ICE Crackdowns and Resistance in the US I Trilateral Talks on Ukraine

CWA # 1948

Conflict Weekly

ICE Crackdowns and Resistance in the US I Trilateral Talks on Ukraine

Conflict Weekly 317, 30 January 2026, Vol 7, No. 4

31 January 2026

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Conflict Weekly Focus Note
The United States: ICE Crackdowns, Rising Resistance and the Political/Legal pushback
R Preetha

In the news
On 24 January, federal immigration agents fatally shot a US citizen, Alex Pretti, in Minneapolis during an immigration enforcement operation, leading to protests and outrage across the city and elsewhere.

On 26 January, the Department of Homeland Security replaced the head Border Patrol official for the Minnesota mission with the White House's border tsar.

On 27 January, in a Fox News interview, President Trump stated that the administration is "going to de-escalate a little bit" in Minnesota. “I don’t think it’s a pullback. It’s a little bit of a change,” he added.

On 28 January, according to internal guidance reviewed by Reuters, ICE officers in Minnesota were directed to avoid engaging with "agitators" and focus on "targeted enforcement of aliens with a criminal history.” Reuters also reported that several Democratic-led US states are pushing for legislation to allow individuals to sue ICE agents over civil rights violations.

Issues at large
First, President Trump’s immigration agenda. For Trump, illegal migration constitutes an “invasion” and is a matter of US national security, public safety and economic stability. Since returning to office in 2025, President Trump has framed immigration enforcement as a core duty, committing to execute “the largest domestic deportation operation” in American history. For him, the federal government failed over the past four years to control borders and protect citizens. This reflected in his 20 January 2025 executive order “Protecting the American People Against Invasion,” which states that “Enforcing our Nation’s immigration laws is critically important to the national security and public safety of the United States.” It points to undocumented migrants as sources of crime, espionage, terrorism and fiscal burden, and calls for the “total and efficient” enforcement of immigration laws. His administration justifies centralisation and expansion of federal power over immigration enforcement, including expanded deportations, expedited removals and mobilising multiple federal agencies to support mass enforcement. Unlike previous administrations that prioritised criminals or security threats, Trump targets all undocumented migrants.

Second, the ICE raids. There have been controversies over enforcement methods, accountability and civil rights across US cities. Besides Minneapolis, large-scale raids have taken place in cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago and Charlotte, with federal agents reportedly detaining thousands and arresting nearly 3,000 people in Minnesota alone under Operation Metro Surge. According to a Reuters report, at least 30 people died in ICE custody in 2025, the highest record in over two decades. Early 2026 has already seen at least six deaths in ICE detention centers.

Third, Trump’s immigration agenda and the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” The latter significantly increased immigration enforcement and border security funding to over USD 170 billion by 2029. Supporters state that ICE raids are required to restore law and order, whereas critics point out that the administration's enforcement approach has breached legal boundaries, federal–state relations and violated civil rights.

Fourth, legal/political responses and the pushback. Following the protests and deaths linked to ICE operations, several Democratic-led states have moved to expand legal accountability for federal agents. In December 2025, Illinois became the first state to pass a law allowing individuals to sue federal immigration officers in state courts for civil rights violations. The US Justice Department filed a lawsuit seeking to block it, arguing that it violates the Constitution’s “Supremacy Clause.” Similar legislation is under consideration in California, New York, Virginia, Maryland and Connecticut, addressing what supporters describe as a legal gap, as existing federal law permits lawsuits against state and local officials (including police) but not individual federal agents.

In perspective
First, the violence in Minneapolis raises the question of whether the incident marks a turning point or simply a course correction in US immigration enforcement. Media reports point out that the shootings have caused bipartisan scrutiny, protests and diplomatic fallout. As per a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll, Trump’s public approval rate declined to 39 per cent, the lowest since his return to the office. This shows that the aggressive enforcement approach is creating a shift in public sentiment.

Second, the immigration agenda helped Trump win in 2024, but the Minneapolis incident, along with concerns over civil rights, legal measures and protests, has led to a decline in support ahead of the midterm elections. At the same time, enforcement operations continue after making adjustments in Minneapolis towards a more targeted approach. The broader impact can possibly be seen in legal and institutional changes, including state efforts to allow civil suits against federal agents.

