CWA # 1956
End of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
Erosion of arms control, Return of nuclear anxieties, and the New focus on China
The World This Week #342-343, Vol 8, No 03, 08 February 2026
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Lekshmi MK
8 February 2026
Lekshmi MK is pursuing post-graduation in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai, and is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
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What happened?
On 04 February, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia expired after 15 years. Trump stated that "If it expires, it expires,” and that “We'll just do a better agreement." Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, responded that “This is a new moment, a new reality – we are ready for it.”
On 05 February, Reuters reported that Russia expressed regret over the expiry of the New START treaty. Russian officials said the end of the treaty removed long-standing constraints, but Moscow would continue to act responsibly in matters related to strategic stability.
On 06 February, Reuters reported that at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the US accused China of conducting a secret nuclear test in 2020 and called for negotiation of a broader arms control agreement that would include Beijing along with Russia. At the Geneva forum, the UK called for a new phase of nuclear arms control involving China, Russia, and the US, expressing concerns over Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion. France argued that an agreement among the largest nuclear powers was essential, given the unprecedented decline in nuclear norms.
What is the background?
First, the suspension of the START amidst the deterioration of US-Russia relations after the Ukraine war. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process began during the Cold War as a series of agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, to reduce and limit nuclear weapons. These treaties established numerical caps, verification mechanisms, and regular inspections to ensure transparency and strategic stability. The New START treaty, signed in 2010, became the latest and most comprehensive framework in this arms control tradition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 altered US-Russia relations. Sanctions, military support to Kyiv, and diplomatic hostility eroded the minimal trust required for arms control engagement. Russia suspended participation in New START’s inspection and data-sharing mechanisms, arguing that normal cooperation was impossible amid Western pressure. Although the treaty remained legally valid, its core verification provisions became ineffective. The breakdown of communication and confidence removed the political space needed for dialogue on renewal.
Second, China and the START. Trump has been arguing that extending the existing bilateral treaty was inadequate for current nuclear realities. For him, any credible arms control agreement must include China, citing its expanding nuclear capabilities. However, Beijing has firmly rejected this proposal. For China, joining trilateral arms control talks with the United States and Russia is “neither reasonable nor realistic” given the large disparity in nuclear forces and strategic environments. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said China’s arsenal is of a “totally different scale” and emphasised that Beijing pursues a self-defence strategy and will not participate in US-Russia disarmament negotiations at this stage.
Third, the gradual decline of the arms control treaties. Over the past two decades, the erosion of key agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Open Skies Treaty weakened the overall framework of US-Russia strategic engagement. These treaties once sustained regular dialogue, transparency, and mutual confidence on nuclear stability. As they collapsed, the institutional culture of arms control cooperation declined. New START was left as a standalone agreement without the support of a wider network of confidence-building measures.
What does it mean?
First, renewed fears of a nuclear arms race without legal limits. With New START expiring, there are no legally binding caps on US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons for the first time in decades. The removal of numerical limits and verification mechanisms is likely to increase mistrust, thereby raising concerns about a renewed nuclear arms race and deployment.
Second, the efforts to bring China in. Trump’s insistence on including China signals a redefinition of the arms control framework. Arms control is no longer viewed as a bilateral responsibility between Washington and Moscow but as a broader strategic issue involving Beijing, reflecting the new US concerns over China’s expanding arsenal.
Third, rising international concern over China’s nuclear expansion. Calls by the US, UK, and France to include China in future arms control reflect growing global anxiety over Beijing’s nuclear trajectory. China’s expanding capabilities are increasingly seen as central to strategic stability, even as Beijing resists joining formal limits. This places China at the heart of future nuclear diplomacy. It also complicates the prospects for a quick replacement to New START. The broader concern is that without China’s participation, any new framework may struggle to achieve legitimacy or effectiveness.
