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NIAS Global Politics team
8 November 2026 |
The US Mid-term Elections:
Four Takeaways and Three Questions
D. Suba Chandran
On 3 November, the mid-term elections that took place in the United States witnessed the Democrats winning substantial seats – for both the House of Representatives and the Senate, gaining majority in both the houses. Besides securing a majority in the two houses, the Democrats, according to initial data, have also made substantial inroads into what are considered as the Republican geography (states like Texas, Kansas and South Carolina) and the Republican demography (the Hispanic electorate, for example).
While the data refers to a “Blue Wave” its implications for the US polity and Trump’s presidency for the remaining two years.
1. The Resurgent Blue: Democrats gain majority in the House and in the Senate
In the House of Representatives, the Democrats have gained 42 more seats and have taken their tally to 254, way ahead of the required 218 for majority. Having lost the 42 seats and with 162 seats so far, the Republicans have lost the majority of the House. In the Senate, Democrats have 54 seats, winning seven more seats. The Republicans have 44 seats, thereby the Democrats having a majority here as well. Results are awaited for two more seats.
Before the mid-term elections, the Republicans had 218 seats (against Democrats’ 214) of the 435 in the House of Representatives, and 53 of the total 100 seats in the total against Democrats’ 45 (and two independents).
Winning 54 in the Senate and 254 in the House of Representatives so far (results are to be declared in a few more seats), the election results clearly indicate a Blue Wave.
2. The Blue over Red geography: Democrats make inroads into Republican strongholds
A second major takeaway is not about the Democrats winning more seats, but where they have won those. According to available data, the Democrats have made inroads into two major areas that the Republicans had a hold – in terms of geography and demography.
Certain states in the US – Texas, Kansas and South Carolina are considered as a Republican geography, where the party had political stronghold. In the mid-term elections, the Democrats succeeded in winning seats from the above along with other states including Iowa, Ohio, and North Carolina, where the Republicans have performed better in the past. Available data indicates that many counties that voted for Trump in the Presidential elections in 2024, helping him secure a substantial lead, have now voted for the Democrats. Similarly, some of the metropolitan and suburban areas that voted for Trump in 2024 have now voted for the Democrats.
3. Shifting demography: Young, and Hispanic vote as a game changer
Another interesting takeaway is relating to the inroads that the Democrats have made in the mid-term elections is into the electorate geography of the Republicans. The Hispanic, according to the data available in the open source, who voted for Trump in 2024, have now voted for the Democrats. In the latest mid-term elections, many Hispanic counties have voted for the Democrats. A similar trend also relates to the middle class voters from the suburban areas. Reports indicate that they have voted now for the Democrats, after supporting Trump during 2024 Presidential elections.
Besides the Hispanic and the middle class, available reports also suggest the young voters have supported the Democrats. More data and analysis is required to find out, whether the White men and women have also cast their votes this time for the Democrats.
4. Economy more than Iran, as a primary cause for the backlash against Trump and the Republicans
While rest of the world is more focused on Trump’s Iran war and his engagement with Israel as a primary cause for the Republicans’ decline, surveys before the elections suggest that the economic situation as a primary reason for the dissatisfaction. Employment, cost-of living and healthcare and housing costs have been discussed as primary factors of the dissatisfaction among the electorate.
While the US-Iran war did matter to how the Americans looked at the Trump, the electoral loss is more related to the economic implications of the war, than the harsh anti-Iran position that the administration has taken as a foreign policy approach. Rising fuel prices and the cost of living because of the war seemed to have angered the American voters, than the war itself. The economic consequences of the war, than the decision to strike Tehran seemed to have mattered while voting.
Three questions: On Democrats control over the Congress, Trump’s sway over the Republicans
The election results have raised a few questions as well? First, what does the Democrats control of the Senate and the House mean for the American polity? Until the mid-term elections, the Republicans control over the Congress meant, the White House (the Executive) had a smooth sailing with no major challenges from the legislature. With Democrats taking control over the Congress, how will the Executive-Legislature relations progress?
Second, will the mid-term election results, finally give the courage to the Republicans to stand up against Trump? The party and its leadership have become subservient to Trump during the last two years. Will the party stand-up? Will a few leaders defy Trump openly?
Third, a few analyses have remarked on Trump as a lame duck President. Will Trump understand the implications of the election results, or he will get even more aggressive and rash in his approach toward internal politics and external relations?
