CWA # 184
The NIAS Arctic Series
The Polar Silk Route: China's ambitious search in the Arctic
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Harini Madhusudan
3 November 2019
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Chinese leaders make a conscious attempt to not provoke negative responses from the Arctic States and its critics while also ensuring that they are not excluded from having access to the Arctic.
A significant component of China's Arctic Policy revolves around its idea of a 'Polar Silk Road,' a network of trade routes to the Arctic that would help ease global shipping. Early 2018, China released an official Arctic Policy Paper, which depicts how China views the myriad economic opportunities in the region. What are China's ambitions in the Arctic? How far is China committed to its aims in the Arctic? What are the challenges that these interests pose to the region?
The Northern Europe, the US and even Russia look at China's intentions in the Arctic with suspicion. Chinese leaders make a conscious attempt to not provoke negative responses from the Arctic States and its critics while also ensuring that they are not excluded from having access to the Arctic.
Brief Background
With the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1925, China began showing the intent of participating in the Arctic. However, China's real participation can be seen from the late 1980s after they established the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. In 1984 their first expedition took place and by 1996 they joined the International Arctic Science Committee. In 2013, China became an observer nation of the Arctic Council.
In 2018, the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) made eight transits through the Arctic between Europe and China. Several of these were done by the Tian Hui, Tian You and Tian En two of which carried equipment to the wind power industry, which was delivered to buyers in Europe. The Voyage was through the East Siberian Sea and the Vilkitsky Strait, and the difficult part of it was that the level of ice coverage in that part was upto 90 per cent.
Early 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, singled out China on its Arctic ambitions and claimed that the Arctic has become an arena for power and competition. Chinese goals in the Arctic make perfect sense to their exports. As an export-based economy, shipping through the Northern Sea Route of Siberia or through the transpolar route would be up to 30 per cent lesser than going through the Malacca and the Suez.
To increase its influence in the region, China has adopted two specific strategies. First, they have used trade and investments in the littoral states of Arctic with multiple projects that promise economic benefits, playing on the idea of multilateralism that the region holds and has gained relevance in the politics of the region. Second, they have invested in the Arctic oil, gas and resources. China heavily invests on the research component of the Arctic. Their major focuses are on "Arctic geology, geography, hydrology, meteorology, sea ice, biology, ecology, geophysics and marine chemistry. China also monitors "local climatic and environmental changes," collects data on "bio-ecological character and environmental quality."
Vostok 2018
Northern European and the US are all suspicious of China's intentions in the Arctic. In August 2018, China launched a joint military partnership with Russia, where China took part in the annual military exercises with Russia. It was a display of military might where the Tsugoi training range was transformed into a simulated battlefield; where the Russian and Chinese coalition fought a fictional adversary. Popularly called the Vostok, these exercises have been the largest that Russia has staged since its Cold War time drills in 1981. It became an advertisement for the growing military partnership between Moscow and Beijing.
Security and Suspicion
All players in the Arctic are viewed with suspicion but in the case of China, the actions and words mean different things. On the one hand, they are seen as promoting free and open access by also calling it 'Global Commons'; on the other, they are building their technology and military abilities to suit the requirements of the region. Xi Jinping has also placed the Polar Silk Route ambition of China on their Belt and Road program.
One way to look at it, is that China has a significant interest in the resources of the region. The other one would be that China is using the opportunity the Arctic opens and is ensuring that it part-take or even lead in being the exporter of crucial technology required in the Arctic region. As an export economy, China could just be grabbing an important opportunity. Often concerns over China's intentions are perceived alongside that of Russia's but the truth is, China and Russia too have sufficient suspicion of each other. Reality is in the middle of the two ends. Neither is China a massive threat to everything the Arctic nor is multilateralism their only goal in the Arctic.
In its Arctic report of 2018, China has clearly stated that it intends to increase its Arctic expeditions and create nautical maps for open use. These scientific interests provide China with legitimate access to the regions waters and also technical capabilities to monitor the region. According to research conducted by PLA, Arctic navigation and satellite surveillance technology have been identified as a priority by China's military establishment. This knowledge and capacity-building efforts by China is seen as a security threat in the Arctic by the US in its latest Arctic policy.
To conclude, China is balancing both its internal strategic interests as well as international skepticism of its role in the Arctic. However, multiple legal challenges remain for China, for example, China's legal stance on the Arctic contradicts its stance with the South China Sea dispute. However, one could expect them to succeed in claiming the two interests China holds; the commercial opportunities and ensuring their claims in the region are intact. China has a keen awareness of the security implications of its Arctic presence, and it is likely addressing the need to devote resources to prepare for them. Such a shift does not necessarily translate into China becoming an aggressive player in the Arctic, because many Arctic countries can be seen doing similar things to ensure their safety in the region.
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