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CWA # 1777
NIAS Africa Studies
DR Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal: A Pause than Peace

  Anu Maria Joseph
3 August 2025

On 27 June, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda signed a peace deal in Washington, ending the ongoing violent conflict in eastern DRC. According to the US-led deal, both parties have agreed to a cessation of hostilities and respect the territorial integrity. The deal additionally calls for "disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration" of armed groups in eastern Congo, and the return of refugees and displaced people.

The agreement includes a framework for the US “to expand foreign trade and investment derived from regional critical mineral supply chains,” to “link both countries, in partnership, as appropriate, with the U.S. government and U.S. investors.”

US President Trump stated: "Today, the violence and destruction come to an end, and the region begins a new chapter of hope and opportunities." Trump described the deal as "a glorious triumph."  

DRC's presidential office stated: “Another diplomatic success of President Felix Tshisekedi--certainly the most important in over 30 years."

Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe stated: "There is no doubt that the road ahead will not be easy. But with the continued support of the United States and other partners, we believe that a turning point has been reached."

A brief background to the conflict
Eastern DRC, a region sharing borders with nine other countries, has been a region of conflict for decades. The fundamental issue has been the quest to control the huge deposits of minerals, including diamond, gold, cobalt, copper, coltan, lithium, nickel and rare earths. The conflict in eastern DRC involves hundreds of non-state actors, armed groups, neighbouring countries, unresolved history, access to mineral towns and networks, ethnic tensions, territorial control and influence. 

The post-colonial tensions that persisted over land, resources and hundreds of ethnic rivalries evolved into a multidimensional crisis after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the two Congo wars that followed. Upon fear of another holocaust, several ethnic and inter-ethnic groups in the region formed armed groups to defend against each other. The mineral reserves and illegal mining and trading activities became the source of funding for the armed groups. According to the UN, currently, there are more than 120 armed groups in eastern DRC. 

Meanwhile, the DRC government always left the governance in the region to ethnic chiefdoms, and the grievances of these peripheries were never addressed. The governance problem in the region exacerbated the tensions in the region. Additionally, these armed groups have been supported by DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi at various points, acting as proxies for each country’s economic interests in the region.

The latest wave of violence began in January when M23 (an ethnic Tutsi rebel group supported by Rwanda) captured the regional capitals of the North and South Kivu provinces, Goma and Bukavu. According to the UN, the renewed conflict has killed more than 7000 people and displaced more than 350,000. 

Major Actors
The DRC. The conflict is happening in the eastern provinces (North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri) of the DRC. The country wants to regain territories lost to the rebels and prevent them from capturing more. DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting M23 rebels with weapons and troops, and invading Congolese territory to loot minerals. A UN report in 2024 supported the DRC’s claims, which have been accepted by many African and Western countries.

Rwanda. The link between the M23 rebels and Rwanda is the Tutsi kinship. The minority Tutsi community in eastern DRC, who migrated from Rwanda to the region over centuries, has always been considered "foreigners" by other communities. However, the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, formed after the genocide in 1994, has been supporting its DRC kin or M23, ever since, for two reasons: To use the group to fight and stop the FDLR from expanding and returning and accessing the mineral deposits in eastern DRC. 

M23. M23, or March 23, an ethnic Tutsi-led group in eastern DRC, was formed in 2012. It is a breakaway group from the National Congress for the Defence of People (NCDP), a rebel group that fought for the rights of minority Tutsis in eastern DRC after the Congo wars. M23 was formed against the Hutus who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC over the fear of persecution for carrying out the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Hutus who fled Rwanda after the genocide formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in eastern DRC. Since then, Rwanda has accused the DRC of supporting FDLR against the minority Tutsis in eastern DRC. The group was named after the date of the 23 March 2009 peace agreement. In 2013, M23’s offensive was thwarted by the UN and DRC forces. In 2021, the group reemerged and has been continuing its violent campaign in the region with support from the Rwandan. While currently the group is in absolute control of two cities and mining towns across South and North Kivu, it seems to have come closer to achieving its objectives of territorial control, access to minerals, regional and political influence, and protection of Tutsi minorities.

