CWA # 1954
Nepal Elections 2026: Political Parties, Gen Z Protests and Hope for a New Beginning
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Nishchal Nath Pandey
8 February 2026
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Photo Source: Kathmandu Post
Nepal is set to hold parliamentary elections on 5 March. These elections are epoch-making in the country’s history. After the Gen Z movement of 8 September 2025, Nepali politics has been in complete flux. Traditional political parties are experiencing internal turmoil, with younger generation leaders clamouring for change. There was initial hope among the NC and CPN (UML) leadership that the Supreme Court would reinstate the old parliament, but the possibilities of this now seem to be fading with elections less than a month away.
The Gen Z Protests 2025 and the Government Response
On 8 September 2025, the Gen Z protesters, mostly in their school and college uniforms, swarmed the Parliament building, demanding change, better governance, and an end to cronyism and the endemic corruption that have plagued Nepali politics for over three decades. The government at the time, led by KP Oli, comprised the two largest political parties – the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML)- and boasted a near two-thirds majority in the House. In essence, the government was so strong that there was no opposition. The Maoists, instead of being an alternate turned into a substitute, hoping that the coalition would break and they would tie hands with either the NC or the CPN (UML) to form another loose coalition.
Nepal has had 20 governments in 20 years, leading to frustration and despair among the populace, who see no future and only aspire to migrate abroad. Most of Gen Z have not seen any other Prime Minister in their lifetimes except Deuba, Oli, or Prachanda. The generation gap, coupled with the weakening of state institutions and dissatisfaction over unemployment or low wages, led to the Gen Z uprising, which the traditional two parties led by octogenarians could not have visualised.
A series of errors in judgment was exhibited by the Oli administration in the lead-up to the 9 September 2025 mayhem. The Prime Minister did not recommend a state of emergency to the President, although such a power has been granted under Article 273 of the Constitution. Despite violence a day earlier on 08 September, the Oli government dilly-dallied on an apt state response throughout the night of 08 and the morning of 09 September. Although the Home Minister resigned, the Prime Minister delayed his resignation and kept the four security chiefs engaged in continuous meetings even as supermarkets, private residences, parliament buildings, and Supreme Court buildings were being ransacked. A timely imposition of a state of emergency and an army-imposed curfew from the late evening of 08 September would have possibly prevented the deadliest day in Nepal’s modern history.
Events of 08-09 September strained Nepal’s institutions, especially the Nepal Police, to the breaking point. Much of this was due to politicisation and favouritism being practised by the NC and the CPN (UML) inside the police service. Public trust in the judiciary and other Constitutional bodies is also on the wane, as people view them as politicised, inaccessible, corrupt, and lacking in accountability. Whereas in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, the heads of government had to flee the country, the Nepal Army was able to protect the lives of all political leaders, invite the protestors to a dialogue at the army headquarters, and form an interim administration led by the first woman Prime Minister of the country. The Sushila Karki-led government was given twin tasks of restoring law and order and holding free general elections on March 5.
The Road Ahead
The March 2026 elections will surely see new faces coming into the national limelight. Although it is possible that Nepal will again have a hung parliament, a young leadership without the baggage of the past will steer Nepal into the future. This will mark a generational shift in the national polity, a clear hint that South Asia as a whole is changing, with people clamouring for better governance, consistent with the rule of law and respect for independent institutions.
The old Parliament was reduced to a rubber stamp, with stalled legislative work and low MP attendance. There were only tall talks of a constitutional amendment, but no forward movement in that direction. Precisely because there was no heated debate or discussion in the House, social media turned into a boxing ring, with anger pouring into the streets. After the March 5 elections, a more lively parliament is expected, with informed debates and free discussion on every aspect of national life. Younger generation of experts like Dr Swornim Wagle′ and Shisir Khanal from the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Dr Rajan Bhattarai from CPN (UML), industrialist Binod Chaudhary and young turk Uday SJB Rana of the Nepali Congress are expected to bring in the energy and expertise on diverse areas from the economy to constitutional amendment, and from the woes of the private sector to the expectations of Nepalese living abroad. Other urgent tasks for the new parliament and indeed the new government will be to ensure that the perpetrators of the 09 September violence are brought to justice, the looted weapons are recovered, and the prisoners who fled are brought back from their hiding.
There is a slight possibility of the old leaders who had been enjoying power and privilege for the last three decades rejecting official election results, contesting the legitimacy of both the September 2025 youth uprising and the outcome of the elections, and even pointing fingers to ‘foreign conspiracy.’ This will heighten the danger of post-election violence and deepen the crisis rather than provide a way out. Both the Nepal Army and the international community need to nip such machinations in the bud and press ahead with the formation of a freshly elected parliament and an elected government.
No doubt that the forthcoming high-stakes general election is likely to be one of Nepal’s most closely contested in recent history and therefore will be a critical inflection point for political stability, better governance and economic recovery.
About the author
Dr Pandey is Director of the Kathmandu-based Centre for South Asian Studies (CSAS) and an Adjunct Professor at the School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru.