visiting despite consistent regional protest.
What is the history of the Yasukuni Shrine?
The Yasukuni Shrine was built on the Kudan Hill in Tokyo in 1869 under Emperor Meiji to consolidate state loyalty. It progressively listed combatants from multiple conflicts through World War II, amassing approximately 2.5 million enshrined souls by 1945, including ethnic Koreans and Taiwanese conscripted into the imperial military. Following Japan's 1945 surrender, the US occupation forces severed state sponsorship in December 1945, transforming it into a private religious organisation. This transition proved structurally critical; as a private institution, the shrine retained complete autonomy over enshrinement decisions, placing them beyond government reach. In 1978, under head priest Nagayoshi Matsudaira, the shrine enshrined 14 Class A war criminals, including Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. These individuals had been convicted of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established by the Allied powers to prosecute major war criminals following World War II. The enshrinement reversed decades of policy under former head priest Fujimaro Tsukuba, who had refused to enshrine war criminals on religious grounds. In Shinto theology, enshrinement confers spiritual absolution of all earthly conduct. The adjacent Yushukan Museum reinforced this ideological stance by presenting Japan's military expansion as defensive action against Western imperialism, whilst omitting reference to the Nanjing massacre, where historians estimate between 15 and 20 million Chinese died between 1937 and 1945.
Why do China and South Korea oppose the shrine?
China and South Korea regard Yasukuni Shrine as a statement of Japan's refusal to reckon with its wartime aggression. For Beijing and Seoul, the shrine functions as a monument to unresolved war crimes, and official visits signal insufficient remorse. Korea's colonial experience under Japanese imperial rule from 1910 to 1945 included forced labour, sexual enslavement and cultural suppression. China's experience included the Nanjing massacre and systematic atrocities across occupied territories. The shrine's enshrinement of those responsible for these crimes, combined with its revisionist framing in the Yushukan Museum, is interpreted as refusal to acknowledge responsibility. The protests began in 1985 when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone first visited in official capacity, triggering Chinese objections that have continued for over four decades. In May 2005, China's Vice Premier Wu Yi cut short her visit to Japan in direct retaliation for Prime Minister Koizumi's assertion that foreign countries should not interfere in the Yasukuni issue. South Korea has repeatedly urged Japan to demonstrate concrete historical reckoning through actions, not merely verbal expressions of regret.
Why do Japanese officials continue visiting the Yasukuni Shrine despite backlash?
Visits signal loyalty to Japan's nationalist constituencies within the Liberal Democratic Party, providing domestic political benefit that outweighs annual protests from China and South Korea. Ministers frame such visits as personal religious expression rather than official function, satisfying constitutional requirements whilst enabling political symbolism. Defence ministers have particular incentive, as these visits demonstrate respect for military service and appeal to defence minded constituencies. Breaking this pattern invites political criticism from the right.
What is the government's position?
The shrine's private status secures institutional autonomy that enables its continued political function. The priesthood retains absolute authority over enshrinement, which Shinto law designates as permanent and irreversible. The Japanese government delivers war dead names but cannot compel or reverse enshrinement decisions, owing to constitutional separation of religion and state. This legal constraint means no mechanism exists to de-enshrine the 14 Class A war criminals, regardless of international pressure or domestic reconsideration.
What does it mean for Japan, China and South Korea?
Japan's structural inability to de-enshrine war criminals, combined with continued visits from political leaders, signals to both nations that Japan prioritises nationalist symbolism over regional reconciliation. For China and South Korea, the shrine remains a symbol of Japan's unwillingness to face its past wartime conduct. Without either a change in Japan's domestic political calculus or a mechanism to alter the shrine's status, the pattern of annual visits and annual protests will likely persist, sustaining a recurring diplomatic tension between Japan and its two closest neighbours.
Namrata L Ghanghatkar is a postgraduate student at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences, Bengaluru. She is currently a research intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS).
Newsmakers
General Ratko Mladic I Kidnapping in Nigeria I Wildfires in North Africa
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar
General Ratko Mladic
The “Butcher of Bosnia” dies in UN custody
On 27 August 2026, Reuters and other news outlets reported that former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic, who was convicted of genocide and other war crimes, died at the age of 83 in a UN detention facility in The Hague. Mladic was convicted in 2017 and sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war committed during the 1992–95 Bosnian War. His conviction was mainly linked to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, in which more than 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys were killed. He was also held responsible for the siege of Sarajevo, where thousands of civilians died. Mladićs arrested in Serbia in 2011 after years of evading capture. He remained in UN custody after his conviction and had repeatedly sought release on health grounds. His death drew different reactions from the survivors of genocide, who stressed the need to remember the atrocities, while some Serbian nationalists praised Mladić. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed support for the victims and rejected the denial or glorification of the genocide.
Kidnapping in Nigeria:
Ransom payments triple to NGN7.78 billion as abductions surge across the country
On 26 August, Africanews and other major outlets reported that kidnappers collected nearly NGN 7.78 billion (USD 5.8 million) in ransom payments between July 2025 and June 2026, according to a report by Lagos-based consultancy SBM Intelligence. The report found 7,825 people were kidnapped during the period, a 66 per cent increase from the previous year, with at least 1,142 people killed. While total ransom demanded fell from NGN 48 billion to NGN 22.9 billion, the collection rate rose sharply from 5.35 to 34 per cent, driven largely by two mass abductions. A faction of Boko Haram, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), collected around NGN 07 billion from just eight incidents, including the abduction of over 400 people from Ngoshe, Borno State and roughly 300 pupils and staff from a school in Papiri, Niger State. The north accounted for 93.7 per cent of all victims, with Zamfara State the worst affected, while mass abductions accounted for around four in five victims nationwide.
SBM warned that ransom payment did not guarantee survival, noting at least six people were killed after payments were made, and said kidnapping networks were increasingly demanding goods and fuel rather than cash. The findings were released as President Bola Tinubu ordered security forces to rescue up to 600 civilians abducted in Niger State the previous week, an attack presidential candidate Peter Obi called a "serious national emergency." SBM said tackling the crisis required disrupting the financial flows sustaining insurgency while addressing the economic desperation driving recruitment into criminal groups, warning that without a coordinated strategy, kidnapping risked becoming entrenched as a funding mechanism for groups threatening the country's stability.
Wildfires in North Africa:
National mourning declared in Algeria as wildfires kill 12, injure 54
On 26 and 27 August, BBC and other major sources reported that wildfires killed 12 people and injured 54 across northeastern Algeria, as a severe heatwave gripped North Africa. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune declared three days of national mourning. Interior Minister Said Sayoud said five deaths occurred in Jijel province, four in Bejaia, and three in Tizi Ouzou, with six of the injured in intensive care. Sayoud travelled to Bejaia with Health Minister Mohamed Seddik Ait Messaoudene to assess firefighting and evacuation efforts, as homes across Bejaia and Jijel were evacuated. Footage from local broadcaster Jijel News showed residents sheltering in a post office amid thick smoke. Civil protection recorded 154 fires nationwide on Wednesday alone, 69 of which remained active that evening. Similar fires killed 30 people in Bejaia three years ago, while July saw at least six deaths across more than 2,000 fires nationwide. The World Meteorological Organization said North Africa has warmed faster than any other African subregion since 1991, at 0.43 degrees Celsius per decade, a trend a recent study also linked to rising camel deaths during summer heatwaves.
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar are postgraduate students at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences. They are currently Research interns at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)