The Road to Peace
Initially, the peace mediations in eastern DRC have been led by Angola. However, Angola's efforts for direct talks between M23 and the DRC in March were unsuccessful when M23 withdrew at the last moment. In March, Qatar successfully hosted ceasefire talks between President Tshisekedi and President Kagame. However, the agreed ceasefire remained redundant as M23 was not involved in the discussions, the ceasefire conditions were unclear, and M23 had less incentive to withdraw from Goma and Bukavu. In April, Qatar mediated a truce between M23 and the DRC after direct talks in Doha. Qatari-led truce laid the foundations for peace mediations before the US took the lead.

In March, DRC proposed a critical mineral deal with the US in return for security assistance to combat rebellion in eastern DRC. Although historically the US has been hesitant to provide any military assistance to the DRC military over human rights allegations, DRC being the largest supplier of cobalt and a major producer of lithium, tantalum and uranium, the US was convinced. And for Congo, the deal will diversify its mineral sectors away from Chinese domination. The US-led mediations began when the US envoy to Africa, Massad Boulos, visited Rwanda and the DRC in April, where he mentioned interest in the mineral deal with the DRC. On the same day, Rwanda and DRC signed the Declaration of Principles on mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and peaceful settlement of disputes. 

What does the Agreement say?
The heart of the deal is mutual commitment from the DRC and Rwanda to respect territorial integrity and end hostilities. According to which, Rwanda has agreed to withdraw its troops from the Congolese territory within 90 days, and both parties would bring an “irreversible and verifiable end” to supporting rebel groups.

Secondly, the agreement calls for disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration of armed groups, humanitarian access, return of displaced people and reaffirmation of the mandate of the UN mission in Congo. Additionally, they have established a joint security mechanism to carry out the implementation of the peace deal with the US and Qatar as observers. They have also committed to a “regional economic integration framework” to be signed in July.

The sharing of critical minerals is not mentioned in the peace agreement. While Trump has placed the deal in his wider global peace pursuits, the critical minerals section is expected to feature separately in the “regional economic integration framework.”

Major Issues
First, the deal lacks inclusivity. Rwanda and the DRC are not the only actors in the conflict. The conflict involves more than 120 armed groups, including the M23. While peace talks were held between Congo and Rwanda, separate talks on armed groups were held in Doha between Congo and M23. The exclusion of M23 and other rebel groups in the peace agreement and leaving the discussions on disengagement of armed groups in Doha have cast doubts on the feasibility of the peace agreement. The coordinator of the M23-affiliated Congo River Alliance (ARC), Corneille Nangar, criticised the US deal as “limited” and undermined the Doha process. M23 executive secretary, Benjamin Mbonimpa, said: “Our problems are different from what was dealt with in Washington.”

Besides the armed groups, several neighbouring countries are stakeholders in the conflict. Burundi has hostile ties with Rwanda since the two Congo wars. Ugandan forces have been helping Congolese forces to hunt down the Uganda-based armed group, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), active in eastern DRC. Further, the African Union, the East Africa Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Angola, which led the previous peace efforts, were not included during the peace talks.

Second, the previous record of failed peace efforts. The Eastern DRC has a history of multiple failed peace agreements and initiatives. One of the most comprehensive peace agreements following the Second Congo War (1998-2003) was the Addis Ababa Agreement 2013. The agreement and the deployment of the UN mission contained M23’s campaign temporarily. It called on Rwanda to adhere to international law, respect Congo’s sovereignty and refrain from assisting armed groups. However, the agreement failed, and M23 reemerged in 2021. The DRC government asked the UN mission, MONUSCO, to withdraw in 2024 after failing to operationalise its mandate effectively. 