Israel Elections 2026:
Five takeaways on the missing majority and Persistent internal fragmentation
Brighty Ann Sarah
On 27 October, Israel went to polls for the 26th Knesset, the first since the 07 October 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent wars in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran and related conflicts. Despite the 77.8 per cent voter turnout, the highest the country has seen in two decades, no major contender acquired the required 61-seat majority to form an independent government in the 120-seat Knesset. Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing/religious bloc secured 53 seats and the major opposition led by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot’s Yasher party won 48. The Arab-led lists also reached a record of 19 seats.
Israel uses a proportional representation system in which the entire country is treated as one electoral district and voters choose a political party rather than an individual candidate. Seats are allocated proportionally among lists that clear the 3.25 per cent electoral threshold.
Of the roughly 10.2 million Israeli population, 78 per cent are the Jewish and non-Arab communities, and the Arab-Israelis make up about 22 per cent with smaller Christian and Druze communities. Among the diverse Jewish population, Netanyahu’s far-right Likud party draws its support from the conservative and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) voters in the country’s periphery. The secular and Ashkenazi Israelis, the wealthier Jewish communities historically rooted in Central and Eastern Europe, favour centre and centre-left parties such as the Yasher.
The following are the major takeaways from the 2026 Israeli elections:
1. The persistent Knesset trend of ‘no single-party majority’ holds firm
In none of the Israeli elections since the state's founding has a single party ever claimed a majority of 61 seats, which holds true for the latest contest as well. Tel Aviv has only had governments formed through multi-party coalitions, sometimes fragile ones that collapse before completing a full term. The enduring fragmentation is a result of Israel’s proportionate representation system, which awards seats strictly according to each party’s share of the national vote. The design deliberately amplifies the country’s deep social, religious, ethnic and ideological polarisation, encouraging voters to back niche parties representing specific groups and interests rather than large parties with broader visions.
2. International backlash failed to blemish Netanyahu’s domestic standing
Since the 2022 election and the outbreak of the Gaza war, Benjamin Netanyahu’s standing has undergone a categorical shift, but in sharply opposing directions at home and abroad. Internationally, the escalating and persistent violence across Gaza has severely degraded his global position, turning many formerly cordial relationships sour. This erosion has been compounded by multiple ICC criminal cases, widespread genocide accusations, and broad international condemnation including through sanctions.
Domestically, however, the war has largely shifted the public psyche favourably for Netanyahu's government. Security concerns, intensified by four years of continuous hostilities and regional upheaval, became the dominant electoral pivot and largely overrode earlier controversies, including the major corruption cases against Netanyahu, which barely featured in the 2026 campaign. Despite enduring questions of accountability and criticism over his refusal towards an independent probe into the 07 October attacks, Netanyahu’s wartime efforts and hardline posture have helped secure his political position among a substantial share of Israeli voters.
3. The right-wing bloc gained a lead, but revealed internal fragmentation
Despite securing the larger share of seats, the Netanyahu-led Likud coalition witnessed a dip from their previous win of 64 seats in 2022. The fragmentation remains within the party itself, with a fracture in mobilising the ultra-Orthodox voters. The Shas party represents Israel’s ultra-Orthodox sect and the major support to Likud; however, the party has been at odds with the Netanyahu administration over the conscription of Haredi Jews. The Haredis have been historically exempt from military conscription in lieu of full-time religious study, however a 2024 Supreme Court rule challenged the blanket exemption and the Netanyahu administration's failure to pass a new exemption law has drawn severe criticism from the sect.
Further, public support for ending broad exemptions were high, with the majority favouring an egalitarian conscription law or sanctions on draft-dodgers. Opposition parties campaigned hard on universal service, capitalising on many secular and traditional voters who felt the burden of war had fallen unfairly on them.
4. 07 October attacks and broader security threats ranked among the high in voting
The security concerns triggered by the 07 October Hamas attacks and the subsequent regional upheaval remained among the dominant considerations for the Israeli electorate. Beyond militarisation and securitisation measures, the failures surrounding 07 October and the question of accountability also featured prominently in the electoral discourse. Opposition voters prioritised the establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the intelligence and political failures that enabled the Hamas attack. The perception of persistent external threats, reinforced by a continuing sense of existential insecurity, remained central to the electoral considerations.
5. Escalating hostility at home and in the region mobilised Arab voters
The turnout among Arab-Israelis witnessed a marked increase, reaching unprecedented levels as Arab parties collectively secured 19 seats. The concerns shaping the community’s electoral participation were largely influenced by the war in Gaza, against the backdrop of continued violence in the occupied Palestinian territories. For Arab citizens, organised crime, gun violence and a growing perception that governance under National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir had neglected or exacerbated insecurity within the community contributed to the historic turnout.