Conflict Weekly Focus Note
The War in Ukraine: The Trilateral Talks, and the Deadlock over Donetsk & Security Guarantees for Kyiv
Lekshmi MK

In the news
On 24 January, Ukraine, Russia and the United States held peace talks in Abu Dhabi after previous negotiations in Moscow and Berlin. Russia’s demand to withdraw Kyiv's forces from the Donbas remains a major sticking point that Kyiv firmly rejects. There has been no sign of compromise on the territorial dispute. As the talks continued, Russian forces carried out air strikes on Kyiv and other areas. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister said that Russia launched attacks on Ukraine during the talks, calling the timing “cynical.”

On 26 January, the media reported that Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that the US-backed security guarantees document for Ukraine is “100% ready,” following the trilateral peace talks in Abu Dhabi. President Zelensky said the agreement underscores Ukraine’s need for US security guarantees, while reaffirming Kyiv’s stance on territorial integrity.

On 28 January, the media reported that Russia and Ukraine negotiators are to meet again on Sunday in Abu Dhabi, with possible participation by US officials. The Financial Times reported that the Trump administration has signalled to Ukraine that future US security guarantees may be tied to Kyiv agreeing to a peace deal that would involve ceding control of the Donbas region to Russia.

On 29 January, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the issue of control over Donetsk as “very difficult” and still requiring work to bridge differences between Moscow and Kyiv at US-mediated talks. He said there might be a US presence in follow-up talks.

Issues at large
First, the stalemate over territorial integrity and security guarantees. The primary issue has been over Ukraine’s insistence on preserving its territorial integrity and its demand for credible US security guarantees. Reports indicate that Washington is signalling that such security assurances may be tied to Ukraine agreeing to withdraw from areas of Donetsk. This places Ukraine in a difficult position, where securing future protection appears to depend on accepting the present territorial compromise.

Second, continuing disagreement over Donetsk. The disagreement over control of parts of Donetsk in the Donbas region remains a key sticking point in the peace talks. Russia wants Ukraine to withdraw its forces from areas of Donetsk that Kyiv still holds. Moscow sees full control of this region as necessary for any lasting settlement. However, Ukraine strongly opposes leaving these areas, as doing so would entail giving up more territory and weakening its position. For Kyiv, such a move would undermine its sovereignty and appear to accept territorial loss by force. This unresolved territorial disagreement over Donetsk continues to slow progress in the negotiations.

Third, the narrowing focus of negotiations. As the talks progress, the focus of the discussions has become narrower and more specific. Earlier, negotiations covered broad issues such as ceasefire arrangements, humanitarian concerns, and general security matters. Now, the talks are mainly centred on difficult territorial questions, especially the status of Donetsk and the wider Donbas region. This shift shows that both sides realise that without addressing core territorial disputes, no agreement can be reached. As a result, other issues have taken a back seat while negotiators try to resolve the most sensitive and decisive matters first.

Fourth, continuing Russian military strikes and the issue of trust. Even as peace talks continue, Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities have not stopped. Missile and drone attacks during negotiations show that the war is still active on the ground. These attacks create a serious trust problem between the two sides. Ukraine sees the strikes as a sign that Russia is not fully committed to diplomacy and may use military pressure to strengthen its position at the negotiation. The continuing strikes highlight the fragile and uncertain nature of the peace process.

In perspective
First, a settlement would require Ukraine to make tough decisions over its territory and securing long-term US security guarantees. It also shows that peace may come with compromises that Kyiv earlier refused to consider.

Second, the US neutrality. Its security guarantees to Kyiv, linked to Ukraine's acceptance of territorial compromise, raise questions about Washington’s neutrality.

Third, Russia leverages military pressure to shape negotiations. Russia’s actions on the ground show that it is using the battlefield to gain an advantage in negotiations. This creates pressure on Ukraine and shapes the tone of diplomacy. Instead of building trust, these attacks remind all sides that Russia holds military leverage. Russia may use it to push for favourable terms in any possible agreement.

CW Column: Conflicts in Africa
Africa:
Renewed violence in Ethiopia and a Jihadist attack in Niger
Anu Maria Joseph

What happened this week?
1. Ethiopia
On 29 January, Al Jazeera reported clashes between the Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray region. The fighting broke out in Tsemlet, in western Tigray, which has been claimed by forces from the neighbouring Amhara region. Following renewed clashes, flights to the region were suspended. Al Jazeera quoted the security sources: “The situation appears to be deteriorating."

