Conflict Weekly 300th Issue

CWA # 1823
Conflict Weekly 300th Issue
Europe, US and the War in Ukraine: Promise vs Support
Europe

Conflict Weekly 300, 25 September 2025, Vol 6, No. 38

Abhiruchi Chowdhury
25 September 2025
Photo Source: Reuters

On 27 February 2022, Russia initiated a war against Ukraine, which continues to date. The objective of initiating hostilities against Ukraine, as per Russian President Vladimir Putin, was to prevent the country from joining NATO and protect the civilians who spoke Russian.  Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has received support and assistance from the US and European countries for countering the Russian assault. 

The following are the five takeaways drawn from the actions of Europe and the US. 

1. Declining military support to Ukraine
Withdrawal of the US and Europe, taking the lead in providing all-around support to Ukraine. In May, Europe (the European Union, Switzerland, Norway, the UK, and Iceland) surpassed the US in terms of providing military aid through defence procurement to Ukraine. Till June, Europe has approximately contributed EUR 35 billion in comparison to the US’s EUR 30.7 billion as military aid to Ukraine via defence purchases. In July, Trump had agreed to send arms to Ukraine under a new deal agreed with NATO, according to which the supplied arms and ammunition would be financed by the European countries. Further, when it comes to total financial support, which includes military, financial, and humanitarian assistance, Europe contributed approximately USD 166 billion in comparison to the US’s USD 130.6 billion. 

2. Contrasting positions over Russia sanctions
There is a contrast between the EU and the US in imposing sanctions against Russia after Trump assumed the US Presidency. According to the government of the UK, the sanctions imposed by the US, UK and the EU on Russia have resulted in the latter getting devoid of approximately USD 450 billion. Under the Trump administration, the US has adopted a divergent position in comparison to the EU when it comes to imposing sanctions to push Russia to end the war. On one hand, Trump has demanded that the EU impose sanctions on China and India, which are the top two purchasers of Russian oil. The Trump administration is clearly reluctant to impose any new sanctions against Russia and has instead imposed 25 per cent additional duties on imports from India for purchasing Russian oil. The EU, on the other hand, is keen to impose further sanctions against Russia. However, it has remained unsuccessful in convincing Trump to do the same. 

3. The uncertain future of “coalition of the willing” countries. 
After Zelenskyy’s disastrous meeting with Trump at the White House in February, France and the UK took the lead in forming a group called “the coalition of the willing.” The group has more than 30 countries that have expressed their readiness to provide security reassurances to Ukraine after the war comes to an end. The coalition of willing countries sees the security of post-war Ukraine connected with their own security against Russia. Nevertheless, what kind of security assurances the coalition of willing countries could agree upon and effectively provide remains unclear. Russia would never accept the proposition of putting European troops anywhere in Ukraine.  When it comes to the US, Trump has publicly stated that it would assist the coalition of willing countries in providing security to Ukraine after the war comes to an end. However, he vehemently dismissed the idea of putting US troops for the security of Ukraine. Trump’s recent actions and statements with regards to NATO and the EU clearly signify that the US’s involvement in providing finances to the coalition of willing would remain minimal. In the absence of the US from the scene and Russia’s strong reservations against the security assurances, the future of the “coalition of the willing” does not seem bright, which in turn means that Ukraine might remain vulnerable to Russian aggression even when the war comes to an end.  

4. Trump’s unsuccessful discussions and meeting with Putin
The self-proclaimed peacemaker has badly failed in achieving a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, let alone putting a complete end to the war. On 15 August, Trump and Putin held their first in-person meeting in Alaska since the start of the Ukraine war. Trump remained unsuccessful in achieving his stated aim of pushing Russia to cease all hostilities against Ukraine. The meeting was followed by a devastating missile and drone assault by Russia on Kyiv on 28 August, in which 21 people lost their lives. However, this was not the first time that Trump-Putin did not yield into positive result for the region and was instead followed by drone and missile attacks. Trump had also hinted at a future meeting between the Russian and the Ukrainian President, which the world continues to await. 

5. Dismissive attitude of Trump towards Zelenskyy
Trump, time and again, has put the onus for the initiation of war on Zelenskyy. In February, Trump had labelled Zelenskyy as “dictator” and asserted that his approval ratings hovered around four per cent, justifying the need for fresh elections in Ukraine. On 28 February, Trump met Zelenskyy for the first time at the White House, which turned out to be a shouting contest between the two leaders. During the meeting, Trump asserted that Ukraine would not be able to win the war and stated that the Ukrainian President could be responsible for the initiation of the third world war. In April, Trump questioned the competency of the Ukrainian President, claiming that he had an opportunity to stop the war. In August, after meeting Putin, Trump claimed that the Ukrainian President can end the war “immediately,” implying that the war continues to go on because of Zelenskyy.   

About the authors
Abhiruchi Chowdhury is an independent scholar based in Delhi.


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