However, the inclusion of the faction in a potential coalition with the Eisenkot-led bloc remains unlikely, as it could be perceived as a departure from the coalition’s pro-Israel positioning and the established reluctance to form alliances with Arab political factions.
Brighty Ann Sarah is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
Brazil Elections 2026:
Five takeaways on Lula's re-election and the Changing dynamics of democratic politics
Maya Swetang Choubey
On 25 October, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the fourth presidential term with 51.79 per cent of the vote against 48.21 per cent for Flávio Bolsonaro. The winner made a comeback after the first-round defeat and became the only candidate with four presidential mandates in the history of democracy in Brazil. In response to his loss in the election, Flávio Bolsonaro declared that he would challenge the results of the vote.
In the closing stage of the election, Lula bolstered his digital campaign using smartphone videos and WhatsApp groups to appeal directly to youth voters. Moreover, there were claims of Meta's manipulation and bias with the help of algorithms in favour of certain political messages. However, the company claimed that there was no political preference but only technical errors. Furthermore, there was a reduction of abstention in the runoff election in Brazil to approximately 19.2 per cent.
The following are five takeaways from the Brazil Elections 2026:
1. Lula’s political legacy and the shifting nature of the electoral process
The political revival of Lula has to be analysed in the context of increasing political polarization in Brazil and changing voting preferences of the Brazilian people. Lula’s two presidential mandates (2003-2010) have been marked by anti-poverty programs, welfare benefits and economic growth in the country. At the same time, the present political situation of Lula has been undermined by such factors as inflation, corruption scandals and criticism regarding the Workers' Party. On the other hand, Flávio Bolsonaro has been using the conservative political platform of his father Jair Bolsonaro.
2. Campaigning on the web and increased importance of young voters
The social networking sites have become increasingly important tools in political mobilization in Brazil. The previous success of Jair Bolsonaro showed the effectiveness of digital tools in engaging voters other than those in traditional political organizations. In his campaign, Lula tried to redress the balance in the last three weeks before the election. Through the creation of the WhatsApp group Lula’s Army, Congressman André Janones was able to mobilize his followers through video clips, hashtags and online messages. Lula's use of selfie videos and mobile phone communication is a reflection of the desire to reach out to younger voters.
3. Algorithmic governance and the accountability of technology companies
The claims against Meta raise broader questions regarding the power of private technology firms in influencing the democratic process. Instagram, Facebook, and WhatsApp are capable of exerting influence over the dissemination of political information. In this sense, the limits on political accounts and algorithmic curation could lead to a situation where political communication is biased towards certain candidates. According to research from the field of political communication, specifically Tarleton Gillespie’s studies about the importance of algorithms in the matter, platforms are able to do so by controlling and distributing the information. Nevertheless, the Brazilian situation does not show any coordination of efforts between the US government and American technology companies in order to influence the election.
4. Voter turnout and the issue of democratic legitimacy
Decreasing levels of abstention in the second round are linked to the mobilization of voters resulting from the results of the first round. As The Indian Express reports, based on the data available, nearly three million extra people turned up to vote in the runoff, thereby lowering the rate of abstention from 21.08 per cent to 19.2 per cent. On the other hand, the lack of concession by Bolsonaro and his challenge to the results indicate that maintaining institutional trust in such a politically polarized situation is difficult. In other words, two interrelated questions are raised by the election in question.
5. Brazil’s autonomous position in a changing geopolitical sphere
Consequences of the victory go beyond domestic politics in Brazil. Considering Brazil is the biggest economy in Latin America, the political course taken by the country will have an impact on regional alignment, South-South cooperation and interaction with great powers. Lula's fourth mandate will affect the relations between Brasília and Washington, especially given the ideological contradictions with the Trump administration, but also his position in BRICS and other clubs of emerging economies. This presidential race also shows that the role of digital platforms in modern democratic politics grows bigger each year. The use of social networks to reach out to young people and accusations of the bias of algorithms bring up issues of digital governance and transparency of the electoral process. Domestically, Lula has to manage a politically polarised country, with a conservative Congress, budget constraints and ideological divisions. Bolsonaro's unwillingness to accept defeat shows how difficult it is to preserve trust in institutions after a controversial election.
To summarise, the results of the Brazilian election are a reflection of three interrelated trends – the endurance of established political elites, the growing role of digital technologies in democracy and the geopolitical significance of Latin America's biggest economy.
Swetang is a PhD Scholar at NIAS, specialising in Arctic security, governance, and the broader geostrategic landscape. He holds an undergraduate degree in geography and a Master's in International Relations and Peace Studies.
The Third Russia-Africa Summit:
Four takeaways on Expanding trade, Africa's attempt to diversify partnerships and Moscow's limited influence
Akshath Kaimal
Between 28-29 October, Moscow hosted the Third Russia-Africa Summit, led by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and African Union Chairperson Évariste Ndayishimiye. It brought together representatives from 48 African countries, including 22 heads of state. The summit was first launched in Sochi in 2019 in an attempt to revive Moscow’s historical relationships with African countries, expand economic and military cooperation, and establish a platform to expand Russia’s influence on the continent. It also reflected Moscow’s ambition to strengthen its position among developing countries and diversify its international partnerships. The second summit, held in St Petersburg in July 2023, took place amid Russia’s growing diplomatic isolation following its invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions. At that meeting, leaders agreed to hold future summits every three years, resulting in the 2026 edition. Putin described Russia’s intentions as “seeing African countries defend their sovereignty, develop with confidence and strengthen their economies and social spheres,” while Ndayishimiye emphasised the “importance of ensuring that these resources generate tangible benefits for the continent’s population.”
The following are four takeaways from the Third Russia-Africa Summit:
1. The summit produced a broad set of agreements with implementation remaining the key test
The summit adopted three principal documents: the Joint Declaration of the Third Russia-Africa Summit, the Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Applications of Artificial Intelligence Technologies, and the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan for 2027-2029. Separate action plans involving the African Union Commission and SADC were also signed. Russian presidential adviser Anton Kobyakov reported that more than 60 agreements had been signed during the summit and accompanying forum. These included intergovernmental, institutional, and commercial agreements, whose individual value and implementation status remain unclear. Defence cooperation was central to the discussions. Putin said Russia had military-technical cooperation agreements with 45 African countries. He also reported that bilateral trade exceeded USD 27 billion in 2025 and set a target of USD 50 billion but did not provide a timeline for the same. The outcomes indicate an effort to move beyond political declarations. But practical constraints, including sanctions, infrastructure and disrupted supply chains mean implementation remains a key test, particularly in realising tangible benefits for African partners.
2. Russia is seeking expanded strategic influence in Africa, but its economic and security capacity has limits
Russia’s expanded engagement with Africa is a partly attempt to offset diplomatic isolation following its invasion of Ukraine. Moscow also wants to demonstrate that it retains influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Since 2023, Moscow has opened eight new embassies on the continent, bringing its total to 48, while also expanding military, agricultural, and energy partnerships with African countries. With its 54 countries representing the largest regional voting bloc in the UN General Assembly, Africa also offers much needed diplomatic support for Russia. However, Russia’s economic presence remains comparatively limited. Its trade with Africa reached approximately USD 27 billion in 2025, against around USD 348 billion for China and USD 367 billion for the EU. In addition to this, despite Russian-backed forces having expanded defence cooperation across the Sahel, average annual deaths linked to violent extremism in the region rose sharply from 927 in 2016-2019 to 10,470 in 2022-2025, reflecting the complex security environment in the country. Russia can offer arms, grain, fertilisers and selected energy projects, but its ability to match the scale of Chinese or Western investment remains constrained.
3. Africa’s engagement with Russia is an attempt to diversify partnerships
African participation in the summit reflects a broader strategy of diversifying partnerships rather than a collective shift towards Russia. For some governments, particularly in the Sahel, Russia offers military assistance and diplomatic engagement without the political conditions associated with some Western partnerships. For others, cooperation in grain, fertilisers, nuclear energy, mining and education offers opportunities to address specific development needs. Russia said it supplied more than 18 million tonnes of grain to African countries in 2025, while nearly 40,000 African students are currently studying in Russia. Yet African governments are also seeking more than commodity supplies and security assistance. The summit declaration itself calls for local processing of minerals, technology transfer, value-added exports and job creation, reflecting a longstanding concern that external partnerships have not sufficiently supported industrialisation on the continent. Whether Russia can meet these demands remains uncertain, particularly given its relatively modest trade and investment capacity.
4. While multipolarity was the objective, Russia-Africa engagement is unlikely to transform the international order
The summit reflects the growing great power competition in Africa, but it is unlikely to create a fundamental shift in the international order, despite the Joint Declaration calling for the same. China’s position, for instance, illustrates the difference between diplomatic outreach and sustained economic engagement. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000, has held regular summits and ministerial meetings every three years, creating an institutional framework for long-term cooperation and helping trade between the two reaches USD 348 billion in 2025. The US and EU also maintain extensive economic and political ties with African countries, and Russia’s presence is unlikely to displace these established partnerships, despite being the primary security provider for the countries in the Sahel and Horn of Africa. For the US and EU, Moscow’s growing security role, particularly in the Sahel, complicates their influence, but is unlikely to replace them. China, meanwhile, faces competition in selected sectors but retains a much deeper economic foothold going back decades. While the summit produced a host of agreed documents spanning multiple sectors, Russia is still held back by sanctions and international isolation, which will ultimately limit its influence on the continent.
Akshath Kaimal is a postgraduate in International Studies and International Humanitarian Action. He is currently a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, and is part of the NIAS Pakistan Reader team.
Demographic Changes in South Asia:
Six takeaways on Shifting workforce dynamics, Persistent gender gaps and Ageing population
Arshaq Amaan
On 03 November, the World Bank released the report titled "Demographic Changes in South Asia: From Tailwinds to Headwinds for Development" examining the region’s changing population structure, including declining fertility rates, population ageing, employment patterns, women’s participation in the workforce, healthcare and pension systems.
The following are six major takeaways from the report:
1. Weaker demographic advantage in South Asia
South Asia is experiencing a major shift in its population structure. The region has benefited from a large working-age population, which has supported economic growth and provided opportunities for development. However, this advantage is gradually declining as the population ages and the proportion of older people increases. Unlike advanced economies, which had a longer period to prepare for this transition, South Asian countries are facing a much faster shift. This creates pressure on governments to strengthen employment opportunities, improve productivity and prepare healthcare and pension systems for an ageing population. The report emphasises that South Asia must make better use of its remaining demographic opportunity by investing in its people and creating productive jobs before population ageing becomes a greater economic challenge.
2. Quality of Employment is more crucial than population size
South Asia’s employment challenge is not simply about creating more jobs, but also about improving the quality of existing employment. A large share of the working-age population remains outside employment, while many of those who are employed work in the informal sector, often facing limited job security and social protection. The region also has fewer employment opportunities in non-agricultural sectors compared with other emerging economies. Another concern is that formal businesses in South Asia create jobs at a much slower pace due to constraints such as inadequate infrastructure, complex regulations and limited investment in innovation and training. The report emphasises that improving employment requires a stronger business environment, alongside investment in workers’ skills, health and productivity.
3. Women’s untapped potential in employment opportunity
Women’s participation in the workforce remains a major challenge in South Asia. Despite representing a significant share of the region’s potential workforce, many women remain outside the labour market due to barriers such as unpaid household and care responsibilities, limited access to childcare, safety concerns, mobility restrictions and social expectations. In addition, gaps in skills and other labour-market barriers often limit women’s access to stable, productive and better-paying jobs. The report highlights that improving women’s participation in employment and investing in their education and skills could strengthen the region’s human capital and support economic growth. Its projections suggest that even modest improvements in these areas could bring significant economic benefits by 2050.
4. Ageing population is placing healthcare systems under pressure
Population ageing is creating new challenges for South Asia’s healthcare systems, public services and government spending. Although people are living longer, they are not necessarily spending those additional years in good health, increasing the need for better healthcare and long-term support. Noncommunicable diseases, such as diabetes, heart disease and cancer, account for a major share of the region’s disease burden, making prevention and long-term treatment increasingly important. Older workers also face greater employment insecurity, as many remain in informal jobs without adequate financial or social protection. At the same time, demand for long-term care services is expected to grow significantly, requiring more trained care workers and stronger support systems. The report highlights the need for South Asian countries to prepare their healthcare and care systems for an ageing population.
5. Pension systems are failing to protect an ageing population
South Asia’s pension and social protection systems face significant gaps, leaving a large proportion of the population without adequate financial security in old age. Most working-age people are not covered by contributory pension schemes, and only a small share of older adults receive pension benefits. This is closely linked to the region’s high levels of informal employment, self-employment and interrupted work histories, which make it difficult for people to build up pension contributions throughout their careers. As the population ages, these gaps could leave more older people financially vulnerable and increase pressure on governments. The report therefore emphasises the need to expand old-age income protection, improve pension coverage and strengthen the institutions responsible for delivering benefits, while ensuring that these reforms remain financially sustainable.
Arshaq Amaan holds a BSc in Forensic Science from JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bengaluru, and is currently a Research Intern with the Global Politics Team at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.