2. Niger
On 29 January, the BBC reported that a jihadist group attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport outside Niger's capital, Niamey. According to Niger's Ministry of Defence, four military personnel were injured, and 20 attackers were killed. Military leader General Abdourahamane Tiani stated: "We commend all the defence and security forces... as well as Russian partners who defended their security sector with professionalism." On the same day, Niger's military government accused France, Benin and the Ivory Coast of supporting the assault on the airport. Tiani stated: “We have heard them bark, they should be ready to hear us roar."

What are the issues?
1. Ethiopia’s Tigray problem, renewed conflict and worsening humanitarian crisis
Ethiopia's Tigray problem has been ongoing since 2021. The one-year conflict between the TPLF and the federal forces during 2021-2022 killed more than 600,000 people. The conflict began when Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, ending the TPLF's decades of political domination. TPLF accused Abiy's administration of marginalising the Tigray community and the region. The tensions escalated into violent conflict when TPLF attacked the Northern Command headquarters of the federal forces. The conflict ended with the November 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement.

However, despite the agreement, Tigray remained fragile due to several disagreements, the lack of full implementation of the peace agreement, and post-agreement violence. Only half of the 2.1 million IDPs have returned. WFP reported that because of the budget cuts related to the USAID blockade, WFP has closed its office in the Shire region, which hosts the largest number of IDPs. According to the WFP, 80 per cent of the population needs emergency support.

Meanwhile, the post-agreement initiatives of the Abiy administration triggered ethnic violence across other regions, including Amhara and Oromia. The skirmishes began after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed demanded all ethnic militias, including Amhara’s Fano militia, Tigray’s TPLF and Oromo’s Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), to be integrated into the Ethiopian federal force following the Tigray peace agreement. In early 2025, internal divisions within the TPLF were reported regarding the interim administration of Tigray, leading to a brief instance of violence in Mekelle in March 2025.

Recently, the tensions have been increasing in the contested area of Tselemti in western Tigray ahead of the June general elections. According to the BBC report, the armed forces from Amhara occupied the Tselemti region, which became the source of the renewed conflict.

2. Niger’s growing jihadist violence and external tensions
Niger is ranked fifth in the Global Terrorism Index 2025 after Burkina Faso, Pakistan, Syria and Mali. According to ACLED, attacks by jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State have killed nearly 2,000 people in Niger in 2025. The jihadist attacks in Niger increased after the military coup in 2023. During 2023-2025, Niger's military forced out the French and the US troops, which were helping in combating jihadists, citing years of failure. Meanwhile, Niger, along with other neighbouring military-run governments from Burkina Faso and Mali, formed the Alliance of Sahel states and recently announced the creation of a 5000-member force for joint military operations. The airport, which was attacked, is the headquarters of the joint force.

In 2024, Russia emerged as a new security partner following the withdrawal of the French and the US from the region. Ever since the coup and Russia's entry, Niger's relations with France have strained. The military claims that Western powers, especially France, want to destabilise and interfere in the country's internal affairs. Additionally, the military accuses Benin and the Ivory Coast of hosting foreign intelligence and hostile foreign troops. While the military has accused France, the Ivory Coast and Benin of sponsoring the jihadist attack on the airport without any evidence to back the claims, there are no official responses from the countries.

What does it mean?
In Ethiopia, the new wave of violence has triggered fear of a resurgence of violent conflict after three years of fragile peace. While the key issues related to the peace deal, Tigray administration, integration of ethnic armed forces, territorial disputes and tensions between and within ethnic factions persist, Tigray and regions around are prone to recurrent violent ethnic conflicts and resurgence of another civil conflict.

In Niger, ever since the coup, the military government has shifted from Western alliances towards a non-interference-based Russian alliance. However, the security situation has steadily worsened after the coup. The attack on the airport reflects increasing vulnerability to the expanding insurgency, tensions with France and the neighbouring countries and a major regional challenge to the Sahel Alliance.

CW Column: Conflicts in the Middle East
The Middle East:
US threats against Iran, and Phase Two operations in Gaza
Brighty Ann Sarah

What happened this week?
1. Iran
On 29 January, according to media reports, the US was considering measures against Iran, including targeted strikes on security forces and leadership aimed at inspiring protesters and initiating regime change. On 28 January, Trump reiterated his warning: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran…. Like with Venezuela, it is ready, willing and able to rapidly fulfil its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” He demanded that Iran agree to a “NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS” deal.

