CWA # 2295
The World This Week
The EU-China Trade Talks I Brazil Elections 2026
The US "Super Intelligence Force"
The World This Week #374, Vol 8, No. 36, 11 October 2026
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NIAS Global Politics Team
11 October 2026
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The EU-China Trade Talks:
Between a temporary ease of tensions and a trade breakthrough
Aparna A Nair
What happened?
On 08-09 October 2026, China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao and European Commission Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič met in Beijing for the second meeting of the China-EU Trade and Investment Consultation. The discussion primarily centred around trade and market access but also identified cooperation potential in new energy, AI, services trade, the digital economy, and green and low-carbon development.
The key outcomes include an understanding on hybrid-vehicle trade and an agreement to continue company-specific price-undertaking and review procedures related to the EU’s anti-subsidy case on Chinese electric vehicles. China agreed to continue facilitating export licenses for rare earths and permanent magnets destined for the EU. The latter agreed to facilitate Chinese licensing cases in dual-use sectors. Both reached consensus on possible tariff reductions on some goods under WTO rules and to continue discussions on market access and export controls. They also agreed to continue the consultation by a ministerial-level video conference in January 2027 and a third meeting in March 2027.
China's Ministry of Commerce readout described the talks as "equal, professional and constructive." It added that both sides also agreed to mutual delisting of the sanctioned firms.
What is the background?
1. A brief note on the first consultation meeting and the current bilateral trade
On 29 June 2026, the EU Trade Commissioner and China’s Commerce Minister held the first meeting of the China–EU Trade and Investment Consultation mechanism in Brussels. The mechanism created a formal channel to address trade and investment issues. It includes the trade imbalance, export controls, intellectual property, and reform of the World Trade Organisation.
Trade imbalance is the central source of friction between the countries. Eurostat reported in Q2 of 2026 that the EU exports USD 56.8 billion to China and imports USD 173.6 billion, creating a trade deficit of USD 116.7 billion. China accounts for 21.9 per cent of EU imports. EU officials view this as unsustainable, and it raises concerns about market access, Chinese industrial overcapacity and EU measures on Chinese products.
2. EU 's reliance on China and growing pressure from EU countries
A recent European Parliament Research Service briefing reported that China supplied 95.6 per cent of the EU’s imported processed rare earth elements in 2025. China also supplied at least 60 per cent of EU imports in eight processed critical raw-material categories, including magnesium, gallium, germanium, bismuth and cobalt. This gives China leverage across the critical supply chain, from electric vehicles to defence. Even though long-term measures of diversification of suppliers, domestic extraction and processing, and recycling are in place, the EU remains exposed to short-term disruptions or licensing delays.
EU countries have been vocal about pivoting away from such dependencies that harm the economy. Recently, the leaders of France and Germany wrote to the European Commission President to consider stronger and swifter tools to respond to harmful trade practices. The letter did not name China but called out dumping and subsidies in trade. They called for a rapid response instrument that will restrict access to the EU single market. It will require consensus among the majority of member states and approval.
3. China’s mixed responses to EU measures
Beijing has consistently warned of protectionism and supply-chain decoupling against the proposed EU trade tools. China has also recently instituted an anti-dumping investigation into EU imports of p-nitrotoluene, stating that it follows domestic law and WTO rules. Beijing has undertaken a combined approach of diplomatic warnings, trade investigations and negotiated concessions.
What does it mean?
First, a test of managed interdependence. For the EU, the talks resulted in short-term supply restrictions and delayed escalation. The outcome is a relief for EU businesses because it provides supply assurance. For China, continued access to the EU market protects its immediate interests. This reflects a shift to managed interdependence, where both sides are not seeking decoupling but try to preserve economic links.
Second, a temporary ease of tensions, not a trade breakthrough. The understandings on hybrid vehicles, rare-earth licensing and possible tariff reductions give both sides room to negotiate and may ease immediate pressure on businesses. But they do not settle the EU’s concerns over its trade deficit, market access or Chinese industrial competition. The real progress happens when the dialogue leads to verifiable changes in these arenas. Overall, the October outcomes lower the immediate risk of escalation, but they do not remove that structural conflict. The countries tried to manage current dependency problems rather than to reduce them. The understanding reached therefore functions as a short-term stabiliser to eliminate the immediate risk of supply chain restrictions.
Aparna A Nair is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. She is a Research Assistant at NIAS.
Brazil Elections 2026:
Far-Right Surge, "Re-Democratisation" and Foreign-Policy Realignment
Glynnis Winona B
What happened?
On 04 October, Brazil held its general elections to elect the president, state governors, state legislators, members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Nearly 159 million people voted, and the voter turnout stood at 78.92 per cent. Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party received 47.03 per cent of the vote, while current President Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party received 45.16 per cent. As neither candidate secured more than 50 per cent of the vote, a runoff is scheduled for 25 October. The first-round results also saw gains for right-wing parties in the Congress and across the states, with members of the Bolsonaro family winning Senate seats.
On 06 October, Flávio said that a right-wing majority in Congress would let him change the Constitution and "re-democratise" Brazil. Earlier, he had pledged to bring Brazil into the US-led "Shield of the Americas" security initiative.
What is the background?
1. Two primary contestants – Bolsonaro and Lula
The main contest is between Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator and the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro and Lula da Silva, who has led the federal government since 2023. Flávio's first-round lead has given him an advantage, while Lula aims to deliver a contrasting campaign to secure another term. Jair Bolsonaro was sentenced in 2025 to more than 27 years in prison and cannot contest. Now, Flávio carries the political movement of the family. Lula defeated Jair by a narrow margin in 2022. That election was followed by claims of fraud and by the attack on government buildings in Brasília.
2. The Right and the Senate
Brazil's National Congress comprises a 513-member lower house and an 81-member Senate. Politicians aligning with Bolsonaro have prioritised the Senate. Impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court justices are constitutionally conducted by the Senate. Bolsonaristas have demanded such proceedings following the court's imprisonment of former president Jair Bolsonaro for attempting a coup. Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who oversaw the case, is the main target of this demand. Removing a justice requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate, which means 54 of 81 seats, so even a larger right-wing bloc would need support from other parties.
3. Right-wing parties back Flávio
Right-wing parties have lined up behind Flávio ahead of the runoff. Republicanos and the União Brasil–PP federation have backed his candidacy. Parties supporting him now hold around 259 of the 513 seats in the lower house, and this gives him a strong political base. Brazil has a large number of parties, and presidents usually have to bargain with several of them to pass laws. A large bloc in the lower house would therefore make governing easier for Flávio.
4. Key Electoral Issues
Relations with the US, public security, Amazon conservation and labour policy have shaped the campaign. Lula has accused President Trump of attempting to influence the election. This accusation draws on the tariffs imposed by the US on Brazilian goods in 2025 and the sanctions placed on Justice de Moraes. Lula has also highlighted Flávio's links to individuals associated with Rio de Janeiro's criminal underworld. Meanwhile, concerns over Amazon deforestation and proposed labour reforms remain central to the political debate.
What does it mean?
First, right-wing advancement in Congress, state governments and the Senate strengthen Bolsonaro's political influence. This could increase pressure on the Supreme Court and its decisions. It may also open the way for an amnesty or reduced sentences for those convicted of the coup attempt. This would test the independence of the judiciary.
Second, Flávio's call to "re-democratise" Brazil raises concern regarding potential changes to existing democratic institutions, and critics fear that it may turn into a coup. Supporters describe the idea as a correction of judicial imperialism, while critics sense a risk to the independence of courts. Amending the Constitution requires three-fifths of both houses, which is 308 deputies, so the right would still need support from centrist parties.
Third, a Flávio presidency could bring Brazil closer to Washington's security agenda. Further, it could reshape its regional relations. This would mark a shift from Lula's policy of strategic autonomy and close engagement with BRICS and China, which is Brazil's largest trading partner. Closer alignment with the US and right-leaning governments could also strain relations with left-led neighbours.
Finally, a right-wing government could alter environmental policies. This can affect Amazon conservation and Brazil's climate commitments. Brazil hosted COP30 in Belém in 2025, so any weakening of environmental enforcement would draw international attention. The expansion of agribusiness and mining could also reverse the recent fall in deforestation. Labour policy may likewise move towards market-oriented reforms.
Glynnis Winona B is an undergraduate student in the Department of International Relations, Peace Studies and Public Policy at St. Joseph's University, Bengaluru.
The US "Super Intelligence Force":
Trump aims at rebranding, regulation, and technological dominance
Lekshmi MK
What happened?
On 29 September, President Trump signed an executive order directing federal agencies to use “Super Intelligence” (SI) instead of “Artificial Intelligence” (AI) in official communications, while asking the administration to develop a federal definition of the term.
