The US-Iran War, Week Three
Multi-front Escalation and Economic Fallouts

Rohini Reenum
20 March 2026

Photo Source: Times of Israel

Conflict Weekly Note
In the news

US-Israeli offensive
Between 13 and 14 March, the US conducted strikes on Iran's Kharg Island, targeting military installations while sparing oil infrastructure. The US Central Command claimed to have targeted 90 military sites on the Island. On 14 March, a missile strike on an industrial site in the central Iranian city of Isfahan killed at least 15 people. On the same day, President Trump revealed that he has appealed to China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom to join the US in securing the Strait of Hormuz. Later, he called on all “the Countries of the World that receive Oil through the Hormuz Strait” to join the coalition, making a special mention of NATO. No countries have made any announcement so far regarding joining the coalition. On 15 March, US President Donald Trump threatened Iran with further attacks on the Kharg Island if it continued blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

On 17 March, the Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, claimed that Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Head, Ali Larijani, and commander of the Basij paramilitary forces, Gholamreza Soleimani, were killed in overnight strikes. On the following day, Iran confirmed their deaths, vowing revenge. On 18 March, President Trump criticised NATO allies and partners for failing to provide stronger military support in efforts to end Iran’s chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz. On the same day, Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars field, and Iran confirmed the killing of Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in an overnight attack by Israel.

Iran’s Response
Between 13 and 18 March, Iran continued to target US military bases across the Middle East, central Israel, and sporadic attacks in the Gulf countries.

On 18 March, there were multiple drone attacks in Iraq, including near the Baghdad airport and the US embassy in the Green Zone. On the same day, an Iraqi armed group claimed responsibility for 28 drone strikes across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan over the past 15 days. In response to the South Pars field attack, Iran's IRGC  launched attacks on several energy sites in the Gulf countries, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas facility, where authorities reported significant damage, and at the United Arab Emirates’ Habshan ?gas facility, where operations were suspended. Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, in an interview, said that “This is America’s war” and blamed the US for the regional escalation.

Following the killing of three senior leaders, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the “cowardly assassination” of his “dear colleagues” and added that their “path will continue stronger than before.”

Regional Responses
On 18 March, Al Jazeera reported that Saudi Arabia was hosting an emergency meeting of foreign ministers from Arab and Muslim countries in Riyadh to discuss Iranian retaliation. On the same day, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry made a strong statement following the Iranian attack on its Ras Laffan gas facility. The statement read “Qatar considers this assault a dangerous escalation, a flagrant violation of its sovereignty, and a direct threat to its national security.”

On 19 March, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan declared that the “little trust” rebuilt with Iran over the last few years is now “completely shattered.” Farhan also warned that “The Kingdom and its partners possess significant capabilities, and the patience we have shown is not unlimited.”

Developments within the US
On 18 March, US National Counterterrorism Center director Joe Kent tendered his public resignation protesting the Iran War. In his statement, he claimed that “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby.”

Issues at large
1. The rapid multi-front escalation
In the third week, the war has significantly escalated across all fronts, with the killing of three key senior Iranian leaders, targeting of its strategic assets, such as the Kharg Island, and its biggest gas field. In retaliation, Tehran has also indiscriminately targeted energy reserves and infrastructure across the Gulf countries, expanding its targets dramatically. On the maritime front, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, with Iran allowing only a few ships to pass per day based on the ship’s flagged state. With key mediators in the Middle East like Qatar and the UAE caught in the War’s crosshairs, a defiant Iran and an unwilling Trump, there naturally has been no talk of any ceasefire/peace negotiations. The only development on this front has been President Trump’s assurance that henceforth, Israel will not attack any of Tehran’s gas fields.

2. Pushback, yet reluctance of the Gulf countries to militarily retaliate
Following escalating Iranian aggression, the response from Gulf countries has shifted from defensive posturing to an active, coordinated pushback, stopping short of active military retaliation. For instance, Saudi Arabia issued warnings of military retaliation, and the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs labelled the attack on its gas field a “calculated act of economic terrorism.” Additionally, Qatar has also expelled key Iranian military and security officials along with their staff from its territory. Despite this hardening of their stance, the Gulf countries have maintained a policy of strategic non-retaliation, possibly for the fear of an all-out regional war, its long-term economic ramifications, and being viewed domestically as fighting an Israeli War. Non-retaliation also helps them maintain neutrality and secure international support.

3. Lack of support for the US-Israeli offensive
During the first two weeks, the US allies' lack of support for the Iran War was reflected in their measured statements. However, in the third week, with Trump’s direct appeals for joining the coalition rejected, traditional US allies have made their stance clearer. Further, there are signs of growing divergence of opinion among US allies in the Middle East as well. Interestingly, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi made a surprise statement in an Economist opinion stating that “the United States has lost control of its foreign policy and is involved in a war that is not its own.” This lack of support for the War at the home front was also reflected in the high-profile resignation of Trump’s counterterrorism aide, which not only reflected a difference of opinion but also put under scrutiny the pretext and rationale for starting the war itself.

4. Global economic fallouts
While the first two weeks of the War pushed oil prices past USD 100, the recent attacks on gas fields have triggered a significant global supply shock. Brent crude, which hovered around USD 70 before the war, has surged to USD 126 following the Ras Laffan attack. QatarEnergy confirmed that the strikes wiped out 17 per cent of Qatar’s LNG capacity. Experts have warned that repairs could take 3 to 5 years, creating a long-term structural deficit in global gas supply. The Hormuz Blockade has also adversely impacted the global energy supply, which is currently falling 20 million barrels per day (mb/d) short of demand.

In perspective

With expanded targeting of energy reserves and infrastructure, the War has metamorphosed from an earlier precise decapacitation military campaign to a comprehensive energy war, threatening the global energy supply chain and immediate and future energy security. With the intensification of Iranian retaliation across the Middle East and consequent growing frustration among the Gulf countries, the region could very well be at the precipice of a total regional conflagration.

The successive killing of key Iranian leaders has also hardened Iran’s defiance and rhetoric, which views the Israeli-US offensive as an existential threat to the country. This makes negotiations difficult and only heightens the threat of miscalculation. Further, President Trump is also beginning to face the repercussions of starting a unilateral war, both from his allies and at home. Overall, the trajectory of this war is becoming difficult to predict, with its progression and expansion, and a lot will depend on who blinks first and calls for de-escalation.


Click here for recent and related publications:
Rohini ReenumThe US Iran War, Week Two: Expanding Fronts, Shifting Goalposts, and Global Fallout,” Conflict Weekly #323, 13 March 2026
Rohini Reenum
The US-Iran War, Week One: Rapid Escalation, Regional Spillover, Global Uncertainty,” Conflict Weekly #322, 06 March 2026

 

Rohini Reenum is a PhD Scholar at NIAS.

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