Earlier, on 24 January, Iran’s top military official responded to Trump's warnings, stating that any attack would be treated "as an all-out war against us," adding that "our military is ready for the worst-case scenario.”

On 23 January, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on nine vessels known as Iran's shadow fleet and eight related firms that transport and trade Iranian oil and petroleum products to foreign markets. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the “critical component of how Iran generates the funds used to repress its own people.

2. Gaza
On 22 January, the US presented development plans for “New Gaza,” rebuilt from scratch, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The reconstruction efforts are set to start from Rafah. On the same day, the US-backed Palestinian technocrat leader announced that the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza would open in the upcoming week.

On 23 January, an exclusive Reuters report revealed that Israel seeks to restrict the number of Palestinians entering Gaza through the Rafah crossing, with the aim of ensuring that more people leave the territory than enter it.

On 27 January, Gaza’s Hamas-run government urged its civil servants and security personnel to cooperate with the 15-member National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).

On 28 January, the US informed the UN Security Council that the demilitarization of Gaza will include decommissioning weapons through an agreed process "supported by an internationally funded buyback" program, suggesting that Hamas members would be given funds or jobs in exchange for surrendering their weapons.

What are the issues?
1. Iran: Trump’s shifting goal posts and escalating uncertainty
Trump’s initial warnings of military action against Iran were framed around the killing of protesters and assurances of US support. However, the latest remarks signal a clear shift toward targeting Tehran’s nuclear programme, with negotiations conditioned on a permanent halt to uranium enrichment, new restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, and an end to support for regional proxy groups.

2. Gaza: Ambiguities over the “limited opening” and broader questions over “New Gaza”
Despite the return of all hostages and their remains, the Rafah crossing remains tightly restricted and heavily surveilled. While Egypt had earlier stressed that the crossing would reopen only if both entry into and exit from Gaza were ensured, PM Netanyahu has stated that only around 50 Gazans will be permitted to re-enter the enclave per day. This prioritisation of outward movement over return risks concentrating populations in southern Gaza, with the establishment of camps around Rafah potentially resulting in the forced settlement of civilians in the area.

As the second phase advances, pressure on Hamas to disarm has also intensified. Washington oscillates between threats of total military annihilation to offering amnesty and buy-back programmes to influence fighters to surrender their weapons. Although Hamas has expressed openness to disarmament talks, the viability of their disarmament while the core demands of full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and recognition of Palestinian statehood remain unmet is uncertain. Further, Hamas’ demands for the 10000-member police force to be integrated into the (NCAG) directly contradicts the provisions of Trump’s Board of Peace, which prohibits “foreign terrorist organizations” from participating in governance.

The “New Gaza” initiative centres on ambitious urban redevelopment, as the US “Master Plan” map designates areas for coastal tourism featuring high-rise towers, residential districts, industrial complexes, data centres, advanced manufacturing hubs and other facilities. While the reconstruction strategy seeks to attract large-scale private investment, with the US government committing 20 per cent, it largely sidesteps immediate rehabilitation needs, questions of property rights and compensation and arrangements for displaced Palestinians during rebuilding. In this sense, the initiative closely echoes the ethos of Trump’s earlier vision of transforming Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East.”

What does it mean?
For Iran, the new wave of confrontations indicates Washington’s attempts to escalate the threat perception to coerce negotiations. The imminent US strike threat is likely to weaken the already fragile political ecosystem, forcing Tehran to balance internal stability. Another flare-up of domestic protests and crackdowns could trigger US action, justified as intervention.

For Gaza, phase two advancement leaves fundamental questions unresolved. While Hamas faces mounting pressure to demilitarise, its demands remain unaddressed, adding to the uncertainty over the process. The Rafah crossing’s continued “limited opening” undermines the return of Palestinians, as the reconstruction plans prioritise investment potential over humanitarian needs.

Peace and Conflict This Week:
Regional Roundups
Brighty Ann Sarah, R Preetha, Lekshmi MK, Aparna A Nair, Yesasvi Koganti, Aishwarya D Pai, and Tonica Sharon

China, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
China: Arrest of top military commander marks “profound shift” in China’s politics, observes Reuters; Taiwan will remain on guard and monitor the “abnormal changes” in China’s leadership, says Defence Minister
On 26 January, a Reuters special report observed that the arrest of Gen. Zhang Youxia, senior vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and second in command under President Xi Jinping, marks a “profound shift” in Chinese politics. Gen Youxia was arrested on 24 January “for suspected serious violations of discipline and law.” Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC's Joint Staff Department, was also placed under investigation, shrinking the seven-member body into two, with Xi at the top. Citing leading China analysts, the report highlighted that the probe into the CCP’s top brass marks a scale-up in Xi’s long-running anti-corruption efforts, concentrating even more power with the president and further obscuring China’s already secretive military command. Based on the developments, the report suggests that a near-term attack on Taiwan is unlikely.
On the same day, Taiwan’s Defence Minister Wellington Koo stated that Taipei will “closely monitor abnormal changes among the top levels of China's party, government, and military leadership.” He added that Taiwan would employ a mix of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, along with intelligence sharing, to assess China’s possible intentions. “We won't let the downfall of any one person make us lower our guard or slacken the level of war preparedness we should maintain,” he stated, adding that the Chinese threat was clearly intensifying, citing war games, daily military activity and rising defence spending, and warned that Taiwan could not afford to lower its guard.

Myanmar: Intense fighting near the Dhanyawaddy naval HQ leaves civilians dead in Kyaukphyu drone strikes
On 26 January, Mizzima reported that fierce clashes had broken out near the Dhanyawaddy Naval Headquarters in Kyaukphyu Township, Rakhine State, as the Arakan Army (AA) mounts a decisive push along key access routes. Fighting is most intense in Zin Chaung, Thaing Chaung, and U-Kin villages along the strategic road to the base, with the military reportedly deploying army, navy, and air force units to hold ground. Local reports say air and drone strikes followed AA attacks on reinforcement routes, amid civilian casualties from village bombardments. While casualty figures remain unconfirmed, Rakhine-based media reported deaths among displaced elderly civilians and injuries to others.

Myanmar: The opposition rejects the election as illegitimate
On 28 January, Mizzima reported that Myanmar’s opposition leaders and ethnic representatives have categorically rejected the military-planned election, arguing that it lacks both domestic and international legitimacy and will neither bring peace nor political stability. Speaking during an online public panel, leaders from the National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and the Pa-O National Federal Council (PNFC) cited widespread public resistance, low participation in census and election preparations, and the exclusion of major 2020 election-winning parties such as the NLD as evidence that the process does not reflect popular will. They further criticised the military-controlled Union Election Commission, complaints by participating parties over flawed procedures, and the absence of political freedoms under martial law, warning that the polls would merely reproduce authoritarian rule. The speakers also stressed that the election violates ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and UN Security Council Resolution 2669, is unlikely to gain international recognition, and will not end the conflict, as armed resistance and parallel political processes will continue outside the junta framework.

Myanmar: The nationalists protest the Rohingya genocide case at the UN court
On 28 January, Mizzima reported that hundreds of Myanmar nationalist activists and Buddhist monks staged a rare, military-permitted protest in Yangon against the genocide case brought against the country at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over atrocities committed against the Rohingya minority. Demonstrators rejected allegations of ethnic cleansing, asserting that Myanmar’s 2017 military crackdown targeted militancy rather than civilians, despite UN findings that executions, sexual violence and mass displacement forced over one million Rohingya into Bangladesh. The protest coincided with ongoing ICJ hearings, which began on January 12, even as critics note that a guilty verdict, though unenforceable, would further isolate Myanmar internationally, where several states already recognise the crackdown as genocide and have sanctioned junta leader Min Aung Hlaing following the 2021 coup.

South Asia
India-US tariff tensions: Treasury Secretary Bessent indicates possible US tariff relief for India as Russian oil imports reduce
On 24 January, Reuters reported that following India's reduction in Russian oil imports, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent indicated the potential removal of an additional 25 per cent tariff on India. Speaking to Politico at the World Economic Forum, Bessent stated Indian refiners had sharply reduced purchases of Russian oil, calling the outcome “a success.” He noted that the 25 per cent tariffs linked to Russian oil imports remain in place but suggested there could be a pathway to lifting them. I would imagine there is a path to take them off." On 23 January, Reuters said that in December, India imported the least Russian oil in two years, raising OPEC’s share of its crude imports to an 11-month high. Bessent’s comments come amid growing pressure from President Trump, who has warned that tariffs could be raised further if India does not further scale back its purchases of Russian oil.