On 04 October, President Trump announced the creation of the Super Intelligence Force, a federal task force led by Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton, intended to coordinate the government's approach to AI development, promote US leadership in the technology and protect national interests. It will coordinate engagement with technology companies, consumers, public-interest groups, religious organisations and critical infrastructure providers.
On 04 October, Musk said that SpaceX would rename its AI division from SpaceXAI to SpaceXSI, following Trump’s push to replace the terminology. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman argued, “We believe that the world should accept some bad things happening for the benefits of this technology and people having the agency.” In contrast, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei has called for the pace of AI development to be slowed to allow safety measures to keep up with advances in capability. Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis has also supported a more coordinated approach to AI safety and oversight.
What is the background?
1. Trump’s push to develop Super Intelligence amid the growing competition with China
President Trump has sought to position the US at the forefront of advanced AI, viewing technological leadership as central to economic competitiveness and national security. The push to develop Super Intelligence comes amid growing competition with China; both countries seek to advance AI capabilities with potential applications in scientific research, defence, intelligence and economic productivity. Major technology companies, including OpenAI, Anthropic and Google DeepMind, are investing in advanced AI systems. At the policy level, Trump views technological leadership as an important component of national security. He aims to strengthen US technological dominance, attract investment in advanced AI and ensure that the US remains ahead of China.
2. Strengthening federal efforts to govern AI
The debate has also exposed differences over the appropriate role of the federal government in regulating advanced AI. While technology companies and some policymakers have called for safeguards, the administration has emphasised US leadership and resisted measures it considers restrictive. At the same time, concerns over emerging AI capabilities, public safety and the risks of insufficient oversight have increased pressure for a coordinated federal response. These competing priorities form the wider policy context for the establishment of the Super Intelligence Force.
3. A divided US debate over AI development and regulation
Technology executives remain divided over the pace and regulation of advanced AI development. OpenAI has emphasised the broad deployment of AI and its potential economic and societal benefits, while Anthropic has placed greater emphasis on AI safety and the risks associated with increasingly capable systems. Google DeepMind has pursued advanced AI development alongside research into safety and responsible deployment. These differences reflect a wider debate within the technology industry over how to balance innovation, commercial competition and safeguards against potential risks. They also raise an important question: whether voluntary safeguards are sufficient or whether governments should introduce stronger oversight of advanced AI systems.
Although technology companies and local authorities view these facilities as important for investment and technological development, communities have raised concerns about environmental impacts, rising electricity costs and limited consultation. The scale of these projects has raised questions about whether existing electricity grids can meet growing demand, who will bear the costs of upgrading infrastructure, and how data centre development will affect local resources and communities. In response to power constraints, some developers are exploring dedicated electricity generation rather than relying entirely on the existing grid. This has added to debates over the environmental consequences of new energy projects, including the continued use of natural gas. However, the Trump administration has prioritised US technological leadership and competition with China, while seeking to address public concerns about AI safety.
What does it mean?
First, rebranding AI and the US race for technological dominance. Renaming the AI as “Super Intelligence” is Trump’s attempt to reshape the political narrative around advanced AI and reinforce the US ambition to lead the global technology race. However, a change in terminology does not itself demonstrate a technological advantage over China. Its significance will depend on whether it is accompanied by concrete investments, research advances and effective policies.
Second, growing public concerns. The expansion of AI data centres highlights a growing tension between national technological ambitions and local community concerns. Although these facilities can generate investment and employment, their consequences may place pressure on local infrastructure and resources. Public opposition could therefore become an important political and policy challenge as the US seeks to expand its AI capabilities.
Third, AI governance remains a federal policy challenge. The creation of the Super Intelligence Force reflects the administration’s effort to coordinate federal policy on advanced AI while addressing its associated risks. However, effective governance will depend not only on coordination across government agencies but also on how the administration engages with major technology companies. Balancing innovation and national security with public accountability will remain a key challenge.
