China's Interests and Strategies in the US-Iran War
Why Beijing’s support for Iran is rhetoric and muted

Femy Francis
22 March 2026

Photo Source: The Diplomat

On 28 February, the US, along with Israel, launched a large-scale offensive, “Operation Epic Fury,” against Iran, to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. China has expressed concerns as it calls for an immediate ceasefire of the war. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: that the war on Iran “should not have happened…These actions have violated international law and basic norms of international relations.”

China also abstained from voting UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2817, condemning Iran's retaliatory strikes against Gulf states as a breach of international law. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, said: “The spillover of escalating tensions in the Middle East serves no one's interest. Resolving differences through dialogue and negotiations is the only viable way forward.”

What are China’s interests in Iran?

First, Iran is an important partner; so are other countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia supplies more oil to China than Iran; Beijing also has a USD 50 billion agreement as part of Riyadh’s Vision 2030. Trade turnover with the UAE is significantly higher than with Iran. If China openly and aggressively support the Iranian cause, it would undermine its relations with the other countries in the region.

Second, Iran and China’s oil supply. Iran has been one of China’s major oil suppliers for over a decade, at a discounted rate. The Foundation for Defence of Democracies found that China buys roughly 90 per cent of Iran’s oil export. China sees the immediate shortfall of 1.4 million barrels per day in oil imports from Iran.

Third, strategic partnerships with Iran. In the past five years, Tehran and Beijing have deepened their economic partnership. In 2021, China’s Foreign Minister signed a “25-year cooperation agreement.” The deal pledged to invest USD 400 billion in Iran for over 25 years. The deal was seen to keep Iran’s economy afloat amid American sanctions. They also signed a security partnership to counter terrorism, illegal immigration and transnational crime. The war threatens the investments made by China in Tehran, and their strategic partnership comes under scrutiny.

China also has military and technological ties with Iran. China has been the supplier of air defence systems, ballistic missile components, dual-use material and technical training for Iran.

What to expect from China?

China’s response has been mixed, shaped by its own strategic interests and calculations. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack. China’s Foreign Minister noted that “Might does not make right,” and that “the world has regressed to the law of the jungle.” China also contacted several West Asian countries and sent a special envoy for a diplomatic tour of the region, urging them to mediate peace. While calling for a joint/global effort, Beijing has not initiated any specific efforts to address the crisis. China’s response to the war remains stale.

So, what can be expected from China? First, rhetorical support to Iran. It is expected to remain muted with moral support. It will continue to portray itself as a neutral mediator, providing moral backing to Iran, but will stop short of any military or security commitments.

Second, relying on alternative energy sources. China can be seen relying on other oil sources, though this has been a major setback. For Iran, oil exports to China remain the largest; however, for China, Iran is not its largest oil supplier. China’s major oil imports came from around the world, spanning nearly 50 countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, North and South America, and Oceania. In 2025, Russia was the largest source accounting for 19.22 per cent of their oil imports, followed by Saudi Arabia (14 per cent), and Iraq (11 per cent).

China’s interest and strategies in the war remain calculated as it balances limited support for Iran and not offending other actors in the war. It is unlikely that China will be involved militarily; instead, it will focus on diplomacy. The main priority for China is to prevent any disruption to its own energy supply and global trade routes. Therefore, it would push for stability and broker peace, all the while engaging with alternative partners.

PREVIOUS COMMENTS

February 2026 | CWA # 1959

Yesasvi Koganti | Yesasvi Koganti is an undergraduate student from Madras Christian College, Chennai.

UK and China
February 2026 | CWA # 1957

R Preetha | R Preetha is pursuing post-graduation in the Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai, and is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

The India–US interim trade framework
February 2026 | CWA # 1956

Lekshmi MK | Lekshmi MK is pursuing post-graduation in the Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai, and is a Research Assistant at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.

End of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
December 2025 | CWA # 1931

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
December 2025 | CWA # 1924

Padmashree Anandhan

NATO Summit 2025
August 2025 | CWA # 1801

R Preetha

28 August 1963
August 2025 | CWA # 1780

Abhiruchi Chowdhury

Trump tariffs:
August 2025 | CWA # 1778

Lekshmi MK

28 July 1914
June 2025 | CWA # 1694

Aashish Ganeshan

The US:
May 2025 | CWA # 1689

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine
May 2025 | CWA # 1688

Ayan Datta

Gaza
May 2025 | CWA # 1675

Lekshmi MK

Turkey:
May 2025 | CWA # 1673

Padmashree Anandhan

Ukraine:
May 2025 | CWA # 1667

R Preetha and Brighty Ann Sarah

East Asia:
March 2024 | CWA # 1251

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
February 2024 | CWA # 1226

NIAS Africa Team

Africa This Week
December 2023 | CWA # 1189

Hoimi Mukherjee | Hoimi Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science in Bankura Zilla Saradamani Mahila Mahavidyapith.

Chile in 2023: Crises of Constitutionality
December 2023 | CWA # 1187

Aprajita Kashyap | Aprajita Kashyap is a faculty of Latin American Studies, School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi.

Haiti in 2023: The Humanitarian Crisis
December 2023 | CWA # 1185

Binod Khanal | Binod Khanal is a Doctoral candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi.

The Baltic: Energy, Russia, NATO and China
December 2023 | CWA # 1183

Padmashree Anandhan | Padmashree Anandhan is a Research Associate at the School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangaluru.

Germany in 2023: Defence, Economy and Energy Triangle
December 2023 | CWA # 1178

​​​​​​​Ashok Alex Luke | Ashok Alex Luke is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at CMS College, Kottayam.

China and South Asia in 2023: Advantage Beijing?
December 2023 | CWA # 1177

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri | Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri is a postgraduate student at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at the University of Madras, Chennai.

China and East Asia
October 2023 | CWA # 1091

Annem Naga Bindhu Madhuri

Issues for Europe
July 2023 | CWA # 1012

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Myanmar continues to burn
December 2022 | CWA # 879

Padmashree Anandhan

The Ukraine War
November 2022 | CWA # 838

Rishma Banerjee

Tracing Europe's droughts
March 2022 | CWA # 705

NIAS Africa Team

In Focus: Libya
December 2021 | CWA # 630

GP Team

Europe in 2021
October 2021 | CWA # 588

Abigail Miriam Fernandez

TLP is back again
August 2021 | CWA # 528

STIR Team

Space Tourism
September 2019 | CWA # 162

Lakshman Chakravarthy N

5G: A Primer
December 2018 | CWA # 71

Mahesh Bhatta | Centre for South Asian Studies, Kathmandu

Nepal
December 2018 | CWA # 70

Nasima Khatoon | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

The Maldives
December 2018 | CWA # 69

Harini Madhusudan | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

India
December 2018 | CWA # 68

Sourina Bej | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

Bangladesh
December 2018 | CWA # 67

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer | Research Associate, ISSSP, NIAS

Afghanistan