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Sunidhi Sampige & Tanvi Harendra
8 December 2025 |
What happened?
On 4 December, President Putin arrived in New Delhi, marking his first visit to India in four years. PM Narendra Modi greeted Putin personally upon his arrival. The two leaders met for a private dinner at the Prime Minister's residence.
On 5 December, Modi and Putin co-chaired the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit, which aimed to strengthen economic, defence, and technology cooperation. On 2 December, the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, provided its assent to the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistic Support (RELOS). The agreement, originally signed on 18 February 2025, contains procedures for dispatching Russian military formations, warships, and aircraft to India, as well as for managing mutual logistical support.
On 5 December, India's Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman met with her Russian counterpart Anton Siluanov to encourage Russia to increase imports from India and to promote Russian investment in India; also to develop projects in the energy sector, infrastructure, digital payment systems, and SMES, to achieve USD 100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030. The same day, India's Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and his Russian counterpart, Andrey Belousov, discussed increasing collaboration in the production and maintenance of military platforms, as well as expanding joint training and exercises. They also discussed how India and Russia could use the Logistic Support Agreement to improve the operations of their respective militaries, provide each other with access to bases and supplies during joint exercises and operations, and develop capabilities for planning support.
On 5 December, Russia and India signed multiple strategic and economic agreements. The new economic cooperation programme, covering trade and investment, will continue through to 2030 and form the foundation for an FTA with the Eurasian Economic Union. As part of the agreement, Russia promised to supply India with fuel continuously for an indefinite period. Both countries also agreed to deepen their energy and critical minerals relationship by developing small modular reactors and floating nuclear power plants, and by establishing shipping routes through the Arctic. In addition, Indian businesses reached an agreement with Russia's URALCHEM to build a urea production facility in Russia.
What is the background?
First, rekindling and strengthening of the bilateral relations. Since December 2021, Putin has not visited India; therefore, there have been no official meetings between the leaders during this period while Russia was engaged in military action in Ukraine and subject to increasing Western sanctions. Russia's invasion of Ukraine made India take a neutral approach to the situation. The current visit is aimed at reinvigorating the bilateral ties.
Second, the sanctions and the oil imports. Numerous European countries reduced their dependence on Russian oil and gas. Moscow began to look toward greater trade with East Asia, including China and India. India significantly increased its imports of Russian oil and gas at discounted rates, making Russia its largest energy supplier. India's inflation fell, and energy was secured; India provided Russia with an alternative market despite Western restrictions.
Third, the pressure on India on its Russia relations. India was being pressured by the US and its allies to keep a distance from Russia, especially in the defence sector. The US has repeatedly raised the issue under CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act), which allows the imposition of sanctions on nations that enter into significant defence deals with Russia. India's purchase of the S-400 air defence system from Russia had attracted attention.
What does it mean?
Putin's visit to India has both symbolic and strategic relevance for both. For Russia, the visit is a diplomatic gesture that shows it still has strong global allies despite Western sanctions and isolation. The interaction with India contributes to Russia refuting the statement of total isolation on the international stage and strengthening its pivot towards Asia as a long-term strategic angle. For India, the visit is an indication of its current policy of strategic autonomy, and a reaffirmation that New Delhi will not succumb to external pressure to dictate its foreign policies.
Second, the evolving nature of the global order. As the level of great power rivalry increases, India is shaping itself to be capable of dealing with the other blocs, yet not necessarily taking a loyalty test to either of them. This gives India the ability to get economic advantage, ally with countries in defence, and increase its leverage on the international front.
About the authors
Sunidhi Sampige & Tanvi Harendra are Research Interns at NIAS.