Lekshmi MK is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
TWTW Newsmakers
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani and Urja R Kudalkar
India and Switzerland:
President Parmelin's visit brings five agreements and fresh momentum to bilateral ties
On 05 October, The Economic Times and other major sources reported that India and Switzerland signed five agreements after talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Swiss President Guy Parmelin in New Delhi, during his three-day state visit. The agreements cover a migration and mobility partnership, a young professionals exchange scheme, transport technologies and infrastructure cooperation, a science and technology letter of intent, and an innovation and entrepreneurship arrangement. The migration pact provides multiple-entry visas of up to five years and renewable one-year student permits, while the exchange scheme allows up to 300 people from each country annually. PM Modi said the two sides agreed to deepen defence production and nuclear energy cooperation. PM Modi described the India-EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement, in force for a year, as India's first free trade agreement with a European economic bloc, targeting USD 100 billion in investment and one million direct jobs over 15 years. He said the agreement would expand Indian exports of agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, textiles and engineering goods, while attracting Swiss investment in biotechnology, banking, and food processing. President Parmelin said Switzerland hoped to soon conclude an investment protection agreement and stressed progress on intellectual property protection. The second India-EFTA Prosperity Summit, held on 07 October, was set to review progress under the agreement.
("India-EFTA summit today: Trade, investment in focus as Swiss president visits India," First Post, 07 October 2026; "PM Modi, Swiss President Guy Parmelin Hold Talks, India And Switzerland Sign Five Agreements," News On AIR, 05 October 2026; "India, Switzerland sign five pacts to deepen trade, investment ties after Modi-Parmelin talks," The New Indian Express, 06 October 2026; "India, Switzerland to strengthen ties in defence, nuclear energy sectors," The Indian Express, 06 October 2026; "'India's first FTA with any economic bloc in Europe': PM Modi highlights $100 bn investment goal in meet with Swiss Prez Parmelin," The Economic Times, 05 October 2026)
China's Golden Week:
13-day break boosts overseas trips but spending per trip hits four-year low
On 09 October, Reuters and other major news outlets reported that China's Golden Week, the national holiday marking the founding of the People's Republic of China, ran for seven days from 01 October to 07 October, with the 77th anniversary celebrated nationwide. One of the country's longest public breaks and a peak tourism season, it is closely watched as a gauge of household spending and consumer confidence. This year, many combined it with the Mid-Autumn Festival on 25 to 27 September for a 13-day holiday. Mainland travellers made 4.4 million outbound trips, up 9.3 per cent year-on-year, with trips of eight days or more rising from 29 per cent in 2024 to around 42 per cent. South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Australia were popular destinations, while Japan dropped off the list. Domestically, however, average spending per trip fell 1.9 per cent to CNY 893.92, the lowest since 2022, while holiday box office revenue dropped 36.6 per cent to CNY 1.16 billion, the lowest since 2014. Analysts attributed the pattern to weak consumer confidence amid a prolonged property downturn, describing strong travel volumes alongside cautious spending.
("China Prepares to Celebrate Day of PRC Founding," News By, 29 September 2026; "China's Golden Week boosts global tourism," China Daily, 09 October 2026; "China Golden Week spending per trip hits four-year low amid overseas travel jump," Asia One, 09 October 2026; "China's Golden Week travel surge masks cautious consumer spending," Reuters, 29 September 2026)
UN Secretary General's Pakistan visit:
Guterres calls for diplomacy and recognises Islamabad’s mediation role
On 06 October, UN news and other prominent news outlets reported that United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres had called for an end to the United States-Iran conflict during his official visit to Islamabad. He urged all parties to return to diplomacy and restore navigational rights and freedoms in accordance with international law. The conflict, which began in late February following joint United States and Israeli strikes on Iran, has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and affected global trade in crude oil, fertilisers and liquefied natural gas. Guterres praised Pakistan’s role in facilitating dialogue between Washington and Tehran, including its contribution to the 17 June Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the subsequent ceasefire. He also highlighted Pakistan’s contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, its support for Afghan refugees and its commitment to multilateralism. Addressing wider regional issues, he stressed that lasting peace required the realisation of Palestinian self-determination. During his visit, Guterres also highlighted Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate change despite its limited contribution to global emissions. He praised its climate initiatives and called on developed countries to lead efforts to reduce global emissions significantly during the current decade. The visit underscored Pakistan’s diplomatic role in regional dialogue alongside its humanitarian and climate challenges.
