PR Explainer

CWA # 1972
PR Explainer
Pakistan-Taliban Peace Talks
Background, Issues, Challenges and Implications
CWA #1975

Lekshmi MK
31 December 2025

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During 18-19 October, the first round of talks, held in Doha, Qatar resulted in an immediate ceasefire, with Qatar and Turkey mediating to halt the escalating border violence between Pakistan and the Taliban-led Afghan government. During 25-30 October, a second round of talks followed in Istanbul, Turkey. The second talk aimed at building on the Doha ceasefire and negotiating longer-term security arrangements. However, after nearly four days of discussions, the talks ended in deadlock, particularly over Pakistan’s demand for decisive action against militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 

During 02-03 December, the third round of engagement, hosted by Saudi Arabia in Riyadh failed to deliver a breakthrough, as disagreements over counterterrorism responsibilities and enforcement mechanisms remained unresolved.

1. Why did the talks happen? What are the historical background and issues?
The 2025 Pakistan-Taliban talks were rooted in longstanding security and border-related tensions between the two sides. Pakistan has consistently raised concerns over cross-border militancy, particularly the presence of groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), which have used Afghan territory to launch attacks inside Pakistan. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Islamabad has sought cooperation from Kabul to curb these groups. However, the Taliban’s governance constraints, internal priorities, and limited administrative control have complicated effective enforcement. Adding to this is the unresolved dispute over the Durand Line, which has historically remained a flashpoint. It led to frequent border closures, and accusations of cross-border firing. These underlying tensions escalated in October 2025, when intense border clashes resulted in casualties, creating an urgent need for diplomatic engagement. Against this backdrop, Qatar and Turkey stepped in as mediators, facilitating talks in Doha to prevent further escalation and to secure at least a temporary halt to hostilities through dialogue.

2. What were the key demands and positions of Pakistan and the Taliban during the talks?
First, during the 2025 talks, Pakistan’s primary demand was firm action by the Taliban against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups operating from Afghan territory. Islamabad sought verifiable counterterrorism measures, including denial of safe havens, intelligence cooperation, and assurances that Afghan soil would not be used for attacks against Pakistan. Pakistan also pushed for greater border discipline along the Durand Line and mechanisms to prevent cross-border infiltration.

Second, the Taliban’s position was more constrained. While they publicly committed to preventing Afghan territory from being used against neighbouring states. They also resisted Pakistan’s demands for direct military action against TTP, citing ideological ties, internal cohesion concerns, and sovereignty issues. The Taliban emphasised dialogue over force, denied full responsibility for militant attacks, and sought respect for Afghan sovereignty and non-interference.

Pakistan demanding concrete security guarantees and the Taliban offering broad assurances without enforcement became the central obstacle in the talks.

3. Why did the talks deliver only a ceasefire and not a lasting settlement?
The 2025 Pakistan-Taliban talks resulted only in a temporary ceasefire because the negotiations failed to address deep structural and strategic constraints on both sides. Pakistan sought verifiable and enforceable action against Pakistan-origin militant groups, operating from Afghan territory. However, the Taliban were unwilling and institutionally constrained from taking decisive military action against these groups due to ideological affinities, concerns over internal cohesion, and limited governance capacity.

Moreover, there was a mutual trust deficit. Pakistan doubted the Taliban’s ability and intent to enforce commitments, while the Taliban viewed Pakistan’s demands as infringements on Afghan sovereignty. The absence of monitoring or enforcement mechanisms meant that assurances remained largely rhetorical.

Finally, the talks were crisis-driven rather than solution-oriented, prioritising de-escalation over long-term settlement. 

4. What does the 2025 Pakistan-Taliban talks mean?
First, the preference for conflict management. The 2025 Pakistan-Taliban talks signal a preference for conflict management over conflict resolution. Regionally, the talks underscore the fragility of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, where ceasefires can pause violence but do not eliminate the drivers of militancy. The continued presence of Pakistan-origin militant groups operating from Afghan territory means that border instability is likely to persist.

Second, the growing role of third-party mediators. The talks also highlight the growing role of third-party mediators such as Qatar and Turkey, reflecting a shift toward extra-regional diplomacy to manage South Asian security tensions. By positioning themselves as neutral peace brokers, these states seek to prevent escalation, facilitate dialogue, and enhance their diplomatic credibility in managing complex conflicts. For neighbouring states and global actors, this mediation reinforces concerns that Afghanistan may continue to function as a security spillover zone. This could continue with instability affecting refugee flows, regional trade, and counterterrorism efforts. As external actors attempt to contain rather than resolve the conflict.

Third, future engagements will remain tactical. Looking ahead, the outcome suggests that future engagements will remain tactical rather than transformative unless mechanisms for verification, enforcement, and regional cooperation are institutionalised. Without these, ceasefires may recur, but a durable peace settlement will remain weak, leaving the region vulnerable to renewed escalation.

References
Mushtaq Ali, “Fresh round of Afghanistan-Pakistan talks fails to reach a deal, officials say,” Reuters, 03 December 2025
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghanistan-pakistan-hold-peace-talks-doha-after-fierce-fighting-says-afghan
“After four days, Pakistan-Afghan Taliban dialogue collapses in Istanbul,” The News International, 29 October 2025
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1354695-pakistan-afghan-taliban-regime-agree-on-continuation-of-ceasefire
“Pakistan, Afghan Taliban regime agree on continuation of ceasefire,” The News International, 31 October 2025
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1354695-pakistan-afghan-taliban-regime-agree-on-continuation-of-ceasefire
Asif Shahzad, Mohammad Yunus Yawar and Mushtaq Ali, “Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to immediate ceasefire after peace talks in Doha,” Reuters, 19 October 2025
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghanistan-pakistan-hold-peace-talks-doha-after-fierce-fighting-says-afghan


About the author
Lekshmi MK is pursuing postgraduation in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai. She is also a research intern at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. Her research interests include ocean governance, geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic regions, the impact of climate change on maritime security, and environmental diplomacy.

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