CWA # 2290
Conflict Weekly
Students Protest in France
The Houthi-Saudi Arabia Escalation & Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Moscow Format Consultation
Conflict Weekly #352, Vol 7, Nos. 39, 09 October 2026
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NIAS Global Politics Team
9 October 2026
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Students Protest in France:
Underfunded schools, Marginalised suburbs and an Increasing fiscal squeeze
Preetha Renganarayanan
In the news
On 03 October, Reuters reported that tens of thousands of students and supporters protested across France, continuing demonstrations that began on 21 September over dilapidated schools, overcrowding and teacher shortages.
On 06 October, Reuters reported that the protests spread nationwide, marking the largest mobilisation since the demonstrations began. Police used tear gas and water cannons in several cities; President Macron convened an emergency meeting. The Interior Ministry estimated that more than 250,000 people participated in the protests, while organisers put the figure at 450,000, reported France 24.
On the same day, PM Lecornu told lawmakers that 215 teenagers and 85 school staff had been injured, calling it “the heaviest toll in decades” for the school system, reported Reuters. Further, France’s Interior Ministry said 6,100 people had been arrested since the protests began, with most of them being minors.
Issues at large
1. A deepening crisis of underfunding, overcrowding and dilapidation of schools
The protests are rooted in growing concerns over deteriorating conditions in France’s lycées, where students generally spend their final three years of secondary education. Students have raised concerns over overcrowded classrooms, teacher shortages, ageing school buildings and demanding schedules. Successive heatwaves in June also exposed the poor condition of school infrastructure, with inadequate insulation and a lack of air conditioning making classrooms difficult to use. Despite France ranking around the OECD average in education spending, expenditure per secondary student has stood largely stagnant at EUR 11,660 in 2024 compared to EUR 11,910 in 2010, as per Education Ministry data. Though the nationwide high school protest movement on this scale in the 1990s secured increased funding, spending per student later stagnated despite growing demands on schools.
2. The education divide in France’s marginalised suburbs
The protests started in the deprived suburbs of Paris before spreading to the other cities. The situation in Seine-Saint-Denis, one of France’s poorest departments, shows how educational problems are disproportionately concentrated in poorer urban areas. According to an elected parent representative, classes in mathematics, humanities, English and sport at a school in Aubervilliers, a suburb north of Paris, had been cancelled since the start of the academic year due to teacher shortages. A CGT union survey found that two-thirds of schools in Seine-Saint-Denis had unfilled teacher positions. The concentration of these problems in deprived suburbs has therefore brought wider concerns over unequal access to public education and the marginalisation of poorer urban communities into focus.
3. The wider divide between the urban core and the periphery
The suburban frustration reflects deeper socioeconomic inequalities in France. In 2023, the median annual standard of living in Seine-Saint-Denis was EUR 21,250, compared to EUR 33,650 in Paris and EUR 25,840 nationally, according to the national statistics bureau of France. The department’s poverty rate stood at 29.5 per cent, almost twice the national rate of 16.2 per cent. In 2021, within Greater Paris, poverty ranged from below 7 per cent in affluent areas like Garches to over 40 per cent in areas like Aubervilliers in Seine-Saint-Denis. The protests therefore reflect not only grievances over schools, but also the wider socioeconomic disparities between France’s urban core and its periphery.
4. Growing fiscal squeeze with budget cuts and rising public debt
The protests are escalating in the backdrop of a wider fiscal squeeze that is limiting the government’s room for public spending. The government’s 2027 budget includes EUR 54 billion in cuts and savings which led to a nationwide public-sector strike on 29 September. It has also proposed freezing state employees’ base salaries in 2027 making it the fourth such annual freeze. Unions argue that repeated freezes have reduced their purchasing power. In addition, rising borrowing costs are adding pressure with the yield on France’s 10-year government bonds recently exceeding 5 per cent, its highest level in 24 years. This cumulation of high public debt, weak growth and higher borrowing costs have constrained the government’s fiscal space. The student protests therefore come at a time when the government faces competing demands to reduce expenditure while addressing gaps in public services.