(“UN chief departs after concluding three-day official visit to Pakistan,” The Express Tribune, 08 October 2026; “In Islamabad, Guterres calls for end to US-Iran conflict,” UN news 06 October 2026; “UN secretary-general concludes three-day official visit to Pakistan,” The nation 09 October 2026; “UN Secretary-General Guterres arrives in Pakistan for official visit,” Yeni Safak, 06 October 2026
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan:
Collective defence pact advances amid regional security tensions
On 05 October, Al Jazeera reported that Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan had agreed to activate collective deterrence measures under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement following Houthi attacks on Saudi territory and critical infrastructure. The decision followed a meeting of the three countries’ defence and foreign ministers in Riyadh. Signed on 07 August, the agreement treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. The countries agreed to provide military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia, signalling a shift towards implementing their collective security commitments. However, the scale and operational details of the deployment remain unclear. On 08 October, reports highlighted Pakistan’s expanding military role in the Gulf without parliamentary involvement. Pakistan’s Information Ministry confirmed that the necessary government procedures had been completed but did not clarify whether Parliament or the Cabinet had approved the deployment. This raises questions about legislative oversight, particularly as Pakistan’s Parliament voted in 2015 to remain neutral in the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen.
(“Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan to meet in Riyadh amid Yemen escalation,” Arab weekly, 05 October 2026; “Turkiye, Pakistan agree Saudi Arabia military deployment under Mecca pact,” Al Jazeera, 05 October 2026; “For First Time, Pakistan To Deploy Troops To Aide Saudi-Backed Yemen Forces,” NDTV world, 06 October 2026; “As Munir's military takes on Gulf role, Pakistan's parliament is not involved,” Reuters, 09 October 2026)
Horn of Africa:
Egypt talks on sovereignty and Nile water as Tigray fighting flares, with no concrete plan announced
On 05 October, Arab News and other major news outlets reported that the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan had called for peaceful solutions to regional disputes during a mini-summit in El-Alamein, Egypt. The meeting took place amid renewed fighting in Ethiopia and concerns over wider regional instability. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan attended the summit. The leaders stressed national sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference and adherence to international law on transboundary rivers. The meeting coincided with Ethiopian federal forces regaining control of Mekelle, the Tigray regional capital, following renewed clashes with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Ethiopia accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of supporting the Tigrayan rebels, but all three denied the allegations. Egypt and Sudan also remain in dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Nile water security. Although the summit emphasised peaceful dispute resolution, it announced no specific mechanism to address these tensions.
(“Ethiopia controls Tigray capital as regional rivals meet in Egypt, The Hindu, 04 October 2026; “Ethiopia’s regional rivals urge ‘peaceful’ solutions to disputes at Egypt summit,” Arab News, 05 October 2026; “Ethiopian forces seize Mekelle as regional rivals gather in Egypt, The Africa report, 04 October 2026; “Ethiopian federal forces control Tigray capital as regional rivals meet in Egypt,” France 24, 04 October 2026)
Myanmar leader’s visit to Malaysia:
Talks focus on regional engagement and repatriation amid continuing political tensions
On 08 October, Al Jazeera and major news outlets reported that Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim had pledged to support Myanmar’s reintegration into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during talks with President Min Aung Hlaing in Kuala Lumpur. Myanmar has been excluded from high-level ASEAN political meetings since 2021 over its failure to implement the bloc’s peace plan following the military coup. Anwar said Malaysia would continue cooperation on regional engagement and the repatriation of Myanmar nationals. He confirmed that 10,493 nationals had been accepted for return, while Min Aung Hlaing said more detainees would be repatriated. Malaysia stated that the visit did not constitute recognition of Myanmar’s military-backed government. However, the engagement has drawn criticism from human rights groups concerned about conditions in Myanmar and the safety of those returned amid the ongoing conflict. The discussions also covered trade, energy, security and economic cooperation. The visit highlights Malaysia’s effort to pursue diplomatic engagement while ASEAN’s restrictions on Myanmar’s political representation remain in place. The extent to which this approach can support reintegration while addressing continuing human rights concerns remains uncertain.
(“Malaysia PM says will work on Myanmar’s ASEAN reintegration,” Al Jazeera, 08 October 2026; Malaysia to work towards Myanmar's full reintegration into ASEAN, PM says,” Reuters, 08 October 2026; Myanmar leader to visit Malaysia after migrant returns begin, France24, 06 October 2026; “Malaysia to work towards Myanmar's full reintegration into ASEAN, says Anwar,” CAN, 08 October 2026)
Namrata L Ghanghatkar, Priyanka Makhijani, Urja R Kudalkar are postgraduate students at the Department of Public Policy, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences. They are currently Research interns at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)