Nepal: Governments keep ignoring Nepal's human rights body’s recommendations, says the Kathmandu Post
On 28 January, The Kathmandu Post reported that the executive's stance on the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in Nepal has not changed, even after the establishment of a civilian government with a record of supporting human rights. The Karki government, like its predecessors, has not implemented the commission’s recommendations to date, with only 13.29 per cent of the 1,618 complaints being addressed since the commission was formed in 2000. After the fire that allegedly destroyed the commission’s recommendations, there has been no progress, even after the recommendations were resubmitted to the government. Violations of human rights during the Maoist insurgency remain unaddressed, and the implementation of the NHRC Act is weak. The government admits that implementation has been poor for several reasons, while the NHRC continues to call for changes in policies to address fundamental rights, with recommendations covering civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. The effectiveness of the NHRC is also marred by a lack of resources and delayed justice in conflict-era cases.

Bangladesh: Jute millers threaten shutdown over raw jute shortage
On 27 January, The Daily Star reported that Bangladesh’s jute millers have threatened a nationwide shutdown from 1 February if the government fails to address an acute shortage of raw jute that has disrupted production and forced several mills to suspend operations. The Bangladesh Jute Mills Association (BJMA) said raw jute prices have surged to BTK 5,000 to 5,500 per maund, over 120 per cent higher than peak harvest prices in July–August 2025, due to a supply–demand mismatch, continued exports, and alleged hoarding by traders. BJMA and the Bangladesh Jute Spinners Association urged authorities to release stockpiled jute at reasonable prices, curb hoarding, and ensure adequate domestic supply, warning that recent government approvals allowing limited exports despite conditional export rules had worsened shortages.

Pakistan: Five terrorists killed in Pishin operation
On 27 January, Dawn reported that, in an operation which lasted several hours, five suspects, which included one wanted in several terrorist cases, were killed during an intelligence-based operation which was led by the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) of police in Balochistan’s Pishin district, according to officials who said on Monday. During the exchange of fire, 10 CTD officials sustained injuries. The CTD seized a huge quantity of arms, which included rocket launchers, hand grenades and SMGs, and ammunition from their possession. Despite repeated warnings by the police to them to surrender, they fired at CTD officials using modern weapons, and an exchange of fire ensued. The residents of Pishin district, especially those living in Kali Karbala has expressed their satisfaction over the successful operation that they said would put an end to fear and panic in the area.

The Middle East and Africa
The War in Gaza: Hamas seeks role for its police force ahead of disarmament talks
On 27 January, Reuters reported that Hamas is seeking to incorporate its police force and civil servants into a new US-backed administration for Gaza, even as discussions on disarmament move forward. According to sources, Hamas wants its roughly 10,000 police officers and more than 40,000 civil and security personnel to retain their roles under the proposed National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, a technocratic body meant to govern the enclave following an October ceasefire. The ceasefire agreement links further Israeli troop withdrawals to Hamas surrendering its weapons. However, Hamas officials told Reuters that the group has not yet received a detailed or concrete disarmament proposal. Israel has rejected any future role for Hamas-affiliated personnel in Gaza, calling for full demilitarisation of the Strip. US officials have indicated that heavy weapons would be decommissioned, while lighter arms could be registered under a new security arrangement. The issue of governance and security personnel remains a significant point in negotiations.

Rwanda and the UK: Kigali initiates arbitration against London over cancellation of asylum deal
On 28 January, Rwanda filed an arbitration case against the United Kingdom after Prime Minister Keir Starmer cancelled an asylum deal in 2024. The deal was signed before PM Starmer took office. Under the deal, Britain was to send migrants who entered the country illegally to Rwanda in return for payments. The plan faced legal challenges from the beginning. Only four people were sent voluntarily. Rwanda has submitted a notice to the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration. It argues that the UK breached the financial terms of the migration partnership. Kigali stated that the request from the UK in 2024 was to forgo two payments of GBP 50 million each, due in April 2025 and April 2026. Rwanda stated that it was ready to agree to the terms if the agreement was formally cancelled and a new financial term was agreed upon. However, this was not done, and the payments were not made. In response to the situation, a spokesperson for Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the programme cost taxpayers GBP 700 million and resettled only four individuals. This was in addition to the deteriorating relationship between the two countries, which had already been strained due to the UK’s suspension of aid to Rwanda over its involvement in the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Europe and the Americas
The War in Ukraine: The trilateral peace talks end in Abu Dhabi without a breakthrough as Russia strikes Kyiv
On 24 January, Ukraine, Russia and the United States were holding peace talks in Abu Dhabi after previous negotiations in Moscow and Berlin. The meeting is part of an ongoing effort to find a way to end the ongoing war. The peace talks focused on reaching a ceasefire, agreeing on security guarantees, and discussing territorial issues such as control of parts of eastern Ukraine. President Zelensky noted that the war cannot be resolved without addressing territorial issues. Russia’s demand to withdraw Kyiv's forces from the Donbas remains a major sticking point, which Kyiv firmly rejects. There has been no sign of compromise on the territorial dispute. At the same time as the talks continued, Russian forces carried out air strikes on Kyiv and other areas. Ukraine’s air defence systems were activated to stop incoming missiles and drones. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that Russia launched attacks on Ukraine during the talks, calling the timing “cynical.” He said this showed that Russia was ignoring diplomatic efforts.