In perspective
First, there is a two-layered deficit: stagnant funding and the urban-periphery divide. Short term measures such as replacing absent teachers and school repairs might quell the immediate frustration, but the stagnation in per-student education spending points to a deeper resource deficit that requires sustained investment. This challenge is also unevenly distributed among poorer suburbs. Thus, measures that do not address both the funding gap and its unequal geographical impact, may leave the underlying social disparity in public-service provision unresolved.
Second, France’s fiscal situation limits what the government can offer. Given the high borrowing costs and a major savings push, a significant increase in education spending may prove difficult. Therefore, the government’s ability to balance these parallel pressures will determine whether the public frustration will subside or develop into a wider challenge on public-services.
Third, the 2026 student protests could become a political test for the government. The demonstrations are unfolding at a politically sensitive moment with President Macron in the final phase of his presidency and unable to seek a third consecutive term in the 2027 presidential election. With limited political and fiscal room to respond, the government’s handling of the protests could serve as a test of its ability to respond to growing public grievances.
Preetha Renganarayanan is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
The Houthi-Saudi Arabia Escalation:
A Revived civil war, Yemen's renewed posture, and Tipping regional power balances
Brighty Ann Sarah
In the news
On 02 October, Reuters reported that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated that Iran had proposed engaging Yemen’s Houthis through political channels following the group’s attacks. Dar noted that both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi sought to bring the matter to a conclusion.
On 03 October, Reuters and other major outlets reported that the Houthis had targeted an Aramco facility in Riyadh using ballistic missiles and drones.
On 05 October, Al Jazeera and other sources reported that the Saudi-backed Yemeni government had claimed a rapid military advance under Operation Dawn of Yemen, aimed at dislodging the Iran-backed Houthis from much of the territory they had seized.
Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced the launch of military operations to recapture the remaining territories held by the Houthis and restore “the authority of the state and its institutions over the entire national territory”.
On 07 October, the Houthis retaliated with ballistic missile and explosive-laden drone strikes on the Yemeni city of Aden. The group subsequently claimed responsibility for attacks targeting two civilian airports and the Royal Saudi Air Force’s King Khalid Air Base.
Issues at large
1. Revival of Yemen’s dormant civil war
Yemen’s civil war traces its roots to the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, which forced long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh from power. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia movement from the northern Saada governorate that had already fought several rounds of conflict against the central government capitalised on this weakness. In 2014 they advanced from their heartland, and seized control of the capital Sanaa. Saudi Arabia entered the conflict in March 2015 at the head of a coalition, launching Operation Decisive Storm. Riyadh viewed the Houthis as an Iran-aligned threat on its southern border and a challenge to its regional influence.
The kingdom has remained both a key backer of the internationally recognised government and a primary target for Houthi attacks. The 2022 UN-brokered truce largely froze the fighting for several years. That calm ended in September when the Houthis seized control of the Bad el-Maneb strait in connection with the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, snipping Saudi Arabia’s access to its major shipping artery. The escalation plunged Yemen back into an all-out war.
2. Yemen’s renewed posture
The latest offensive from the Yemeni government and the deceive victory had long remained an impossibility. The significant support from Saudi Arabia supplied the decisive military edge to Sanaa. The operation has reportedly destroyed Houthi positions, supply lines and high-value targets, securing key territory and pushing them to the highlands. Further, the operation marked the first time in years that Yemen’s government has been successful in consolidating the operational coordination among the multiple anti-Houthi factions in the country after years of internal rivalry. The main forces involved include the Southern Giants Brigades, southern tribal and Salafi fighters; Nation’s Shield Forces, formed under Saudi auspices around and placed under the direct authority of Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alimi; and the Popular Resistance / Tihama Resistance and National Resistance elements comprised of local tribal and residual Republican Guard units operating on the western coast and around Taiz. This level of coordination signals significant momentum for a government that has long been fragmented, under-resourced and consistently outshown by the more cohesive Houthi military structure.