Following M23’s re-emergence, there were two major initiatives—the East Africa Community (EAC) brokered “Nairobi Process” and Angola-led “Luanda Process.” The Nairobi Process focused on disarmament and demobilisation of the armed groups, and the Luanda Process dealt with the DRC-Rwanda political issues. But, both failed when M23 captured Goma and Bukavu in January. Eastern DRC’s record of failed peace efforts is attributed to multiple issues, including lack of incentives, commitment and compliance, inclusiveness, conflicting demands, and ethnic tensions.

Third, limitations of the US-led peace deal. The US deal focuses on the economic aspects of the conflict. The deal would potentially pressure DRC and Rwanda to resolve the dispute over the control of mineral regions and end the support to the armed groups. While more emphasis was given to the territorial and resource disputes, the deal undermined the root causes and the multidimensional conflicts in the region. It lacks clarity on how the mineral resources would be shared and the disputes would be resolved. Besides, one of the shortcomings of the US-led deal, raised by several human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, has been the lack of accountability for the war crimes. Amnesty International responded to the deal: “Without addressing impunity for the horrific crimes committed in eastern DRC, the agreement missed an opportunity to decisively tackle a long-standing driver of the conflict.” The deal raises the question of whether peace can be sustained without justice. 

Fourth, the challenge of demobilisation. The signatories of the deal have taken a unilateral decision on the disengagement and disarmament of the hundreds of armed groups active in the region. These armed groups have been assimilated into the society, making the commitment from the groups to disarm and demobilise almost impossible. On the day the deal was signed, AFP reported that the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) militia killed ten people in an attack on a displaced people’s camp. The continuing attacks by several armed groups despite the peace deal underscore the major challenge of enforcing the demobilisation. Neither the deal nor the signatories seem to have the institutional capacity to disarm and demobilise all armed groups in the region until and unless the underlying issues, grievances and root causes are addressed.

Fifth, scepticism over US entry into the region. The deal’s focus on economic aspects and the US interest in acquiring DRC’s vast mineral resources have led to accusations that the deal is more of a trade agreement than a peace initiative. The Congolese perspective on the US deal is divided. Many expect that the deal and US entry into the region would pressure the armed groups to disarm and demobilise, and bring stability in the region. Many are hopeful that the US entry into the DRC’s mineral sector would end the monopoly of Chinese companies. Besides, it would be a new entry for the West in West Africa to change the anti-West narratives and counter the Russian security presence. However, for many, the US involvement has brought more fear. They are sceptical that the deal will ultimately lead to the US exploiting Congo’s natural wealth, without benefiting the country. They fear that American peace would be forced upon them, similar to that of Iran and Afghanistan.

Challenges Ahead
The deal, although debated, is a major achievement towards peace in eastern Congo. However, it poses more challenges than opportunities. 

First, a long-term peace is elusive. The deal will stay if all parties to the conflict commit and comply with its implementation. Considering DRC’s record of failed peace initiatives and the number of actors involved, commitment and compliance appear to be almost impossible. Or else, the deal includes monitoring and implementing mechanisms. However, the mechanisms of implementation, inclusivity and accountability were left open-ended during the peace talks. 

Second, the absence of armed groups in the peace deal. Although Rwanda and DRC have agreed to stop supporting the armed groups, the hundreds of these groups did not sign any peace agreement. These groups can fund their activities on their own through illegal mineral trade. And, DRC lacks the institutional strength to bring all the armed groups to adhere to the deal. The success of the US deal would depend on the Qatari-led mediations with the armed groups. A peace that does not involve these armed groups would not be a peace at all.

Third, still, the deal is unlikely to end the decades-long conflict. Root causes of unresolved history, ethnic tensions and debated land ownership policies were not discussed during the peace talks. It implies that although the deal might be able to contain violence, an end to the conflict in eastern DRC is unlikely to happen. The potential of another violent recurrence is likely, impling that the peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda is more of a pause to the conflict than a peace.

About the author
Anu Maria Joseph is a Project Associate at NIAS.

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