The War in Ukraine: Zelensky says US security guarantees document is “100% ready”; EU finalises a law banning Russian gas
On 26 January, the media reported on Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky announcing the US-backed security guarantees document for Ukraine is “100% ready” and awaits confirmation of the date and place for signing, after the trilateral peace talks in Abu Dhabi. Once signed, the document will be sent for ratification to both the US Congress and the Ukrainian parliament. President Zelensky said the agreement underscores Ukraine’s need for US security guarantees as part of efforts to end the ongoing war, while reaffirming Kyiv’s stance on territorial integrity. Meanwhile, EU countries gave final approval to a law banning Russian gas imports by late 2027, fulfilling the bloc’s plan to cut energy ties with Russia. The ban covers LNG by the end of 2026 and pipeline gas by September 2027. Some members, including Hungary and Slovakia, opposed the move.

The US: Second Minneapolis shooting fuels political debate over the use of ICE
On 26 January, Reuters reported that the second shooting by federal agents in Minneapolis had intensified national political attention on President Donald Trump’s aggressive immigration crackdown. The public unrest sparked due to the shootings of Alex Pretti, and Renee Good by the federal immigrant agents earlier this month has also evoked debate in Washington as Congress nears the deadline to fund the Department of Homeland Security, on 30 January, which oversees Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As Senate Democrats have reportedly warned that they might oppose funding legislation for ICE unless enforcement practices are reviewed, some Republican lawmakers have also broadly supported the crackdown, calling for greater transparency and accountability. The House Homeland Security Committee has requested that immigration officials testify, with several senators questioning the adequacy of training and the use-of-force powers. Gun rights groups have also weighed in, noting that Pretti was legally armed at the time of the incident. Public opinion polling cited by Reuters shows widespread concern across party lines about minimizing harm during immigration enforcement operations.

The US: Democratic-led states push to advance lawsuits against ICE agents, reports Reuters
On 28 January, Reuters reported that many Democratic-led US states are looking to advance legislation for individuals to sue Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents for civil rights violations. The push has increased in the backdrop of protests over tactics used by ICE agents during President Trump’s immigration crackdown, as seen in Minneapolis and other areas. Illinois became the first state to pass such a law last month, allowing civil lawsuits against federal agents in state court. The US Justice Department filed a lawsuit seeking to block it, arguing that the measure violates the Constitution’s “Supremacy Clause” which makes federal laws supersede contradicting state laws. Similar legislation is being considered in California, New York, Virginia, Maryland, and Connecticut. These state measures aim to address what supporters call an accountability gap in the US legal system. While a 1871 law enacted by the US Congress (called Section 1983) allows civil rights lawsuits against state and local officials, including police, no such law allows for similar claims against individual federal agents, such as the ICE officers accused of violating constitutional rights. The recent killings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti by ICE agents and reports of aggressive enforcement methods have further drawn attention to such legal measures. Legal experts call such proposed state measures "a potential sea change" in the American legal system.

The US: Trump warns Iran ‘massive armada’ en route, demands “NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS” deal as Tehran threatens unprecedented retaliation
On 28 January, Reuters reported that Trump had warned Iran through a TruthSocial post that “A massive Armada is heading to Iran….. Like with Venezuela, it is ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” He demanded that Iran agree for a “NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS” deal in order to avoid strikes more lethal than the June 2025 attacks. Iran’s former Minister of Defence Ali Shamkhani responded warning that any military action will be treated as an “act of war,” and that the “response will be immediate, all out, and unprecedented, targeting heart of ‌Tel Aviv and all those supporting the aggressor.”A senior Israeli official with direct knowledge of the US-Israeli planning said Israel does not believe airstrikes alone would be sufficient to topple the regime, and that “If you’re going to topple the regime, you have to put boots on the ground,” reported Reuters.