3. The strategic geography of the conflict
With the revival of full-scale war, the government’s stated objectives have expanded well beyond temporarily securing the strait and restoring commercial traffic. The territories now being fought over carry outsized importance, with the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the adjacent coastline of Mocha, Dhubab and the surrounding Tihama plain directly affecting the security of Red Sea shipping and Saudi oil export routes. The highlands and supply roads around Taiz further determine whether the government can maintain links between its southern base in Aden and the rest of the country. Operation Dawn of Yemen itself has been framed as a campaign to reassert control over Houthi strongholds, including the capital Sanaa.
4. The US-Iran restraint and a new challenge
Both the United States and Iran have largely remained outside the latest wave of direct fighting. Washington has declined Saudi requests for offensive military assistance beyond intelligence sharing, while Iran is publicly expressing willingness to mediate between Riyadh and the group. Beyond the initial strategic contest over the Bab al-Mandeb, the conflict in Yemen has taken on a dynamic of its own. What began as a secondary theatre linked to the broader US-Iran confrontation has grown into a self-sustaining war. The Houthis-Saudi confrontation now pose challenges well beyond Iran’s interest, and a resolution to the broader US-Iran conflict no longer guarantees a desescalation in Yemen.
In perspective
Yemen’s latest gains in its campaign against the Houthis mark a significant escalation in the government’s efforts to reclaim territory from the group. However, the advance has been made possible largely through Saudi Arabia’s support, and its sustainability remains uncertain. For the Houthis, the loss of strategic territory represents a significant setback, while their “escalation for escalation” response sustains the risk of a prolonged conflict, particularly as negotiations remain at a nascent stage. Tehran’s assistance also hangs on a balance as deeper involvement in the Houthi conflict risks further straining its already stretched capabilities.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Moscow Format Consultation:
Increasing Taliban legitimacy, Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, and a Missing joint statement
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
In the news
On 05 October, officials from Russia, Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in Moscow for the eighth Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan. Delegations from Belarus and Egypt also attended as guests. The Afghan delegation was led by Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi.
On the same day, Sergey Lavrov held a separate meeting with the Afghan Foreign Minister. The two sides reportedly discussed prospects for developing bilateral cooperation and interaction within international and regional forums. Lavrov stated: “Five years is a short time to overcome the consequences of many decades of occupation, yet your [the Taliban] government’s achievements are evident, and we welcome them,” further noting the Taliban’s successes in combating extremists and its efforts to eradicate drug trafficking.
Following the meeting, Russia’s special representative for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, said that the delegations of Pakistan and Afghanistan “didn’t see eye to eye,” resulting in the lack of a joint statement. However, he added that while this was regrettable, the Moscow Format remained useful as a platform for regional cooperation.
Issues at large
1. The Moscow Format and the evolving legitimacy of the Taliban
The Moscow Format started as a trilateral between Russia, China, and Pakistan in December 2016, and was expanded to India, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) in 2017. The stated purpose and objective of this format was to help facilitate intra-Afghan talks, act as a reconciliation process in Afghanistan to establish peace, and to discuss the humanitarian, political, and security implications of the conflict. The Taliban first attended in 2018 as a stakeholder in the conflict. After Russia recognised the Taliban government in 2025, it joined as a formal member. This meeting in 2026 demonstrates regular participation by the Taliban alongside other countries at a high-level forum, increasingly establishing the legitimacy of the Taliban’s governing authority, while much of the international community refuses to recognise the Taliban government formally.
2. Continued Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions, despite negotiations and mediations
The meeting comes after repeated efforts internationally to mediate and discuss the Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict. Qatar and Türkiye helped secure a ceasefire in October 2025, followed by Istanbul talks and a proposed monitoring mechanism. In 2026, China hosted talks in Urumqi after renewed fighting, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye also supported efforts to de-escalate the conflict. However, these initiatives have failed to produce a resolution to the dispute over cross-border militancy and Pakistan’s challenges with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In addition, the lack of a joint statement further reflects the depth of their divide, as Pakistan continues to demand that Kabul take verifiable action against militants operating from Afghan territory, while the Taliban rejects Islamabad’s accusations and continues to condemn Pakistani military strikes.
