In the news
State of Negotiations
On 25 April, President Trump unilaterally called off the US delegation to Islamabad prior to the second round of peace talks. On 26 April, Tehran proposed a new peace deal that prioritised the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The deal also proposed nuclear negotiations at a later stage, after the Strait is reopened and the US naval blockade is lifted. On the same day, President Trump reiterated that Iran has to completely abandon its nuclear ambitions, or there will be no peace deals. “They cannot have a nuclear ?weapon, otherwise there's no reason to meet," he said. Trump added that Tehran can phone Washington to discuss the ceasefire proposal.
On 28 April, President Trump rejected the ceasefire proposal advanced by Iran, citing that the proposal did not account for discussions on Iran’s nuclear development plans. On 01 May, a second proposal from Tehran was also rejected, with Trump stating, “They’re asking for things I can’t agree to.”
On the Strait of Hormuz
On 24 April, CENTCOM reported that the USS Rafael Peralta had enforced the blockade on an Iranian-flagged ship attempting to reach Iran's ports, and that US forces had redirected at least 33 ships since the blockade began on 13 April.
On 30 April, oil prices topped at USD 126 a barrel, the highest since the war began, after Trump warned that the blockade could last ‘months.’
On the US and Iran domestic fronts
On 29 April, the Pentagon also made the first official disclosure of Washington’s war expenses, standing at USD 25 billion.
On 01 May, the Trump administration argued that the US-Iran ceasefire agreement in April and the subsequent suspension of hostilities bypass the 01 May War Powers deadline on achieving congressional approval for the US-Israel war against Iran.
On the same day, reports emerged of internal fragmentation within Iran’s top brass and the civilian leadership seeking the ouster of Foreign Minister Araqchi over subservience to the IRGC leadership, amid heightening inflation and economic crisis in Tehran.
Issues at large
1. The stalled negotiations and Islamabad’s backchannel efforts
Following the first round of political negotiations in Islamabad, which ended without a deal, momentum for diplomatic resolution has steadily collapsed as President Trump cancelled the planned second round. This has reduced diplomacy to unilateral proposals from Iran delivered via Pakistan, which have been repeatedly rejected by Trump, who stated he is “not satisfied” that the proposals do not account for Iran's nuclear and ballistic missiles programme. However, Pakistan has remained central in hosting initial talks, facilitating indirect message-passing, and continuing backchannel efforts despite setbacks with officials emphasizing their commitment to “facilitation and dialogue,” upholding the ceasefire, and bridging gaps to achieve a comprehensive deal, even as indirect channels remain the primary conduit.
2. Competing US and Iranian agendas over the Strait of Hormuz
The central flashpoint of the conflict remains the Strait of Hormuz, with Washington and Tehran pursuing sharply competing agendas. Iran is pushing for the immediate reopening of the strait and the lifting of the US naval blockade as essential confidence-building measures and economic lifelines to ease the impact of sanctions and disrupted oil exports. Tehran has framed them as prerequisites for any broader de-escalation or permanent ceasefire. In contrast, Washington is insisting on the long game, maintaining the blockade as leverage to extract major concessions, particularly on Iran’s nuclear program, while maintaining the blockade as a pressure point on Tehran.
3. The dual blockade of the Hormuz and its global fallouts
The dual blockade in the Strait of Hormuz has triggered one of the sharpest global oil supply disruptions in decades. The strait, which carries nearly 21 million barrels per day of crude and products, 20 per cent of global seaborne oil trade, has seen traffic drop to around 5 per cent of pre-war levels, with hundreds of tankers stranded or rerouted at massive extra cost. This has driven a steep price surge, with Brent crude trading at around USD 124 per barrel. The shock has pushed global fuel prices, increased costs for fertilizers and manufactured goods, with Asia bearing the heaviest burden as the primary buyer of Gulf crude. The US has been relatively insulated as a net exporter, though American consumers still face higher gas prices as markets remain highly volatile and sensitive to any breakthroughs in indirect US-Iran talks.
4. The US Congress's pressure on the Trump administration over the President’s War Powers
The US Congress mounted pressure on the Trump administration as the 60-day War Powers Resolution deadline passed on 1 May 2026. Democrats, joined by some Republicans wary of an open-ended conflict, have repeatedly pushed War Powers resolutions demanding formal congressional authorisation for continued operations or the termination of US involvement in the conflict. Although the administration countered by arguing that the April ceasefire “terminated hostilities” for the purposes of the War Powers clock, it highlights the chance of future legislative pushback if the conflict drags on without clear progress toward a deal.
5. Economic pressure and internal divides in Iran
The US naval blockade, secondary sanctions and the dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have slashed Iran’s oil export revenues, slashing nearly 60 per cent of export income. The IMF projects Iran’s economy will shrink by around 6.1per cent in 2026, with inflation nearing 69 per cent, while the rial has collapsed to a record low of 1.8 million against the US dollar. Reports of internal fragmentation between the civilian leadership and IRGC, with the Revolutionary Guard exerting control over key decisions, sidelining civilian leaders, risk undermining Iran’s negotiating position in future talks.
In perspective
First, Washington’s unyielding position against Iran’s proposals is likely to continue. Washington appears willing to sustain the pressure on Iran and higher global oil prices to force a more comprehensive deal on American terms rather than accepting a quick, limited reopening that could allow Tehran to regroup. This divergence has become a major sticking point, further complicating Pakistan’s mediation efforts as indirect proposals continue to circulate without bridging the gap between Iran’s immediate priorities and Washington's larger demands.
Second, Tehran is under increasing pressure to open the Strait. Iran has prioritised reopening the Strait of Hormuz as the prerequisite for future negotiations in both its latest proposals. Hard-hit by economic repercussions, Iran is pushing to restore maritime transit as quickly as possible. The US Naval blockade has dealt severe blows to Tehran’s attempts to monetise the transit through the strait, and the economy is severely strained. Since reopening the Strait of Hormuz is tied to Iran accepting key US demands, Tehran faces greater pressure to restart meaningful negotiations with Washington.