The US and Venezuela: CIA raises skepticism about interim president’s willingness to formally cut ties with US adversaries, reports Reuters; Washington to issue general license lifting certain sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry
On 28 January, a Reuters exclusive report revealed that the US intelligence have raised doubts about whether Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez will be willing to formally cut ties with Washington’s adversaries as per the demands of the Trump administration. US officials have publicly demanded that they want the interim president to sever relations with close international allies like Cuba, Iran, China and Russia, including expelling their diplomats and advisers from Venezuela. However, the presence of representatives of these countries at her swearing-in ceremony was notable. The report stated that it was unclear if Rodriguez was fully on board with the US strategy for Venezuela. According to a senior Trump administration official, President Trump "continues to exert maximum leverage" over Venezuela's leaders and "expects this cooperation to continue."

On the same day, Reuters also reported that Washington is preparing to issue a general license that would ease some sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sector, marking a shift from plans to grant case-by-case exemptions to companies seeking to operate in the country. Many partners and customers of state oil firm PDVSA, including producers Chevron, Repsol and ENI, refiner Reliance Industries, and several US oil services companies, have sought individual licences in recent weeks to boost output or exports from the OPEC member. The surge in applications has slowed plans to expand exports and attract investment, the report said. The US Treasury Department, the White House and Venezuela’s oil ministry have not responded to the report.

The Pentagon National Security Strategy: Rebukes allies’ dependence on US security guarantees, urges greater defence responsibility; Terms Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat”
On 23 January, the Pentagon released a critical National Defense Strategy severely criticising Washington’s allies for relying on the previous US administration to subsidise their defence. The 34-page document is the first since 2022, and calls for "a sharp shift - in approach, focus, and tone,” highlighting that allies should take more responsibility in countering threats. The document highlights China as an Indo-Pacific force that only demands deterrence, stating that the goal "is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them.” It identifies Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat,” and urges South Korea to take primary responsibility in countering North Korea “with critical but more limited US support.” The report also asserts that Washington will "actively and fearlessly defend America's interests throughout the Western Hemisphere," emphasising on the Panama Canal and Greenland.

The UK and the US: PM Starmer condemns President Trump's comments on European troops in Afghanistan
On 24 January, the UK's Prime Minister Keir Starmer condemned President Trump's comments about European troops staying off the front lines in Afghanistan "insulting" and "appalling." Trump had stated in an interview that the US had "never needed" the transatlantic alliance and accused allies of staying "a little off the front lines" in Afghanistan. In response to the question of demanding an apology from Trump, Starmer stated that had it been him, he would certainly apologise. Netherland's Foreign Minister David van Weel had also condemned Trump's remarks on Afghanistan, calling them untrue and disrespectful.

About the authors
R Preetha is pursuing postgraduation in the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is also a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

Lekshmi MK is pursuing postgraduation in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. She is also a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

Anu Maria Joseph was a Project Associate at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

Brighty Ann Sarah is pursuing postgraduation in the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. She is also a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

About the Conflict Weekly Regional Roundup Team
Brighty Ann Sarah and R Preetha are postgraduate students at the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai. Lekshmi MK is a postgraduate student at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. Rizwana Banu, and Aparna A Nair are undergraduate students at the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai.

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Attacks in South Lebanon, Beirut’s Conundrum, and Tel Aviv’s Greater Goals

March 2026 | CWA # 2019

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Rising Violence in Nigeria

Limited State Capacity, Multiple Actors, and a Complex Security Environment

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The US-Iran War, Week Two

Expanding Fronts, Shifting Goalposts, and Global Fallout

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March 2026 | CWA # 2001

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February 2026 | CWA # 1997

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Four Years of War in Ukraine

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Pakistan-Afghanistan Clashes

Another round of cross-border attacks

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Continuing militant attacks in Balochistan

Expanding violence, Security-first response and Missing political dialogue in Pakistan

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AI Impact Summit in New Delhi I Munich Security Conference 2026

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February 2026 | CWA # 1964

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UK and China

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Tariff recalibration and Energy and Supply Chain realignment

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