3. Russia’s strategic stake and the Moscow Format as an instrument
Russia’s interest in Afghanistan has seemingly been security. Lavrov has argued that the Pakistan-Afghan tension is partly due to the Islamic State and outside interference. This suggests that Moscow possibly remains concerned about the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), narcotics trafficking, and the potential spillover of instability into Central Asia. This is also in tandem with Russia's removal of the Taliban’s terrorist designation, recognition of its government later that year, and in May 2026 describing its relationship with Kabul as a “full-fledged partnership,” covering security, trade and humanitarian cooperation. The Moscow Format consequently serves as an instrument through which Russia maintains diplomatic relevance in Afghanistan and the wider Eurasian region, and advances Moscow's "regional solutions to regional problems" doctrine.
In perspective
First, the consultations demonstrate the Taliban’s growing legitimacy. Its participation as a formal member, engagement with Lavrov, bilateral meetings, and ability to influence the language of the final document reflect its growing capacity to shape regional discussions and be treated as Afghanistan’s government.
Second, the lack of a joint statement reflects the deepening divide between Kabul and Islamabad. With Pakistan's strikes continuing days before and after the meeting, the forum was unlikely to change the conflict's course. While the lack of a consensus this time demonstrated a setback, Moscow asserts that the format was made not for bilateral dispute resolution but for regional cooperation.
Third, Russia’s interest possibly stands between security concerns and relevance. Hosting these consultations lets Moscow keep an eye on the security situation of the region, while building regional consensus on security, humanitarian aid, and trade, and presenting itself as a continued convenor of diplomacy when it comes to Afghanistan.
Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella is an undergraduate student from the Department of Political Science, School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bengaluru. She is currently an intern at NIAS.
CW Newsmakers
Congo's Ebola crisis & Ethiopia's Tigray conflict
Namrata L Ghanghatkar and Urja R Kudalkar
Congo's Ebola crisis:
Over 4,000 dead and first fatality confirmed in Kenya
On 07 October, Reuters and other major sources reported that an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo had infected more than 8,000 people and killed over 4,000, making it the second largest Ebola outbreak on record. Caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain, for which there is no approved vaccine or specific treatment, the outbreak was declared in May after starting in Ituri province and has since spread to seven provinces in the country's north and east. Uganda recorded 20 cases and two deaths before being declared Ebola-free, and a doctor who returned to France in June tested positive, with no further spread. Kenya became the fourth country linked to the outbreak after a Kenyan citizen who had lived in Congo for seven years died in Nairobi, exposing weaknesses in border screening. The Médecins Sans Frontières organisation warned of an "alarming surge" in North Kivu province, which now accounts for 40 per cent of new cases, likening the response to "fighting a megafire." Butembo, home to around two million people, has only four treatment centres. Armed conflict, mistrust of authorities, violence against health workers, strikes by unpaid health workers, misinformation, and aid cuts have hindered the response, while the UN reported that soldiers burned an Ebola-hit camp near Bunia, forcing 19,000 people to flee. The WHO recommended against travel restrictions and is supporting Kenya's contact tracing and surveillance.
Ethiopia's Tigray conflict escalates:
As government forces enter Mekelle and rebels withdraw
On 03 October 2026, Reuters and other major news reported that pro-government forces reportedly retook the airport in Mekelle, the regional capital of Tigray, amid renewed fighting with Tigrayan forces. The clashes marked a serious escalation of tensions following the civil war that lasted from 2020 to 2022. Government forces advanced towards the city as Tigrayan fighters reportedly abandoned their positions. Tigrayan rebels subsequently withdrew from Mekelle as government forces entered the city. The developments marked a significant shift in control of the regional capital. However, the withdrawal does not necessarily indicate that the wider conflict has ended. Concerns remain over further clashes, civilian safety and the disruption of essential services. The renewed violence highlights unresolved tensions following the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the previous large-scale war. Disputes over territories, the return of internally displaced people, political representation and the disarmament of Tigrayan forces remain significant challenges. Continued fighting could undermine the peace process and deepen the humanitarian crisis. It also raises concerns about stability across the Horn of Africa, where regional rivalries add to existing security challenges. The latest developments underline the fragility of the peace agreement and the need for renewed political engagement to prevent further escalation.
Namrata L Ghanghatkar and Urja R Kudalkar are postgraduate students at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences. They are currently Research interns at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.