In the news
On 11 May, Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun, in a meeting with the US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa, urged the United States to put pressure on Israel to cease fire and stop home demolitions in south Lebanon.
On 12 May, President Trump rejected the latest peace proposal from Iran, which had the end of Israeli hostilities in Lebanon as a core demand. On the same day, Israel's Channel 12 reported that the Israeli forces were "preparing to expand the ground operation in Lebanon, in light of Hezbollah's ongoing violations," ahead of the third round of US-mediated negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. The Israeli military said on Tuesday that its troops had carried out a days-long raid near the Litani River in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah chief Sheikh Naim Qassem stated that the group will not stop fighting and “will not return to how things were before March 2.” Qassem called for indirect negotiations, stressing that such talks fall under the authority of the Lebanese state, maintaining that Hezbollah’s weapons are an internal Lebanese issue and should not be included in negotiations with Israel.
Separately, Lebanon’s health ministry announced that "380 people, including 22 children and 39 women, have been killed in strikes on Lebanon since the ceasefire came into effect.”
Issues at large
1. The troubled road to a ceasefire
The renewed Israel-Hezbollah clashes, triggered by Hezbollah’s retaliatory strikes on Israel at the onset of the US-Israel war against Iran, shattered the fragile November 2024 ceasefire. Washington mediated two rounds of negotiations in April, a 10-day pause followed by a three-week extension. However, the fundamental points of contention have remained unchanged; Israel demands the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and the dismantling of its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah insists on an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.
These irreconcilable positions have confined the two US-mediated talks in April to little more than temporary halts in fighting, without progress toward resolution. The second round also framed the ceasefire extension as an Israeli “act of goodwill" while explicitly granting Israel the right to preemptive self-defense even based on suspected threats. Further, Hezbollah was excluded from the negotiations. Lebanon has refused ministerial-level engagement with Israel without a comprehensive halt to hostilities, an end to the occupation, and a clear timeline for Israeli withdrawal. As a result, despite the declared ceasefire, the period has seen intensified hostilities and repeated mutual violations, rendering the truce largely nominal.
2. Israel, Hezbollah, and the challenges to the ceasefire
Despite the declared ceasefire, hostilities have been mutual, frequent, and asymmetric. Since the US-brokered ceasefire took effect, Lebanon has repeatedly accused Israel of ceasefire violations and entrenching its military in southern Lebanon. Israeli forces have maintained and expanded positions in southern Lebanon, a “forward defense line” or buffer zone roughly 5–10 kilometers deep; conducted frequent airstrikes and raids, including north of the Litani River; and issued ongoing evacuation orders for dozens of villages. The ceasefire’s ambiguous clauses have enabled Israeli preemptive strikes.
Hezbollah has outright rejected the US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, insisting that any discussion concerning its disarmament is a purely internal Lebanese matter that does not require Israeli involvement. Its exclusion from the talks, despite being the primary military actor, remains a significant obstacle. Without Hezbollah’s buy-in, any agreement reached between Washington, Beirut, and Tel Aviv lacks enforceability.
3. Beirut’s limitations and entrenched Hezbollah influence
Beirut’s limitations in curbing Hezbollah are rooted in deep structural, military, and political weaknesses. The Lebanese Armed Forces are outmatched by Hezbollah in manpower, weaponry, and combat experience and have historically avoided direct confrontation to prevent a civil war. Politically, Hezbollah remains a powerful actor with strong parliamentary representation, a vast social network, and deep roots within the Shia community. Hezbollah has also been successful in delivering social services and expanding its outreach beyond the capacities of the weakened state machinery. Any attempt by the state to disarm the group risks triggering sectarian violence and destabilizing Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance. These constraints have severely impeded Beirut’s repeated attempts to disarm Hezbollah.
In perspective
First, implementing a new ceasefire remains complicated due to a long history of fragile, repeatedly failed truces. Past efforts, including the two short-lived US-mediated rounds in April 2026, have produced only temporary halts rather than lasting resolutions due to core disputes over Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and security guarantees that remain unresolved.
Second, Israel is likely to maintain its military pressure through preemptive strikes and retain its buffer zone in southern Lebanon, refusing full withdrawal until it sees credible progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Third, Hezbollah is anticipated to reject the US-mediated process, continue limited retaliatory attacks and drone operations, rebuild its capabilities quietly, and pressure the Lebanese government to harden its stance.
